Tank Tracks to Rangoon (34 page)

7th Indian Division continued to push south along the river, the oil town of Chauk being entered unopposed on 18th April. Meanwhile, 20th Division had been advancing south-west from Meiktila, parallel with 7th Division, and by this time was slightly
ahead of its neighbour. The divisional commander therefore decided to send a brigade, plus the whole of 150 Regiment RAC, off to the west to seize the important road junction of Magwe, so isolating all enemy forces contesting the advance of 7th Division.

The advance guard of this force, consisting of 150 Regiment and a Dogra battalion, encountered little opposition from the Jif troops along the way, and secured its primary objectives without difficulty. The next day, 19th April, 150 Regiment treated the defenders of Magwe to a full dress regimental attack, going in A right, C left and B in reserve, storming its way through the town in a bloodless victory and shooting up enemy boats trying to escape across the river. Large numbers of Jifs were captured, and caused some embarrassment by trying to embrace their fellow countrymen.
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The following day the Carabiniers’ B Squadron assisted 33 Brigade’s capture of Yenaungyaung, Burma’s principal oil town. The course of the battle is described by Colonel J. M. Ashton, the Carabiniers’ second-in-command at the time.

Here you had to ascend a steep hill from the Pin Chaung. This hill was secured on the evening of the 20th against considerable opposition. Owing to the country only one troop of tanks was used. The road up the hillside was a headache for the troop leader, Lt Sourbutts. First he came to a road block of bulldozers. Finding a way round entailed a dismounted recce under close sniper-fire. Having negotiated this he came to an area where the Jap had buried open barrels full of petrol all down the sides of the road, spaced about five yards from each other. At the top of the line there was a road block of further barrels. The whole ‘Brock’s Benefit’ was now touched off, the entire road for a considerable distance appearing to be on fire. Once again the troop leader had to get out and find a way round.

Watching as I was from the high ground north of the chaung, this was a very picturesque battle. The red sandstone hill in the evening sun, the oil derricks along the sky line and the three tanks creeping up the slope. They would come into line and fire with all they had got for two or three minutes. You could see the infantry (The Queen’s) working forward all the time and rushing positions as the tanks ceased firing. In this way they worked their way up that long hill and by 1700 hours a company had been established on the high ground.

Next day the remainder of the very rambling town of
Yenaungyaung was captured with great quantities of oil well machinery, enemy vehicles and some guns.

On 22nd April A Squadron pushed down the road and effected a junction with 20th Division’s troops in Magwe. Both squadrons then moved east to Taungdwingyi, and came under command of 20th Division, which continued to advance with another left hook, this time at Allanmyo.

Here the Japanese made a determined stand, and 4/10th Gurkhas, with A Squadron in support, had a hard fight throughout 28th April, capturing the north end of the town. One Lee had been knocked out by a 47-mm anti-tank gun, in exchange for the capture of the 47-mm and two 75-mm guns, and a body count of 100. The enemy evacuated the remainder of the town during the night.

Whilst Allanmyo was being stormed, a strange shape had come lumbering into the Carabiniers’ regimental leaguer. A wealth of road-wheels, a deep hull slightly reminiscent of World War I, sponson escape hatches, and a 75-mm gun mounted in a turret which appeared one size too small for the rest of the vehicle, identified it as a member of the genus British Infantry Tank Mark IV, commonly known as the Churchill. It had arrived for field trials, and the Carabiniers must have felt that it had arrived very much at the wrong time and in the wrong place, for its principal vices and virtues (low speed, heavy armour and a matchless climbing ability) would have been better employed at Imphal rather than during a dash of several hundred miles to Rangoon.

After Allanmyo, A Squadron continued the advance southwards towards Prome in company with 100 Brigade, fighting two sharp actions at Byetgyi Chaung and Palo. Ominously it had now begun to rain heavily, and the chaungs became more and more numerous, filling slowly and causing more delay than the Japanese.

On 2nd May, Lt-Colonel F. J. S. Whetstone, commanding the Carabiniers, was given the task of seizing Prome, using a fast moving group consisting of both his squadrons, A Squadron PAVO, a Gurkha battalion and artillery. This was accomplished the following day, without loss, the enemy having fled.

‘After entering Prome during the evening, driving around and finding it a ghost town, unoccupied and undefended, we harboured in an open space astride the road south of it to prevent
any recce or re-entry by the Japs. We were highly amused the next morning to find the leading infantry regiment, who had been following us the previous day, entering the place in battle order being filmed by newsreel reporters as “capturing the important town of Prome—the first (!) troops to enter it since the British evacuation.” There was no mention of PAVO, but by that time my leading troop was miles away down the Rangoon road!’
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33 Corps’ advance had, of course, been covered by advance and flank guards provided by PAVO and the 7th Light Cavalry squadron, sometimes working together, pushing along minor tracks to the east when they were not out ahead of the main body. The 7th’s C Squadron were very heavily engaged during the week prior to the capture of Prome, a week which began badly for them with the loss of their energetic and able commander, Alister Campbell, who was crushed when his tank overturned whilst negotiating a diversion round a blown bridge. Campbell, who had been awarded a DSO and the MC and bar since he joined the regiment at Imphal, died five months later as a result of his injuries. Command was at once assumed by Captain Jemmet, and the squadron continued to fight with its accustomed panache.

The next day the advance continued until heavy opposition was met from 47-mm and 75-mm anti-tank guns. These were taken on by No 1 Troop, Robb’s. As his tank crossed the crest it was penetrated by a 47-mm shell, killing both him and his operator. The driver, L/Dafadar Judger Singh, was hit in the head and blinded by blood. The tank, out of control, plunged down a bank, from where, with the help of smoke from the PAVO mortars, Robb and Dfr Bishen Singh were got out. At about the same time Jemadar Kirpal Singh’s tank was hit three times by the 47-mm gun, killing the operator Sowar Chhota Singh, and wounding the rest of the crew. Chhota Jemmet and Sowar Nanu Singh between them directed artillery fire onto this gun and caused it to be knocked out.

The next day was spent reorganizing, as in the last three days the squadron had lost in killed and wounded six tank commanders, including the squadron commander, and three tanks.

Not a whit dismayed they continued on the 29th as advance guard of 100 brigade with only three troops, commanded by Frank Hand, Jemadar Kartar Singh and Risaldar Hazara Singh, who although not supposed to get into a tank on account of the wound in his head, came up from the B Echelon. This was to prove one of the most successful days the squadron had, as during some very fierce fighting they accounted for at least sixty enemy, two 75-mm
guns and three lorries for the loss of only two wounded, of which one remained on duty.

This was to be C Squadron’s last battle, for their services were not required again by 33 Corps, and they enjoyed a well earned rest in Prome. Meanwhile, the Carabiniers’ B Squadron had pushed on south from Prome through torrential rain, reaching Inma on 4th May. They had covered 475 miles in thirty-six days since leaving Mandalay, and had only 150 to go before reaching Rangoon.

Suddenly, they were ordered to stop. They affected deafness, and were told again. They argued that given sufficient bridging aid they could be in Rangoon in three days. They were told to hold their ground, and were naturally furious.

The reason for this apparently meaningless order was that 26th Indian Division, accompanied by A Squadron 19th Lancers, had made an unopposed landing in the south, and had captured Rangoon. As there were now more Japanese
behind
33 Corps’ spearhead than there were ahead of it, and since there was no further need for maximum speed, it had been decided that some time should be spent tidying up.

This was particularly true of the west bank of the Irrawaddy, which was being cleared by two brigades of 7th Indian Division. Here, the enemy was in better shape, and consisted largely of troops withdrawing from the Arakan through the An Pass. Whilst they had received a mauling from 15 Corps, they had not had the tremendous physical and psychological punishment received by their comrades involved in the Meiktila and Mandalay battles, and were still full of fight.

The Carabiniers’ C Squadron, released from its duties at Mount Popa, had been rafted across the river north of Yenaungyaung during the last days of April. Moving south with 89 Brigade, the squadron cut the road south of Salin, and then advanced a further forty miles to Singaung, opposite Magwe, which was captured on 28th April. Here an enemy Type 95 tank was knocked out, and two more captured.

Two days later C Squadron was leading a column which had Pyawbwe
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as its objective. The column was checked by fire, and while the infantry went to ground, Major Dimsdale despatched Lt Shewell’s troop round to the right to put in a flank attack. Whilst Shewell was feeling his way round, Dimsdale
climbed out to speak to the infantry, and had only just done so when his tank was hit at a range of less than 200 yards by a 105-mm gun. He was standing on the rear decking when the shell struck, and was badly injured, a further member of the crew being killed.

Meanwhile, Shewell had emerged from the jungle almost on top of the 105 mm, and killed the crew with his Brownings. However, the 105 mm was covered in turn by a 75 mm which put a round into Shewell’s own tank. Although the vehicle was filling with smoke and gave every indication of burning, Shewell remained aboard and only gave the order to abandon after he had knocked out the 75 mm as well.

Shewell’s remaining tanks withdrew, and Lt Shepley’s troop was sent up to replace it. Shepley arrived to find that Shewell’s tank had not caught fire after all, and that, moreover, it now had a Japanese crew, who were busy firing the Browning. His first task, therefore, was to knock out the vehicle once and for all, which he accomplished with his own 75 mm.

After two more enemy guns had been destroyed, the advance continued, and Pyawbwe was entered on 1st May, another Lee being lost to a 75 mm which held its fire until the tank was less than fifty yards distant.

The country was now becoming hilly and broken, and the going more difficult. 5th May found Shepley’s troop harboured with a Gurkha battalion in a saucer surrounded by hills. The enemy was observed digging in on two hills overlooking the harbour, and the tanks made an attempt to shift them, which was only partially successful, and resulted in the loss of one tank.

Next day, Shepley was detailed to deal with further Japanese positions overlooking the harbour, and climbed a hill at the rear to get a better shot, getting his remaining tank to knock down trees on the forward slope, so clearing his Une of vision.

‘At 0830 Lt Shepley opened fire with 75-mm AP as a safety precaution against prematures,
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and then used 75-mm HE. An enemy gun immediately replied, the round falling short of his tank by some ten yards…. The four other tank commanders were positioned on the lower slopes and consequently the enemy
gun was hull down to them. The tank v gun duel lasted fully twenty minutes and towards the end it was noticed that Shepley was firing bursts of 200 or more from his co-ax, which suggested he was on target, but finally his tank received a direct hit and blew up; none of the crew escaped.’

Shepley’s tank had been engaging one of the war’s best tank-killers—a captured British 25-pounder. His courage in sticking it out rather than reversing back over the crest was duly noted by the infantry, who later cleared the enemy from the hills. This was C Squadron’s last action, and as the country had become impossible, they were released and moved to Singu, crossing the river to Magwe, and driving to Prome.

Meanwhile, 33 Corps had resumed its advance on Rangoon. There was little opposition. B Squadron was held up for a while at Minhla Chaung, but by 12th May the enemy had abandoned the position, leaving some guns behind. By the 15th Tharrawaddy had been taken, and at Milestone 60 from Rangoon the same day Major Boyd’s PAVO squadron met the leading Shermans of 19th Lancers, who had not fired a shot since landing. To celebrate the junction of 15 and 33 Corps, a 19th Lancer troop joined the Carabiniers’ A Squadron in an attack on a village east of Milestone 60 where enemy tanks had been reported, and was rewarded with the capture of a Type 95 in running order.

So ended 33 Corps’ advance along Sum’s subsidiary axis. It had been completely successful, and the armour had been used as divisional advance guards, providing superiority at the point of contact, and employing its mobility to turn the enemy’s positions on a number of occasions. Considering that it had fewer divisions and less armour than 4 Corps, it had achieved a remarkable feat of arms, and it is a pity that it is not as well known as 4 Corps’ own advance on Rangoon.

The essential difference between the two Corps’ use of armour was that whilst 33 Corps used its tanks to attain divisional objectives, in 4 Corps the tanks were concentrated and used as the spearhead of the entire Corps, thrusting deep into the enemy’s body, the shaft of the spear being the infantry divisions which followed behind.

It had been deduced, correctly, that the Japanese were basing their defensive front on Pyawbwe, and 4 Corps’ primary task was, therefore, the capture of this town. The plan was for two 17th Division’s brigades, 48 and 99, to attack respectively from the north and north-east, supported by the Royal Deccan Horse, whilst an armoured column, known as ‘Claudcol’, made a wide right hook to the west, cut the road south of Pyawbwe, and attacked northwards into the town.