The Circle (72 page)

5. That the Commanding Officer of
RYAN
could have predicted the position of
KENNEDY
throughout her turn with a good degree of accuracy.

6. That the Commanding Officer of
KENNEDY
could not have predicted the course and speed of
RYAN
in proceeding to her assigned plane guard station.

7. That the message from CTG 21.1 may have influenced the Commanding Officer of
RYAN
to expedite his evolution, but does not excuse courting danger in its execution.

8. That Commander James John Packer, Commanding Officer of
RYAN,
was derelict in his duties in that he failed to comply with U.S. Navy Regulations Articles 0701 and 0751, which assigned him responsibility for the safety of his ship and for the observance of every caution prescribed by law and regulation to prevent collision on the high sea, in the following respects:

(a) Violation of Article 27, International Rules of the Road (General Prudential Rule).

(b) Violation of Article 22: Did not keep out of the way of a privileged vessel, but crossed ahead.

(c) Violation of Article 23:
RYAN
did not slacken speed, stop, or reverse.

(d) Violation of
Allied Tactical Publication 1,
Article 533 and others:
RYAN,
a small ship, hampered the movements of
KENNEDY;
crossed the bow of the carrier when it was not safe; and changed a clear situation into an awkward one by lack of timely indication of her intent and through an impatient haste to accomplish her evolution.

9. That the above derelictions of duty by Commander Packer were due to poor judgment, due principally to:

(a) Fatigue and sickness.

(b) Lack of recent experience in maneuvering with carriers.

(c) Lack of allowance for restricted boiler power and slow engine response.

(d) His confusion at a critical time during a rapidly evolving situation, as a possible result of the following factors:

(1) Night and radar silence

(2) High closing rates

(3) Desire to effect a rapid maneuver

(4) Incorrect reading of
KENNEDY'
s position angle.

10. That the above derelictions of duty by Commander Packer were the direct cause of the collision.

11. That the reason for the final left turn of
RYAN
that led to the collision is ultimately irretrievable.

12. That Rear Admiral Hoelscher, commander of the task group, was negligent in his duties in that he failed to comply with U.S. Navy Regulations, Article 0611, which assign him responsibility as senior officer present for the safety of ships in company. This opinion as to negligence is based on the following factors, in that:

(a) As senior officer present, he was responsible for the planning and execution of maneuvers of the force, even though this duty had been delegated.

(b) He prescribed complex high speed maneuvers at night, darkened, by ships that had not first practiced such maneuvers during daylight.

(c) He might have been more prudent by setting a policy that ordered plane guard ships to station prior to executing turns to recovery courses; and might have prescribed the use of running lights during maneuvers, until such time as he was satisfied all units were capable of safely executing them while darkened; and thus

(d) He failed to comply with the International Rules of the Road, Article 27, by not having due regard to all risks of collision.

13. That there exists a further question as to negligence or dereliction of duty in Rear Admiral Hoelscher's actions subsequent to the collision proper in regard to
RYAN.

14. That Captain Javits, Commanding Officer of
KENNEDY,
was negligent in his duties in that he failed to comply with Article 0701, U.S. Navy Regulations, which assign him responsibility for the safety of his ship, in that he:

(a) Assumed
RYAN
had turned right initially at the execution of his turn signal, and therefore that everything was proceeding normally.

(b) Was not alert, as
KENNEDY
was turning, to the risk inherent in the positions of the two ships, which increased as they drew closer.

(c) Commenced executing a course adjustment toward
RYAN
without ascertaining her position and bearing drift, and without ascertaining properly whether she understood his intentions.

(d) Failed to comply with the International Rules of the Road, Article 27, by not having due regard to all risks of collision, and Article 21, by not keeping his course.

15. That there was no negligence or dereliction of duty in connection with Captain Javits's actions subsequent to the collision.

16. That there was no negligence or dereliction of duty on the part of Lieutenant Commander Arthur Garner, Officer of the Deck of
KENNEDY.

17. That Lieutenant Evlin and Ensign Lenson, Officer of the Deck and Junior Officer of the Deck respectively on
RYAN,
were negligent in their duties, in that they failed to comply with U.S. Navy Regulations, Articles 1008 and 1010, which assign them responsibility for the safety of the ship. This opinion as to negligence is based on the factors that they failed to comply with the International Rules of the Road by not having due regard to all dangers of navigation and collision (Article 27).

18. That no persons other than Commander Packer, Captain Javits, Rear Admiral Hoelscher, Lieutenant Evlin, and Ensign Lenson are in any way responsible for the collision.

19. That the deaths and injuries resulting from the collision and subsequent events were not due to the intent of any person in the naval service, except as may be subsequently found in the cases of Lieutenant Commander Bryce, Lieutenant Norden, BM1 Isaacs, SN Greenwald, SN Gonzales, SR Lassard, and Rear Admiral Hoelscher.

20. That all deaths and injuries suffered in the course of these events occurred in the line of duty.

21. That confusion exists as to the exact meaning of the signal “mike corpen.”

22. That the combat readiness and material condition of
RYAN
at the time of collision was unsatisfactory due to no fault of the crew or commanding officer.

23. That a deficiency in design exists as to lighting aboard aircraft carriers, in that it is difficult to ascertain angle visually under dimmed lighting.

24. That a deficiency of design exists as to flooding of nuclear weapons magazines aboard destroyers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

1. That in view of the death of Commander James John Packer, whose dereliction of duty was the direct cause of the collision, no disciplinary action be taken in his case.

2. That Rear Admiral Hoelscher be addressed a letter of admonition for the negligent acts specified in the Court's opinion.

3. That Captain Javits be addressed a letter of admonition for the negligent acts specified in the Court's opinion.

4. That in view of the death of Lieutenant Alan Evlin, whose dereliction of duty contributed to the cause of the collision, no disciplinary action be taken in his case.

5. That Ensign Lenson be addressed a letter of caution for the acts specified in the Court's opinion.

6. That a court–martial be convoked to try Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Bryce, Lieutenant Richard Norden, Boatswain's Mate First Class Lemond Isaacs, Seaman Nathaniel Greenwald, Seaman Tulio Gonzales, and Seaman Recruit William Lassard for actions subsequent to the collision.

7. That a court–martial be convoked to try Rear Admiral Hoelscher for actions subsequent to the collision.

8. That no disciplinary action be taken against any other persons involved in the case.

9. That in future classes of nuclear–carrying ships, a remotely operated flood valve for the nuclear magazines be installed, such that flooding can be initiated from the bridge or damage–control central in case of fire.

10. That in order to reduce the possibility of a recurrence of this type of incident, the following action be taken:

(a) Revise tactical orders, publications, and doctrine to provide:

(1) An indication that operational commanders recognize that commanding officers and crews of ships are not automatically experienced in night carrier operations, and that therefore before such operations are undertaken, especially darkened and in radar silence, consideration be given to the actual experience of the commanding officers to be involved.

(2) That during night air operations, with ships darkened, the officer in charge shall station plane guards in advance of turning to the launch or recovery course, unless the tactical situation shall dictate otherwise.

(3) That a special signal be provided for use by carriers while operating aircraft, indicating “I am adjusting my course to—”, and that acknowledgment from all screen units be received before execution.

(b) That a more distinctive lighting measure be developed to make aircraft carrier courses easier to judge for ships in company.

(c) That renewed emphasis be placed on thorough familiarity of officers with the International Rules of the Road, and that appropriate action be taken to impress on them the importance of constant alertness.

AUSURA

DENNISON

MOREHEAD

 

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

To: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. Noted. Approved. Advise me of action re Recommendations 9 and 10.

 

M.

OTHER BOOKS BY DAVID POYER

TALES OF THE MODERN NAVY

Black Storm

China Sea

Tomahawk

The Passage

The Gulf

The Med

THE HEMLOCK COUNTY NOVELS

Winter Light

Thunder on the Mountain

As the Wolf Loves Winter

Winter in the Heart

The Dead of Winter

THE TILLER GALLOWAY NOVELS

Down to a Sunless Sea

Louisiana Blue

Bahamas Blue

Hatteras Blue

OTHER NOVELS

Fire on the Waters

The Only Thing to Fear

Stepfather Bank

The Return of Philo T. McGiffin

Star Steed

The Shiloh Project

White Continent

 

“Timely, exciting, deeply affectionate and respectful of the naval men, women and traditions he portrays. The author infuses his books with authentic detail, but his special gift is the creation of complex characters … A treat … Most highly recommended.”

—
Library Journal

“Outstanding!”

—
The Virginian Pilot & Ledger Star

“An entirely different kind of sea story … The young ensign undergoes a trial by fire. At the end the reader is sweating it out with him. Will justice prevail, or will the ensign be sacrificed to the system?”

—
The New York Times Book Review

 

CAPTAIN DAVID POYER'S
military career has included service in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Arctic, Caribbean, Persian Gulf area, and Pacific. His novels have won millions of readers around the world, and his sea fiction is required reading in the Literature of the Sea course at the U.S. Naval Academy. His novel-cycle of the modern Navy,
The Med, The Gulf, The Circle, The Passage, Tomahawk,
and
China Sea,
and
The Command.
He lives in Virgina with his wife and daughter.

Visit David Poyer's Web site at

www.poyer.com

THE CIRCLE

Copyright © 1992 by David Poyer.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. For information address St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 92-2980

ISBN: 0-312-92964-1

EAN: 80312-92964-0

St. Martin's hardcover edition / May 1992

St. Martin's Paperbacks edition / June 1993

St. Martin's Paperbacks are published by St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

eISBN 9781466848207

First eBook edition: June 2013