The Great Train Robbery (6 page)

GPO Mail, High Value Treasury Notes

6.50pm ex Glasgow to London Euston

Driver: Jack Mills – Crewe Loco

Co Driver: David Whitby – Crewe Loco

Guard: Thomas James Miller – Euston

Train stopped at unauthorised signal, signal faked with aid of glove to cover green light and four six volt Ever-Ready Dry Cell batteries to keep ‘Red’ showing. Driver and Co-Driver attacked and Diesel Engine and two front coaches un-coupled. Driver forced to take it about one mile to a point at Sears Crossing, where raiders attacked GPO Staff in Royal Mail Coach K30204M and 120 Mail bags stolen.

Believed Army type vehicle – 3-Ton with Large Wheels. High Floor. (2) Land Rover Type. Grey or Light blue. (3) Unknown.
15

By the time the first police car containing two officers arrived at Cheddington at 4.36 a.m., the gang and the money were long gone. As dawn broke, the train was extensively photographed before being moved to Cheddington station to be fingerprinted. The sabotaged signals, the cut telephone lines and abandoned pick-axe handles used to smash into the carriage were caught on film, but no prints were found. It seemed there was very little for the police to go on and the gang was in with a chance of getting clean away.

Notes

  
1
.  locomotive D318 was used by the film company. The 1988 film
Buster
, starring Phil Collins, used Class 40 locomotive D306. The technical information about the train, its coaches and layout are to be found in POST 120/110 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).

  
2
.  The basic narrative of this chapter is drawn from the regular investigation reports written by DCS Gerald McArthur (original reference 202/63/943), which were originally closed until 2045. They were opened on 25/6/10 as a result of a Freedom of Information application made in connection with research for this book (TNA, DPP 2/3717/1). A significant number of sections in these reports were redacted under Section 40 (2) of the FOI Exemptions regulations (and at the time of writing remain redacted until 2045). However, full and unredacted zerox versions of some of the McArthur reports that were originally copied by Scotland Yard to the Post Office Investigation Branch are to be found at the British Postal Archive; see POST 120/96, 120/97, 120/98, 120/99. While some of these have deteriorated over the past fifty years due to light exposure, they remain the only unedited copies available to researchers.

  
3
.  POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).

  
4
.  DPP 2/3718, part 3 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).

  
5
.  
Ibid
.

  
6
.  Although McArthur was, in theory, a Scotland Yard adviser to the Chief Constable of Buckinghamshire, Brigadier John Cheney, he was effectively in charge of the police investigation in Buckinghamshire.

  
7
.  POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).

  
8
.  DPP 2/3718, part 1 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).

  
9
.  POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).

10
.  DPP 2/3718, part 1 of 6 (originally closed until 2045, but opened under FOI request 25/6/10).

11
.  POST 120/96 (originally closed until 1993; opened 1994).

12
.  
Ibid
.

13
.  
Ibid
.

14
.  HO 287/1496 (originally closed until 1995; opened 1996).

15
.  BTPC/Euston A.001718.

A
t 8.30 a.m., Detective Constable (DC) Keith Milner from Bucks CID in Aylesbury arrived at Bridego Bridge:

Just off the south west side of the bridge I saw two rods with white material attached. On the track by the bridge itself I found a railway man’s cap and a long crowbar. I took possession of these articles. I then went to the home signals at Sears Crossing, where I took possession of 4 x 6 volt batteries which had been connected to the red signal light, and a glove which covered the green signal light. Inside the glove was a piece of black paper.
1

At around the same time as Milner arrived at the trackside, Clifford Osmond, controller of the Post Office Investigation Branch, based at St Martin-le-Grand in the City of London, telephoned Brigadier John Cheney, chief constable of Buckinghamshire, and it was agreed that a meeting should be held of all interested parties at GPO Headquarters, London, at 3 p.m. that afternoon.

At 10.30 a.m. a message was sent to New Scotland Yard and to the chief constables of Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire and Northamptonshire as follows:

At approximately 02.45 hours today a mail train robbery occurred between Leighton Buzzard and Cheddington, Bucks. 120 mail bags containing a very considerable sum of money are missing. It is thought that the persons responsible may have hidden up and attempted to get away by mingling with normal morning traffic. Observation and frequent spot checks of traffic vehicles is requested.
2

Shortly afterwards, Brigadier Cheney telephoned Commander George Hatherill, head of CID at Scotland Yard, asking that the Yard be represented at the GPO conference scheduled for that afternoon. The conference was held at the head office of the GPO in London and some thirty attended, the most prominent being:

Brigadier J.N. Cheney, chief constable of Buckinghamshire Constabulary, and representatives of his staff including DS M. Fewtrell; Commander G.H. Hatherill, OBE of the Criminal Investigation Department, New Scotland Yard, and representatives of his staff including DS G. McArthur; Brigadier K.S. Holmes, CBE, director of the Postal Services Department, General Post Office, and representatives of his staff; Mr C.G. Osmond, OBE, controller of the Investigation Branch, General Post Office, and representatives of his staff; Mr W.O. Gaye, chief of police, (CID) British Transport Police, and representatives of his staff.
3

Brigadier Cheney and DS Fewtrell told the gathering about the information in their possession regarding the robbery and the enquiries being conducted. The IB’s controller, Clifford Osmond, said that he believed the theft would be in the region of £2.5 million, which was greeted with shock and incredulity.
4

At the conclusion of the meeting, Hatherill told Cheney that DS Gerald McArthur would be sent to Aylesbury to assist in the enquiries. McArthur and Detective Sergeant (DSgt) Jack Pritchard later left for Aylesbury where they arrived at 10.20 p.m. that evening. On arrival they immediately set about arranging for road checks to be made the following morning for a period of two hours, commencing at one hour before the time of the robbery to one hour after the time of the robbery. It was hoped by this means to trace regular travellers in the area who might have seen something that could assist enquiries. They also conferred with several local farmers and with the aid of an Ordnance Survey map examined the area surrounding the scene of the robbery. Deserted farms and outbuildings, ex-RAF and army camps likely to be used by the thieves as a hideout were also pointed out to them.

Early the following morning, McArthur and Fewtrell discussed the statements made by train driver Mills, fireman Whitby and the GPO staff, who had all mentioned one of the robbers saying that someone would be watching the train for thirty minutes and concluded that this was possibly the time that the thieves had allowed themselves to get clear away from the scene of the robbery to their hideout. They further calculated that if this was so, then the maximum distance they could have travelled would be in the region of 15 to 30 miles.
5

The possibility was discussed of being able, even with maximum help, to search such a vast area in an attempt to locate the robbers before they vacated their hideout and destroyed any evidence it may have contained. They believed it to be an impossible task but decided to announce to press and radio reporters their belief that the hideout was within 30 miles, knowing that the ensuing publicity might well concern the robbers enough to make them abandon their hideout before they were ready. The announcement to the press was made at the first press conference on 9 August 1963.
6

DSgt Pritchard remained at Police Headquarters in Aylesbury while DS McArthur and DS Fewtrell left for Cheddington station where the train was now under guard. DS Ray of the fingerprint department, who was to carry out a forensic search of the locomotive, met them at Cheddington only to find the engine missing, which was now apparently in Crewe. After an angry phone call to British Railways officials, McArthur was promised the engine’s return the following morning, Saturday 10 August.

On Friday afternoon, a series of conferences were held at Police Headquarters in Aylesbury with officers of the British Transport Police and the Post Office Investigation Branch. It was agreed that the IB would take statements from the GPO employees who had been on the train, other than those in the HVP coach, who had already given statements to the Railway Police. It was also decided to release information to the press, radio and television concerning the 10-ton army lorry seen by David Whitby.

The IB, being a post office department, came under the overall responsibility of a government minister, the postmaster general. Reginald Bevins, the Conservative MP for Liverpool Toxteth, broke off his family holiday as soon as news of the robbery reached him and flew to London. After a one-hour briefing by ministry officials and IB officers Frank Cook and Harry Lyons, Bevins spoke to press and TV journalists: ‘I want to find out why the precautions taken were not adequate. Clearly our security arrangements have not been satisfactory … one cannot rule out an inside job.’
7

On Bevins’s instructions, one of the key lines of the IB investigation was to focus on establishing whether or not it was an inside job and, if so, who was responsible for assisting the gang.

When the Post Office held their own post-mortem on TPO security the following afternoon, the issue of possible inside collusion very quickly surfaced:

Minutes of a meeting held on the 9 August 1963
To discuss the security of TPOs

1.  
The Chairman
referred to the attack on the Up Special TPO on the 8 August when very heavy losses were incurred. He thought that all the time the Post Office was committed to carrying HVPs our policy should continue to concentrate the traffic on TPOs. The recent attack had demonstrated however that the security of TPOs was not adequate and it was necessary to make them as safe as possible with the minimum of delay. The present meeting had been called to discuss additional security measures that the Post Office thought to be necessary.

2.  
Repairs to HVP coaches
The Chairman explained that there were three special HVP carriages which had been equipped with bars over the windows, additional bolts and catches on doors, lockers and bandit alarms. The up and down special TPOs each included one of these carriages and the other was held in reserve. On the 8 August these three carriages had been withdrawn from service for repairs and an old HVP vehicle had been included in the up special which did not include the special security measures. The LPR confirmed that one of the special carriages had been returned and would be in use tonight. Mr Fiennes confirmed that unless there is something especially wrong with the other two coaches they would be returned to service by the beginning of next week. He would also find out why it took so long to affect the repairs.

3.  
Reserve HVP coaches
The Chairman then suggested that some action was required to avoid a repetition of the situation. It was agreed that an additional reserve carriage should be specially fitted out as quickly as possible. The LPR agreed to make arrangements to let Mr Fiennes have the numbers of the carriages to be so fitted together with a list of the scale of protection required.

4.  
Security installations
LPR confirmed that bolts and throw over catches had been fitted on all the coaches on the up and down specials except on one gangway door. The LPR agreed to arrange for this to be done immediately. Mr. Mitchell confirmed that the bolts and catches were adequate provided they are fitted correctly. The LPR agreed to arrange for all new fitments to be inspected.

Finally, Mr W O Gaye, Chief of Police (Crime) BR explained that experiments were being made by the railways in conjunction with the Bank of England and the Home Office radio departments with a view to establishing radio communication between the train and the constabularies through which they have passed. He agreed to take the first opportunity of mentioning the post office interests in these experiments with a view to possible participation.
8

The fact that all three of the special HVP security coaches equipped with barred windows, reinforced doors and bandit alarms had, for the very first time ever, been out of service at the same time due to various defects, raised once more the spectre of possible inside collusion. Earlier that morning, Bevins had again been pressed on the matter by BBC TV News, and had responded:

BEVINS: These trains have made thousands and thousands of journeys without the slightest mishap, without the slightest loss of money over the past 120 years; this is the first time it’s happened.

INTERVIEWER: Are you blaming British Railways?

BEVINS: No, I’m not saying that at the moment.

INTERVIEWER: Are you now more convinced than you were yesterday that this may be an inside job?

BEVINS: Well, when I was asked the question yesterday, I said I did not rule out the possibility of it being an inside job, I don’t rule it out now.
9

Bevins clearly had the bit between his teeth on this issue, as after the television interview he wrote a memo to his private secretary making his suspicions crystal clear:

Private Secretary