The Essential Galileo (25 page)

However, suppose one were to decide that, even in the case of propositions about natural phenomena, they should be condemned or accepted on the basis of scriptural passages which are unanimously interpreted in the same way by all the Fathers; even then I do not see that this rule would apply in our case, given that one can read in the Fathers different interpretations of the same passages. For example, Dionysius the Areopagite says that it was not the sun but the Prime Mobile which stopped;
³⁰
St. Augustine thinks the same thing, namely, that all heavenly bodies stopped; and the bishop of Avila
³¹
is of the same opinion. Moreover, among the Jewish authors whom Josephus endorses, some thought that the sun did not really stop, but that it appeared so for the short time during which the Israelites defeated their enemies. Similarly, in the miracle at the time of Hezekiah, Paul of Burgos thinks that it did not take place in the sun but in the clock.
³²
[338] At any rate, I shall demonstrate further below that, regardless of the world system one assumes, it is in fact necessary to gloss and to interpret the words of the text in Joshua.

[§4.2.5] Finally, let us grant these gentlemen more than they ask— namely, let us submit entirely to the opinion of wise theologians. Since this particular determination was not made by the ancient Fathers, it could be made by the wise ones of our age. The controversy concerns questions of natural phenomena and dilemmas whose answers are necessary and cannot be otherwise than in one of the two controversial ways; so they should first hear the experiments, observations, reasons, and demonstrations of philosophers and astronomers on both sides of the question, and then they would be able to determine with certainty whatever divine inspiration will communicate to them. No one should hope or fear that they would reach such an important decision without inspecting and discussing very minutely all the reasons for one side and for the other, and without ascertaining the facts: this cannot be hoped for by those who would pay no attention to risking the majesty and dignity of the Holy Writ to support their self-righteous creations; nor is this to be feared by those who seek nothing but the examination of the foundations of this doctrine with the greatest care, and who do this only out of zeal for the truth and for the majesty, dignity, and authority of the Holy Writ, which every Christian must strive to uphold. No one can fail to see that this dignity is desired and upheld with much greater zeal by one group than by the other—by those who submit in every way to the Holy Church and who do not ask for the prohibition of this or that opinion, but only that they be allowed to present things whereby she could more reliably be sure of making the safest choice; and not by those who, blinded by their own interests or incited by malicious suggestions, preach that she immediately flash the sword since she has the power to do it, without considering that it is not always useful to do all that one can do. This opinion was not held by the holiest Fathers. Indeed, they knew how harmful and how contrary to the primary function of the Catholic Church it would be to want to use scriptural passages to establish conclusions about nature, when by means of observations and of necessary demonstrations one could at some point demonstrate the contrary of what [339] the words literally say; thus, not only were they very circumspect, but they left precepts for the edification of others. From St. Augustine,
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis
, book 1, chapters 18 and 19,
³³
we have the following: “In obscure subjects very far removed from our eyes, it may happen that even in the divine writings we read things that can be interpreted in different ways by different people, all consistent with the faith we have; in such a case, let us not rush into any one of these interpretations with such precipitous commitment that we are ruined if it is rightly undermined by a more diligent and truthful investigation; such recklessness would mean that we were struggling for our opinions and not for those of Scripture, and that we wanted to make scriptural opinion conform to ours, when we ought to want to make ours conform to that of Scripture.” A little further, to teach us how no proposition can be against the faith unless it is first shown to be false, he adds: “It is not against the faith as long as it is not refuted by an unquestionable truth; if this happens, then it was not contained in the divine Scripture but originated from human ignorance.” From this, one sees the falsehood of any meanings given to scriptural passages which do not agree with demonstrated truths; and so one must search for the correct meaning of Scripture with the help of demonstrated truth, rather than taking the literal meaning of the words, which may seem to be the truth to our weak understanding, and trying somehow to force nature and to deny observations and necessary demonstrations.

Your Highness should also note with how much circumspection this very holy man proceeds before deciding to assert that some scriptural interpretation is so certain and sure that there is no fear of encountering disturbing difficulties; not satisfied with just any scriptural meaning which might agree with some demonstration, he adds: “But if this were proved to be true by an unquestionable argument, it would be still uncertain whether by these words the writer of the holy books meant this or something else no less true; for if the rest of the context of the passage showed that he did not intend this, then what he did intend would not thereby be falsified but would still be true and more beneficial to know.” Now, what increases our amazement about the circumspection with which this author proceeds is the fact that he is still not completely sure upon seeing that demonstrative reasons, as well as the literal scriptural meaning and the preceding and subsequent text, [340] all point in the same direction, and so he adds the following words: “If the context of Scripture did not disprove that the writer meant this, one could still ask whether he might not have meant the other.” Still he does not decide to accept this meaning or exclude that one, but rather he does not think he can ever be sufficiently cautious, and so he continues: “If we found that he could have meant the other, then it would be uncertain which of the two he intended; and if both interpretations were supported by solid documentation, it would not be implausible to believe that he meant both.” Next, he seems to want to give the rationale for his procedure by showing to us the dangers to which certain people would expose themselves, Scripture, and the Church; these are people who, concerned more with the preservation of their own errors than with the dignity of Scripture, would want to extend its authority beyond the limits which it prescribes for itself. And so he adds the following words, which by themselves should suffice to repress and to temper the excessive license which some people arrogantly take: “In fact, it often happens that even a non-Christian has views based on very conclusive reasons or observations about the earth, heaven, the other elements of this world, the motion and revolutions or the size and distances of the stars, the eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of years and epochs, the nature of animals, of plants, of rocks, and similar things. Now, it is very scandalous, as well as harmful and to be avoided at all costs, that any infidel should hear a Christian speak about these things as if he were doing so in accordance with the Christian Scriptures and should see him err so deliriously as to be forced into laughter. The distressing thing is not so much that an erring man should be laughed at, but that our authors should be thought by outsiders to believe such things, and should be criticized and rejected as ignorant, to the great detriment of those whose salvation we care about. For how can they believe our books in regard to the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life, and the kingdom of heaven, when they catch a Christian committing an error about something they know very well, when they declare false his opinion taken from those books, and when they find these full of fallacies in regard to things they have already been able to observe or to establish by unquestionable argument?” Finally, we can see how offended are the truly wise and prudent Fathers by these people who, in order to support propositions they do not [341] understand, constrain scriptural passages in certain ways and then compound their first error by producing other passages which they understand even less than the former ones. This is explained by the same saint with the following words: “It is impossible to express sufficiently well how much harm and sorrow those who are reckless and presumptuous cause to prudent brethren. This happens when they begin to be rebuked and refuted for their distorted and false opinions by those who do not accept the authority of our books, and so they put forth those same books to prove and to defend what they had said with very superficial recklessness and very obvious falsity, and they even quote many of their passages from memory, considering them supporting testimony, but without understanding either what they say or what they are talking about.”

To this type belong, I think, those who will not or cannot understand the demonstrations and the observations with which the originator and the followers of this position confirm it, and who thus are concerned with putting forth Scripture. They do not notice that the more scriptural passages they produce, and the more they persist in claiming that these are very clear and not susceptible to other meanings besides what they advance, the greater the harm resulting to the dignity of Scripture if later the truth were known to be clearly contrary and were to cause confusion (especially if these people's judgment had much authority in the first place). There would be harm and confusion at least among those who are separated from the Holy Church, toward whom she is nevertheless very zealous like a mother who wants to be able to hold them on her lap. Your Highness can therefore see how inappropriate is the procedure of those who, in disputes about nature, as a first step advance arguments based on scriptural passages, especially when very often they do not adequately understand these.

However, if these people truly feel and fully believe they have the true meaning of some particular scriptural passage, it would have to follow necessarily that they are also sure of possessing the absolute truth about the physical conclusion they intend to discuss and, at the same time, that they know they have a very great advantage over the opponent, who has to defend the false side; for whoever is supporting the truth can have many sense experiences and many necessary demonstrations on his side, [342] whereas the opponent cannot use anything but deceptive presentations, paralogisms, and fallacies. Now, if they know that by staying within the limits of the physical subject of discussion and using only philosophical weapons, they are in any case so superior to the opponent, why is it that when they come to the debate they immediately seize an irresistible and fearful weapon, so that their opponent is frightened at its mere sight? To tell the truth, I believe they are the ones who are frightened and are trying to find a way of repelling the enemy because they are unable to resist his assaults. That is why they forbid him to use the reason which he received through the Divine Goodness and why they abuse the very proper authority of the Holy Scripture, which (when adequately understood and used) can never conflict with clear observation and necessary demonstrations, as all theologians agree. However, the fact that these people take refuge in Scripture, to cover up their inability to understand and to answer the contrary arguments, should be of no advantage to them, if I am not mistaken, since till now such an opinion has never been condemned by the Holy Church. Therefore, if they wanted to proceed with sincerity, they could remain silent and admit their inability to discuss similar subjects; or else they could first reflect that it is not within their power, nor within that of anyone but the Supreme Pontiff and the sacred Councils, to declare a proposition erroneous, but that they are free to discuss whether it is false; then, understanding that it is impossible for a proposition to be both true and heretical, they should focus on the issue which more concerns them, namely, on demonstrating its falsity; if they were to discover this falsity, then either it would no longer be necessary to prohibit it because no one would follow it, or its prohibition would be safe and without the risk of any scandal.

Thus let these people apply themselves to refuting the arguments of Copernicus and of the others, and let them leave its condemnation as erroneous and heretical to the proper authorities; but let them not hope that the very cautious and very wise Fathers and the Infallible One with his absolute wisdom are about to make rash decisions like those into which they would be rushed by their special interests and feelings. [343] For in regard to these and other similar propositions which do not directly involve the faith, no one can doubt that the Supreme Pontiff always has the absolute power of permitting or condemning them; however, no creature has the power of making them be true or false, contrary to what they happen to be by nature and de facto. So it seems more advisable to first become sure about the necessary and immutable truth of the matter, over which no one has control, than to condemn one side when such certainty is lacking; this would imply a loss of freedom of decision and of choice insofar as it would give necessity to things which are presently indifferent, free, and dependent on the will of the supreme authority. In short, if it is inconceivable that a proposition should be declared heretical when one thinks that it may be true, it should be futile for someone to try to bring about the condemnation of the earth's motion and sun's rest unless he first shows it to be impossible and false.

[§4.2.6] There remains one last thing for us to examine: to what extent it is true that the Joshua passage
³⁴
can be taken without altering the literal meaning of the words, and how it can be that, when the sun obeyed Joshua's order to stop, from this it followed that the day was prolonged by a large amount.

Given the heavenly motions in accordance with the Ptolemaic system, this is something which in no way can happen. For the sun's motion along the ecliptic takes place in the order of the signs of the zodiac, which is from west to east; this is contrary to the motion of the Prime Mobile from east to west, which is what causes day and night; therefore, it is clear that if the sun stops its own true motion, the day becomes shorter and not longer and that, on the contrary, the way to prolong it would be to speed up the sun's motion; thus, to make the sun stay for some time at the same place above the horizon, without going down toward the west, [344] it would be necessary to accelerate its motion so as to equal the motion of the Prime Mobile, which would be to accelerate it to about three hundred and sixty times its usual motion. Hence, if Joshua had wanted his words taken in their literal and most proper meaning, he would have told the sun to accelerate its motion by an amount such that, when carried along by the Prime Mobile, it would not be made to set; but his words were being heard by people who perhaps had no other knowledge of heavenly motions except for the greatest and most common one from east to west; thus he adapted himself to their knowledge and spoke in accordance with their understanding, because he did not want to teach them about the structure of the spheres but to make them understand the greatness of the miracle of the prolongation of the day.