The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames (65 page)

  
1
Force 17:
Peter Taylor,
States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence
(London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 38. Arafat’s intelligence bureau was initially called Rasd. Force 17 did not emerge until the mid-1970s.

  
2
they all should be fluent in Hebrew:
Mustafa Zein, interview, Amman, October 7, 2012.

  
3
“He was a youthful Marlon Brando …”:
Ibid.

  
4
“explore the possibility of contact …”:
Mustafa Zein, e-mail to author, August 11, 2012.

  
5
“The man was a magnet”:
Ibid.

  
6
a very thin Swiss platinum watch:
Zein, “Deceit with Extreme Prejudice,” p. 117. Photographs of Salameh in the 1970s show him wearing a thin silver-colored watch.

  
7
Ali Hassan Salameh was born:
Nadia Salti Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan” and “After I Die,”
Monday Morning
(Beirut weekly magazine), January 29–February 4, 1979, pp. 16–26. Ali Hassan Salameh says in this interview, “I was born in Iraq in 1942.” Other sources report that he was born in Qula, Palestine, in 1940.

  
8
“Salameh has turned Ramla
[
town
]
into a centre of disorder”:
Michael Bar-Zohar and Eitan Haber,
The Quest for the Red Prince
(Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 1983, 2002), pp. 28–30. Bar-Zohar and Haber seem to be quoting Haganah intelligence files, but their book has no source notes.

  
9
the British never caught Salameh:
Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cuppers,
Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine
(London: Enigma, 2010), p. 201; “Three Nazi Air Officers Caught in Palestine,”
New York Times
, October 28, 1944; Rick Fountain, “Nazis Planned Palestine Subversion,”
BBC News
, July 5, 2001.

10
Salameh’s guerrillas allegedly carried out the attack:
Bar-Zohar and Haber,
Quest for the Red Prince
, p. 69; Benny Morris,
1948: The First Arab-Israeli War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 101.

11
During the first six months of 1948, Salameh’s force grew:
Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001
(New York: Vintage Books, 1999, 2001), p. 194; B. Morris,
1948
, p. 121.

12
Salameh boasted to a reporter:
“Tel Aviv Seizure Planned,”
New York Times
, March 25, 1948. “26 Jews Are Slain in Convoy Attacks,”
New York Times
, March 25, 1948.

13
On June 2, 1948, he died:
Bar-Zohar and Haber,
Quest for the Red Prince
, p. 89; Mahdi Abdul Hadi, ed.,
Palestinian Personalities: A Biographic Dictionary
(Jerusalem: Passia, 2006), pp. 172–73.

14
“We must mention two Palestinian commanders”:
Bar-Zohar and Haber,
Quest for the Red Prince
, p. 89.

15
“The influence of my father …”:
Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan” and “After I Die.”

16
“I wanted to be myself”:
Ibid.

17
Ali studied engineering:
Abdul Hadi,
Palestinian Personalities
, pp. 172–73.

18
Nasser offered scholarships:
Mohammed Natour (Abu Tayeb), “The Martyrdom of Ali Hassan Salameh,” unpublished manuscript, courtesy of Mustafa Zein.

19
Shortly afterwards he joined Yasir Arafat’s Fatah:
Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan” and “After I Die.”

20
“I became very attached to Fatah”:
Ibid.

21
Salameh was sent back to Cairo:
Yezid Sayigh,
Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 180.

22
He was methodical and patient:
In 1968, Ali Hassan supposedly called a press conference in Cairo and announced that he had exacted vengeance for his father’s death twenty years earlier. He announced that he had smuggled himself into occupied Jerusalem and together with other underground Fatah cadres had bought a delivery van. He had then parked it near a crowded market and rigged a two-hour timing device to explode its cargo of gasoline bottles and dynamite. “The young guerrilla spoke with undisguised satisfaction,” reported the
New York Post
, “of the explosion which killed twelve people and wounded fifty-three more.” The only problem with this story is that the
Life
magazine account of the Cairo press conference cites a nonexistent
New York Post
story. Neither the
New York Times
nor any other media reported on this alleged Cairo press conference. So perhaps the story is Mossad disinformation, planted with
Life
magazine to burnish Salameh’s credentials as a legendary terrorist. See Paul O’Neil, “A Charming Assassin Who Loved the Good Life,”
Life
, April 1979, p. 102. The reports of Andreas Baader’s dealings with Salameh can be found in Odd Karsten Tveit’s
Alt for Israel: Oslo-Jerusalem, 1948–78
(Oslo: J. W. Cappelens, 1996). See also Stefan Aust’s
The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of the RAF
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 72.

23
Ali Hassan had married well:
O’Neil, “Charming Assassin,” p. 102. O’Neil erroneously reported that Nashrawan was the granddaughter of the grand mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Husseini. The families are unrelated. Nashrawan says the family still has the deeds to their property in Haifa. Her brother, Hisham al-Sharif, married Ali Hassan Salameh’s sister, Jihad. Mustafa Zein, e-mail to author, March 17, 2013.

24
David Ignatius’s novel:
David Ignatius, interview, July 28, 2010. Ignatius explained to the author that these details of Ames’s first meeting with Salameh were entirely factual.

25
“Ali looked at Bob …”:
Mustafa Zein, interview, Amman, October 8, 2012.

26
“You Arabs claim your views are not heard …”:
David Ignatius, “The Secret History of the U.S.-PLO Terror Talks,”
Washington Post
, December 4, 1988.

27
prime minister Harold Wilson:
Wilson arrived in Washington on January 27, 1970. Richard Nixon, “Remarks of Welcome to Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Great Britain,” January 27, 1970,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2502
.

28
Ames’s promising lead:
David Ignatius, e-mail to author, June 11, 2013; David Ignatius,
Agents of Innocence
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), pp. 82–86.

29
“Bob had Ali Hassan over …”:
Yvonne Ames, interview, November 19–20, 2010.

30
“He moved like a panther”:
Frank Anderson, interview, November 4, 2010. 94
“Love Me Tender”:
Taylor,
States of Terror
, p. 55.

31
an IQ of 180:
O’Neil, “Charming Assassin,” p. 101, and “Death of a Terrorist,”
Time
, February 5, 1979.

32
“People expect a revolutionary …”:
Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan” and “After I Die.”

33
“Professionally speaking”:
Frank Anderson, interview, November 4, 2010.

34
“The PLO factions were the darling …”:
Hume Horan, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 3, 2000, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

35
“I didn’t think the king …”:
Harrison Symmes interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Box 1, Folder 460, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

36
was virtually alone …”:
O’Connell,
King’s Counsel
, pp. 99–100.

37
“Bob was just very clearly anti-Hashemite …”:
Dewey Clarridge, interview, November 26, 2011. Another DO officer, Thomas Twetten, confirms that Ames’s anti-Hashemite views were long-standing. Twetten was stationed in Amman in 1980 when he met with Ames in Washington: “I was pleased to meet with Bob Ames, who had a major effect on policy at that time. And I was quite shocked to have him accuse me of a pro-Hashemite bias. He seemed quite sure I did, based on my position. And I considered myself quite balanced, based on my reporting from Amman. His irritation seemed an unwarranted provocation.” Thomas Twetten, e-mail to author, February 21, 2011.

38
“misinterpreting his own personal experience …”:
O’Connell,
King’s Counsel
, pp. 99–100.

39
“Bob was prescient”:
Graham Fuller, interview, April 3, 2012.

40
“Foreign Minister Eban told
[
U.S
.]
Ambassador
[
Charles
]
Yost …”:
Document 325, “Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, September 24, 1970,” in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Nixon-Ford Administrations
, vol. 24,
Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970
.

41
“any move to undermine Hussein …”:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, p. 285; Nigel Ashton,
King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 154, 398.

42
“Like all of us who get to know anything …”:
George Cave, interview, March 14, 2011.

43
“it was not as though there was a Palestinian people …”: Times
(London), June 15, 1969; David Hirst,
The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East
(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003), p. 392.

44
“Palestinian guerrillas …”: CBS Evening News
, September 6, 1970.

45
“betting all his chips”:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, p. 274; David Raab,
Terror in Black September: The First Eyewitness Account of the Infamous 1970 Hijackings
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 138–39; Hume Horan, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 3, 2000.

46
“It was very messy”:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, pp. 274–75; Hume Horan, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 3, 2000.

47
“The fight goes on …”:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, p. 275; Peter Snow and David Phillips,
The Arab Hijack War: The Whole Story of the Most Incredible Act of Piracy in the Decade
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), pp. 104, 141.

48
King Hussein sent a frantic message:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, p. 276;
“Black September Plea to Israel,”
BBC News
, January 1, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/lowmiddle_east/1095221.stm
.

49
“There were atrocities …”:
Bird,
Crossing Mandelbaum Gate
, p. 277; Hume Horan, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 3, 2000.

50
It was Salameh’s idea:
Bassam Abu Sharif,
Arafat and the Dream of Palestine
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 34.

51
“It left an indelible mark …”:
Stephan, “Abu Hassan by Abu Hassan” and “After I Die.”

52
moved to write a poem:
Bob Ames, untitled poem, Yvonne Ames papers.

53
Salameh was providing raw intelligence:
Timothy Naftali,
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism
(New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 78.

54
“under a lot of pressure …”:
Frank Anderson, interview, November 4, 2010. Helms confided this to Anderson in 1992 during one of their “mentoring” lunches. At the time, Anderson was chief of the Near East Division in the Directorate of Operations.

55
“Headquarters in Langley wanted Salameh …”:
Bruce Riedel, interview, March 30, 2011. Riedel says he was asked to review the entire Salameh-Ames file as part of a general review of Fatah’s connection to terrorism: “Were they really clean or not?” He says it was not a security investigation of Ames or Salameh.

56
“There is a lot that is just a matter of opinion …”:
Henry Miller-Jones, e-mail to author, March 10, 2012.

57
“Bob would say”: John Morris
, interview, March 22, 2011.

58
“My best sources were never recruitable”:
Graham Fuller, interview, April 3, 2012.

59
“Ali’s ambition …”:
Frank Anderson, interview, November 4, 2010.

60
“I remember avidly reading …”:
Charles Allen, interview, December 21, 2012.

61
“I thought it was a mistake”: Charles Waverly
, interview, March 28, 2011.

62
“I was of the opinion …”:
Sam Wyman, interview, March 28, 2011.

63
“An agent does not always mean a paid agent”: Hillel Katz
, interview, Tel Aviv, November 11, 2012.

64
“A CIA officer would start the ball rolling …”:
Zein, “Deceit with Extreme Prejudice,” p. 160.

65
Bob gave Mustafa handwritten instructions:
Ibid., p. 163-A. Zein reproduces the handwritten note in his unpublished memoir—and it quite clearly appears to be in Ames’s neat handwriting. Ames misspelled Cairo’s famed Shepheard Hotel as Shepard’s Hotel.

66
“a complete professional …”:
Eveland,
Ropes of Sand
, p. 143.

67
“The meeting did not go well”:
Taylor,
States of Terror
, p. 70.