The Good Book (13 page)

  9. ‘Yet its original cause is quite other, prior in time, more noble in character, and springing more directly from human nature itself?

10. ‘The Latin word for friendship, “amicitia”, is derived from the word for love, “amor”, and affection is the prime mover in forming bonds.

11. ‘For as to material advantages, it often happens that they are obtained by people merely pretending friendship, who treat others with respect only from self-interest.  

12. ‘But friendship by its nature admits of no feigning, no pretence: it is both genuine and spontaneous.

13. ‘Therefore, Fannius, I say that friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than a wish for help:

14. ‘From an inclination of the heart, combined with a feeling of affection, rather than from calculation of the material advantage.

15. ‘The strength of this feeling you may notice in animals. They show such love to their offspring for a time, and are so beloved by them, that they clearly display the bond of affection.

16. ‘But this is even more evident in the case of humanity: first, in the affection between children and parents, an affection which only shocking wickedness can sunder;

17. ‘Next, when the passion of love has attained   mutual strength, on our finding someone with whose character and nature we are in full sympathy,

18. ‘Because we think that we perceive in him the beacon-light of what we cherish or admire, respect or like.

19. ‘For nothing inspires love, nothing conciliates affection, like the answering chord of what we see is good.  

20. ‘Why, in a certain sense we may be said to feel affection even for people we have never seen, owing to their reputation for honesty and virtue.

21. ‘If the attraction of probity is so great that we can love it not only in those we have never seen,

22. ‘But even in an enemy we respect, we need not be surprised if affections are roused when they meet goodness in those with whom intimacy is possible.’

Chapter 5

  1.   ‘I do not deny that affection is strengthened by the receipt of benefits, Fannius, as well as by the perception of a wish to render service,

  2. ‘But when these are added to the original impulse of the heart, a great warmth of feeling springs up.

  3. ‘And if anyone thinks that this comes from a sense of weakness, based on a need for help or security,

  4. ‘All I can say is that he who thinks so gives friendship an origin very base, and an ignoble pedigree.

  5. ‘For if this were the case, a man’s inclination to friendship would be exactly proportional to his low opinion of his own resources.   Whereas the truth is quite the other way.

  6. ‘For when a man’s confidence in himself is greatest, when he is so fortified by virtue and wisdom as to want nothing and to feel absolutely self-dependent,

  7. ‘It is then that he is most conspicuous for seeking out and keeping up friendships.

  8. ‘Did Scipio, for example, want anything of me?   Not the least in the world!   Neither did I of him.

  9. ‘In my case it was an admiration of his virtue, in his case it was perhaps the opinion he entertained of my character, that caused our affection.

10. ‘Closer intimacy added to the warmth of our feelings. But though many great advantages ensued, they were not the source of our affection.

11. ‘For as we are not beneficent and liberal with a view to receiving gratitude, and do not regard kindness as an investment, but follow a natural inclination to liberality;

12. ‘So we looked on friendship as worth seeking, not for ulterior gain, but in the conviction that what it had to give was from first to last included in the feeling itself.

13. ‘When once people have found a friend, their aim is to be on the same footing in regard to affection, and be more inclined to do a good service than to ask a return.’

Chapter 6

  1. ‘Scipio and I frequently discussed friendship. He used to say that the most difficult thing in the world was for a friendship to remain unimpaired to the end of life:

  2. ‘So many things might intervene, as for example conflicting interests, differences of opinion in politics,

  3. ‘Frequent changes in character, whether owing to misfortunes or to advancing years.

  4. ‘He used to illustrate these facts from the analogy of childhood, since the warmest affections between children are often laid aside with their toys;

  5. ‘And even if they managed to keep friendships into adolescence, they were sometimes broken by a rivalry in courtship,

  6. ‘Or for some other advantage to which their mutual claims were incompatible.

  7. ‘Even if the friendship was prolonged beyond that time, yet it frequently received a shock should the two happen to be competitors for office.

  8. ‘For while the most fatal blow to friendship in the majority of cases was the lust of money,

  9. ‘In the case of the best people it was rivalry for office and reputation,

10. ‘By which it had often happened that the most violent enmity had arisen between the closest friends.

11. ‘Again, wide and justifiable breaches were caused by an immoral request made by one friend of another, to pander to someone’s desire to assist him in doing wrong.  

12. ‘A refusal, though perfectly right, is attacked by the asker as a violation of the laws of friendship.

13. ‘Now the people who have no scruples about the requests they make to their friends, thereby allow that they are ready to have no scruples about what they will do for their friends;

14. ‘And it is the recriminations of such people which commonly not only quench friendships, but give rise to lasting enmities.  

15. ‘“In fact,” Cato used to say, “these fatalities overhang friendship in such numbers that it requires not only wisdom but good luck to escape them all.”

16. ‘With these premises, then, let us first, if you please Fannius, examine the question: how far ought personal feeling to go in friendship?

17. ‘I think that the plea of having acted in the interests of a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong action.

18. ‘For, seeing that a belief in a person’s virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue is abandoned.

19. ‘But if we decide it is right to grant our friends whatever they wish, and to ask them for whatever we wish,

20. ‘Perfect wisdom must be assumed on both sides if no mischief is to follow.

21. ‘But we cannot assume this perfect wisdom; for we are speaking only of such friends as are ordinarily met with,

22. ‘Whether we have actually seen them or have been told about them: people, that is to say, of everyday life.  

23. ‘We may then lay down this rule of friendship: neither ask nor consent to do what is wrong.

24. ‘For the plea “for friendship’s sake” is a discreditable one, and not to be allowed.’

Chapter 7

  1. ‘Let this, then, be laid down as the first law of friendship, that we should ask from friends, and do for friends, only what is good.

  2. ‘But do not let us wait to be asked either: let there always be an eager readiness, and an absence of hesitation.

  3. ‘Let us have the courage to give advice with candour. In friendship, let the influence of friends who give good advice be paramount.

  4. ‘I offer you these rules, Fannius, because I believe that remarkable opinions are held by some, who say we should avoid close friendships, for fear that one person should have to endure the anxieties of several.

  5. ‘Each person, they say, has enough and to spare on his own hands; it is too bad to be involved in the cares of other people.

  6. ‘The wisest course is to hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible; you can then tighten or slacken them at your will.

  7. ‘For the first condition of a happy life, they say, is freedom from care, which no one can enjoy if he has to worry for others as well as himself.

  8. ‘Another opinion is still less generous: that friendships should be sought solely for the sake of the profit they give, not from motives of feeling and affection;

  9. ‘And that therefore just in proportion as a man’s power and means of support are lowest, he is most eager to gain friendships.

10. ‘What ignoble philosophy! For let us examine these two doctrines.

11. ‘What is the value of this “freedom from care”? It might seem tempting at first sight, but in practice it has often to be put on one side.

12. ‘For there is no business and no course of action demanded from us by our honour which we can consistently avoid from a mere wish to escape anxiety.

13. ‘No, if we wish to avoid anxiety we must avoid virtue itself, which necessarily involves some anxious thoughts in abhorring qualities that are opposite to itself,

14. ‘As for example kindness for ill-nature, self-control for licentiousness, courage for cowardice.

15. ‘Thus you may notice that it is the just who are most pained by injustice,

16. ‘The brave who are most pained by cowardly actions,

17. ‘The temperate who are most pained by depravity.

18. ‘It is then characteristic of a rightly ordered mind to be pleased at what is good and grieved at the reverse.’

Chapter 8

  1. ‘Seeing then that the wise are not exempt from heartache, why should we banish friendship from our lives, for fear of its involving us in some amount of distress?

  2. ‘If you take away emotion, what difference remains, I do not say between a man and a beast, but between a man and a stone or a log of wood?

  3. ‘So I say again, the clear indication of virtue, to which a mind of like character is naturally attracted, is the beginning of friendship.

  4. ‘When that is the case the rise of affection is a necessity.

  5. ‘For what can be more irrational than to take delight in objects incapable of response,

  6. ‘Such as office, fame, splendid buildings and personal decoration,

  7. ‘And yet to take little or no delight in a sentient being endowed with virtue, who has the faculty of loving and returning love?

  8. ‘For nothing gives more pleasure than a return of affection, and the mutual interchange of kind feeling and good offices.

  9. ‘And if we add, as we may fairly do, that nothing so powerfully attracts one thing to itself as likeness does to friendship,

10. ‘It will at once be recognised that the good love the good, and attach them to themselves as though they were united by blood and nature.

11. ‘For nothing can be more eager for what is like itself than nature.

12. ‘So, my dear Fannius, we may look upon this as an established fact, that between good people there is, as if of necessity, a kindly feeling, which is the true source of friendship.

13. ‘Again, the believers in the “interest” theory appear to me to destroy the most attractive link in the chain of friendship.

14. ‘For it is not so much what one gets from a friendship that gives one pleasure, as the warmth of the friend’s feeling;

15. ‘And we only care for a friend’s service if it has been prompted by affection.

16. ‘And so far from its being true that lack of means is a motive for seeking friendship, it is usually those who possess sufficient means,

17. ‘And above all who possess virtue (which is a man’s best support; so the virtuous are least in need of others), who are most open-handed and beneficent.

18. ‘Indeed I am inclined to think that friends ought at times to be in want of something.

19. ‘For instance, what scope would my affections have had if Scipio had never wanted my advice or co-operation at home or abroad?

20. ‘It is not friendship, then, that follows material advantage, but material advantage follows friendship.’

Chapter 9

  1. ‘Who would choose a life of the greatest wealth and abundance on condition of neither loving nor being loved by any creature?

  2. ‘That is the sort of life tyrants endure. They can count on no fidelity, no affection, no security in the goodwill of anyone.

  3. ‘For them all is suspicion and anxiety; for them there is no possibility of friendship.  

  4. ‘Who can love one whom he fears, or by whom he knows that he is feared?

  5. ‘Yet such men often have a show of friendship offered them, but it is only a fair-weather show.

  6. ‘If it ever happen that they fall, as it frequently does, they will at once understand how friendless they are.

  7. ‘It often happens in the case of men of unusually great means that their very wealth forbids genuine friendships.

  8. ‘For not only is fortune blind herself, but she generally makes those blind also who enjoy her favours.

  9. ‘Now, can anything be more foolish than that men who have all the opportunities that wealth can bestow, should secure all else that money can buy: horses, servants, costly plate;