Terror in the Balkans (54 page)

8. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Col-

laboration,
chap. 1; Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia
, chaps. 1 and 2.

9. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration,
39–46; Pavlowitch,
Serbia: The History behind the Name,
131–132; Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia,
chap. 5.

10. Djokic´,
Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia
, 280.

11. Marko Attila Hoare, “Whose Is the Partisan Movement? Serbs, Croats and the Leg-

acy of a Shared Resistance,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
15 (2002): 25.

12. Schreiber, “Germany, Italy, and South-East Europe: From Political and Economic

Hegemony to Military Aggression,” 316–325, 362–372.

13. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 479–481; Ian Kershaw,
Hitler: Nem-

esis, 1936–1945
(London: Penguin, 2000). On German policy towards Yugoslavia in

1941, see also Klaus Olshausen,
Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan: Die deutsche Poli-

tik gegenüuber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941
(Stuttgart:

Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973).

14. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 480–485. On Hitler’s Serbophobia,

see also Klaus Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
(Hamburg:

E. S. Mittler, 2002), 43.

15. Vogel, “German Intervention in the Balkans,” 493–526; Mark Wheeler, “Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” in
Resistance and Revolution in
Mediterranean Europe 1939–1948
, ed. Tony Judt (London: Routledge, 1989), 123–125.

16. Klaus Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” in
Das Deutsche Reich und
der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 8. Die Ostfront, 1943/44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den

Nebenfronten,
Karl-Heinz Frieser et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007), 1010–1011.

17. Ibid., 1009–1010.

18. On the partition of Yugoslavia in spring 1941 and its immediate effects, see for overviews Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
, 132–133, 340–354;

290
Notes to Pages 76–80

Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 28–53; Stevan K. Pavlowitch,
Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
(London: Hurst, 2008), chap. 2. For more detailed treatment, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, chaps. 2–6.

19. Matteo Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 3; Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule

in Occupied Europe
, 340–341.

20. Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
, 10.

21. Ibid., 11.

22. On the NDH, see Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat,
Der Kroatische Ustasha-

Staat 1941–1945
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964); Tomasevich,
War and
Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, chaps. 6–11.

23. Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 28–33.

24. Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance
, 6; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 49–51.

25. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration
, 4, 30–39, 336–342; Marko Attila Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s
Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks 1941–1943
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21–23.

26. On the Ustasha’s anti-Semitic beliefs, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 43, 348–349, 370, 593.

27. Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks
1941–1943
, 22–23.

28. Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collabo-

ration
, 335.

29. On NDH-Italian-German relations and the state of the NDH economy, see Tomase-

vich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 241–294, 617–706.

30. Ibid., 387.

31. On Catholic support for the Ustasha, see Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
, 369–372. On priests’ abhorrence of Ustasha crimes, see ibid., 400.

32. Ibid., 343.

33. Ibid., 380–387.

34. Pavlowitch,
Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
, 32.

35. Walter Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und

Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 49; Schmider,

Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 594.

36. Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei,”
28; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien
1941–1944,
573; BA-MA, RW 40/2. Militärbefehlshaber Serbien, 5/1/41, 5/4/41.

Unterstellung. All further archival references are BA-MA unless otherwise stated.

On Turner, see in particular Christopher R. Browning, “Harald Turner und die

Militärverwaltung in Serbien 1941–1942,”
Verwaltung contra Menschenführung im

Notes to Pages 80–82
291

Staat Hitlers,
ed. Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Topper (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1986), 351–373

37. Walter Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia,” in
National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies
,

ed. Ulrich Herbert (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000), 167.

38. For an overview of the general structure of the German occupation in Serbia and the individuals who headed it, see Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944
, 573–575, 590–608.

39. Georg Tessin,
Verbände und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS

im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945
(Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1972–1997), 6:193, 272; 12:149, 188; Richard Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in Ost- und Südosteuropa 1941–1945: Deutsche Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Verbrecher—Österrei-

chische Opfer?” (PhD thesis, University of Vienna, 2006), 120–122.

40. Albert Seaton,
The German Army 1933–1945
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1982), 159–160; Bernhard R. Kroener, “The Manpower Resources of the Third

Reich in the Area of Confl ict between Wehrmacht, Bureaucracy, and War Econ-

omy, 1939–1942,” in
Germany and the Second World War, Volume 5. Organization

and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power. Part 1: Wartime Administration,

Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939–1941
, Bernhard R. Kroener et al. (Oxford:

Clarendon, 2000), 810–816, 964–1000; Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in

Ost- und Südosteuropa 1941–1945: Deutsche Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Ver-

brecher—Österreichische Opfer?,” 120–122.

41. Schmider, “Der jugoslawische Kriegsschauplatz,” 1013.

42. RW 40/2. Kriegstagebuch, 5/11, 5/16 and 5/20/41.

43. Charles D. Melson, “German Counter-Insurgency Revisited,”
Journal of Slavic

Military Studies
24 (2011): 124–125.

44. Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia,” 164.

45. Germann, “‘Österreichische’ Soldaten in Ost- und Südosteuropa 1941–1945: Deutsche

Krieger—Nationalsozialistische Verbrecher—Österreichische Opfer?,” 120–122.

46. In this and later chapters, the term
insurgent
is used to denote the Germans’

Partisan
and
Chetnik opponents combined. For an introduction to the 1941 Ser-

bian uprising and the German response, see Pavlowitch,
Hitler’s New Disorder:

The Second World War in Yugoslavia
, 49–72. For greater depth, see Walter R.

Roberts,
Tito, Mihailovicánd the Allies, 1941–1945
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers

University Press, 1973), chaps. 1, 2; Milazzo,
The Chetni Movement and the Yugo-

slav Resistance
, chaps. 2, 3; Jozo Tomasevich,
War and Revolution in Yugoslavia,
1941–1945: The Chetniks
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975), chap. 5; Milovan Djilas,
Wartime: With Tito and the Partisans
(London: Martin Secker

and Warburg, 1977), 3–121; Wheeler, “Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Com-

munist Party of Yugoslavia,” 123–144; Schmider,
Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien

1941–1944
, chap. 3; Hoare,
Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks 1941–1943
, chaps. 1, 2; Geoffrey Swain,
Tito: A Biography
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 33–41.

292
Notes to Pages 83–86

5. isl a nds in a n insurgent se a

1. See Appendix A.

2. Georg Tessin,
Verbände und Truppen der Deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im

Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945
(Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1972–1997), 6:193, 12:149, 202, 222.

3. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1229–1230. 704. Inf.-Div. Ia, 6/13/41. Betr.: Personelle und

materielle Ausstattung der Division, p. 3; MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1241. 704. Inf.-Div.

Ib/Ic, 6/13/41. Gesundheitszustands-Meldung nach dem Stande vom 10. Juni 1941.

4. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1317–1318. 704. Inf.-Div. Ic, 5/29/41. Betr.: Stimmungsberi-

chte, p. 1.

5. Ibid., p. 2.

6. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1279. 704. Inf.-Div. Ia, 6/5/41. Divisionsbefehl, p. 1.

7. Ibid.

8. RW 40/2. Befehlshaber Serbien Ic. Tätigkeitsbericht, 5/25–6/8/41.

9. RW 40/2. Befehlshaber Serbien Ic. Tätigkeitsbericht, 4/24–5/24/41, p. 2.

10. For the 704th see MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1317–1318. 704. Inf.-Div. Ia, 5/29/41. Betr.: Stimmungsberichte, p. 2.

11. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1248–1249. OKH Hauptquartier, 4/21/41. Merkblatt über

Plünderung und Beutemachen zu Belehrungszwecken.

12. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1271–1272. 704. Inf.-Div. Ia, 6/6/41. Betr.: Ausbildung, p. 2.

13. The German army was not uniformly chivalrous during the 1940 campaign. See

Raffael Scheck,
Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of French

Black Soldiers in 1940
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

14. On the role national and regional “initiatives” across Nazi-occupied Europe played

in the emergence of the Final Solution, see Ulrich Herbert, ed.,
National Social-

ist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies

(Oxford: Berg, 2000).

15. Walter Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und

Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 26.

16. Walter Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in Serbia,” in
National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies
,

ed. Ulrich Herbert (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000), 165–166.

17. Ibid.

18. Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenver-

nichtung in Serbien 1941/42,
40; Manoschek, “The Extermination of the Jews in

Serbia,” 165–166. On the Wehrmacht campaign against the Serbian Jews in 1941,

see Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Juden-

vernichtung in Serbien 1941/42,
35–49, 62–66, 91–108; Christopher R. Browning,

“Harald Turner und die Militärverwaltung in Serbien 1941–1942,”
Verwaltung

contra Menschenführung im Staat Hitlers,
ed. Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Top-

per (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1986), 351–373; Christopher R. Brown-

ing, “The Final Solution in Serbia. The Semlin Judenlager—A Case Study,”
Yad

Vashem Studies
15 (1983): 55–90; Christopher R. Browning, “Wehrmacht Reprisal

Notes to Pages 86–89
293

Policy and the Mass Murder of Jews in Serbia,”
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen
33

(1983): 31–47. The best English-language overview is Manoschek, “The Extermina-

tion of the Jews in Serbia.”

19. Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenver-

nichtung in Serbien 1941/42,
39.

20. Though the Serbian government then made allowances for Sinti and Roma whose

forefathers had been of fi xed abode since 1850 (ibid., 39).

21. Manoschek,
“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenver-

nichtung in Serbien 1941/42,
26, 38, 62. On the refugees’ murderous treatment later in 1941, see ibid., 62–69, 75–79.

22. MFB4/72350, 20294/3, 1305. Standortkommandantur Valjevo, 5/19/41.

23. BfZ, Sammlung Sterz. Corporal Gerhard Reichert, tenth company, 70th Infantry

Regiment, 111th Infantry Division, 4/27/41. Reichert is a pseudonym; federal Ger-

man data protection laws prevent the naming of individuals (a) who are still alive, (b)

who died within the last thirty years, or (c) for whom no date of death or proof that

they are still alive could be found, but who were born within the last 110 years. For

this study, individuals for whom no date of birth could be established are also ano-

nymized. Nor are photographs of anonymized individuals reprinted for this study.