Terror in the Balkans (107 page)

weapons.38 Granted, the Partisans were retrieving some of their weapons

themselves, some among their number would have been unarmed in any

case, and the fi gures for Partisan dead were subject to other distortions

also. Yet this was still the kind of massive shortfall that had hundreds

of noncombatant deaths written all over it. Such shortfalls in 1943 raise

even more suspicion than they would have done in previous years. For

the increasingly professionalized and militarized Partisans of this period

were much less likely than their predecessors to have allowed substan-

dard Axis troops to slaughter them in such numbers.

224
terror in the balk ans

If it had already been apparent during 1942 that German troops in the

NDH were conducting themselves ever more brutally, it was more appar-

ent still in early 1943. This was irrespective of whether those troops were

German themselves or, in the 369th’s case, German-led. Granted, high-

level commanders stipulated that persons taken in White I were not to be

shot immediately, but placed in a hostage reserve. But the operation still

produced a massive contrast between the number of persons shot and

the number of weapons seized. Women, children, and deserters were, it

seems clear, frequently being killed for the troops’ convenience.

The legacy of ruthless decades-old counterinsurgency doctrine must

take much of the blame for this. So too must the hardening effect of

National Socialist ideological indoctrination—even if said ideology, and

said doctrine, were being conveyed within the 369th to Croatian troops

by German- or Austrian-born offi cers and NCOs. The conditions the

troops faced played a role also. Among other things, soldiers now felt

insecure even in those Muslim or Croatian areas in which they had pre-

viously felt safe. And it is probably not too outrageous to suggest that,

fi ghting as they were in a region that by now was essentially lawless, and

seeing what Yugoslavs were capable of doing to each another, many of the

369th’s junior German offi cers and NCOs would have had fewer qualms

about behaving similarly and encouraging their troops likewise.39 Many

of their Croatian rank and fi le, of course, would have had fewer qualms

still. Seeking to fully explain events of the kind Frank Deakin describes,

however, should not detract from their harrowing nature.

But, as before, not all divisions were behaving as brutally as others. In

late 1942, such restraint as the 718th Infantry Division had shown earlier

that year had been supplanted by a gruesome lapse during its operations

around Jajce. But in early 1943 it returned to something approaching

its earlier form, form that contrasted markedly with the 369th Infantry

Division’s. The 718th’s fi les for early 1943 do not contain ruthless direc-

tives of the sort which the 369th was so fond of issuing; if anything, they

contain the opposite. On February 16, for instance, the 718th’s divisional

command decreed that “it is understandable that the soldier should be

able to obtain extra provisions in the form of plundered livestock. But

The Devil’s Division
225

it has been established that some livestock have been slaughtered, one

piece of meat taken, and the livestock left in the road. This is plunder and

squandering to the detriment both of our own homeland and of the local

land.”40 The same order, mindful perhaps of the slaughter the division’s

troops had infl icted during the Jajce operations, also directed that:

Valuable individuals are not to be shot, so that some information can

be prised out of them.

Deserters with our own certifi cation, who provided testimony, were

shot, in some cases purely because they could not be escorted back.

This attitude cannot be tolerated!

Women and children, when not under suspicion, are to be left

exactly where they are found.41

Nor was the need for measured treatment of the population lost on the

718th’s subordinate units. In February 1943, for instance, Battle Group

Annacker requested “the formation of propaganda units which will fol-

low the troops and explain and justify their conduct to the population

through the spoken and written word.”42 Because leafl ets alone would

have little effect upon the illiterate sections of the population, the group

urged “skilful spoken propaganda, as practised recently by the Parti-

sans.”43 It also recognized that “the propaganda troops must not consist

of Ustasha people, for the population views the Ustasha and everything it

stands for with hate and distrust. Rather, they should consist of members

of the Croatian Army or civilians.”44 Free, at least for the moment, of the

brutalizing pressure it had faced during the Jajce operations, the 718th

Infantry Division seems to have been allowing saner counsel to prevail.

Furthermore, the body counts the 718th’s troops infl icted during

this period, high though they were, were less outrageous than those the

369th was dealing out. For the whole of January 1943 the 718th recorded

killing 204 Partisans at a loss to itself of thirty-eight dead.45 Against this

was the 369th’s recording of 834 reported Partisan dead, at a loss to itself

of thirty-six dead, between mid-January and mid-February. The con-

trast does need qualifying. For one thing, the 718th’s troops still seem to

have been killing large numbers of civilians; as before, the very relative

226
terror in the balk ans

nature of their “restraint” needs keeping fi rmly in mind. Furthermore, if

they still were not killing as many civilians as the 369th, this was partly

because they had less opportunity; the “Partisan” dead they recorded

were killed in the course not of major mobile operations, but of smaller-

scale operations and general security duties. Even so, some of the con-

trast is surely due to the greater restraint the 718th exercised. For though

the 369th and 718th suffered comparable losses during these periods, the

369th killed at least four times as many “Partisans” as the 718th.

Most strikingly, unlike the 369th, the 718th stood ready, immediately

after White I and its follow-up operation, to exchange prisoners with the

Partisans. There had been sporadic contact between Germans and Parti-

sans from as early as spring 1942. The fi rst signifi cant prisoner exchange

had taken place in Posusje, between Livno and Mostar, in September of

that year. It is unclear who made the fi rst move on that occasion; that it

was Tito is suggested by reports from the Partisans, who, perhaps seek-

ing a basis for prisoner negotiations with the Germans, were treating

their German prisoners well at this particular time.46

One reason why a number of senior German offi cers stood ready to

negotiate such exchanges was that they now believed Partisans should

be granted the status of proper combatants. Major General Benig-

nus Dippold, commander of the 717th Infantry Division, appeared to

express admiration for the Partisans’ fi ghting qualities when he declared

that “one must view the enemy as poorly-equipped troops, but not as

bandits.”47 There was undoubtedly a pragmatic motivation behind such

professions of gallantry. Recognizing that they were facing a genuine

military opponent, more astute offi cers realized that according the Par-

tisans proper combatant status made it more likely that both sides would

give quarter when taking prisoners. But this was still a profound about-

face from the German military’s usual view of insurgents. Some senior

fi gures, at least, were forming a saner perception of the challenge their

forces were facing.48 Yet there is no sign that the 369th Infantry Division

was contemplating similar measures at this time.49

Even higher command was reining in its subordinates to some extent.

Although Croatia Command had on January 12 issued extremely harsh

guidelines, the same directive also forbade attacks on women and chil-

dren. This was a clear contrast with Hitler’s order of December 16,

The Devil’s Division
227

1942.50 But much of the impetus, particularly for the 718th, came from

divisional command. That the 369th and the 718th Infantry Divisions

diverged so hugely on this score was down to three reasons.

It has already been established that a poor-quality unit, facing a hardy,

dangerous opponent in a harsh environment, was more likely to feel

vexed by its situation, and behave more ferociously in order to ease its

frustration and reassure its superiors. The further down the command

chain such a unit was, the sharper its experience of battle, and the more

vicious its likely response. Given the poor quality of the 369th’s units, it

would have been surprising if such a brutalizing malaise had
not
infected

its divisional command.

If Croatia Command’s reports are to be believed, the 717th Infantry

Division, despite having been offi cially upgraded to light division status,

was even weaker than the 369th when it went in to Operation White I.51

Yet the 369th gave ample cause for concern. A brace of reports issued

during January and February 1943 testifi es to its parlous manpower.

On January 23, for instance, General Neidholt reported that “through

borrowing and requisitioning the troops have acquired a huge amount

of baggage. They make for an extremely unmilitary looking picture on

the roads . . . (T)he troops are completely out of control.”52 Through-

out February the situation grew worse: “(troops and non-commissioned

offi cers) lie about uninterested on the trucks and give no salute. . . . The

morale reports show that a large number of the Croatian troops are just

fellow travellers without any understanding of the necessity of the bat-

tle against the Partisans.”53 Desertion became endemic.54 The 369th’s

situation was not helped during White I by the fact that the Luftwaffe

provided most of its assistance to other formations participating in the

operation, particularly the Prinz Eugen Division, and not to the 369th.55

In August 1943 the 369th’s intelligence section fi nally snapped out of

its dejection over the troops’ condition, and articulated some reasons

for it. It identifi ed problems born of national character; of the country’s

political and economic conditions; and of the ways in which the troops

were led, used, and treated. On the last of these scores, it maintained that

the troops’ morale was worst in units where German personnel were less

228
terror in the balk ans

numerous. But it also maintained that, once the rot to morale had hit in,

no amount of harsh German army discipline could arrest it.56

But perhaps the single main reason why the troops’ performance was

so affl icted was that the 369th was too slow to recognize and counter

the symptoms of worsening morale. The fact that General Neidholt’s

prior career had been less than dazzling may indicate that here was a

commander with an uncertain grip on the discipline and morale of his

division. Certainly, there was nothing intrinsic in a Croatian legionnaire

division’s makeup that made poor morale inevitable, at least in early

1943. For as will shortly be seen, poor morale was a pitfall the 373d Infan-

try Division, the 369th’s sister legionnaire formation, managed to avoid.

Whatever the reason, troops of such poor quality were clearly unable

to fi ght a counterinsurgency campaign successfully. The frustration both

the division and its troops doubtless felt can only have intensifi ed when

the White operations failed to achieve their objectives. Tito had had

advance warning of White I ten days before the operation even started.

He used this window of opportunity to systematically destroy roads and

bridges in the region, and thus further hamper Axis attempts to encircle

his forces effectively.57

By early 1943, in contrast, the 718th Infantry Division’s troops were

of considerably better quality than the 369th’s. Of course, their equip-

ment and manpower were still beset by defi ciencies. In this they were no

different to their comrades in any of the core German army counterin-

surgency divisions in Yugoslavia.58 But like its fellow “seven-hundred-

number” divisions, the 718th had been converted into a light division

in early 1943. In February the 718th’s command described the division’s

fi ghting power as “extremely good given its current combat strength.”59

It had positive things to say about the division’s training, artillery, pio-

neer companies, and supply, and about the morale of its troops. It was

certainly overstating things when it described the division’s ability to

carry out its tasks as “limitless.”60 But, clearly, its fi ghting power was

considerably higher than the 369th’s. And just as poorer fi ghting power

probably helped make the 369th more ferocious, so did the 718th’s supe-

rior strength probably help make it less so.

But this is not the full explanation. For one thing, the 718th’s situation

was hardly comfortable either. Following a very brief pause in December,