The Fall of Carthage (21 page)
In late 253 the bulk of the Roman fleet crossed to Africa and made extensive raids along the coast, collecting a large amount of booty, but achieving little. Near the island of Menix (modern Djerba) much of the Roman fleet became grounded on a shoal when caught by the unexpectedly low local tide. At high tide they managed to float the ships, but only after ditching all of their heavier and non-essential equipment. Sailing round the western tip of Sicily to the recently captured Panormus, they then attempted to return directly to Italy, but were caught in another storm, probably near Cape Palinurus in Italy, and lost 150 ships . However, once again the consul in command survived to celebrate a triumph for the dubious successes of his African expedition.
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This string of heavy losses seems to have reduced the aggressiveness of the Roman commanders in the next years, and in particular deterred them from major efforts at sea. However, in 252 they did capture Lipara, denying the Carthaginians the control of these well-placed islands. In 251 the consuls chose to man a mere sixty ships, simply to protect the supply routes to Italy. A greater effort was made in the next year when fifty new ships were constructed. The victory at Panormus in 250 encouraged a major effort against the Carthaginian stronghold at Lilybaeum, a fleet of 200 ships supporting the combined armies of both consuls. The navy's primary role was to seal off the city's harbour and prevent any reinforcements or supply reaching the active garrison. The approaches to the harbour were difficult, only a narrow passage running between the shoals, and this may have encouraged some complacency amongst the Roman fleet. Early in the siege fifty warships had been specially prepared at Carthage to carry supplies and a force of 10,000 mercenaries to the city. Commanded by Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, this squadron travelled to the Aegates Islands west of Sicily and from there waited for a favourable wind. With a strong wind behind their stern, the Punic ships sailed straight into the harbour of Lilybaeum in broad daylight, surprising the Romans, who failed to make any move to stop them, in part because of a reluctance to risk being blown into the harbour. Hannibal's arrival gave a major boost to the garrison's morale as well as adding to its strength. However, he took care to leave the city at night, carrying out the useless cavalry from the fortress, and sailed undetected by the Romans to Drepana further up the coast.
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No more attempts at re-supply were carried out on such a large scale, since without the benefit of surprise the chances of success were slight, but Carthage was eager to keep in communication with Himilco, the commander at Lilybaeum. Another Hannibal, called 'the Rhodian' - perhaps a name intended to celebrate his skill as a sailor, for the Rhodians were famously skilled seamen - volunteered to take his ship into the city and report on the status of the defenders. Hannibal's crew was clearly highly trained and experienced and he took great care in preparing for the voyage, before adopting a similar plan to the other Hannibal, sailing to the Aegates Islands and there awaiting a favourable breeze. Then, when conditions were right, he used his knowledge of the waters to sail straight into Lilybaeum's harbour in mid morning, in open sight of the Roman fleet. Eager to avenge this humiliation, the Romans stationed ten fast ships to catch him on the way out. Hannibal declined to make the attempt under cover of darkness, and rowed out on the next day. Again his intimate knowledge of the shoals and the superb training of his crew allowed the Carthaginian ship to avoid its pursuers and escape. Disdainfully, Hannibal halted in sight of the Romans and waited without setting sail, challenging any Roman ship to fight. The enemy were so impressed by the speed and manoeuvrability of his ship that they declined the offer. Hannibal was to repeat this exploit on several later occasions and his success encouraged a number of other Carthaginian captains to run the blockade, so that the garrison remained in full communication with Carthage and was kept well supplied.
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Failing to intercept the blockade runners, the Romans attempted to block the passage leading to the harbour by dumping boulders and spoil into the sea. Most of this material was swept away by the current, but in one place enough of an obstacle was created to cause a Punic 'four' to run aground whilst attempting a night-time escape from the port. The Romans discovered this to be an exceptionally well-made and speedy ship, so they gave it a picked crew and crammed it full of boarders, and then set it to patrol in an effort to catch their swift opponents. By chance, Hannibal the Rhodian once again sailed openly into the harbour that night and left just as confidently. The captured quadrireme gave chase and managed to overhaul him. Unable to escape, the Punic vessel turned to fight, but was grappled by the Romans and then swiftly overrun by the flood of marines. Hannibal's ship was then also equipped with a chosen crew and a strong force of marines and set to patrol the approach to the harbour. In this way, the Roman fleet was finally able to seal off Lilybaeum from the sea. This episode was the main occasion where the superiority of Carthaginian seamanship was demonstrated. Yet throughout the war it proved exceptionally difficult for them to turn this skill to any tangible advantage in battle, although, unlike the Romans, they avoided any serious losses to the elements. It is notable that the differences in skill were most marked in actions involving only a small number of ships. The massed naval battles offered slight opportunity for subtlety, perhaps the most important factor explaining the Romans' early successes.35
Apart from blockading the city by sea, the Roman fleet played an active part in the progress of the siegeworks on land, since the job of rowing a warship produced large numbers of strong men who were an ideal labour force. As a result of this role, heavy casualties were suffered by the fleet during this siege, probably more from disease spread in the crowded camps than from enemy action. Therefore the Senate collected a draft of 10,000 rowers and dispatched them to Sicily, where they marched overland to Lilybaeum. Guessing that the Carthaginians would be unaware of this accession of strength and so doubt the readiness of the Roman fleet, one of the consuls for 249, Publius Claudius Pulcher, decided to mount a surprise attack on the main base of the Punic fleet at nearby Drepana. It was a bold action but, as we have seen, a surprise attack if successful was probably the easiest, quickest and least costly means of taking a stronghold. The capture of this supporting base would certainly have added to the pressure on the defenders of Lilybaeum. The prospects seemed good, and there were plenty of volunteers from the army to serve as marines, everyone anticipating a good haul of booty.
Claudius went down in Roman history as a reckless incompetent, famously falling into a rage when favourable omens for the attack were not forthcoming. When the sacred chickens refused to eat and so signify that the gods favoured the enterprise, Claudius picked them up and hurled them into the sea, proclaiming that if they would not eat, then let them drink. However, despite his reputation for Claudian arrogance, his initial preparations were careful enough. He put to sea at night to avoid being spotted and news of his departure being carried by land to Drepana, and sailed along the coast. However, in the darkness it was difficult for the Roman ships to remain in close formation, especially since they were
The Battle of Drepana, 249
BC
BC
mmm.
Roman fleet
■■
Carthaginian fleet
crewed by a mixture of the experienced rowers and the new, unabsorbed draft. The route was simple to follow, since it hugged the coast, but throughout the night the Roman fleet straggled and by morning it was in a long, scattered line as it approached the enemy base. Claudius' flagship was somewhere near the rear. The Romans were spotted and word brought to Adherbal, the Punic admiral, who then took the bold decision to put to sea and confront the enemy, rather than permit himself to be blockaded in the harbour. He gathered his crews and collected large numbers of mercenaries to act as marines. It now became a matter of time as to whether Or not the Carthaginian fleet could escape from the harbour and gain sea room before the Roman ships were able to block the entrance.
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The disordered and scattered formation of the Roman fleet and the poorer quality of their crews proved decisive, but only by the narrowest of margins. The entrance to the harbour at Drepana was wide and as the first Roman ships were entering at its southernmost edge, Adherbal's flagship was rowing out past the long spit of land which formed its northern edge. He had signalled the rest of the fleet to follow him, so the Carthaginian ships proceeded in line astern, rounded the two small islands opposite the harbour mouth and ran southwards parallel to the coast, but further out to sea than the Roman fleet. Claudius saw that he had just missed his chance and sought by signal to bring some sort of order to his fleet which was spread over a wide area. Dreadful confusion resulted as the ships which had entered the harbour tried to turn around and escape back into the open sea. Collisions occurred and ships had oars sheared off by friendly vessels. Eventually, the Romans managed to form a rough line of ships close in to the shore, with their rams facing out to sea. The flagship was on the extreme left. In the meantime Adherbal had outflanked the left of the Roman line with five ships, angled forward, and placed his own ship facing the Roman line. As the rest of the fleet came up, he ordered them to form line on his vessel, subordinate officers regulating the deployment, presumably in small boats. After this delay as the two fleets formed up, Adherbal signalled his ships to attack. It would prove the only significant defeat suffered by the Roman navy throughout the war.
The size of the opposing fleets is not certain. Polybius mentions that about thirty Roman ships survived and that ninety-three were captured, but does not make clear whether this figure includes any ships that were sunk. The Carthaginian fleet has been variously estimated as between 100 and 130 and on the whole there is no suggestion of a marked disparity between the two sides. On this occasion the Carthaginian ships carried large contingents of marines and were evenly matched with their Roman counterparts. The Punic crews were undoubtedly better than their opponents, making their ships faster and more manoeuvrable. This might not have mattered had the Romans not been in such a bad position, with their sterns close to the shore. If hard pressed a Carthaginian vessel could back water and pull out of the fighting, but the Romans lacked room to do this. Polybius does not tell us explicitly, but it seems clear that the Roman ships were no longer equipped with the
corvus,
that major deterrent against attacking them from the front. For the first time in a significant action, the Carthaginians were able to display their skill in ramming, striking the enemy and then pulling back without being grappled. The Roman ships lacked the room to manoeuvre to avoid rams or move to each other's aid, and their crews simply did not have the skill to drive through the enemy line and try to ram them from the rear. They may also have felt that it was better to stay in as close a formation as possible for mutual security. The battle was not over quickly, but steadily the Carthaginian advantage became overwhelming. Many Roman ships were sunk, others ran aground and were abandoned, whilst only the thirty ships including Claudius' flagship were able to break out and escape. Claudius was later brought to trial for treason
(perduellio)
at Rome and only narrowly escaped with his life.
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The victory at Drepana heralded a series of further Roman disasters at sea. Claudius' consular colleague Lucius Junius Pullus was with another Roman fleet of 120 warships escorting a convoy of 800 transports, carrying grain to supply the besiegers of Lilybaeum. This got into some disorder crossing to Sicily, so Pullus halted with half the ships in Syracuse to allow the stragglers to catch up. The remainder were sent ahead under the command of the quaestors who were given a small number of warships to protect them. The Carthaginian fleet had also divided, Adherbal adding thirty more vessels to the seventy recentiy brought to Sicily by Carthalo and sending them to attack the Roman naval support at Lilybaeum. After creating some havoc there and burning several ships, Carthalo sailed around the coast towards Heraclea Minoa, hoping to intercept any Roman supply convoys. The quaestors were warned of his approach by the small ships
(lemboi)
y
which Polybius tells us in an aside normally preceded a fleet, but lacked the strength to face him at sea or the speed to escape. Instead they put in to the shore near a Roman-held town and drew their ships out of the water. Getting
ballistae
from the town's fortifications, the quaestors managed to establish a rudimentary fortified line protecting the ships, which proved enough to deter the Punic squadron, who only managed to capture a few ships. Pullus had by this time brought on the remainder of the convoy, and rounded Cape Pachynus south of Syracuse, heading towards Lilybaeum. Unaware of the recent Roman defeats, he unexpectedly sighted Carthalo's fleet. Pullus was unwilling to risk a fight so led his warships and transports close in to this rugged part of the Sicilian coast. Carthalo did not follow, but merely observed from a distance. At this point, once again the weather took a hand. A heavy gale blew up and the signs of this impending gale were spotted by Carthaginian captains who knew this coast, and who prompdy advised Carthalo to sail immediately around the Cape. Again the skill of the Punic sailors was displayed as they battled to bring the fleet successfully round the headland where they were sheltered from the wind. The Romans were exposed to the full force of the gale and so close inshore that they stood no chance of escape. The entire fleet was dashed to pieces on the rugged shore, but numbers of the crew escaped, including the consul, although he seems to have been captured soon afterwards.
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corvus,
that major deterrent against attacking them from the front. For the first time in a significant action, the Carthaginians were able to display their skill in ramming, striking the enemy and then pulling back without being grappled. The Roman ships lacked the room to manoeuvre to avoid rams or move to each other's aid, and their crews simply did not have the skill to drive through the enemy line and try to ram them from the rear. They may also have felt that it was better to stay in as close a formation as possible for mutual security. The battle was not over quickly, but steadily the Carthaginian advantage became overwhelming. Many Roman ships were sunk, others ran aground and were abandoned, whilst only the thirty ships including Claudius' flagship were able to break out and escape. Claudius was later brought to trial for treason
(perduellio)
at Rome and only narrowly escaped with his life.
37
The victory at Drepana heralded a series of further Roman disasters at sea. Claudius' consular colleague Lucius Junius Pullus was with another Roman fleet of 120 warships escorting a convoy of 800 transports, carrying grain to supply the besiegers of Lilybaeum. This got into some disorder crossing to Sicily, so Pullus halted with half the ships in Syracuse to allow the stragglers to catch up. The remainder were sent ahead under the command of the quaestors who were given a small number of warships to protect them. The Carthaginian fleet had also divided, Adherbal adding thirty more vessels to the seventy recentiy brought to Sicily by Carthalo and sending them to attack the Roman naval support at Lilybaeum. After creating some havoc there and burning several ships, Carthalo sailed around the coast towards Heraclea Minoa, hoping to intercept any Roman supply convoys. The quaestors were warned of his approach by the small ships
(lemboi)
y
which Polybius tells us in an aside normally preceded a fleet, but lacked the strength to face him at sea or the speed to escape. Instead they put in to the shore near a Roman-held town and drew their ships out of the water. Getting
ballistae
from the town's fortifications, the quaestors managed to establish a rudimentary fortified line protecting the ships, which proved enough to deter the Punic squadron, who only managed to capture a few ships. Pullus had by this time brought on the remainder of the convoy, and rounded Cape Pachynus south of Syracuse, heading towards Lilybaeum. Unaware of the recent Roman defeats, he unexpectedly sighted Carthalo's fleet. Pullus was unwilling to risk a fight so led his warships and transports close in to this rugged part of the Sicilian coast. Carthalo did not follow, but merely observed from a distance. At this point, once again the weather took a hand. A heavy gale blew up and the signs of this impending gale were spotted by Carthaginian captains who knew this coast, and who prompdy advised Carthalo to sail immediately around the Cape. Again the skill of the Punic sailors was displayed as they battled to bring the fleet successfully round the headland where they were sheltered from the wind. The Romans were exposed to the full force of the gale and so close inshore that they stood no chance of escape. The entire fleet was dashed to pieces on the rugged shore, but numbers of the crew escaped, including the consul, although he seems to have been captured soon afterwards.
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