Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (60 page)

It is important to point out here that there are a range of theorists who may agree with Butler about the chiasmic relationship between the body and dis.. course, but for whom a theory of signifi does not quite address a basic problem: how do we develop a vocabulary for thinking conceptually about forms of corporeality that, while effi in behavior, do not lend themselves

10
Note that Butler's focus on the formative power of discourse posits a strong critique of a rep- resentational model of language. Her objections are twofold: one, that this model incorrectly pre- supposes that language is anterior to the obj ect it represents, when it in fact constitutes the object as well; two, that this model presumes a relationship of exteriority between language and power, when, in essence, language is not simply a tool for power but is itself a form of power. On these points, see Butler's critique of Bourdieu's representational theory of language in Butler 1997c; also see Butler and Connolly 2000.

1
1
In response to a question posed by William Connolly about the nondiscursive character of bodily practices, Butler argues: "To focus on linguistic practice here and non-- practice there, and to claim that both are important is still not to focus on the relation between them. It is that relation that I think we still do not know how to think. . . . It will not be easy to say that power backs language when one form that power takes is language. Similarly, it will not be possible to look at non-- practices when it turn out that our very way of delimiting and conceptu- alizing the practice depends on the formative power of a certain conceptual discourse. We are in each of these cases caught in a chiasmus relation, one in which the terms to be related also partake of one another, but do not collapse into one another" (Butler and Connolly 2000).

easily to representation, elucidation, and a logic of signs and symbols (see, for example, T. Asad 1993 ; Connolly 1999; Grosz 1994; Massumi 2002). For these scholars, a theory of linguistic signifi does not quite apprehend the power that corporeality commands in the making of subjects and objects. These schol.. ars, of course, speak fr within a long philosophical tradition that extends fr Spinoza to Bergson to Merleau..Ponty and, more recently, to Deleuze.

In light of this ongoing debate, a consideration of the mosque participants' understanding of virtuous action raises yet another set of interesting questions regarding Butler's emphasis on the signifi tory aspects of bodily performa.. tives. As I mentioned earlier, the mosque participants do not understand the body as a sign of the self's interiority but as a means of developing the self's potentiality. ( Potentiality here refers not to a generic human faculty but to the abilities one acquires through specifi kinds of embodied training and knowledge, see p. 147.) As described in chapter 4, the mosque participants are in fact strongly critical of the nationalist..identitarian interpretations of reli.. giosity because these views treat the body primarily as a sign of the self rather than as a means to its formation. One might say that for the mosque partici.. pants, therefore, the body is not apprehensible through its ability to function as a sign but encompasses an entire manner of being and acting in which the body serves as the developable means for its consummation. In light of this, it is important to ask whether a theory of embodied performativity that assumes a theory of linguistic signifi ( as necessary to its articulation) is adequate for analyzing formulations of the body that insist on the inadequacy of the body to fu as a sign?

The fact that the mosque participants treat the body as a medium for, rather than a sign of, the self also has consequences for how subversion or destabi..

lization of norms might operate within such an imaginary Note that the mosque participants regard both
compliance to
and
rebellion against
norms as

dependent upon the teachability of the body-what I called the "docility of the body" in chapter 1 -such that both virtuous and unvirtuous dispositions are neccesarily learn . This means that the possibility for disrupting the

structural stability of norms depends upon
literally
retutoring the body rather

than on destabilizing the referential structure of the sign, or, for that matter, positing an altern representational logic that challenges masculinist readings of feminine corporeality. Thus, anyone interested in reforming this tradition cannot simply assume that resignify Islamic practices and virtues (like modesty or donning the veil) would change the meaning of these prac.. tices for the mosque participants; rather, what is required is a much deeper en.. gagement with the architecture of the self that undergirds a particular mode of living and attachment, of which modesty/veiling are a part.

The recalcitrant character of the structure of orthodox Islamic norms

contrasts dramatically with the politics of resignifi that Butler's formu.. lation of performativity presupposes. Butler argues that the body is knowable through language (even if it is not reducible to language); corporeal politics for her often ensue from those features of signifi ion and reference that destabilize the referential structure. In Butler's conception, insofar as the force of the body is knowable through the system of signifi challenges to the system come from interventions in the signifi features of that system. For example, Butler analyzes the reappropriation of the term "queer," which was historically used as a form of hate speech against lesbians and gays, but which has now come to serve as a positive term of self.. identifi For But.. ler the appropriation of the term "queer" works by redirecting the force of the reiterative structure of homophobic norms and tethering the term to a differ.. ent context of valences, meanings, and histories. What is notable for the pur.. pose of my argument here is that it is a change in the referential structure of the sign that destabilizes the normative meaning and force of the term "queer." In the case of the mosque movement, as I have argued above, a change in the referential structure of the system of signs cannot produce the same effect of destabilization. Any attempt to destabilize the normative struc.. ture must also take into account the specifi of embodied practices and virtues, and the kind of work they perform on the self, recognizing that any transformation of their meaning requires an engagement with the technical and embodied armature through which these practices are attached to the self. My somewhat long foray into Butler's theory of embodied performativity elucidates, I hope, the range of productive questions that are generated through an encounter between philosophical "generality" and ethnographic "particularity"-an encounter that makes clear the constitutive role "exam.. ples" play in the formulation of theoretical concepts. Moreover, an analysis of the historical and cultural particularity of the process of subjectivation reveals not only distinct understandings of the performative subject but also the per.. spectival shifts one needs to take into account when talking about politics of

resistance and subversion.

TO EN DU RE IS TO ENACT?

In this section I would like to return to the exploration of different modalities of agency whose operations escape the logic of resistance and subversion of norms. In what follows I will investigate how suff and survival-two modalities of existence that are often considered to be the antithesis of agency-came to be articulated within the lives of women who live under the pressures of a patriarchal system that requires them to conform to the rigid de..

mands of heterosexual monogamy. Given that these conditions of gender inequality uniformly affect Egyptian women, regardless of their religious per- suasion, I am particularly interested in understanding how a life lived in ac- cordance with Islamic virtues affects a woman's ability to inhabit the structure of patriarchal norms. What resources and capacities does a pious lifes tyle make available to women of the mosque movement, and how do their modes of inhabiting these structures differ from women for whom the resources of survival lie elsewhere? In particular I want to understand the practical and conceptual implications of a religious imaginary in which humans are consid- ered to be only partially responsible for their own actions, versus an imaginary in which humans are regarded as the sole authors of their actions. It is not so much the epistemological repercussions of these different accounts of human action that interest me (cf. Chakrabarty 2000; Hollywood 2004), but how these two accounts affect women's ability to survive within a system of in- equality and to flourish despite its constraints.

In what follows, I will juxtapose an example drawn from the life of a woman who was part of the mosque movement with another taken from the life of a woman who considered herself a "secular Muslim," and who was often critical of the virtues that the mosque participants regard as necessary to the realiza.. tion of their ability to live as Muslims. I want to highlight the strikingly dif.. ferent ways in which these two women dealt with the pressures of being single in a society where heterosexual marriage is regarded as a compulsory norm. Even though it would be customary to consider one of these strategies "more agentival" than the other, I wish to show that such a reading is in fact reduc.. tive of the eff entailed in the learning and practicing of virtues-virtues that might not be palatable to humanist sensibilities but are nonetheless con.. stitutive of agency in important ways.

The fu extent to which single women in Egypt are subjected to the pres.. sure to get married was revealed to me in a conversation with N adia, a woman I had come to know through her work in the mosques. N adia was in her mid- thirties and had been married for a couple of years, but did not have any chil.. dren; she and her husband lived in a small apartment in a lower-- iddle- income neighborhood of Cairo. She taught in a primary school close to her home, and twice a week after work she taught Quranic recitation to young children in the Nafi mosque as part of what she considered her contribution to the ongoing work of dacwa. Afterward, she would often stay to attend the lesson at the mosque delivered by one of the better-- daciyat. Some- times, after the lesson, I would catch a bus back with her and her friends. The ride was long and we would often have
a
chance to chat.

During one of these rides, I observed a conversation between Nadia and her longtime friend lman, who was in her late twenties and who also volunteered

at the mosque. Iman seemed agitated that day and, upon getting on the bus, immediately spoke to Nadia about her dilemma. A male colleague who was married to another woman had apparently approached her to ask her hand in marriage.12 By Egyptian standards Iman was well over the marriageable age. lman was agitated because although the man was very well respected at her place of work and she had always held him in high regard, he already had a first wife. She was confused about what she should do , and was asking Nadia for advice. Much to my surprise, Nadia advised lman to tell this man to ap proach her parents formally to ask for her hand in marriage, and to allow her parents to investigate the man's background in order to ascertain whether he was a suitable match for her.

I was taken aback by this response because I had expected Nadia to tell Iman not to think about this issue any further, since not only had the man broken the rules for proper conduct by approaching Iman directly instead of her parents, but he was also already married. I had come to respect Nadia's ability to uphold rigorous standards of pious behavior: on numerous occasions I had seen her give up opportunities that would have accrued her material and social advantages for the sake of her principles. So a week later, when I was alone with Nadia, I asked her the question that had been bothering me : why did she not tell Iman to cut off any connection with this man?

Nadia seemed a little puzzled and asked me why I thought this was proper advice. When I explained, she said, "But there is nothing wrong in a man ap proaching a woman for her hand in marriage directly as long as his intent is serious and he is not playing with her. This occurred many times even at the time of the Prophet."

I interrupted her and said, "But what about the fact that he is already mar ried?" Nadia looked at me and asked, "You think that she shouldn't consider marriage to an already married man?" I nodded yes. Nadia gave me a long and contemplative look, and said, "I don't know how it is in the United States, but this issue is not that simple here in Egypt
[il,mas "' di mish sahla fi ma�r] .
Mar riage is a very big problem here. A woman who is not married is rejected by the entire society as if she has some disease
[il..mara4 ,
as if she is a thief
[barami] .
It is an issue that is very painful indeed
[hadhahi mas"'ila mu?. jid.. dan , jicUl baqzqi] ."

I asked Nadia what she meant by this. She replied: "If you are unmarried af.. ter the age of say late teens or early twenties-as is the case with !man everyone around you treats you like you have a defect
[al,naq�].
Wherever you go, you are asked, 'Why didn't you get married
[matgawwaztTsh ley] ?'
Everyone knows that you can't offer to marry a man, that you have to wait until a man