Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (51 page)

No sooner had the KGB gotten Duggan into an increasingly productive mode than his earlier fears revived that traitors within the Soviet
regime might expose him. He was particularly discombobulated when
Stalin struck at the Red Army in the spring of 1937. Given that Duggan
was then its only State Department source (Salmon having been lost when ties with Lore were cut), the illegal KGB station treated his concerns with great seriousness. Akhmerov met with Borodin to ensure he
was prepared: "`Before the meeting with 19 [Duggan], we carefully
walked Granite [Borodin] through the lead articles in `Pravda' and materials from Central Committee plenums and local party conferences.
Granite was equipped and prepared to discuss with 19 all the questions
that 19 himself touched on."' On 2 July 1937 Borodin reported at length:

"As soon as we met this time, 'ig' [Duggan] announced the following. He can't
make sense of the events taking place in the USSR. He is very troubled by the
exposure of nine former commanders of the RKKA [Red Army] and by the exposure of Trotskyite-Fascist spies in almost every industrial branch and government institution. People he learned to respect have turned out to be traitors to their homeland and to the socialist cause. He can't wrap his mind
around it. How could such prominent people fall into such an abyss? He can't
understand it at all, and the whole thing seems to him `a distant, incomprehensible nightmare.' What would happen to him if there turned out to be a fascist
spy in the institution where his information was being sent? It seems beyond
the realm of possibility, yet two months ago the same thing could have been
said about those nine soldiers. This begs the conclusion that the Soviet Union
is not as solid as had been thought. Its army was not as invincible as others
claimed if such scoundrels had been at its head. Again and again he repeats
that he doesn't understand, that it troubles him and keeps him awake at night.

He admits that he can't be very useful with such an attitude, and he wants
to sever ties with us and try to get involved with the American Comparty, to
help it with its work here. He has an excellent understanding of the situation
in America and could be useful to the party He does not, however, wish to
work for a country where he does not understand what is happening.

"ig" ended this first declaration of his by saying that he can't even be
ioo% certain where his information ultimately ends up. He doesn't want to
cast any aspersions on me as well, and yet-"ig" asks-at this point how can
one be sure that the materials don't ultimately end up in the enemies' hands?

I spoke with "1g" for six hours straight. I told him the history of the struggle between the band of Trotskyites against the party and government. I explained to him the USSR's global position and the implications of the capitalist
encirclement that sends thousands of spies into the Soviet Union, who, naturally, try to penetrate into the most sensitive areas. The state is obligated to expose these traitors and destroy them. There can be no question about that.
The extermination of these traitors only goes to strengthen the nation and its
army immeasurably, and as for weakness, all these events only demonstrate the
weaknesses of fascist intelligence and not, by any means, of the Soviet Union. The country is united as never before around the party and government, and it
is precisely for this reason that the traitors' work was intercepted.

Gradually, "ig" agreed with all of my arguments. I told him that his attitude toward working with us was hardly serious and that he in particular, and
all American liberals in general, would have to decide once and for all whether
they will stand for socialism and progress or cross over into the fascist and reactionary camp. This argument affected him more than all the others. He declared that of course he will remain in the first category and agreed that his
proposal had been poorly thought out. `Let's forget,' said 'ig,"about my temporary weakness and continue our work together; however, if there is another
"purge" in the highest circles of government, I'm afraid I simply won't be able
to continue our work.'

And so we were back at the beginning. I told him that unfortunately our
fascist enemies are not good Christians, as many would think, and will doubtless send their spies and wrongdoers our way. Does that mean they should be
left alone and not destroyed? Only an enemy of the Soviet Union could say
that, not a serious, forward-thinking liberal like "ig." `Yes, of course,' he said,
`they must be caught and destroyed,' but if it touches government circles
again, he can come to only one conclusion, namely that there is something rotten with the whole system if even its leaders become traitors. More arguments
and attempts at persuasion followed. He agreed with everything, but the
whole time I could feel a barely palpable ambivalence. As for his uncertainty
as to where his information ultimately ends up, or will end up, I said that it all
depends on establishing an absolute trust between us. At the moment there
are no proofs I can give him. He doesn't want them anyway, he says, because
he does not suspect me; but supposing even that I was from the other camp, a
proof could be fabricated very easily. No, he does not suspect me; but mainly
he is afraid that his materials, arriving home, will somehow pass through spies
into the enemy's hands, along with the source's name. I assured him that his
name does not appear anywhere, and so forth.

He wanted very much to have a rendezvous arranged between him and
Hede [Massing] .... through whom he had been given our secret meeting
place. He wants to discuss all of his doubts with her, b/c there is an absolute
trust between them. Ultimately, we agreed that "ig" would continue his cooperation and try to rethink his views on current events. I should stress that practically every newspaper, with the obvious exception of the party press, is engaged in a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign of lies and slander. In the front ranks
of this pandemonium stands `NYT' correspondent Harold Denny. I am singling out Denny because in all of `ig's' arguments about the weakness of the
Soviet Union and its army, he continually used facts from Denny's articles. If
every day, every other newspaper prints several articles full of fiction and anti Soviet propaganda, naturally this will influence the thoughts of American liberals. `19' is undoubtedly a victim of this propaganda. Before now he had
never expressed any doubts. The turning point was concurrent with the appearance of a new crop of anti-Soviet articles. `19' is in a fairly isolated position; that is to say on our instructions he has distanced himself from every
liberal and left circle."

A week later Akhmerov reported: "19 [Duggan] stated firmly that he has
decided to continue working with us, having agreed with the arguments
we set forth.... 19 gave a number of materials."50

Laurence Duggan's fears that he could be betrayed by a traitor were
not, as it happens, that remote from reality. The traitor, however, was not
one of the thousands of Soviet officials publicly or secretly tried and executed in the "Moscow trials" that had so upset him. In September 1939
Whittaker Chambers told Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle that
Duggan was a secret Communist and likely involved in espionage. The
path that led Chambers, a former American Communist and GRU agent,
to Berle was a complex one, involving three earlier defectors, Juliet
Poyntz (see chapter 9), Ignace Poretsky, and Walter Krivitsky. All three
played roles in Chambers's decision to defect, but the latter two were also
linked to Duggan.

In July 1937 Poretsky, a senior officer, deserted the KGB and wrote a letter to Stalin denouncing the Soviet leader as a "traitor to the cause of the
working class and socialism" for having instigated the purges and announcing his own support for Stalin's enemy, the exiled Leon Trotsky. Poretsky
(often known by his pseudonym, Ignace Reiss) had never served in the
United States, and his knowledge of KGB operations was thought to deal
mostly with Western Europe. But he had recruited Hede and Paul Massing
and been in contact with them shortly before he deserted. They had introduced him to Noel Field, whom Hede had recruited as a KGB source when
he worked at the U.S. State Department. Poretsky met Field while the latter worked at the League of Nations' headquarters in Switzerland.60

Hede and Paul Massing were back in the United States at the time of
Poretsky's desertion, and Akhmerov checked with them to learn what
Poretsky might know about KGB sources in the United States. In August
he sent Moscow Center the bad news: "`Redhead and Vacek [Hede and
Paul Massing] told me that Raymond [Poretsky] knew about 19 [Duggan] and his wife."' Poretsky had also been contacting KGB sources and
agents he knew in Western Europe and urging them to join him in rebelling against Stalin. Paul Massing offered the opinion that if Poretsky contacted Noel Field unawares, Field might panic. He urged Moscow
Center to send someone to prepare Field. Akhmerov also reminded
Moscow that Field was a close friend of Laurence Duggan, and the two
were in frequent correspondence. He told Moscow: "'It is very important
to keep E. ["Ernst"/Field] on our side. If E. is tarnished as a result of
Raymond's [Poretsky's] exposure, then apparently ig [Duggan] will become frightened and want to sever ties with us."'fi'r

Whether at Akhmerov's prompting or its own initiative, Moscow Center did as he suggested. In 1954 during a debriefing by Hungarian Communist security police Noel Field said that Walter Krivitsky, then his KGB
contact, came to Geneva and told him

that Reiss had become a traitor and that preventive measures must be
taken.... He required me to go with him to Paris in order to discuss my duties. I went with him that very night. He took me to a cafe-I don't remember
the name or address-where he introduced me to a Soviet agent. Following
the introduction Krivitsky left and I did not meet hint again. I don't know the
Soviet man's name. Later, when I went to Moscow, I learned that he was one
of the NKVD's high officials. In fact, he wore the Order of Lenin. He told inc
that they had evidence concerning Reiss's betrayal.... This was very dangerous as Reiss knew many people, and this betrayal could put many people in
danger. He advised me that he had been ordered to protect the connections
known to Reiss from this danger, i.e. to silence him.... He also said that as far
as he knew, Reiss was in Switzerland again, and he was expected to look ine
up. Thus I would be drawn into the operation. He asked nie if I trusted my
wife completely and whether she could also be involved in the operation. Having received my positive answer, he gave inc the task to welcome Reiss amicably and detain him. In the meantime, mny wife or I should inform a person he
would introduce me to, and who would travel to Geneva with me, of Reiss's arrival. After our conversation he introduced me to a young Soviet man called
Max, with whom I was to keep in touch in the future. That very night I went to
Geneva with Max. Having arrived, I introduced hint to niy wife and infbrnied
her about the matter concerning Reiss and the task we had. We arranged with
Max that when Reiss arrives, I would contact him at a certain telephone number using a certain name. We also settled on meeting personally every day.
Reiss didn't show up.62

The reason Poretsky/Reiss didn't approach the Fields was that a KGB
assassination team got to him first. Swiss police found Poretsky beside a
road near Lausanne on 4 September, dead from multiple gunshot
wounds. Moscow Center promptly informed Akhmerov of the outcome: "Raymond [Poretsky] has been liquidated. His wife, so far, has not. She knows
about ig [Duggan] to some extent, and at the moment we are not aware what
steps she will take in the future. For now the danger of ig being exposed
through Raymond's line is significantly diminished. However, this does not
mean by any means that you should observe him and work him over any less
strenuously. The political work with ig needs to become systematic. You
should answer all of ig's perplexing questions exhaustively. Do not leave anything unclear or unaddressed. Always make a note of the questions that interest ig and report them to us.

Who could influence ig? First of all, Redhead and Vacek [Hede and Paul
Massing]. Betty [Vasily Zarubin] will have to orient you regarding the extent to
which they will take this step. Second of all, Ernst [Field]. The latter is wellmannered and impressed a comrade with whom he is connected as a sincere
man, willing to report back about Raymond as soon as the latter turns to him.
It is very likely that Ernst will write about this to Redhead and Vacek, who
connected him with Raymond in the past."h3

Despite the ominous remarks about Elizabeth Poretsky, she was left
unmolested and later wrote a detailed account of her tumultuous life.
Swiss police caught one of the accomplices in the murder of Ignace
Poretsky, but the chief assassin escaped, later to serve in the United States
as a KGB officer working as a TASS correspondent using the name
Vladimir Pravdin. In an autobiography written for the KGB in 1944
Pravdin boasted, "On my own, tracked down and liquidated `Raymond'
[Poretsky]." Moscow went on to tell Akhmerov the following:

"It is possible that Ernst [Field], who corresponds with 1g [Duggan], could
somehow hint at certain facts. Certain caprices will possibly then come from
1g's end, which you will have to overcome. At this point we cannot approach
Ernst about influencing 1g, because 1g is very frightened that Ernst will find
out he works with us. For the time being Ernst has not been tarnished in connection with the business with Raymond [Poretsky], so everything is fine from
that end-at least for the time being.

As for ig's value, it has gone up a great deal in connection with his new position and with the reorganization of internal relations between division chiefs,
and we cannot under any circumstances lose him. It appears that the frequency of the rendezvous will have to be limited to once every two weeks at
first, but for this he is only providing materials to be photographed. The rendezvous where he provides agent materials, on the other hand, should be
made more frequent. In addition, send his agent reports by telegraph immediately, because all of that is exceedingly urgent material."'