Read Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America Online
Authors: Harvey Klehr;John Earl Haynes;Alexander Vassiliev
At the end of April "Miron" again "`expressed dissatisfaction with
the information he was getting and said that to date he [Victor] hadn't
done anything."' Victor again minimized his capabilities and promised to
learn about American views of the USSR. "Miron" responded that he was
"`following the line of least resistance"' and said, given Victor's views, he
"`expects more from him."' The relationship paused once more after
stepped-up American surveillance of Soviet officials in May. October
1953 found Victor again deflecting "Miron's" complaints; now his business
trips to buy cattle for a Hammer family livestock-breeding business were
interfering with giving the diplomat any help. Overwork and a lack of contacts prevented him from being as useful as he would like to be.
Moscow was almost convinced. An analysis at the Center "`persuades us
more and more that his cultivation offers no prospects."' He didn't have
the contacts the Center had assumed, lacked a close relationship with
people like Bedell Smith, and didn't have sustained contact with people
of interest. The cultivation had been far too slow. His refusal to establish
a more covert relationship was a sign he would not work out. The New
York station was ordered to abandon its efforts: "`He should be retained
only as a neutral Contact., 1173
Nonetheless, despite a decade of failure, Moscow Center was not yet
ready to give up. In 1955 it mused: "`At present it is advisable to continue keeping in contact with "S." ["Sonny"/Hammer] in order to secure
acquaintances through him in business circles, among cultural figures, in
the theater world, where he has access through his second wife, an actress. He could be used to infiltrate our people into various clubs, societies, and associations in which representatives of business circles are
members and to acquire through him literature and equipment that we
cannot acquire by legal means.' '174
Victor visited Moscow in July 1956 and saw his son for the first time
in a quarter century (Armasha was now married and had a child). In a
message to the New York station in mid-August Moscow explained that
he had visited the American ambassador, Charles Bohlen, twice and
raised the possibility of registering Armasha as an American by birth but
had not discussed his moving to the United States and had made no effort to meet "Miron" (then back in Moscow). A KGB informant, "Negro,"
assigned to watch Armasha and his mother (he also became Varvara's
lover), reported that Armasha was thrilled with the warmth of his reception by his father, stepmother, and grandmother.7S
While Victor's sudden departure after only a week had prevented the
KGB from meeting him in Moscow, it continued to monitor him in New
York. KGB operative "Ivan" introduced himself in January 1957 as a
friend of "Mixon" and they had five meetings, but "Ivan" concluded that
Victor wanted to use their relationship only as a conduit to send Armasha
letters and packages. As a "`shrewd person,"' Victor might also see his
willingness to chat with KGB agents as a help to Armasha. The New York
station chief reported that he had instructed "Ivan" to gather information on Hammer's acquaintances and what information they could provide if Victor was used "`in the dark"'-that is, without a conscious relationship to the KGB.76
"Ivan" also met Rose Hammer, Victor's mother, who made it clear that the family's goal to bring Armasha to the United States was complicated by his wife and child. Victor had believed that if Armasha could obtain an American passport, the American ambassador could get permission for him to emigrate, but his marriage to an unsuitable woman had
scotched that plan. Rose nurtured the hope that he still might come by
himself; to "Ivan's" comment that he probably loved his wife and such
pressure might be counterproductive, the grandmother reiterated that
they could not allow "their boy to get lost in Russia." It began to dawn on
"Ivan" that the family's pose of support for the USSR was a sham, and
the "`conclusion suggests itself that he [Victor] is using the connection
with us for his own personal motives."' In retaliation, he began to refuse
Victor's pleas to help him send special items to Armasha without going
through parcel agencies. In Moscow Alexander Feklisov, anticipating a
trip Victor planned to Moscow, thought a meeting necessary because
"`the question of his cultivation must be settled."' The New York station
recommended a more overtly threatening approach:
,,if "S." ["Sonny"/ Victor Hammer] does go to Moscow, it might be advisable to
try to put some pressure on him by making use of the consent to work with us
that he gave before the war. (The file obviously contains his signature.) Perhaps the threat of exposure will induce him to cooperate with us in terms of
gathering polit. and econom. information through his numerous acquaintances. The current motivations for "S." to work with us (G.'s ["Gherman"/Ar-
masha Hammer's] presence in the USSR) apparently aren't strong enough. If
you deem such a discussion with "S." inadvisable, then, considering his prolonged uselessness, further contact with him, in our view, should be terminated."
Victor, however, canceled his trip, and in mid-August 1957, Moscow responded to New York that it agreed to end its relationship to Victor. A
Moscow Center evaluation observed that Victor Hammer had
"used the contact with our operative in his own personal interests: to transmit
letters and packages to his son, who lives in the Sov. Union, and to find out
about the opportunities for making money from the sale and purchase of
paintings in the Sov. Union. Moreover, the contacts with high-level people in
the U.S. that "S." ["Sonny"/Victor Hammer] described to Miron proved to be
patently exaggerated.... It became clear that "S." only wants to have a social
relationship with our operative, using it for his own purposes, and isn't interested in establishing a confidential or agent relationship. "S." doesn't have the
necessary agent capabilities and cannot serve as a source of information, and at
the same time he doesn't want to assist our operative in establishing interest ing contacts through him. In light of the foregoing, it has been decided to terminate the contact with "S.," since he is not of interest to Department i of the
PGU."77
Despite that decision, the KGB could not totally give up on Victor
Hammer. When it learned of a possible visit in 1965, it devised a plan to
put listening devices in his car and hotel room, then meet and try to recruit him. If he refused, it would haul out his signed 1931 agreement to
cooperate and pressure him. If he agreed, the KGB wanted his insights
on internal Democratic politics and his willingness "`to covert meetings
with our rep."' The trip, however, was canceled. That fall, a Soviet diplomat and KGB officer met four times with Victor in New York. Once again,
he wanted assistance for his son, who wanted to switch his career from
translator to teacher. Victor noted "'with tears in his eyes that this is his
only child.- In May 1966 another operative wrote another memo concluding that Victor was friendly to the USSR, had fond memories of his
years there, opposed the Vietnam War, was skeptical of American culture, and no longer wanted American citizenship for his son, recognizing
that he wouldn't be happy in America.71
When Victor did visit in 1966, Moscow Center prepared yet another
plan to recruit him, "`conducted on an ideological basis,"' while also employing his old agreement and his affection for his son. He would be told
that he was needed to infiltrate "`our comrade"' into the United States in
some job connected to the fine arts. The report included the protocol for
an operative to contact Hammer back in New York. It also recognized
that as a quid pro quo, Victor would probably "`request assistance in getting his son a job"' as a teacher at a foreign language institute and that
-assistance will be promised him in a positive resolution of this matter., "
But there is no indication that this approach was either made or accepted
or that the KGB made any more efforts to reenroll Victor.79
Victor Hammer died in 1985 after a decade of illness. His will left
everything in trust to his wife, Irene, who was living in a nursing home.
After her death, her daughter and Armasha would inherit the estate,
which had liquid assets of about $700,000, in addition to a $400,000
house. His brother Armand was by this time a wealthy businessman,
heading Occidental Petroleum and having interests in a variety of other
businesses. But as executor of his brother's estate, he filed a claim for
$667,000 he said was owed him for loans he had earlier made to Victor.
To pressure Victor's stepdaughter, he refused to pay nursing home bills
and took steps to sell the house, in which she lived. Irene died before the legal fight was resolved, and Armand settled, giving her daughter the
house and providing Armasha with $zoo,ooo. As he lay mortally ill in November 1990, Armand arranged for Armasha to fly to Los Angeles and
asked him to try to sanitize records in Moscow to make sure that bribes
he had paid to Soviet leaders were not exposed after his death.s0
Armand himself came under renewed suspicion as a Soviet agent by
the CIA in the early 196os. Anatoly Golytsin, a KGB officer, defected in
December 1961; during his lengthy debriefing, he recalled someone
dubbed "Capitalist Prince," whom the KGB had recruited in the 1920S
and reactivated in the late 1950s. Golytsin did not know his real name
but provided four clues: he was the son of an American millionaire, had
come to Russia during the 19zos, had gone back to the United States in
the 1930s, and had left a son behind in Russia, whom the KGB had used
as leverage. James Angleton, chief of counterintelligence, concluded that
Armand Hammer fit the bill of particulars. There is, however, nothing in
the documents recorded in Vassiliev's notebooks suggesting that the KGB
recruited Armand. For example, a KGB memo stated of Armand:
"In early 1861 he visited the Sov. Union as a tourist. On instructions from the
secretary of commerce in the Kennedy adorn. he conducted unofficial talks
about expanding trade between the U.S. and the USSR. He was received by
the leaders of the Sov. Govt. He made positive comments about his meeting
with the Sov. leaders. While he was in M. [Moscow] did sightseeing around
the city with his spouse and visited the Sacco and Vanzetti factory, where he
met with workers who had started working under him. He was astonished by
the growth in labor productivity. He repeatedly commented that the trip to
the USSR made a big impression on him, and the achievements by Soviet people are enormous. While he engages in big business, he didn't shrink from carrying out small-scale operations. For example, when returning from the USSR
in 1861 he took 18 this of black caviar with him, saying that he would be able
to profit with them."
As for Golytsin's "Capitalist Prince," it is more probable that Golytsin had
heard a partial account of the KGB's 193os enlistment of Victor and the
futile efforts to reactivate him, and Angleton confused Victor with Armand. (Possibly contributing to Angleton's confusion, Armand, as part of
the family's effort to extract Armasha from the USSR in 1942, had listed
him as his son on some documents.)"
Whatever benefits it got from its business dealings with Armand
Hammer or its covert connections with the Hammers in the 192os, Soviet intelligence failed in its efforts to persuade or coerce Victor Hammer into providing it with information. He, on the other hand, managed to
cajole the KGB into facilitating his communications and assistance to his
son and former wife, while artfully avoiding its entreaties to be of assistance.
Not every celebrity recruit became a KGB obsession. The KGB's illegal
station in the United States ceased to exist at the end of 1939, when its
chief (and last officer), Iskhak Akhmerov, returned to Moscow. In both
1940 and 1941 Moscow Center planned for a revived illegal station to
take on a recruited but as yet unexploited agent with the cover name "Author." The 1940 plan described "Author" as a source who "has given his
consent to work with us" but added that the new station needed to study
him to determine his "practical use." A 1941 review of the status of KGB
operations in the United States described "Author" as "a millionaire.
Chairman of the Society of Friends of the Sov. Union. Recruited in
Moscow. He was not passed over to the station. Could be a talent-spotting agent. "82
While documents in Vassiliev's notebooks do not provide a real name
for "Author," the description fits only one man: Corliss Lamont. Lamont
had a lengthy and controversial career as an advocate for radicalism and
sympathy for the USSR. Born in 1902 in New Jersey, he grew up in privilege as the son of Wall Street titan Thomas Lamont, a partner and later
chairman of J. P. Morgan. Educated at Phillips Exeter and Harvard, he
attended graduate school at Columbia University, earning his PhD under
philosopher John Dewey. He visited the Soviet Union in 1932 and was
impressed and enthralled. In 1934, however, he told Max Eastman that
he was a "Truth Communist," in contrast to those members of Communist parties who accepted Stalin's official pronouncements.83
Within a few years, however, Lamont had changed his mind, publicly
defending the purge trials, denouncing Trotsky and his defenders, and
calling on liberals to support Stalin and his foreign policy. It was after this
shift in Lamont's views that he was recruited as a KGB agent, likely on a
visit to Moscow in the late 1930s. But there is no evidence that the recruitment led to an active relationship in the United States. The 1941
note about "Author"/Lamont, which states he was "not passed over to the
station," indicated that Moscow Center had never authorized the New
York legal station to establish liaison with him, and the 1940 and 1941
plans to have a revived illegal station establish contact had been aborted. There is no reference to "Author"/Lamont after 1941. When the cover
name appeared again in KGB documents and cables in 1944 and 1945,
it designated Vladimir Morkovin, an engineer working for Bell Aircraft
(see chapter 6).