Terror in the Balkans (86 page)

reprisal its men exacted on August 23. In one house, they found a sackful

of rifl es and a duplication machine with Communist appeals produced

on it, obtained the names of fi fteen absent villagers who were known

Communists, and ordered the police to burn down three of their homes.

This was a harsh measure indeed, but less harsh than an indiscriminate

mass shooting.140

There were also displays of genuine humanity by the 704th’s men. On

one occasion a sixteen-year-old who had been shot trying to evade capture

had his wounds bound by German soldiers, who left him with two local

women to take care of him.141 Even as late as September, relations with the

population could be positively convivial—too convivial, in fact, for divi-

sional command’s liking. “There is greater need than ever,” it proclaimed

on September 16, “for members of the Wehrmacht to keep themselves

fully distanced from the Serbian population.” The division particularly

bemoaned the “unworthy” practice of “sitting round the kitchen table or

in private quarters, chatting with Serbs over cups of coffee.”142

But overall, throughout July and August, in line with the mounting repri-

sal activity across all Serbia, the 704th Infantry Division exacted a grow-

ing death toll of civilians. Some of the killings in its jurisdiction, such

as the reprisal carried out by the local district command following the

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109

attack on General Lontschar’s car near Razna on July 18, were the work

of units outwith the division’s own command chain.143 Elsewhere, how-

ever, it was the 704th’s troops themselves who exacted the death tolls.

From the death toll of thirty-eight, cited earlier in this chapter, that the

fi rst company of the 724th Infantry Regiment exacted on August 17, only

three machine-guns and twelve rifl es were seized. The only Axis casu-

alty was an Albanian gendarme shot in the head.144 On that same day, the

regiment had ten farmsteads burned down and another fi fteen destroyed

by artillery.145 And in a fi refi ght near the railway station at Dublje, west

of Šabac, in late August, men of the eighth company of the 750th Infantry

Regiment, temporarily under the 704th Infantry Division’s command,

killed twenty-fi ve “bandits” at a loss to themselves of just one dead.146

It is clear from such instances that not just insurgents, but civilians

also, were perishing in ever greater numbers at the 704th Infantry Divi-

sion’s own hands. The 704th might be failing to crush the uprising in its

area, then, but it was certainly exacting a mounting death toll. And the

fact that it felt increasingly impotent and frustrated may have been one

of the very forces fueling its brutality. Indeed, some units were spilling

too much blood even for divisional command’s liking. While the 704th

urged its units to inform the divisional intelligence section if any Ser-

bian offi cials were suspected of sabotage, contacting Communists, or

tolerating illegal activities, it also stressed that Serbian offi cials generally

should not be taken hostage.147 LXV Corps detected a wider malaise,

declaring on August 23 that:

It is understandable that troops fi red upon in the back by Commu-

nist bands will cry out for vengeance. This often results in people

found in the fi eld being arrested and shot. But in most cases it is not

the guilty who are caught, but the innocent, and this only results in

the hitherto loyal population being driven into the arms of the ban-

dits by fear or bitterness.148

Tellingly, LXV Corps also stressed that it was better that the Serbian gen-

darmerie or the Serbian authorities apprehend insurgents. Presumably

LXV Corps preferred this to leaving the job to German soldiers who might

themselves kill informers or other members of the “loyal” population.149

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It also reminded its troops that the “loyal” population included women

also: “It goes without saying that no woman, except when she goes armed

against the troops, should under any circumstances be shot without due

legal process.”150 Clearly higher Wehrmacht offi ces were still seeking

to keep the general population onside. Similarly, on September 5 Weh-

rmacht Command Southeast, Field Marshal List’s skepticism toward

Serb–German collaboration notwithstanding, urged “active, intensifi ed

propaganda in the Serbian language with every means available (wireless,

leafl ets, newspapers, posters and so on) . . . increased use of informers . . .

full use of the infl uence of the Serbian government.”151

In September the Germans’ situation grew even more alarming. For it

was now that Tito and Mihailovic´ temporarily made common cause.

Mihailovic´ felt he could no longer remain on the sidelines of such a wide-

spread revolt. Tito saw a Partisan–Chetnik alliance as a means of cultivat-

ing potential Partisan support among the Serb peasantry and politicians.

He also sought to utilize the Chetniks’ assistance, at least for a period,

in training Partisans. However calculating the two men’s motives, the

immediate result was that Mihailovic´’s Chetniks now openly joined the

revolt.152 The most important joint Partisan–Chetnik operations were

near Krupanj, Valjevo, and Kraljevo, and the epicenter of their coopera-

tion was northwest Serbia. The Germans’ increased Luftwaffe support,

mainly in the form of Stuka dive bombers, could only achieve so much

in the face of them.153

The principal town in the 704th’s jurisdiction was Valjevo. But, due

above all to explosions on the Valjevo-Užice road, the danger to the

town’s supply was growing daily, and coal stocks were so low that the

troops were forced to plunder the coal supply in the munitions factory

in Vistad. Meanwhile, every insurgent act of sabotage against roads,

railways, and bridges increased the town’s isolation.154 On September

12 General Borowski was forced to fl y from Belgrade to the 704th’s head-

quarters in Valjevo because of the insurgent roadblocks crisscrossing the

main road.155 Many of the division’s units were also cut off, and some—

such as the 724th Infantry Regiment’s tenth and eleventh companies, sta-

tioned in Krupanj—faced annihilation.

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111

The reports compiled by these two companies convey such a sense of

approaching doom, and of the brutalizing fear it spawned, that they are

worth recounting at length.

Both companies believed the disaster that befell them in early Sep-

tember could have been foreseen. Eleventh company claimed that “this

catastrophe came about because both companies were situated far from

the battalion in bandit-infested, diffi cult terrain. It requires no strategic

ability to cut the troops off from all relief and strike at their backs.”156

Particularly when, in the words of tenth company, the “bandits” were

obviously so strong:

Alarming news about the frequency of bandit unrest in the Krupanj

area was increasing during the fi nal days before the attack. Accord-

ing to these rumors, 1,000 men had gathered near Kamenica. In Ban-

jevac, a village next door to Krupanj, another 400–500 bandits were

said to be active. In the direct vicinity of Krupanj post offi ces and

administrative offi ces were being plundered. Headmen, truck driv-

ers, and workers who had ignored the bandits’ warning were being

shot. Small individual Wehrmacht units were being attacked, motor-

ized columns fi red upon and observation posts in Bela Orvka and

Stolica attacked. Despite all efforts, nothing could be done against

the bandits. These events undermined the Wehrmacht’s status and

reliability in the eyes of the Serbian population.157

As a result, the population’s support for the insurgents was growing: “in

the behavior of the population towards Wehrmacht members, an inner,

icy aversion and an all-unifying hatred towards anything German could

be felt.”158

The prelude to the main insurgent attack was a clash on the morning

of September 2. This engagement, and the fear that affl icted the troops

in Krupanj in its aftermath, are described by tenth company:

On Monday 9/1 at 22.00, NCO Seifert reported in from the watch at

Stolica with the news that the watch had been attacked by a strong

bandit group. On 9/2 at 06.00, a commando of fi ve squads led by

Lieutenant Rehmer and Lieutenant Halder, together with Medical

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terror in the balk ans

NCO Heinrich,159 set out for Stolica to clarify the situation. On the

way, at the north-west exit of Pirstica, the commando encountered

a road block (two-deep felled trees, several meters high), which was

nevertheless undefended. About 800 meters in front of Stolica the

commando encountered an escaped troop from the Stolica watch

consisting of two NCOs and eleven men. At the same time, two

armed men were observed on the heights south-east of Stolica. The

commando opened fi re immediately; this was answered with heavy

fi re from rifl es and light machine-guns on the heights either side of

the road. Lieutenant Rehmer took two squads onto the slopes east of

the road. The enemy could not be seen.

In consequence of the ever more frequent reports that the bandits

were massing and that Stolica had been attacked, the company had

already been in a state of high alert for the past week. The hospi-

tal had been converted into a defensive strongpoint . . . That the

population of Krupanj had deliberately fl ed (from the Germans) was

clear from the behavior of the district chief. At 13.00 I entrusted him

with providing 20 men for a work detail. The mayor arrived himself

and explained that he could not carry this order out, even on pain

of being arrested or shot, for the entire population of Krupanj had

disappeared into the forest. It is clear from this that the whole popu-

lation was informed of the attack in advance, and that its behavior

indicates that it had been working with the bandits closely.160

“On Tuesday 9/2 at 20.45,” reported tenth company, “our watch brought

in an envoy with an offer to capitulate.”161 This part of the story is best

conveyed by eleventh company, which was stationed in the school

and received the ultimatum sooner. At eight in the evening a boy had

appeared with a note for tenth company from the leader of the Chetnik

forces surrounding them: “I demand your unconditional surrender; you

are completely encircled, no one will be harmed, you will be held pris-

oner until the end of the war. If you accept, fi re three fl ares off at 21.00.

If you refuse, the attack will resume at this time and you will be slaugh-

tered.”162 Both companies rejected the ultimatum. Then, “on Wednes-

day night at 00.30 a new attack began. It was a noise from hell, for the

Islands in an Insurgent Sea
113

volume was doubled in the valley. They bombarded our positions, par-

ticularly in the hospital, with grenade launchers.”163

Tenth company then picks up the story:

At 00.30 on 9/3 the bandits opened up a heavy fi re on our fi ve out-

posts. These pulled back into the hospital buildings. We returned

fi re, even though all we had to aim at was the fl ashes from the mouths

of the enemy guns. The enemy attacked in this way four times dur-

ing the night, whereby the fi nal attack, at 06.00, was the heaviest of

all. During the day the hospital was subjected to persistent light rifl e

fi re, and even to machine-gun fi re from time to time. Sharpshooters

fi red from a distance of 100 to 200 meters upon doors, windows, and

walkways in the hospital. The fi re grew heavier when they spotted

our men moving around. We could only move by crawling, jumping

or dragging ourselves from place to place, and that with the greatest

care. It was impossible to leave the building. During the time follow-

ing the attack on Stolica the men could neither sleep nor relax, but

remained in a state of constant alert.164

Our machine-gun posts and grenade-launcher post on the south

side of the roof had to be abandoned when dawn broke, because the

enemy had fi red upon them with a 3.7 cm gun . . . Our machine-guns

took up position by the windows on the third fl oor of the hospital.

From the day of the fi rst attack it was impossible to prepare warm

food for the men, because the kitchens . . . were under constant fi re.

The men received only greatly reduced amounts of cold provisions

such as meat conserve, eggs, and iron portions.

In the night Corporal Volmer was wounded with a shot to the head.

The next morning NCO Ulrich was wounded in the thigh when

relieving a machine-gun post.165 In addition, three wounded from

the Stolica watch lay in the police station.

At the break of darkness the fi re attacks began again, bigger than

before, and increasing in intensity and duration. Between 23.00 and

24.00 fl ashes of light were seen in the direction of Stolica and Moi-

evica at fi fteen-minute intervals, coming nearer and nearer to Krupanj.

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