The Fall of Carthage (48 page)
At the end of 210, Nero returned to Rome and was replaced in the Spanish command by Publius Cornelius Scipio, the eldest son of the consul of 218. During the next five years he showed himself to be the most gifted Roman commander of the war, utterly reversing the situation in Spain, so that at the end of his command the Carthaginians had been completely expelled from the province. Scipio's success should not blind us to the utterly unprecedented nature of his appointment, being given proconsular
imperium
in spite of the fact that he was a private citizen. Other men had received similar grants of power since early in the war, but invariably they had held high magistracies at some point earlier in their careers. Scipio had been
curule
aedile
in 213, but even during the height of the war with Hannibal this post was still essentially a civil office. In his mid twenties, he was far too young to have held the praetorship or consulship, although as a result of his father and uncle's premature deaths, he was head of one of the most distinguished and influential patrician families in Rome. Like most of his generation, the young Scipio had extensive military experience, having reached adulthood at the very beginning of the war. In 218 he had served with his father and perhaps saved his life at Ticinus. He had certainly been present at Trebia and may even have been at Trasimene. As a tribune of the Second Legion he had escaped the disaster at Cannae and played a prominent part in rallying stragglers from the battle and turning them back into some sort of organized force. Our sources are silent, but it seems probable that he saw active service in at least some of the campaigns in Italy during the next few years.
imperium
in spite of the fact that he was a private citizen. Other men had received similar grants of power since early in the war, but invariably they had held high magistracies at some point earlier in their careers. Scipio had been
curule
aedile
in 213, but even during the height of the war with Hannibal this post was still essentially a civil office. In his mid twenties, he was far too young to have held the praetorship or consulship, although as a result of his father and uncle's premature deaths, he was head of one of the most distinguished and influential patrician families in Rome. Like most of his generation, the young Scipio had extensive military experience, having reached adulthood at the very beginning of the war. In 218 he had served with his father and perhaps saved his life at Ticinus. He had certainly been present at Trebia and may even have been at Trasimene. As a tribune of the Second Legion he had escaped the disaster at Cannae and played a prominent part in rallying stragglers from the battle and turning them back into some sort of organized force. Our sources are silent, but it seems probable that he saw active service in at least some of the campaigns in Italy during the next few years.
Livy claims that the Senate decided to hold an election in the
Comitia Centuriam
to choose a proconsul to send to Spain, but that no one seemed to want the post until the young Scipio appeared and was unanimously elected. This is very strange, because pro-magistrates were not elected officials, but appointed by the Senate. It also seems highly unlikely that in the closed world of senatorial politics that Scipio's intentions were not widely known before the event. Perhaps the formal vote was intended to legitimize a decision already made and confirm the legality of Scipio's power, but this does not explain why he was chosen. Attempts to understand the incident in terms of factional politics once again fail to convince and rely on far too many unjustified assumptions about the 'policies' of different families. The Romans were somewhat short of experienced commanders after the heavy casualties of the early years of the war, but there must have been men available who had held senior magistracies. Livy may be right to say that the Spanish command was not an attractive one. Even before their disastrous last campaign the Scipios had complained of lack of supplies. The new commander would continue to face an enemy greatly superior in numbers which would make it extremely difficult to achieve anything significant. There were far better opportunities for distinction in the operations in Italy, which could more easily be translated into future electoral success in Rome. Another factor certainly favoured the choice of Scipio, although it is impossible to know whether or not the Senate were aware of it. The loyalty of the Spanish tribes and chieftains tended to focus around individual leaders rather than states, as the Barcid family had shown. Scipio's name might well prove more useful in regaining lost allies who had once followed his father or uncle than prestige won elsewhere by an experienced, but unknown Roman senator. We can never know precisely how and why Scipio was chosen to go to Spain, but his appointment illustrates the flexibility of the Roman political system at this period just as much as the willingness to give multiple consulships to experienced commanders.
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Comitia Centuriam
to choose a proconsul to send to Spain, but that no one seemed to want the post until the young Scipio appeared and was unanimously elected. This is very strange, because pro-magistrates were not elected officials, but appointed by the Senate. It also seems highly unlikely that in the closed world of senatorial politics that Scipio's intentions were not widely known before the event. Perhaps the formal vote was intended to legitimize a decision already made and confirm the legality of Scipio's power, but this does not explain why he was chosen. Attempts to understand the incident in terms of factional politics once again fail to convince and rely on far too many unjustified assumptions about the 'policies' of different families. The Romans were somewhat short of experienced commanders after the heavy casualties of the early years of the war, but there must have been men available who had held senior magistracies. Livy may be right to say that the Spanish command was not an attractive one. Even before their disastrous last campaign the Scipios had complained of lack of supplies. The new commander would continue to face an enemy greatly superior in numbers which would make it extremely difficult to achieve anything significant. There were far better opportunities for distinction in the operations in Italy, which could more easily be translated into future electoral success in Rome. Another factor certainly favoured the choice of Scipio, although it is impossible to know whether or not the Senate were aware of it. The loyalty of the Spanish tribes and chieftains tended to focus around individual leaders rather than states, as the Barcid family had shown. Scipio's name might well prove more useful in regaining lost allies who had once followed his father or uncle than prestige won elsewhere by an experienced, but unknown Roman senator. We can never know precisely how and why Scipio was chosen to go to Spain, but his appointment illustrates the flexibility of the Roman political system at this period just as much as the willingness to give multiple consulships to experienced commanders.
2
Scipio Africanus was one of the most charismatic figures produced by the Romans during the Punic Wars. In many respects he conformed to the ideal of the youthful military genius which has done much to shape Western ideas of heroism since Alexander the Great. He was that familiar mixture of the man of action and the sensitive, intelligent lover of culture, particularly that of the Greek world. His operations were imaginative, bold and aided by good fortune, so that it is sometimes easy to overlook the careful preparation and planning which underlay the sense of youthful impatience. Polybius' adherence to Scipio Aemilianus ensured that all his ancestors received favourable treatment, but the author's admiration for Africanus seems to have been genuine. He was at great pains to emphasize Scipio's skill as a commander, that the risks he took were the result of sober calculation and not unthinking rashness. A rational Greek with a somewhat cynical view of religion as a useful tool for controlling the masses, Polybius argued that Africanus did not believe the stories of divine assistance which he used to inspire his men. This may be so, but other sources present Scipio as a man who believed that he possessed a special relationship with the gods. This was not unique amongst Roman commanders; both Sulla and Caesar later claimed to be especially lucky because of their personal favour with particular gods and found that their soldiers responded to such claims.
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New Carthage, 209
BC
BC
Scipio took with him to Spain a further reinforcement of 10,000 infantry and probably some cavalry, increasing the Roman army in the province to 28,000 foot and 3,000 horse. This total was barely equal to any one of the three armies maintained by the Carthaginians. Landing at Emporion late in the campaigning season of 210, Scipio concentrated his forces at Tarraco and spent the winter there, negotiating with Spanish leaders. Even before his arrival, Scipio had been contemplating a bold strategy for his first full year's campaigning and the winter months gave the opportunity for the gathering of intelligence and detailed planning, as he later explained in a letter to Philip V which Polybius was to consult. The three Punic armies were widely dispersed, Hasdrubal Barca fighting the Carpetani roughly in the area of modern Toledo, his brother Mago near the Pillars of Hercules
(Straits of Gibraltar), and Hasdrubal Gisgo amongst the Lusitanians. It might be possible for the Roman army to march and confront one of these forces before the others could intervene. However, even if Scipio were able to move into contact there was no guarantee that he would be able to force the enemy into a decisive and successful battle. The longer the campaign continued without result, the greater chance of the arrival of overwhelming enemy forces and the risk that he would suffer at best a humiliating retreat and at worst a disaster similar to 211. Secretiy, Scipio decided that he would instead move against one of the most important strongholds of the Barcid province, the city of New Carthage. The dispersion of the enemy armies made it feasible for the Romans to advance this far without meeting serious opposition, but there was no certainty that they would then be able to take the city, for direct assaults were rarely successful and there would certainly not be sufficient time to blockade the city into submission before relief arrived. Intelligence reports indicated that the garrison was relatively small, whilst fisherman from Tarraco who plied their trade along the coast provided the valuable information that the lagoon apparently preventing access to one side of the city's walls was in fact readily
fordable in several places. Scipio's preparations were careful and thorough, but this, and his eventual success, should not conceal the great boldness and high risks of this operation.
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Keeping their destination secret, Scipio led 25,000 foot and 2,500 horse into the field next spring, whilst his friend Gaius Laelius took the fleet along the coast to New Carthage. Polybius tells us that Scipio reached the city after a seven-day march, but does not tell us where he started from and this seems a very short time to move from Tarraco or anywhere else north of the Ebro. Whatever the details of this operation, it is clear that the Romans arrived rapidly and unexpectedly outside the city. Scipio pitched camp, but made no attempt to surround the city with a wall of circumval-lation. Assembling his troops, he made a speech explaining his reasons for wanting to capture the city and promising rich rewards for men who distinguished themselves, in particular the first man to get over the wall. Finally he claimed that the entire plan had been given to him in a dream by Neptune. Like all speeches supposedly given to massed armies, it is probable that this was delivered to smaller sections in turn.
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The garrison commander, another Mago, had 1,000 mercenaries supported by 2,000 armed townsfolk to meet the next day's assault. The eager but untrained citizens were stationed behind the main gate, ready to sally out, whilst the mercenaries were split into two, half holding the citadel and the remainder the hillock on the eastern, seaward side of the town, where there was also a temple to Aesculapius. The next morning's attack was met by an immediate counter-attack as the armed citizens charged out of the gate and engaged the Roman attacking columns. The defenders of ancient cities often displayed a willingness to fight outside their walls even when greatly outnumbered by the attacking army. Such sallies were a sign of confidence and served the practical purpose of delaying the start of any siegeworks by the attacker, who was forced to fight to gain control of the approaches to the defences. In this case the narrow isthmus connecting the city and mainland in the east prevented the Romans from overwhelming the citizens, despite the delay before all 2,000 had deployed into a fighting line, caused by the column having to leave the city by a single narrow gate. The two sides clashed about a quarter of a mile from the gate, nearer to the Roman camp than to the city walls. Polybius tells us that Scipio, anticipating just such a sortie and planning to inflict serious losses on the defenders, had deliberately kept his men back so that they could fight with every advantage. Despite their lack of training, the citizens fought well and the combat was long and hard, but as the Romans fed in more and more reserves to reinforce the maniples in the fighting line the pressure finally became too much. The Carthaginians broke and fled back to the city, many being cut down as they ran or injured as the mob tried to force its way back through the narrow gateway.
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The Romans followed up eagerly, assault parties racing forward to set ladders against the high city walls. Simultaneously Laelius led the fleet against the southern, seaward side of the city. Scipio himself directed the fighting from high ground near the walls, sheltered from missiles by three soldiers carrying large shields, a measure of prudence which Polybius admired. The Romans attacked with great determination, but made no headway as the barrage of missiles swept men from ladders. As the day drew on and the attacks continued to fail, Scipio had his trumpeters sound the recall. At this stage Mago may well have been satisfied with events. Although his sally had been repulsed, it had delayed the Roman assault and may have reduced its momentum. Neither the Roman army or fleet had made any impression on his walls and the best part of his garrison was still intact. There seemed every reason to believe that he would be able to hold out until relieved by one of the Punic field armies. Polybius claimed that none of the armies was further than ten days' march away.
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It came as some shock to the defenders when the Romans decided to renew their unsuccessful attacks. Usually several days' rest were given to troops before they attacked again after a failed assault. Once again the storming parties rushed against the walls, this time carrying even more ladders than in the earlier advance, more having been issued as the troops rested. Much of their ammunition exhausted, the garrison found it harder to hold back the Roman escalade and only narrowly succeeded in doing so. In the meantime, Scipio had positioned a specially picked unit of 500 men on the northern side of New Carthage, at the edge of the wide lagoon. He had deliberately waited until later in the day when the fishermen of Tarraco had told him that the tide lowered the depth of the water.still further. Without difficulty, the Romans waded through the shallows of the lagoon, following the guides Scipio had brought. Mago had stripped the northern walls of defenders to hold back the onslaught against the isthmus and the 500 men were unopposed as they set their ladders up and ascended. To the east, the rest of the army were inspired by the visible evidence of Neptune's favour and renewed their efforts. Holding their long shields over their heads in the famous
testudo
formation, soldiers approached the gate and began to hack at its timbers with axes. The 500 men made their way along the wall, their body shields and short swords ideally suited to disposing of any defenders who tried to stop them. Reaching the gate they secured it and let in the attacking party, whilst elsewhere the defenders began to give way and allowed many of the escalading troops to climb onto the walls.
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testudo
formation, soldiers approached the gate and began to hack at its timbers with axes. The 500 men made their way along the wall, their body shields and short swords ideally suited to disposing of any defenders who tried to stop them. Reaching the gate they secured it and let in the attacking party, whilst elsewhere the defenders began to give way and allowed many of the escalading troops to climb onto the walls.
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