Terror in the Balkans (50 page)

10. Deák,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Offi cer
Corps 1848–1918,
95–97.

11. Demeter,
The German Offi cer Corps in Society and State, 1650–1945,
89–91.

12. Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42,
41, 50. See also John Moncure,
Forging the King’s Sword: Military
Education between Tradition and Modernization. The Case of the Royal Prussian

Cadet Corps, 1871–1918
(New York: Peter Lang, 1993).

13. Kitchen, The
German Offi cer Corps
,
1890–1914
, 29–31, 120–123; Heiger Ostertag,

“Der soziale Alltag eines Offi ziers im Kaiserreich 1913: Ein militärsoziologisches

Zeitbild,”
Zeitschrift für Geschichte
38 (1990): 1069–1080; Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42,
50–53.

14. On relations between the German army and German society during the Wilhelmine

period, see also Ute Frevert,
A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Con-

scription, and Civil Society
(Oxford: Berg, 2004), chaps. 1–5.

15. Deák,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Offi -

cer Corps 1848–1918,
86–88; Gumz,
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in
Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918,
13–16, 30–34.

16. Rothenburg, The
Army of Francis Joseph
, 176.

17. A point Rothenburg himself makes.

18. See, for instance, David G. Herrmann,
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the
First World War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

19. Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42,
54–60; Deák,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History
of the Habsburg Offi cer Corps 1848–1918,
166–169; Kronenbitter,
“Krieg im Frieden”:
Die Führung der K. u. K. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns

1906–1914,
50–57.

20. Dennis Showalter, “From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way

of War, 1890–1914,”
Journal of Military History
64 (2000): 691; Hürter,
Hitlers
Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42,

58–60; Deák,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg

Offi cer Corps 1848–1918,
112.

274
Notes to Pages 18–21

21. For an introduction to the backgrounds of the membership of the two movements,

see Roger Chickering,
We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the

Pan-German League 1886–1914
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 103–148;

Andrew G. Whiteside,
The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Aus-

trian Pan-Germanism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 43–63. See also Michael Wladika,
Hitlers Vätergeneration: Die Ursprünge des Nationalsozialismus in der K. u. K. Monarchie
(Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2005); Peter Walkenhorst,

Nation—Volk—Rasse: Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890–1914

(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007).

22. John W. Boyer,
Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in

Power, 1897–1918
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 445–446.

23. Deák,
Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Offi cer
Corps 1848–1918,
172–178.

24. Kronenbitter,
“Krieg im Frieden”: Die Führung der K. u. K. Armee und die Groß-

machtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906–1914
, 25.

25. Rothenburg, The
Army of Francis Joseph
, 151. See also Marsha Rozenblit,
Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), chaps. 1, 2, and 4.

26. Kitchen, The
German Offi cer Corps
,
1890–1914
, 46.

27. Ibid.

28. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann,
The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23–28.

29. Mark Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
(London: Allen Lane, 2008), 19–23. See also William W. Hagen,
Germans, Poles and Jews: The

Nationality Confl ict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), esp. chaps. 5, 8.

30. William Mulligan,
The Origins of the First World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 139, 152–154. Recent overviews of German attitudes towards the East

include Gregor Thum,
Traumland Osten: Deutsche Bilder vom östlichen Europa im

20. Jahrhundert
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Wolfgang Wipper-

mann,
Die Deutschen und der Osten: Feindbild und Traumland
(Darmstadt: Primus

Verlag, 2007).

31. Holger R. Herwig,
The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918

(London: Hodder Arnold, 1997), 51.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 20.

34. Wolfram Wette,
The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 6–8.

35. Lawrence Sondhaus,
Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architekt der Apokalypse
(Vienna: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2003), 251–252. See also John R. Schindler, “Defeating Balkan Insurgency: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Serbia, 1878–1882,”
Journal

of Strategic Studies
27 (2004): 528–552; Robin Okey,
Taming Balkan Nationalism:
The Habsburg “Civilizing Mission” in Bosnia, 1878–1914
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Notes to Pages 21–25
275

36. Robert S. Wistrich,
Laboratory for World Destruction: Germans and Jews in Cen-

tral Europe
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 7. See also Christian Promitzer, “The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the

Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism,” in
Creating the

Other: Ethnic Confl ict and Nationalism in Habsbgurg Central Europe
, ed. Nancy M.

Wingfi eld (Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 183–210.

37. On the Balkan situation during the years before the Great War, see Hew Strachan,
The
First World War
, vol. 1,
To Arms
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 35–64.

38. Promitzer, “The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the

Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism,” 193.

39. Sondhaus,
Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architekt der Apokalypse,
105.

40. Ibid., 91.

41. Herwig,
The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918
9.

42. Sondhaus,
Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architekt der Apokalypse
, 98–100.

43. Rothenburg,
The
Army of Francis Joseph
, 127, 141–142; Kronenbitter,
“Krieg im Frieden”: Die Führung der K. u. K. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns

1906–1914
, 121–144.

44. Kronenbitter,
“Krieg im Frieden”: Die Führung der K. u. K. Armee und die Groß-

machtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906–1914,
121–144; Gumz,
The Resurrection and
Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918,
12–13; Arno Mayer,
The Persistence
of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War
(New York: Pantheon, 1981), 282–284.

45. See, for instance, Trutz von Trotha, “‘The Fellows Can Just Starve’: On Wars of

‘Pacifi cation’ in the African Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept of ‘Total

War,’” in
Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences 1871–1914
, ed. Manfred F. Boemke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1999), 415–436; Sabine Dabringhaus, “An Army on Vacation? The

German War in China,” in Boemke et al.,
Anticipating Total War: The German and

American Experiences 1871–1914
, 459–476; John Horne and Alan Kramer,
German
Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Isabel V. Hull,
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial
Germany
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), chaps. 1–8.

46. Hull,
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial
Germany,
132–133.

47. Ibid., 106.

48. For more depth on this issue, see Ben Shepherd,
War in the Wild East: The Ger-

man Army and Soviet Partisans
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004),

chap. 2.

49. On development of insurgency and counterinsurgency during the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, see John Ellis,
From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of

Guerrilla, Revolutionary, and Civil Warfare from the Romans to the Present
(Lon-

don: Greenhill, 1995); Bruce Vandervort,
Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 1830–

1914
(London: University College London Press, 1998); Ian F. W. Beckett,
Modern
Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750

(London: Routledge, 2001).

276
Notes to Pages 25–29

50. Charles D. Melson, “German Counter-Insurgency Revisited,”
Journal of Slavic

Military Studies
24 (2011): 118–119.

51. Horne and Kramer,
German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial,
1.

52. See the essays by Stig Förster, Manfred Messerschmidt, and Thomas Rohkrämer, in

Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, eds.,
On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War
and the German Wars of Unifi cation, 1861–1871
(Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1997); Geoffrey Wawro,
The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of

France in 1870–1871
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 11.

53. Robert M. Citino,
The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third
Reich
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).

54. Hull,
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial
Germany,
chaps. 1–8. On German military planning during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see also Arden Bucholz,
Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning
(New York: Berg, 1991). On the effect such doctrines had upon

general German military planning during World War II, see Geoffrey P. Megargee,

Inside Hitler’s High Command
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and

upon counterinsurgency warfare in particular, see Jonathan Gumz, “Wehrmacht

Perceptions of Mass Violence in Croatia, 1941–1942,”
Historical Journal
44 (2001): 1015–1038; Philip W. Blood,
Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe
(Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006).

55. Hans Umbreit, “Das unbewältigte Problem: Der Partisanenkrieg im Rücken der

Ostfront,” in
Stalingrad: Ereignis—Wirkung—Symbol
, ed. Jürgen Förster (Zurich:

Piper, 1992), 133.

56. Hull,
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practice of War in Imperial
Germany,
chap. 8.

57. Horne and Kramer,
German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial,
425.

58. Gumz,
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918,
33–34.

59. Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42,
63–66.

2. forging a wa rtime menta lit y

1. Stig Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares: German Military Leadership and the

Images of Future Warfare 1871–1914,” in
Anticipating Total War: The German and

American Experiences 1871–1914
, ed. Manfred F. Boemke, Roger Chickering, and

Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 362–376. See also

Dennis Showalter, “From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of

War, 1890–1914,”
Journal of Military History
64 (2000): 705–710.

2. Gunther E. Rothenburg,
The Army of Francis Joseph
(Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1998), 177.

3. Alan Kramer,
Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World

War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90.

Notes to Pages 30–33
277

4. Rudolf Jerabek,
Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo
(Graz: Verlag Styria, 1990), 162–165; Jonathan Gumz,
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 34–59.

5. Gumz,
The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918,
46.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 58.

8. Jerabek,
Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo,
162. On Habsburg ruthlessness towards occupied populations during the Great War, see also Anton Holzer,

Das Lächeln der Henker: Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevoelkerung 1914–

1918
(Darmstadt: Primus, 2008).

9. Jerabek,
Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo,
162–165; Kramer,
Dynamic of
Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War,
132–134.