Tecumseh and Brock (33 page)

Madison and Monroe returned to Washington on August 28. With a British naval squadron at Alexandria, just across the Potomac, the American political leadership had reason to fear a second assault on the capital. The next evening, the president rode his horse over to the lodgings of Secretary of War John Armstrong. Earlier that day, Madison had been warned in the strongest possible terms by a militia general that his officers would not allow Armstrong, by then hated in the capital, to supervise them. In his meeting with Armstrong, the president said frankly that the British capture of the capital had ignited “violent prejudices” in the hearts of many against both of them. In light of the anger of the soldiers, Madison told Armstrong that it would be wise for the secretary to “have nothing to do with them.”
41

Ever haughty, Armstrong refused to shoulder any blame for the debacle. Although he had repeatedly made the case that the target of the British invasion was not Washington, he lashed out at his critics. To Madison's surprise, instead of agreeing to a temporary absence, the secretary of war offered his resignation, insisting all the while that he had done nothing wrong.

This was too much, even for the gentlemanly Madison, who told his colleague that he had failed to foresee the threat to the capital and all of the consequences that flowed from its capture. Earlier, Armstrong had suggested that he might go home to his family in New York. The president ended the tense meeting by saying that he would have no objection if Armstrong followed through on the suggestion. The next morning, Armstrong sent a missive to Madison announcing that he was leaving for New York.

A few days later, Armstrong sent a letter to the
Baltimore Patriot
that made the case for his actions during the siege of Washington. He ended the letter with a denunciation of the troops who had fled from the battlefield. “It is obvious,” he declared, “that if all the troops assembled at Bladensburg had been faithful to themselves and to their country, the enemy would have been beaten and the capital saved.”
42

While the British forces' lightning attack on Washington was underway, their naval assault on the Potomac was proceeding according to plan. Captain Gordon's ships managed to reduce Fort Warburton and then continued upstream, where they forced the humiliating capture of Alexandria. Having been beseeched by the town's mayor and other notables to spare the municipality, Gordon issued an ultimatum. While a couple of demands were struck off the list as impractical, the town leaders pledged to hand over munitions, tobacco, flour, and cotton.

The British held on to Alexandria, plundering the town for the goods on the list, until September 3, when they finally withdrew. Gordon was concerned about American threats vowing that his return voyage down the Potomac would be a living hell.
43
Rumours that the Americans were setting up ambushes to strike Gordon's ships as they navigated narrow stretches of the river were not ill founded. In the end, the Americans did manage a few attacks, even doing some damage to the vessels and wounding and killing a few British sailors.
44
But Gordon's fleet emerged largely unscathed at the end of the twenty-three-day sally. Many Americans were disgusted that Alexandria had offered no resistance to the invaders. Dolley Madison went so far as to tell friends that letting Alexandria burn would have been preferable to such a humiliating surrender.
45

Baltimore, America's third largest city and a key commercial port, was the next obvious target for the British. When they learned the fate of the capital, many Baltimore residents were alarmed and pessimistic about what lay in store for them. Under the leadership of the mayor, a Committee of Vigilance and Safety was formed that included representatives from Baltimore's wards and precincts. Its job was to counter defeatism, prevent loose talk, and look out for suspicious strangers.

Hesitation on the part of the British proved costly. Cochrane, the man in charge, was skeptical of Cockburn's instinctive response to assault Baltimore. Indeed, Cockburn's squadron had just set sail for Bermuda when a message from Cochrane recalled him. After a week of reflection on the matter, Cochrane had decided that the British would proceed with an attack on Baltimore.

When the British fleet sailed north en route for Baltimore, it passed before the eyes of the residents of Annapolis. Panic ensued in the old town that had briefly served as the capital of the United States. The ships sailed up the bay and anchored twenty-two kilometres southeast of Baltimore, at the mouth of the Patapsco River.

During the early hours of September 12, landing boats conveyed the soldiers ashore. By 7:00 a.m. about five thousand men had
disembarked at North Point, taking with them the horses needed
to pull eight cannon, including two howitzers. The British plan was to
defeat the American forces in a battle near North Point and then to
swing around and take Baltimore from the north.
46

Ross and Cockburn led the troops, with Ross in command of the forty-five hundred soldiers and the admiral leading six hundred seamen and Royal and Colonial Marines. Leading a party of about fifty men ahead of the main force, Ross and Cockburn ran without warning into a screen of American soldiers, who had been deployed to warn of the enemy's approach. U.S. cavalry and riflemen were directly in the path of the British commanders and their troops.

To frighten the Americans into believing the whole British force was upon them, the commanders and their small party charged and drove off the soldiers. In the brief melee, however, General Ross was shot and severely wounded. Two hours later, he died.
47
The death of the general, who was so highly regarded by his troops, had a dramatic effect on the critical events of the next twenty-four hours.

With Ross gone, command of the British troops passed to Colonel Arthur Brooke. The new commander led his troops toward the main American line, where three thousand men were deployed. With the two sides facing each other, most of the British soldiers calmly lay down to eat their lunch while sections of the 21st Fusiliers and Royal Marines launched an attack on the enemy's left flank. Lunch over, the British attacked along the whole American line. Following several exchanges of fierce volleys, the Americans broke and fled. The British won the engagement in less than half an hour.

Twenty-four Americans were killed, 139 were wounded, and 50 were taken prisoner. The British casualties numbered 46 dead (including General Ross) and 295 wounded.
48

The British managed to win the battle that followed the death of General Ross. How they would fare under less seasoned leadership in the days to come was yet to be determined.

The morning after their victory at North Point, the British advanced to within 2.4 kilometres of Baltimore while their ships began the bombardment of Fort McHenry. Brooke had gone ahead of the main body of his troops to reconnoiter the defences the Americans had assembled around the northern approaches to Baltimore. British intelligence had concluded, quite accurately, that the Americans had about fifteen thousand men in position to protect the city. To mount an assault on Baltimore, Brooke would need ammunition and rations, including rum, to be sent to his lines from the HMS
Seahorse
. While Brooke was considering his options, the navy launched their attack on Fort McHenry. The British sent a squadron of seventeen vessels — frigates, sloops, schooners, bomb boats, and a rocket ship — into the Patapsco River. Admiral Cochrane took personal charge of the attack from the deck of the light frigate
Surprize
.
49

The Americans had previously sunk twenty-four ships in the waters between Fort McHenry and Lazaretto Point to prevent the British ships from sailing in to make a direct assault. Major George Armistead commanded the one thousand soldiers guarding the fort.

Initially, the British ships were positioned just under 4.8 kilometres from Fort McHenry, out of range of the fort's guns. Congreve
rockets were launched from the
Erebus
but did little damage. In their
wake came a bombardment opened up by two frigates. When their initial volleys fell short into the water, the ships sailed forward into range. In response, Major Armistead ordered his gunners to fire their 24-pounders and long-range 42-pounders at the ships, which forced the frigates to shift back out of range.

Then the British bomb vessels sailed in and launched their own barrage. When the U.S. defenders replied, their cannonballs fell short of the targets. The British could now assail the fort at will.
50
While the British guns could fire far enough for their shots to hit Fort McHenry, the bomb vessels could not close in without making themselves choice targets for the fort's gunners.

The long-range shelling of Fort McHenry went on for hours. Over the course of the battle, Major Armistead estimated that between fifteen hundred and eighteen hundred 10- and 13-inch shells were fired. About four hundred struck within the walls of Fort McHenry, in the process killing four of the defenders and wounding twenty-four.
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While their gunners shelled the fort, the British commanders considered their options. Characteristically, Cockburn favoured going ahead with an assault on Baltimore, while Brooke had other views. He was no Ross. “If I took the place,” he wrote in his diary, “I should have been the greatest man in England. If I lost, my military character was gone for ever.” He was prepared to attack, but only if his ground assault could be reinforced by additional troops from the British ships.

Admiral Cochrane, who was already thinking ahead to an attack on New Orleans, had instructed his subordinates not to press on against Baltimore “unless positively certain of success.”
52
When Brooke received a dispatch informing him that Cochrane had decided not to contribute to the attack on the city — “It is impossible for the ships to render you any assistance” — Brooke concluded that he could not proceed on his own.
53
His hopes of commanding British troops in a glorious victory were dashed.

While the commanders were still deciding what to do, twelve hundred Royal Marines were undertaking a diversionary attack on Fort Covington, located on the far side of the peninsula, near Fort McHenry. The plan was for boats to carry the force in stealth up the Patapsco so they could execute a surprise attack simultaneously with the shelling of Fort McHenry. But the American defenders detected the coming assault and opened fire on the marines with guns based in Fort Covington and Battery Babcock. Royal Navy Lieutenant Charles Napier, who was in command of the operation, decided to call off the assault at about 2:00 a.m. He pulled back the marines, whose boats were under a heavy barrage. As the sun rose, the dead bodies of marines could be seen floating in the river.
54

On September 15, the British forces pulled back from their positions, boarded their boats, and returned to their ships. Cochrane was preoccupied with the coming British assault on the port city at the mouth of the Mississippi, a campaign that would deliver a further blow to the commerce of the United States. The admiral knew that more British troops were on their way across the Atlantic. On September 19, his forces set sail for Halifax, where they would be refitted and prepared for the later descent on New Orleans. Cochrane meantime had dispatched Cockburn and a part of the fleet to blockade the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. The intention was to draw American forces away from the defence of New Orleans, the real target.
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For the Americans, the British assault on Baltimore and Fort McHenry took on a meaning that would be remembered long after the battles were waged. Francis Scott Key, a Baltimore lawyer, watched the bombardment of Fort McHenry from the vantage point of a truce ship. Days earlier, Key had paid a visit to the British commander, Admiral Cochrane, to seek the release of William Beanes, a medical doctor from Maryland who was a personal friend of U.S. President James Madison. Key went in the company of John Skinner, a United States agent for the release of prisoners. The two sailed on a sloop sporting a white flag of truce to make contact with the British fleet.

Skinner and Key were welcomed on board Cochrane's flagship, HMS
Tonnant
. But they were then not allowed to leave with Dr. Beanes until the coming engagement against Baltimore was complete. The two were invited to join the British officers for dinner. Cochrane informed his American guests that they would have to be held aboard the frigate
Surprize
, which was commanded by Cochrane's son. Even though they were quartered on the smaller vessel, the Americans continued to have dinner each evening with the British officers. In a letter he wrote three weeks later, Key expressed his feelings about those with whom he had spent time: “Never was a
man more disappointed in his expectations than I have been as to the
character of British officers. With some exceptions they appeared to be illiberal, ignorant and vulgar, seem filled with a spirit of malignity against everything American.”
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Growing weary of being held by the British, Skinner eventually managed to convince Cochrane to let the Americans return to their own sloop, where they were to be guarded by British sailors and marines until the battle was over. Throughout the night when Fort McHenry was shelled, Skinner and Key remained on deck, anxiously awaiting the outcome of the encounter. At dawn, as the famous story recounts, the two men looked toward the fort to make out which flag flew above it, and Key spotted the huge star-spangled banner above the ramparts. As he later related the moment to his brother-in-law, Roger Taney, “Our flag was still there!”