Putin's Wars (21 page)

The title of Putin’s programmatic declaration, “Russia on the Verge of the Millennium”
(
Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii
), was up to the challenge.
^[21]
This text must be considered as one of the most elaborated pieces of the Putin
ideology. Although Putin might wish to be seen as a cool, analytical pragmatist, for
whom “ideology” smacked of old-fashioned prejudice, his declaration deserves a closer
look. After having described Russia’s economic woes, Putin wrote, under the heading
“Lessons for Russia,” “the problem is not only economic. This problem is also political
and, I am not afraid of this word, in a certain sense, ideological. To be more precise:
ideal, spiritual, moral.”
^[22]
He then went on to develop, what he called, his “Russian Idea.” The core of this
“Russian Idea” was
consensus.
“The fruitful creative work that our Fatherland [tellingly, Putin wrote fatherland
with a capital F] needs so much, is not possible in a society that is permanently
divided and internally isolated.”
^[23]
Putin denied that he wanted to return to the period after the October Revolution
when consensus was created by “strong-arm methods.” He emphasized that “any consensus
in our society can only be voluntary.” This consensus was vital, “because one of the
main reasons behind our reforms proceeding so slowly and with difficulty, consists
namely of the lack of civil consensus.”
^[24]
However, he continued, “I am against the reintroduction in Russia of an official
state ideology in any form.”
^[25]

So, what should be done? Putin came up with three ingredients for the “Russian Idea”
that were expected to promote this consensus: patriotism, “great power” status (
derzhavnost
), and a strong state (
gosudarstvennichestvo
). Regarding patriotism, he went on to explain,

[T]his is the feeling of pride in one’s Fatherland, its history and great events.
It is the endeavour to make one’s country more beautiful, richer, more powerful, happier.
If these feelings are free from national megalomania and imperial ambitions, there
is nothing blameworthy, conservative, in them. It is the basis of the courage, the
perseverance, the power of the people. If we have lost patriotism, and the national
pride and dignity that go with it, we lose ourselves as a people capable of great
events.
^[26]

Although Putin paid lip service to democratic freedoms, he stated that the “universal
principles of the market economy and democracy” should be “organically integrated
with the realities of Russia,” because “every country, Russia included, is obliged
to seek its own way of modernization.” To adapt the universal principles of democracy
to “the realities of Russia” meant that Putin advocated a Russian
Sonderweg
, a “special course,” implying that these universal principles are in fact
not
universal, but in need to be adapted to the Russian situation. This, in essence,
introduces the theory of “sovereign democracy” that some years later would be developed
by Putin’s spin doctor Vladislav Surkov. This theory, therefore, was, perhaps, not
so original: Surkov was only acting as
his master’s voice
.

Putin’s “Russian Idea” can be summarized as follows: state power, the aggrandizement
of state power, and pride of the citizens in this accumulating state power. The three
pillars are: great power status for the state externally (
derzhavnost
), a strong state internally (
gosudarstvennichestvo
), and patriotism: the pride of the citizen in this external and internal state power.
On the first element, Russia’s great power status, a commentator wrote: “The undemocratic
and even authoritarian nature of
derzhavnost
is self-evident. Foreign and security policy implication of this ideology has been
so far the assertion of Russia’s national interests which in many fields are considered
to be conflicting with those of the West.”
^[27]
On the necessity of a strong state internally, Putin wrote:

Russia will not soon, if ever, become a second edition of, let us say, the U.S.A.
or England, where liberal values have a long historical tradition. In our country
the government, its institutions and structures, have always played an exclusively
important role in the life of the country, the people. A strong government is for
the Russian citizens not an anomaly, but, on the contrary, the source and the guarantee
of order, the initiator and main force of any change.
^[28]

Putin’s ideology, therefore, begins with the state and ends with the state. The ultimate
goal of every Russian citizen should be the aggrandizement of state power and not
the aggrandizement of his or her personal freedom and well-being. Putin’s words remind
us of the words of Nobel Prize Laureate for Literature John Steinbeck, who, after
a visit to the Soviet Union, wrote:

It seems to us that one of the deepest divisions between the Russians and the Americans
or British, is in their feeling toward their governments. The Russians are taught,
and trained, and encouraged to believe that their government is good, that every part
of it is good, and that their job is to carry it forward, to back it up in all ways.
On the other hand, the deep emotional feeling among Americans and British is that
all government is somehow dangerous, that there should be as little government as
possible, that any increase in the power of government is bad, and that existing government
must be watched constantly, watched and criticized to keep it sharp and on its toes.
^[29]

It is telling that Putin defined patriotism as the “endeavor to make one’s country
more beautiful, richer, more powerful, happier”—as if
happiness
can be attributed to a country instead of being the exclusive domain of the human
individuals who inhabit it. It is a clear indication of the
personification
of the state by Putin, for whom the state is the ultimate value, an object of worship
and veneration. By paying lip service to democracy he conceals the fact that his ideal
of a strong state inevitably clashes with the democratic freedoms of the citizens.
He expects Russian citizens not to hamper the expansion of state power by political
dissension (e.g., by voting for political parties that propose an alternative to Putin’s
program). Instead they should remain unified and stand—as one bloc—behind the leader
whose supreme task it is to enhance the power of the state, which is the incarnation
of the mythical Fatherland (with a capital F). Therefore Putin continuously stresses
the necessity of
consensus building
.

How important consensus and patriotism are for him is further clarified in the address
read by him six months later on the occasion of the combined session of the Duma and
the Federation Council.
^[30]
In this text he stressed again “that the growth of society is unthinkable without
consensus on common goals. And these goals are not only material. No less important
are spiritual and moral goals. It is the patriotism, which is characteristic for our
people, the cultural traditions, common historical memory, which strengthen the unity
of Russia.”
^[31]
In Putin’s exaltation of a strong state and in his emphasis on national consensus
building we find a striking resemblance with Mussolini’s Italy. Like Putin, Mussolini
wanted to overcome the internal divisions in the population and to build a national
consensus around himself, Il Duce, who was the incarnation of a unified people. Only
in this way did he think he would be able to build a strong, militarized, and centralized
Italian state. It led in Italy to the suppression of political parties, the abolition
of the free press, the persecution of political adversaries, and the introduction
of a one-party state.

Apart from this emphasis on consensus building and the exaltation of state power,
there is, furthermore, a third ingredient in Putin’s text that reminds one of Mussolini’s
Italy. Two days before his appointment to acting president, Putin said: “Today we
find the key for a
rebirth and resurrection of Russia
in the sphere of government and politics. Russia needs a strong and powerful government
and must have this.”
^[32]
In his address six months later, he spoke of “a new Russia” and “the beginning
of a new spiritual elevation.”
^[33]
Here we clearly recognize the
palingenetic
ingredient of a theory of
national rebirth
, which, according to Roger Griffin, is a fundamental element of fascist ideologies.
^[34]
Curiously enough one can observe a parallel between the positions not only of Putin
and Mussolini, but also of Putin and Stalin. According to Aleksandr Yeliseev, “It
must be said that neither socialism, nor even the state were in themselves values
for him [Stalin]. The leader of the USSR considered them instruments necessary to
guarantee what was most important—national independence. . . . Socialism, in Stalin’s
thinking, had to overcome the class divisions inside the nation and make her monolithic
and unified in face of all possible foreign challenges.”
^[35]
It is easy to recognize here Putin’s
derzhavnost
(great power status) and his stress on internal consensus. In the concept of “sovereign
democracy” we find the same emphasis on national independence.

In 2004 United Russia, the “Presidential Party,” had only one task: to reassure the
reelection of Putin as president. Although it was the Presidential Party, Putin was
not a member. It was a huge bureaucratic apparatus in the service of the president.
The party soon became a victim of its own success. After Putin’s reelection in 2004
there was a great influx of new members—especially from amongst bureaucrats, civil
servants, and regional leaders, who rallied to “the party of power”—just as they had
done before, in Soviet times, when they adhered to the CPSU (though at that time the
CPSU was the only choice). This “CPSU effect” had three consequences:

• First, a majority of the new members was less driven by ideological considerations
  than by career prospects.
  

• Second, the new mass basis made the party ideologically still more nebulous and colorless
  than it already was.
  ^[36]
  

• Third, the influx of new members brought into the party people with different ideas
  and ideological backgrounds, which soon led to a pressure for the formation of “party
  wings.” These problems became more acute in 2008, when Medvedev succeeded Putin as
  president and Putin became prime minister. From that moment it was in Putin’s interest
  to change the “President’s Party” into “the Prime Minister’s Party” or better, into
  “Putin’s Party”
  tout court.
  

In November 2007, some months before the presidential elections of 2008, Putin began
to criticize the party. He said: “Does it [United Russia] look like the ideal political
structure? Of course not. There is still no established ideology, principles for which
the overwhelming majority of the members of this party would be prepared to fight
and to accept its authority.”
^[37]
He added that “it is close to the state. And, as a rule, all kinds of criminals
try to infiltrate into such structures . . . . The goal of these people is not the
welfare of the people, but their personal enrichment. And, of course, by such actions,
they compromise the state and the party.”
^[38]
Putin formulated here two new objectives: first, the need for United Russia to
develop its own ideology, and, second, the need to purge the party of unwanted, “criminal”
elements. Shortly thereafter, on April 15, 2008, Putin accepted the position of chairman
of United Russia. In 2010, however, the announced purge was still waiting to be implemented.
The party membership had not diminished, but had grown from 1,980 million in April
2008 to 2,026 million in May 2010. United Russia had become a huge bureaucratic organization
with 2,598 local divisions, employing 40,000 employees.
^[39]
It was clearly on the way to becoming a clone of the Soviet-era CPSU. However,
the other goal formulated by Putin in 2007: giving United Russia an ideology, was
in full implementation. Marlène Laruelle wrote that

a new wave of Russian nationalism has been emerging that broadly exceeds the influence
of older strains of nationalism, whether founded on Slavophilism, Soviet nostalgia,
or Eurasianist theories . . . .
^[40]
Western observers and political scientists have a tendency to reserve the label
“nationalist” only for small extremist groups or political parties, such as Gennady
Ziuganov’s Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovski’s LDPR. It prevents them from
taking stock of the existence of an ideological continuum that encompasses the entire
Russian political spectrum. Indeed . . . the presidential party United Russia is itself
thoroughly permeated with ideological debates about the nature of the country’s national
identity. Owing to its ability to co-opt doctrinaires, to finance them, and to broadcast
their messages to media and public opinion, it has even become one of the major actors
of the nationalist narrative.
^[41]

United Russia, far from distancing itself from the ultranationalist discourses of
Zhirinovsky’s LDPR and Zyuganov’s Communist Party, had begun to develop its own version
of a “patriotic” ideology. This “ideologization process” had three characteristics:

1. It was related to the formation of “wings” in the party.
   

2. It was led by the Kremlin.
   

3. It was not restricted to pure party politics, but embedded in a broader “Gramscian”
   strategy of securing an overall ideological “hegemony” in Russia.