The Essential Galileo (29 page)

But finally, to remove any shadow of a doubt, if the failure to observe such great variations in the apparent sizes of the body of Venus should cast doubt on its circular revolution around the sun (in conformity with
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the Copernican system), then let us make careful observations with a suitable instrument, namely, with a good telescope, and we shall find all effects and experiences exactly agreeing; that is, we shall see Venus crescent when it is nearest to the earth, and with a diameter six times larger than when it is at its maximum distance, namely, above the sun, where it is seen round and very small. I have discussed elsewhere the reasons for not detecting these variations with our simple eyesight, but just as from this failure we could reasonably deny that supposition, so now, from seeing the very exact correspondence in this and every other detail, we should abandon any doubt and consider the supposition true and real. As for the rest of this admirable [363] system, whoever desires to ascertain the opinion of Copernicus himself should not read the fanciful preface of the printer, but the whole work of the author himself; without a doubt he will grasp first-hand that Copernicus held as very true the stability of the sun and the motion of the earth.

§5.3 Galileo's Considerations on the Copernican Opinion, Part II
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[364] The motion of the earth and stability of the sun could never be against Faith or Holy Scripture, if it were correctly proved to be physically true by philosophers, astronomers, and mathematicians, with the help of sense experiences, accurate observations, and necessary demonstrations. However, in this case, if some passages of Scripture were to sound contrary, we would have to say that this is due to the weakness of our mind, which is unable to grasp the true meaning of Scripture in this particular case. This is the common doctrine, and it is entirely right, since one truth cannot contradict another truth. On the other hand, whoever wants to condemn it judicially must first demonstrate it to be physically false by collecting the reasons against it.

Now, one wants to know where to begin in order to ascertain its falsity, that is, whether from the authority of Scripture or from the refutation of the demonstrations and observations of philosophers and astronomers. I answer that one must start from the place which is safest and least likely to bring about a scandal; this means beginning with physical and mathematical arguments. For if the reasons proving the earth's motion are found fallacious, and the contrary ones conclusive, then we have already become certain of the falsity of this proposition and of the truth of the opposite, which we now say corresponds to the meaning of Scripture; so one would be free to condemn the false proposition, and there would be no danger. But if those reasons are found true and necessary, this will not bring any harm to the authority of Scripture; instead we shall have been cautioned that due to our ignorance we had not grasped the true sense of Scripture, and that we can learn this meaning with the help of the newly acquired physical truth. Therefore, beginning with the arguments is safe in any case. On the other hand, if we were to fix only on what seemed to us the true and certain meaning of Scripture, and we were to go on to condemn such a proposition without examining the strength of the arguments, what a scandal would follow if sensible experiences and reasons were to show the opposite? And who would have brought confusion to [365] the Holy Church? Those who had suggested the greatest consideration of the arguments, or those who had disparaged them? One can see, then, which road is safer.

Moreover, we admit that a physical proposition which has been proved true by physical and mathematical demonstrations can never contradict Scripture, but that in such a case it is the weakness of our mind which prevents us from grasping its true meaning. On the other hand, whoever wants to use the authority of the same passages of Scripture to confute and prove false the same proposition would commit the error called “begging the question.”
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For, the true meaning of Scripture being in doubt in the light of the arguments, one cannot take it as clear and certain in order to refute the same proposition; instead one must cripple the arguments and find the fallacies with the help of other reasons and experiences and more certain observations. When the factual and physical truth has been found in this manner, then, and not before, can one be assured of the true meaning of Scripture and safely use it. Thus the safe road is to begin with the arguments, confirming the true and refuting the fallacious ones.

If the earth de facto moves, we cannot change nature and arrange for it not to move. But we can rather easily remove the opposition of Scripture with the mere admission that we do not grasp its true meaning. Therefore, the way to be sure not to err is to begin with astronomical and physical investigations, and not with scriptural ones.

I am always told that, in interpreting the passages of Scripture relevant to this point, all Fathers agree to the meaning which is simplest and corresponds to the literal meaning; hence, presumably, it is improper to give them another meaning or to change the common interpretation, because this would amount to accusing the Fathers of carelessness or negligence. I answer by admitting that the Fathers indeed deserve reasonable and proper respect, but I add that we have an excuse for them very readily: it is that on this subject they never interpreted Scripture differently from the literal meaning, because at their time the opinion of the earth's motion was totally buried, and no one even talked about it, let alone wrote about it or maintained it. But there is no trace of negligence by the Fathers for not thinking about what was completely hidden. That they did not think about it is [366] clear from the fact that in their writings one cannot find even a word about this opinion. And if anyone were to say that they considered it, this would make its condemnation more dangerous; for after considering it, not only did they not condemn it, but they did not express any doubt about it.

Thus the defense of the Fathers is readily available and very easy. On the contrary, it would be very difficult or impossible to excuse or exonerate from a similar charge of carelessness the popes, Councils, and Congregations of the Index of the last eighty years, if this doctrine were erroneous and deserving of condemnation; for they have let this opinion circulate
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in a book which was first written on orders from a pope and then printed on orders from a cardinal and a bishop, dedicated to another pope, and, most important, received by the Holy Church, so that one cannot say that it had remained unknown. If, then, the inappropriateness of charging our highest authorities with negligence is to be taken into account, as it should, let us make sure that in trying to escape one absurdity we do not fall into a greater one.

But assume now that someone regards it as inappropriate to abandon the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers, even in the case of physical propositions not discussed by them and whose opposite they did not even consider; I then ask what one should do if necessary demonstrations showed the facts of nature to be the opposite. Which of the two decrees should be changed? The one which stipulates that no proposition can be both true and erroneous, or the other one which obliges us to regard as articles of faith physical propositions supported by the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers? It seems to me, if I am not mistaken, that it would be safer to modify this second decree than to be forced to hold as an article of faith a physical proposition which had been demonstrated with conclusive reasons to be factually false in nature. It also seems to me that one could say that the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers should have absolute authority in the case of propositions which they aired, and for which no contrary demonstrations exist and for which it is certain that none could ever exist. I do not bring in the fact that it is very clear that the Council
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requires only that one agree with the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers “in matters of faith and morals, etc.”

§5.4 Galileo's Considerations on the Copernican Opinion, Part III
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[367] 1. Copernicus uses eccentrics and epicycles, but these were not the reason for rejecting the Ptolemaic system, since they undoubtedly exist in the heavens; it was other difficulties.

2. In regard to philosophers, if they were true philosophers, namely, lovers of truth, they should not get irritated, but, learning that they were wrong, they should thank whoever shows them the truth; and if their opinion were to stand up, they would have reason to take pride in it, rather than being irritated. Theologians should not get irritated because, if this opinion were found false then they could freely prohibit it, and if it were discovered true then they should rejoice that others have found the way to understand the true meaning of Scripture and have restrained them from perpetrating a serious scandal by condemning a true proposition.

In regard to falsifying Scripture, this is not and will never be the intention of Catholic astronomers such as ourselves; rather our view is that Scripture corresponds very well to truths demonstrated about nature. Moreover, certain theologians who are not astronomers should be careful about falsifying Scripture by wanting to interpret it as opposed to propositions which may be true and demonstrable.

3. It might happen that we could have difficulties in interpreting Scripture, but this would occur because of our ignorance, and not because there really are or can be insuperable difficulties in reconciling Scripture with demonstrated truths.

4. The Council speaks “about matters of faith and morals, etc.” So there is an answer to saying that such a proposition is “an article of faith by reason of the speaker,” though not “by reason of the topic,” and that therefore it is among those covered by the Council. The answer is that everything in Scripture is “an article of faith by reason of the speaker,” so that in this regard it should be included in the rule of the Council; but this clearly has not been done because in that case the Council would have said that “the interpretation of the Fathers is to be followed for every word of Scripture, etc.,” and not “for matters of faith and morals”; having thus said “for matters of faith,” we see that its intention was to mean “for matters of faith by reason of the topic.”

Then consider that [368] it is much more a matter of faith to hold that Abraham had some children and that Tobias had a dog, because Scripture says it, than it would be to hold that the earth moves, even if this were found in the same Scripture, and further that to deny the former is a heresy, but not to deny the latter. It seems to me that this depends on the following reason. There have always been in the world men who had two, four, six children, etc., or none, and similarly, people who have dogs and who do not, so that it is equally credible that some have children or dogs and others do not; hence there appears to be no reason why in such propositions the Holy Spirit should speak differently from the truth, the negative and the affirmative sides being equally credible to all men. But it is not so with the motion of the earth and the stability of the sun; for these propositions are very far removed from the understanding of the masses, and on these matters not relevant to their eternal life the Holy Spirit chose to conform its pronouncements with their abilities, even when facts are otherwise from the point of view of the thing in itself.
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5. In regard to placing the sun in heaven and the earth outside it, as Scripture seems to affirm, etc., this truly seems to me to be a simple perception of ours and a manner of speaking only for our convenience. For in reality all that is surrounded by heaven is in heaven, just as all that is surrounded by the city walls is in the city; indeed, if one were to express a preference, what is in the middle is more in heaven and in the city, being, as it were, at the heart of the city and of heaven. That difference exists because one takes the elemental region surrounding the earth as being very different from the celestial region. But such a difference will always exist regardless of where these elements are placed; and it will always be true that from the viewpoint of our convenience the earth is below us and heaven above, since all the inhabitants of the earth have heaven above our heads, which is our upwards, and the center of the earth under our feet, which is our downwards; so, in relation to us the center of the earth and the surface of heaven are the farthest places, that is, the endpoints of our up and down, which are diametrically opposite points.

6. Not to believe that there is a demonstration of the earth's mobility until it is shown is very prudent, nor do we ask that anyone believe such a thing without a demonstration. On the contrary, we only seek that, for the advantage of the Holy Church, one examine with [369] the utmost severity what the followers of this doctrine know and can advance, and that nothing be granted them unless the strength of their arguments greatly exceeds that of the reasons for the opposite side. Now if they are not more than ninety percent right, they may be dismissed; but if all that is produced by philosophers and astronomers on the opposite side is shown to be mostly false and wholly inconsequential, then the other side should not be disparaged nor deemed paradoxical, so as to think that it could never be clearly proved. It is proper to make such a generous offer since it is clear that those who hold the false side cannot have in their favor any valid reason or experiment, whereas it is necessary that all things agree and correspond with the true side.

7. It is true that it is not the same to show that one can save the appearances with the earth's motion and the sun's stability, and to demonstrate that these hypotheses are really true in nature. But it is equally true, or even more so, that one cannot account for such appearances with the other commonly accepted system. The latter system is undoubtedly false, while it is clear that the former hypotheses, which can account for the appearances, may be true. Nor can or should one seek any greater truth in a position than that it corresponds with all particular appearances.