The Fall of Carthage (25 page)
Rome 241-218
BC
BC
The Romans certainly kept a wary eye on the Carthaginian activity in Spain, although as yet they had no direct involvement in the area. In 231 a delegation of senators went to Hamilcar to question him about the motives for his aggressive campaigns and was told that these were necessary if Carthage was to pay her indemnity to Rome. Later, sometime around 226, another set of envoys went to Hasdrubal, who formally agreed not to expand beyond the River Ebro. It is possible that Rome's interest in Spain was encouraged by her long-time ally, Massilia, but the concern over growing Carthaginian power may well have been genuine. As yet Rome had no direct connection with the Spanish Peninsula, although Latin traders were certainly active there by the second half of the third century.
27
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Rome's world was gradually expanding beyond the Italian Peninsula, with her newly acquired overseas provinces and the powerful navy created during the war with Carthage. In 228 and 219, Roman consuls at the head of fleets of warships fought two wars in Illyria on the other side of the Adriatic, allegedly provoked by the piracy routinely practised by the Illyrian kingdom. Nevertheless it was with an Italian problem, the Gallic tribes of northern Italy, that the Senate was most concerned between the wars. Latin colonies established on land captured from the tribes, notably Ariminum which was founded in 268, were a continual source of friction with the Gauls. Yet as Rome's population increased and her web of alliances expanded the need to find land for the poorer Roman and Latin citizens steadily grew and the fertile plains of Cisalpine Gaul proved especially attractive. In 232 one of the tribunes of the plebs, Caius Flaminius, carried a law to distribute much of the captured
ager Gallicus
to poorer citizens. These were not to be concentrated in new colonies, but each plot of land allocated individually to create a large number of small farms. There was much opposition to this move, in part because other senators resented the prestige that Flaminius would gain and the money that he would doubtless make in the process, but also because it was seen as a provocative gesture.
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ager Gallicus
to poorer citizens. These were not to be concentrated in new colonies, but each plot of land allocated individually to create a large number of small farms. There was much opposition to this move, in part because other senators resented the prestige that Flaminius would gain and the money that he would doubtless make in the process, but also because it was seen as a provocative gesture.
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In 238 the Boii had rallied other tribes and some warriors from beyond the Alps to attack Ariminum, but the war had fizzled out when bickering amongst the Gauls turned to open fighting and they were forced to make peace. By 225 resentment against the flood of setders sparked another, far larger war. This time the Boii united with the Insubres, and were joined by a large contingent of semi-professional warriors from Transalpine Gaul, known as the Gaesatae. When the Gallic army invaded Etruria, it is said to have mustered around 70,000 men. The Gauls were undefeated when they decided to withdraw in front of the consul Lucius Aemilius Papus' army and carry away their substantial booty. The two Roman armies were completely unaware of each other's presence and by a stroke of luck the other consul, Caius Atilius Regulus, who had been recalled from Sardinia, found himself directly blocking the Gauls' line of march. Trapped between the two Roman armies, the tribes were forced to fight at Telamon, forming up in two lines back to back in order to face the enemy armies coming on from opposite directions. Despite this disadvantage the battie was a desperate one. Regulus fell in the early stages and his severed head was carried in triumph to one of the Gallic kings, and it was only after a long struggle that the Romans prevailed, inflicting appalling casualties on the enemy.
In 224 both consuls led armies north and forced the Boii to accept peace. The next year's consuls, the same Flaminius who as tribune had passed the bill to distribute the
ager Gallicus,
and Publius Furius also invaded the tribal lands. Flaminius won a great victory over the Insubres and another tribe, the Cenomani, although a hostile tradition gave the credit for this victory to the army's tribunes. According to Polybius it was these officers who ordered the
hastati
to be re-equipped with the spears of the
triarii
instead of their
pila.
The first line of the legions was then formed into a dense, defensive formation, standing fast until the fury and enthusiasm of the initial Gallic charge had exhausted itself. In 222 the Gauls sued for peace, but the new consuls, eager for glory or perhaps in the genuine belief that the enemy were undefeated, persuaded the Senate to reject these approaches and both took armies against them. One of the consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, relieved the siege of Clastidium, fighting an action in which he single-handedly killed a Gallic King, Britomarus, and stripped him of his armour, winning the highest honour available to a Roman aristocrat, the right to dedicate the
spolia opima.
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His colleague Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio stormed Mediolanum (modern Milan), the tribal capital of the Insubres. After these continued defeats, the tribes all surrendered to Rome, yielding up more of their land. In 218 two new colonies were established, one on either side of the Po at Cremona and Placentia, 6,000 settlers going to each. The provocative presence of a new wave of setders further north than before, and occupying prime land, only added to the bitterness and resentment of the defeated tribes, ensuring that peace would prove short-lived.
ager Gallicus,
and Publius Furius also invaded the tribal lands. Flaminius won a great victory over the Insubres and another tribe, the Cenomani, although a hostile tradition gave the credit for this victory to the army's tribunes. According to Polybius it was these officers who ordered the
hastati
to be re-equipped with the spears of the
triarii
instead of their
pila.
The first line of the legions was then formed into a dense, defensive formation, standing fast until the fury and enthusiasm of the initial Gallic charge had exhausted itself. In 222 the Gauls sued for peace, but the new consuls, eager for glory or perhaps in the genuine belief that the enemy were undefeated, persuaded the Senate to reject these approaches and both took armies against them. One of the consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, relieved the siege of Clastidium, fighting an action in which he single-handedly killed a Gallic King, Britomarus, and stripped him of his armour, winning the highest honour available to a Roman aristocrat, the right to dedicate the
spolia opima.
29
His colleague Cnaeus Cornelius Scipio stormed Mediolanum (modern Milan), the tribal capital of the Insubres. After these continued defeats, the tribes all surrendered to Rome, yielding up more of their land. In 218 two new colonies were established, one on either side of the Po at Cremona and Placentia, 6,000 settlers going to each. The provocative presence of a new wave of setders further north than before, and occupying prime land, only added to the bitterness and resentment of the defeated tribes, ensuring that peace would prove short-lived.
Spain and northern Italy would see much activity when war was finally renewed between Rome and Carthage. In addition, many of the individuals on both sides who were prominent in the campaigns in the 220s would later play a significant role in the Hannibalic war. For the generation of Roman commanders who grew up between the wars with Carthage, their military experiences in Sardinia, Illyria and, most of all, Cisalpine Gaul accustomed them to warfare against armies which were tactically unsophisticated, however individually brave and skilled the warriors composing them might have been. It was to prove poor preparation for confronting a general as skilled as Hannibal at the head of a well-trained army.
PART TWO
THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 218-201 BC
CHAPTER 6
Causes of the Second Punic War
T
HERE WERE CERTAINLY
moments of tension after the First Punic War, but relations between Rome and Carthage were not entirely unfriendly. Trade was renewed, and Punic merchants were as familiar a sight in Rome as Italians seem to have been in Carthage. It may well have been during these years that the ties of guest friendship, so common a feature of international relations in the ancient world, linking Roman and Punic aristocratic families were created or perhaps ones from before 265 revived. The peace concluded in 241 lasted twenty-three years, assuming that we ignore the Roman threat to reopen hostilities over Sardinia in 238, and ended when Hannibal Barca, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, attacked the Iberian city of Saguntum, which was under Roman protection. Neither side showed much reluctance to go to war, in spite of the memory of the earlier hard-fought and costly struggle. Why they did so has been the subject of intense debate ever since, more often than not concerned with apportioning blame to one side or the other. Equally often historians have fallen into the trap of judging events by modern standards, forgetting that even the most politically advanced ancient states went to war frequently and with enthusiasm, especially when they expected to win and eagerly anticipated the benefits victory would bring. Before discussing these issues it is helpful to review the chain of events which led to the declaration of open war by Rome.
1
moments of tension after the First Punic War, but relations between Rome and Carthage were not entirely unfriendly. Trade was renewed, and Punic merchants were as familiar a sight in Rome as Italians seem to have been in Carthage. It may well have been during these years that the ties of guest friendship, so common a feature of international relations in the ancient world, linking Roman and Punic aristocratic families were created or perhaps ones from before 265 revived. The peace concluded in 241 lasted twenty-three years, assuming that we ignore the Roman threat to reopen hostilities over Sardinia in 238, and ended when Hannibal Barca, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, attacked the Iberian city of Saguntum, which was under Roman protection. Neither side showed much reluctance to go to war, in spite of the memory of the earlier hard-fought and costly struggle. Why they did so has been the subject of intense debate ever since, more often than not concerned with apportioning blame to one side or the other. Equally often historians have fallen into the trap of judging events by modern standards, forgetting that even the most politically advanced ancient states went to war frequently and with enthusiasm, especially when they expected to win and eagerly anticipated the benefits victory would bring. Before discussing these issues it is helpful to review the chain of events which led to the declaration of open war by Rome.
1
Probably in 226 Hasdrubal had accepted the demands of the Roman envoys and agreed that the Carthaginians would not cross the River Ebro. The idea of setting a physical boundary to a nation's power was a familiar concept to both cultures.
2
In this case it was no great restriction, since at that time the heartland of the Punic province still lay a long way from the river. Attempts to suggest that the treaty in fact involved a boundary much further south have been unconvincing. Similarly, there is even less foundation for the common assumption that the Romans bound themselves not to intervene south of the Ebro. In fact, at this date the Roman State had no direct connection with Spain, save in the sense that her ally, Massilia, had dependent communities there at Emporion and Rhode.
2
In this case it was no great restriction, since at that time the heartland of the Punic province still lay a long way from the river. Attempts to suggest that the treaty in fact involved a boundary much further south have been unconvincing. Similarly, there is even less foundation for the common assumption that the Romans bound themselves not to intervene south of the Ebro. In fact, at this date the Roman State had no direct connection with Spain, save in the sense that her ally, Massilia, had dependent communities there at Emporion and Rhode.
At some point after 226, Rome formed an association with the city of Saguntum (modern Sagunto, not far from Valencia). Polybius tells us that this was 'some years' before Hannibal's time, but it seems plausible that it would have been mentioned in the Ebro treaty had the link existed at that time, since the city stood a long way south of the river. The debate over whether or not there was a formal treaty granting Saguntum allied status, or whether the city simply requested Rome's protection, as Utica had tried to do during the Mercenary War, does not matter for our present purpose. At some point the Roman Senate was asked to arbitrate in an internal dispute at the city, quite possibly between rival factions favouring Rome and Carthage respectively, and the representatives sent ordered the execution of several Saguntine noblemen. The attractions of a Roman alliance to the Spanish town seem obvious. A city state of local importance, Saguntum can only have watched nervously as the Carthaginian province expanded towards them. Roman support offered the greatest possible security against their stronger neighbour. Why the Romans accepted the alliance is less clear and intimately bound up with the cause of the war, so will be discussed below.
3
3
In 221 the 26-year-old Hannibal succeeded his brother-in-law and continued the aggressive Carthaginian policy in Spain, ranging far more widely than his predecessors. He led his army against the tribes of central Spain, reaching as far north as modern-day Salamanca. Around 220-219 a dispute broke out between Saguntum and a neighbouring tribe accused of raiding its territory. Details are obscure and even the name of the people involved is uncertain, but the tribe was allied to Carthage and received Hannibal's support. Over the winter, a Roman embassy went to Hannibal at New Carthage and reminded him of the earlier Ebro treaty, as well as warning him not to attack Saguntum. The embassy received a frosty reception and proceeded to Carthage to repeat the demands. The young general also referred to Carthage for instructions and in the spring led his army against the city. Saguntum lay on a strong hilltop position, about a mile from the sea. (In the autumn of
AD
1811, the Spanish defenders of a fortress improvised amongst its Iberian, Roman, and Moorish ruins would repulse several attacks launched by one of Napoleon's ablest subordinates, Suchet.) It took Hannibal eight months to capture the town, but from the beginning it was clear that his intention was to take it by storm, rather than starve it into submission. His tactics were far more openly aggressive than those adopted by the Carthaginians in any of the sieges of the First War, and as a result his casualties were higher. Livy even claims that Hannibal himself was wounded whilst directing an attack from very close to the fighting.
4
AD
1811, the Spanish defenders of a fortress improvised amongst its Iberian, Roman, and Moorish ruins would repulse several attacks launched by one of Napoleon's ablest subordinates, Suchet.) It took Hannibal eight months to capture the town, but from the beginning it was clear that his intention was to take it by storm, rather than starve it into submission. His tactics were far more openly aggressive than those adopted by the Carthaginians in any of the sieges of the First War, and as a result his casualties were higher. Livy even claims that Hannibal himself was wounded whilst directing an attack from very close to the fighting.
4
The Romans did nothing to aid the Saguntines once the siege had begun. Livy claims that they sent another embassy to Hannibal, but his chronology at this point is hopelessly confused and, since Polybius does not mention such a move, it is probably best to reject this. Saguntum fell at the end of 219 or in the first weeks of 218, and news of this may have arrived in Rome within a month. An embassy was sent to Carthage in the latter part of the winter, including both of the outgoing consuls of 219, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Marcus Livius Salinator. Livy tells us that it was headed by Quintus Fabius Maximus, thus completing the trio of men who would play prominent roles in the approaching war, but it seems more likely that the leader was the experienced former censor, Marcus Fabius Buteo, who had fought in Sicily as consul in 245. The embassy protested Hannibal's actions and demanded to know whether he had been acting with the approval of the Carthaginian Senate. The Carthaginians were faced with the choice of condemning Hannibal and handing him and his senior officers over to the Romans for punishment, or going to war with Rome. The style of diplomacy practised by Roman embassies seems seldom to have been very subtle, but in this case they were clearly obliged to seek revenge for an attack on an ally. In one tradition which depicted a strong party opposed to the Barcids, a certain Hanno is supposed to have condemned Hannibal's actions, but on the whole the Carthaginians responded angrily to the brusque Roman demands. They refused to recognize the Ebro treaty, saying that they had never ratified it and citing Catulus' referral of the peace terms in 241 to Rome, and disputed their need to recognize any relationship between Rome and Saguntum. Fabius is supposed to have stood in the middle of the chamber and announced that he carried in the folds of his toga both peace and war, and could let fall from it whichever the Carthaginians chose. Tempers ran high amongst the assembled Punic senators and the presiding suffete shouted out for him to choose. When Fabius responded by declaring that he let fall war, a great shout of 'We accept it!' filled the hall. In this way war was declared, although it may have become inevitable earlier than this. Hannibal certainly began preparations for his invasion of Italy once he returned to winter quarters after the fall of Saguntum. It is also quite possible that the
Comitia Centuriata
had already voted for war if the ambassadors failed to gain a satisfactory response at Carthage.
5
Comitia Centuriata
had already voted for war if the ambassadors failed to gain a satisfactory response at Carthage.
5
Polybius discussed the underlying causes of the renewal of hostilities in some detail and concluded that there were three main factors. The first was the bitterness or anger of Hamilcar Barca at the end of the First War when he was forced to surrender despite remaining undefeated in Sicily. The second, and most important, factor was the unprincipled Roman seizure of Sardinia in 238, whilst Carthage was still reeling from the turmoil of the
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