Pep Confidential (35 page)

In October 2012 in New York he had chatted with Garry Kasparov about how to attack the adversary in chess and other sports, and Kasparov had told him: ‘You wouldn’t attack in the same way from a mountain top as you would from wide open countryside.’

He had also dined in New York at the end of 2012 with Ferran Adrià, the gastronomic genius who was about to close his restaurant
El Bulli
. The chef told him: ‘Pep, you’re more than a coach, you’re a great innovator.’

The coach had responded: ‘Look Ferran, all I do is look at the footage of our opponents and then try to work out how to demolish them (in actual fact he used a rather more prosaic and somewhat obscene term). All I do is study my arsenal of weapons and pick the ones I need for each occasion.’

In the opinion of Sala i Martín, Guardiola’s natural talent for innovation is a perfect fit with the German spirit of enterprise.

‘I don’t know what the German footballing public would say but I do know many of the people in charge of government and business in this country and they are all innovators and perfectionists. They live to do things right and avoid mistakes. They’re always looking for perfection. It doesn’t matter whether you’re talking about BMW, Siemens or Audi. They value innovative ideas and are always looking for the perfect product, which tallies exactly with Pep’s working style which is all about constant evolution and innovation. And adaptation. Just look at what’s happened here. Pep hasn’t tried to make Bayern play like Barça. Instead, he has adapted to the country and the players. Having said that, of course, there is no relationship between the way the team is playing now and what they were doing on July 1, 2013.’

In order to fully understand how this analysis of Bayern and their opponents is generated, we need to talk to Carles Planchart, who is in charge of Guardiola’s team of analysts and who has worked with the coach since 2007, when he took over at Barça B. Planchart explains the different stages he and his team go through: ‘There are basically two parts to this job: the analysis of your own team and that of your opponent. And they are two entirely different tasks. You’re working in a club that has a game every three days, so you just don’t have time to correct all their mistakes on the pitch. You therefore need to use other methods to communicate the corrections which are impossible to get through to them during a game. If you happen to have a whole week of training sessions then, of course, you can plan a series of exercises to correct the errors. For example, if the defensive line is too high or too deep, or if there’s too much space between the team lines, or there’s a problem dealing with crosses, or if we are defending badly at the front post. Otherwise, the most efficient method is to show them visual images, because that gets the idea across very quickly.’

At the end of every match the analysts agree their conclusions about the play they’ve been watching. They’ll comment on collective and individual action as well as the strategic and tactical side of things. Pep will then work one-to-one with specific players during the week, or decide to save the information for a more appropriate time. Usually, however, strategic and individual adjustments have to be made immediately and these will then inform the analysis of the next game.

This season Planchart’s team has added another dimension. They now analyse each player’s moves as well as looking at the tactical plays. By the end of the match they have a detailed account of all the specific moves each of the Bayern players has made and can judge whether or not they have made the right decisions. They have opened a file on each player in which all his plays are noted in detail. After the match they organise these into categories of play. For example, there will be a list of aerial challenges, headers, dribbles and so on. They can then show each man specific images which help him as an individual or in the context of his position in the team line, or with a view to tactical priorities. All of the footage is filmed with a wide angle, so that they can judge the player and his work in terms of the tactical work of the team, not just how he does individually and technically.

‘Pep always like to see the whole match and we load it on to his computer as soon as the match is over,’ continues Planchart. ‘He might then look at the whole game or watch the particular moves we’ve categorised, either player by player, or by type of move, or under different tactical headings. He’ll also find my notes there, both details from the match and specific things we’ve agreed to watch out for. As well as getting the match broken down like this, Pep likes to review the match himself and he produces his own analysis.’

The other part of this analytical process consists of breaking the rival down, a vital stage in the process of choosing Bayern’s own approach to the game. The German league records every Bundesliga and 2. Bundesliga (second division) match in panoramic format and then makes the footage available to clubs first thing every Monday morning. The Champions League has no equivalent service and it is hugely difficult to tape the matches – so much so that clubs have been known to indulge in trickery such as using a small, hand-held camera to record from the stands, or wearing glasses fitted with a recording device.

It is absolutely vital to record matches in situ in panoramic format so that the action can be studied from a tactical point of view. ‘In Germany, scouting is considered a part of the job and not some form of espionage. The clubs themselves even pass footage to each other. It’s normal practice here,’ Planchart explains.

It is also vital to analyse the opponent in order to select the right playing system, the players you’ll need and even the training exercises they’ll do in the run-up to the match. ‘In Barcelona, whenever we played a Champions League final we would analyse our opponent’s last 12 matches, and for ordinary games we’d watch an average of five or six. We have to take account of the time of year and the type of team our opponents are facing in each game. It makes a difference whether they are taking the initiative or waiting for a chance to counter-attack, if they have a similar playing style to ourselves, etc. If your opponents are going up against teams that are similar to us, that’s fantastic. If not, it’s much less meaningful.’

After analysing the five or six games, Planchart prepares a report for Pep, organised according to concepts and the related moves. It will be a visual presentation, which is much easier to understand, and which will offer three examples of each concept in action. If Pep finds this helpful, he’ll then base his own work around the information presented.

‘Normally as soon as the match is over or first thing the next morning, I give him the report on our next opponent. I work two weeks ahead, but he just concentrates on the next game. Sometimes I’ll give him some of the Champions League information a bit earlier and then, if he has a week without a Wednesday fixture, he can have a look at it a bit earlier than usual. But usually he just works from game to game and only once a match is over can he think about the next one.’

Guardiola has a look at the report first. It covers around 50 or 60 different moves and allows him to get a general idea of how to prepare his next game. Sometimes it even gives him a clear idea of the line-up he’ll need. He can then start to plan the training activities with Torrent and Buenaventura, bearing in mind specific aspects of the game. In the next few days, he’ll do a detailed analysis of their opponents, looking at matches, or parts of matches and drawing his own conclusions. He makes lots of notes and decides on the key ideas he needs to transmit to his men. Sometimes he combines these with concepts developed from previous matches, either because he wants to revisit a particular move or tactical idea or for motivational purposes.

During the match, Planchart and his team also send images of specific moves to the bench where Domènec Torrent receives them on his iPad: ‘Carles sends things he’s noticed himself or specific moves we’ve asked for to my iPad – corner kicks, a type of counter-attack … we ask for it in image form so that Pep can see it almost simultaneously.’

The analysts in the stands have their camera connected to Torrent’s iPad, to the computer in Pep’s office and to the computer in the dressing room, which is connected to a screen on the wall. In real time, Planchart selects and sends those moves he thinks are relevant and saves others for later. Then, five minutes before half-time, he nips down to Pep’s office and files the entire footage of the first half. Obviously they don’t have the same network of connections away from home and Planchart has to take his own computer down to the dressing room.

He usually picks three or four concepts to cover at half-time and will use two or three three-second videos to demonstrate what he means about each one. In total, there will be rapid shots of roughly 10 specific moves. ‘What are we doing at half-time? That’ll be Pep’s first question. He comes into his office and asks, “what are you seeing up there?” Because you get a completely different view of the action from up above and you spot different things. He always listens attentively when I make my report. In fact Pep is always listening, always analysing. He’ll discuss with Torrent how to correct faults or how to change the game. He then makes a note of the few concepts he wants to correct and goes off to the players’ dressing room. With about five or six minutes to go, he’ll call the relevant players over, show them the images and tell them what he wants to change. And then off he goes, back to the bench.’

As Pep said to Ferran Adrià, innovation can sometimes be the most prosaic of processes.

‘All I do is look at footage of our opponents and then try to work out how to demolish them.’

45

‘PERFECT FOOTBALL IS DAMN DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.’

Munich, February 15, 2014

IN EARLY FEBRUARY Mario Götze scores the Allianz Arena’s first goal of 2014. It’s been seven weeks since Bayern played on home turf and in that short time plenty of things have changed. It’s not just that Pep seems different, it’s that his team is functioning differently – quicker, more electric, as if propelled by a new energy despite the never-ending injury list. Thiago has transformed into the emblem of this devastating Bayern.

‘He just needed a great goal like the one he scored in Stuttgart,’ Pep explains. ‘It has helped the fans understand what enormous quality he has. Thiago won’t ever be a prolific scorer but a great footballer? Yes. Just look at what he did back in Dortmund. Three months without a match and he takes over the whole game.’

Thiago’s increased influence stems from reasons beyond the psychological effect of that terrific goal. It’s tactical, too. Guardiola has abandoned the single
pivote
and the false 9. Circumstances have dictated. In various games he has had to use a centre-forward and a second striker just off him, which has meant a little bit more protection down the middle of the pitch. This had its roots in the month of October: every time he put Götze on as a second striker behind Mandžukić he had to alter the positioning of the midfielders and use them in a double
pivote
formation. Then in January, during the epic fightback in the Mercedes Benz Arena in Stuttgart, he needed to do the same thing, with Thiago and Lahm as double
pivote
, so that Pizarro could play off Mandžukić.

Such was the improvement in the team’s dynamic that the coach chose to modify his traditional philosophy. ‘When he is in this position Thiago is in constant contact with the ball, he’s taking one or two touches and he generates fluidity and continuity in our play. Lahm is there to support him, especially in the fluidity of moving the ball. Philipp is terrific and he’ll help make Thiago still better than he is now.’

Torrent puts it like this: ‘The use of the double
pivote
was born out of the disappearance of our false 9. When we have to use a second central striker, linking between him and midfield, we have to close up behind them using two organising midfielders in the middle. The
pivotes
also feel much more secure playing with just one attacking midfielder than with two.’

There has been a lot of team rotation, as many as seven starters changing from one match to another, despite which the football in the Allianz has been spectacular since the turn of the year. Götze and Thiago are flying and Lahm is comfortable at
pivote
. From February 2 the
Schickeria
, the stand where Bayern’s ultras congregate, echoes to cries of: ‘Champions in March!’ and Bayern do indeed blast their way through the next few weeks. From that day until March 8, Bayern win eight out of eight games with an overwhelming goal difference, scoring 33 and conceding just twice. In the Allianz they beat Eintracht Frankfurt 5-0, Freiburg 4-0, and Schalke 5-1. Away from home they defeat Nuremberg 2-0, Hannover 4-0 and Wolfsburg 6-1. In the DFB-Pokal they eliminate Hamburg 5-0 and in the Champions League they take the Emirates Stadium, beating Arsenal 2-0. Bayern have become a demolition machine. Torrent reckons it stems from the winter break. ‘The training camp in Qatar marked an extraordinary change in us. Perhaps because after the holidays the players were refreshed and they’d had time not just to learn but to fully assimilate all that we’d been teaching them. Qatar was like a catalyst. Everything clicked and we became more than the sum of our parts. The team shot forwards because the players fully understood what was happening and why.’

Guardiola seems slightly less satisfied than his assistant. ‘Perfect football is damn difficult to achieve. Heynckes’ Bayern managed it last season, but I still require some time to really learn the Bundesliga and it will also be a while before my players are playing at their absolute maximum.’

Right now those players seem driven by a bottomless energy. The team is unmoved by the fact that Kroos is sent to the bench as a punishment for having reacted badly to being substituted. The collective energy overrides any individual dip. Even when the players go from one side of the stadium to another to acknowledge their fans after yet another win, yet another record, they
run
. They show that they can play direct, vertical football against Frankfurt or use long, continuous ball-possession against Hamburg in the DFB-Pokal, when they own the ball for 84% of the first half. It’s unheard of in Germany but it doesn’t necessarily impress Pep.