The Enigma of Japanese Power (15 page)

The Japanese press serves the System in that the journalists indirectly help indoctrinate the public to accept it as inevitable. Sometimes, though, their corrective function is directed at some malfunctioning aspect of the System itself. From time to time, the Japanese nation throws itself on a particular subject with a real vengeance as the media hit it day after day. A subject that attracts such intense negative attention is known as a
mondai
, which in various contexts means ‘problem’, ‘issue’ or ‘question’.

The
mondai
of school bullying described above set a record by lasting more than a year. Most press-generated
mondai
are on the front pages for a couple of months at the most, but during this time it is very predictable what the conversations in bars, coffee shops and elsewhere will be about. At the least, they create a sense of togetherness and concord. Alternative opinions about the
mondai
of the month, other than those the media make current, would be almost as surprising to one’s Japanese conversation partners as disagreeing with their routine comments on the state of the weather.

The most monumental of
mondai
in recent decades was the
kogai mondai
, focusing on industrial pollution of air, land and water. The national press went on a concerted campaign of publishing scary stories that lasted for roughly half a year. This finally caused people to stop eating fish almost entirely, and severely threatened the market for sea-food. Possibly to prevent that from getting out of hand, the
kogai mondai
was wiped off the front pages by a barrage of news stories and articles concerning the possibility of a large earthquake destroying much of the capital, in which the emergency preparations of the government were questioned. The near monolithic voice of the press may sometimes cause massive over-reactions to events that occasionally seem to come close to the edge of mass hysteria.

The press sometimes turns on abuses to which the officials have shut their eyes. The
sarakin
, ‘salary-loan’ companies, provide a good example. These gangster-connected usurers maintain normal business relations with banks, insurance firms and other financial institutions, and often work out of respectable offices.

The reason for their existence is the very underdeveloped state of Japanese consumer credit. Japanese have for decades brought their savings (on the average a little under one-fifth of their income) to the commercial banks and the postal savings system, whence the money has flowed exclusively in the direction of big industry. Banks have not been equipped to judge the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, and untied loans to private individuals were for long almost unheard of. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when other circumstances had increased the demand for consumer credit, the
sarakin
entered the picture, enticing office workers into taking out short-term loans without the need for collateral. The catch lay in interest rates at around 40 to 70 per cent or even higher. A large number of inexperienced borrowers sank ever deeper into debt, a process heartily encouraged by the loan sharks.

In 1984 the press began to record family murders and suicides brought about by this state of affairs. There were horror stories of gangsters coming to front doors demanding to be paid, destroying the name of the debtor among his neighbours in the process; of letters sent to the debtor’s children at school; and of despairing housewives becoming prostitutes under the guidance of the
sarakin
.

The laws regulating this business were contradictory, and decisions in a number of extreme cases that underwent the process of legal conciliation were not encouraging. With no institution or group to represent the victims, the press found itself the only watchdog, and did in fact bring about a certain alleviation of the problem, stimulating new (though inadequate) legislation and bureaucratic guidance that created a category of less usurious
sarakin
.

The process that led to the legislation clearly illustrates how, under the System, the interests of the consumer are the last to be considered. Jurisdictional disputes among ministries, and moves by LDP politicians to protect the usurers in exchange for ‘political funds’, blocked five bills and delayed legislation for six years.
²⁷
The law that was eventually enacted legitimated the
sarakin
and established a ceiling of 73 per cent on interest rates, to be lowered to 40 per cent at a date when the ‘economic conditions’ of the
sarakin
permitted – all this while there was a competing law on the books limiting interest rates to 20 per cent! The parties best served by the new law are the bigger
sarakin
and the Ministry of Finance. The latter had been most upset over the unorganised condition of this newest sector in an otherwise well-controlled financial world; now, the new law calls for registration of
sarakin
businesses, which means the ministry has established channels for compulsory information in one direction and administrative guidance in the other.

Insufficient legal protection of the public has helped the development of many rackets in Japan. The
sarakin
are only one example; others include the
juku
crammer schools, doctors who overprescribe medicine and the
koenkai
that help elect LDP politicians. Racketeering is also rife in Japan’s real-estate business and stockmarkets. None of these is the target of serious reform attempts, and it is left to the press to react to such excesses as actually threaten to disturb the social order.

In a traditional service that goes back centuries, the gangsters, who exert control over themselves within crime syndicates, help the police keep non-syndicate crime under control. The Tokugawa shogunate officials in charge of public order showed themselves masters of pragmatic government by reasoning that, since crime can never be entirely eliminated, organised crime should be used to help keep the unorganised kind to a minimum. Crime in those days centred on the Tokaido, the famous road between Kyoto and Edo (later Tokyo), which was used by people of high rank as well as by highwaymen and other rabble. The simple solution of the shogunal officials was to give responsibility for keeping order on the road to the bands of shady elements that organised the inevitable gambling and prostitution.

The
yakuza
are celebrated in the cinema and tolerated in the social landscape. Just like the cowboy operating on the fringes of the law, the cinema
yakuza
often champions the victims of injustice. Unlike the cowboy, however, he is never portrayed as an individualist and loner. The belief is still common among ordinary Japanese that the
yakuza
preserve venerated customs and virtues that in mainstream society have yielded to modernity, which means, for the most part, intensive group solidarity and simplistic demonstrations of absolute loyalty towards a master.
Yakuza
films like samurai films romanticise the traditional manliness of an imagined warrior past. In fact, ‘the samurai heroes are in some ways less traditional, less essentially Japanese than the
yakuza
’.
²⁹
Outside the cinema, real-life
yakuza
, especially the older ones, tend to believe that they are indeed guardians of tradition; the ‘pure’ Japanese behaviour on the screen actually rubs off on to the organized criminals, who love these films.

The record of a police interview illustrates this: ‘I am obliged to obey the words of my boss at any cost. If he said that a crow is white, I would say it is white. If I had to wear white clothes [be killed in gang warfare] or wear blue clothes [go to prison] as a result of that, I would accept it.’ Pseudo-blood-ties are created through ceremonies in which the newly united sip sake from the same bowl. A lawyer specialising in defending
yakuza
says that, whereas he first viewed their use of kinship terminology as nonsensical sentimentalism, he began to realise how persuasive it is for the
yakuza
themselves. ‘Neither logic nor money can control a self-willed gangster. But by brandishing the supreme and irrational principle of the “fatherhood” of the boss, the organization can make members submit to anything.’
³⁰

Yakuza
are accustomed to protection from people in high places. Both before and after the war they were used by the corporations to help break strikes. Large and famous firms with impeccable reputations are not above using them for intimidation purposes – in the rare case, for instance, of litigation against them. It is an open secret that gangsters sometimes do the dirty work for politicians. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku had a
yakuza
‘bodyguard’ on call, and a number of other politicians used to take the precaution of having gangsters attend political rallies. Considering how much can be accomplished in Japan by intimidation, it should be no surprise that some LDP politicians still consider good relations with highly placed
yakuza
to be useful. It has not been considered sensational when a cabinet minister attended a gangster wedding, or sent flowers. Former prime minister and
éminence grise
Kishi Nobusuke was vice-chairman of a committee organising a
yakuza
funeral in 1963.
³¹
In 1974 he sent a congratulatory telegram to Taoka Mitsuru, son of the Yamaguchi-gumi boss, on the occasion of his wedding.
³²

The world of the
yakuza
borders on and partially blends with that of the rightists, who portray themselves as the only true patriots. The extreme right encompasses more than eight hundred groups with well over one hundred thousand members, one-fifth of whom are highly active. The activists remind Japan of their existence primarily by making a noise, zigzagging through traffic with their sound-trucks blaring martial music, and by a few bombing attempts directed at the teachers’ union. But in 1987 a reporter of the
Asahi Shimbun
was murdered by a gunman thought to belong to a mysterious extreme rightist organisation called Sekihotai. Since then this outfit has also threatened to kill former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, besides issuing further ‘warnings’ directed at the newspaper.

Apart from the extremist fringe, there exists an extensive network of sympathisers with rightist causes that reaches into the media, the universities and the LDP. The two best-known rightists of recent times, privately wealthy power-brokers who pulled wires for many a top politician, reached their positions partly through gangster connections. They are Kodama Yoshio, who attracted much attention through his involvement in the Lockheed bribery scandal until his death in 1984, and Sasakawa Ryoichi, who still attracts attention through his philanthropic activities. In 1982 Sasakawa, lobbying hard for the Nobel peace prize, established the US–Japan Foundation, to promote cultural exchanges with the USA, and he is the largest private donor to the United Nations. In 1978 he received from the Japanese government the First Order of the Sacred Treasure and in 1987 the First Order of Merit with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.

Both
yakuza
and rightist recruit among the juvenile delinquent element, especially the notorious
bosozoku
, or motor-cycle gangs. Between 30 and 40 per cent of newcomers to the Yamaguchi-gumi are
bosozoku
members.
³³

Throughout this century police and corporations have used gangsters to counterbalance Marxist influence. At the time of the 1960 struggle in connection with the extension of the security treaty with the USA, a struggle that pitted radical leftist student protesters and leftist unions against the government, Kodama Yoshio mediated between the LDP and Tokyo gang bosses in organising an army of over 30,000
yakuza
and rightists to help the police preserve order during the scheduled visit of President Eisenhower.
³⁴
The gangs had prepared leaflets, armbands, transport facilities and logistical support before the visit was finally cancelled because of the unrest. The
yakuza
around this time were brimming with confidence, and their number reached a peak of nearly 200,000 in 1964.

In the mid-1960s, when they appeared to be becoming too powerful, the police cracked down on some gangs, and in some parts of the country they have occasionally assisted citizen groups attempting to keep
yakuza
out of their neighbourhoods. But no serious attempt to break the gangs has ever been made. It is not corruption that is at the bottom of this, but the fact that Japan’s low crime statistics would probably rise if the police had to cope unaided with a chaos of criminals operating individually or in small groups. As one student of the Japanese police concludes: the ‘relationship is mutually beneficial: police and gangsters each find it advantageous to maintain rapport and to enhance it with a façade of cordiality. This nucleus of goodwill and understanding seems to remain even when the police must severely crack down on a gang after a major incident.’
³⁵

Police specialists regularly visit gangster headquarters to find out whether any members have been ostracised and, if so, proceed to pick them up. Both parties are served by this, since it means that there will be no lone-wolf criminals roaming the streets plotting revenge. The large syndicates openly maintain offices – adorned with gang emblems – in the cities.

Police and gang bosses have occasionally held summit conferences aimed at delimiting territory and tacitly confirming informal standing agreements. Deals are continually being made, especially in connection with firearms investigations. The police will ask the
yakuza
to part with illegal guns in exchange for turning a blind eye to, say, a case of stimulant drug smuggling. Gangs have been known to buy guns simply so that they can comply with such requests.
³⁶

Japanese gangsters seem convinced that they fulfil a socially important function. Leaders can be interviewed about
yakuza
activities, and will argue fairly convincingly that without their organisation antisocial youth would have nowhere to go and be a great nuisance. This echoes the contention of the greatest modern
yakuza
of them all, the late Taoka Kazuo, that he made sure that the drop-outs of society did not run wild.
³⁷
Although they do not advertise the fact, the gangs are indeed among the few Japanese organisations that welcome members of the minority
burakumin
and Korean communities, which face considerable discrimination. This is one reason why so many gangs originated in the Kansai area, around Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe, where such communities are concentrated.

In his memoirs Taoka claimed that his gang had protected the Kobe police headquarters against attacks by a Korean gang that he helped eliminate. During a one-hour television programme devoted to the Yamaguchi-gumi and broadcast in August 1984 by NHK (comparable in function and prestige to Britain’s BBC), executives of the mob were given the opportunity to explain their alleged great services to society to an audience of 25 million viewers.

An ‘in-house’ magazine published by the Yamaguchi-gumi gives some idea of how Japan’s mobsters like to see themselves.
³⁸
Inside the front cover is a reminder of the goal to which the syndicate has dedicated itself: the development of ‘our country and our society according to the
kyodo
spirit’, which means that members must (1) preserve harmony in order to strengthen the group; (2) love and respect people outside the group and remember what is owed to them; (3) always be courteous and always be aware of senior-junior relationships; (4) learn from the experience of seniors and work for self-improvement; and (5) show restraint in contacts with the outside world.

This is followed by poetry on nature and life. An essay by Taoka Kazuo explains how the big boss became a member of the All-Japan Anti-Drug Movement because drug trafficking is no good and members of the syndicate should not become involved in it. Another executive of the syndicate relates how the socially oppressed gathered in outlaw bands during the Tokugawa period to share each other’s warmth and understanding. An executive assistant follows this with suggestions as to how to make the Yamaguchi-gumi more respected by people on the outside, explaining that it is not just simply a criminal gang. The magazine continues with a eulogy for a dead gangster written by his daughter. A readers’ column gives a member from a sub-gang the opportunity to delve into the past and explain how his gang helped the city authorities of Kobe deal with outrageous behaviour by Koreans and Chinese shortly after the war. There are warnings against expanding one’s territory too rapidly, the point being stressed that establishing local gang branches is not quite the same as the expansion of a commercial franchise network. There are complaints about injustices in Japanese society and advice by bosses of sub-gangs on how to further internal harmony. Another look at history portrays the police as powerless in the face of street robberies, rape, murder, kidnapping and the like until the author’s gang came to the rescue. After a lesson on law, and a poem by a mobster to console the spirit of his dead boss, the magazine ends with personal information on individual gang members about to be released from jail and when and where the welcoming ceremonies will be held. There is information on the funerals and weddings of members, and last of all a list of addresses where every member who is in prison can be reached.

Most Japanese have difficulty differentiating between Robin Hood-type folklore and the rather unappetising reality. Even apart from the extortion rackets that victimise food and entertainment establishments in many districts, the
yakuza
can drive away the clientele of any shop simply by moving in next door with an operation of their own.

The unwritten rules of the System hold that gangsters may run protection rackets, prostitution and related illegal businesses, but that they are forbidden to carry guns and deal in narcotics. The police are also extremely wary of efforts to combine federations into a nation-wide syndicate, since this undermines the police’s divide-and-rule advantage. An iron rule is that
yakuza
must make sure no innocent bystanders get hurt in their battles. It is clear that the special relationship with the police can last only so long as society is not being undermined by drug addiction and there is no flow of innocent blood. There have been numerous instances where gangs have voluntarily offered up for prosecution members who broke these rules. But arrest and incarceration carry the significant advantage of promotion in the
yakuza
hierarchy.