Read The Great Train Robbery Online
Authors: Andrew Cook
‘This was no hoax. Whoever put the detonators on the track was obviously after the mail train’.
Minutes after the goods train had gone on, the mail train from Peterborough and Norwich flashed by, unmolested, for London. Three of the ten coaches were travelling sorting offices. British Railways Police and Essex detectives met yesterday to discuss the Great Train Robbery that never was.
5
Apart from failing in its objective, the Marks Tey incident differed in another significant way from the Brighton line hold-ups: it seemed that the gang responsible did not have the knowledge or ability to stop the train by manipulating the signals. Instead, they employed a rather clumsy and imprecise method of doing so, which had the added disadvantage of attracting unwanted attention. In spite of this, the hold-up location had been well chosen on a lonely stretch of the line, where the railway crossed over a country lane by way of a low bridge. From the lane, the main A12 trunk road was only a minute or two away, giving a fast and direct route of escape from Marks Tey into the heart of East London.
Although the overnight events at Marks Tey were covered in perfunctory fashion by other Fleet Street papers, the
Daily Express
reported in greater detail, making it a major headline story. Uniquely,
Express
reporter Frank Howitt had been sent to Essex to get first-hand accounts from railway officials. Whilst the glare of the media spotlight was on the small Essex village between Braintree and Colchester, the Post Office Investigation Branch launched their own secret investigation:
PSD/HMB
(1) In view of the publicity given in the press on the 27th January 1962 (particularly in the Daily Express) about a suspected attempt to hold up the East Anglia T.P.O, I think we should urgently ensure that TPO security is as good as it should be – particularly when the train is brought to a halt on some pretext.
(2) The question of access by corridor on part passenger part TPO trains and of window/door security on all TPOs are matters which might be reviewed. The IB would send a representative if required.
(3) It may well be that all reasonable steps have already been taken as the result of the IB minute dated 21 September 1960 (copy enclosed) – but risk now is, perhaps, sufficient to warrant this suggested review.
(C G OSMOND)
29 January 1962
6
Despite this second request to Royal Mail security, it seems that, yet again, no meaningful review of TPO security was undertaken. Four months later, Osmond fired off yet another missive to the PSD/PMB security department, this time as a result of a spate of robberies carried out on mail vans and sub-post offices, which again had all the hallmarks of inside information:
PSD/PMB (Security)
17 May 1962
Postal security arrangements have been under review following on the general intensification of attacks on post offices and on the mails which started just over a year ago. Many additional precautions have been and are being taken which, when fully implemented, should lead to a considerable improvement in our defences against thieves and robbers.
This circular:-
(a) Brings together information and instructions about security which have been issued in various ways but which have not yet been carried into the permanent rule book;
(b) Draws attention to points in the permanent rule books that are of special importance at the present time;
(c) Contains some new instructions, which are sidelined for ease of reference, and
(d) Makes proposals for obtaining, through discussion or local Whitley Committees, the fullest measures of staff co-operation in making local security arrangements effective.
Whilst it is not desired to disturb authorised and long-standing arrangements which are satisfactory and which may have been introduced to avoid irksome attendances, the position in such cases should be reviewed to ensure that the safeguarding arrangements are defensible and that the unavoidable ‘waiting period’ is as short as possible (POR B3 II 3(a)).
Branch and Sub Offices.
Imposters, dressed as postmen, have presented themselves at Branch or Sub Post Offices as the official collector and have been given the registered despatch. Officers making up registered despatches at Branch or Sub Offices should, if the collector is not personally known to them, always insist on the production of one of the means of identification listed in POR B4 XIV 1 and B 4a I 9. They must not release the despatch before the appointed time.
Collections.
Where it can be arranged without disproportionate cost, steps should be taken to avoid important collections of registered mail from Branch and Sub Branch Offices or private firms being followed by ordinary collections from firms’ or public posting boxes.
7
As a result of follow-up enquiries, the
Express
men established that there had indeed been a dramatic escalation in post office crime during the past two years, as can be seen from the statistics they obtained:
1955-56 | 17 offences |
1958-59 | 67 offences |
1959-60 | 76 offences |
1961-62 | 91 offences |
It seemed that inside information on when post office vans would leave certain sorting offices, their routes and the amounts of money on board was being supplied to criminals, along with knowledge to assist them in identifying the High Value Packet mailbags from regular ones. In addition to cash, hauls included bulk supplies of postage and National Insurance stamps, which could be sold on in pubs, clubs and indeed to business firms for considerably less than their face value.
A source within the Flying Squad, Chief Inspector Peter Vibart, told the
Express
team, off the record, that the criminals concerned almost certainly had the advantage of floor plans and security details of certain post offices and sorting offices, and knew the location of strongrooms. It was also apparent that keys or copy keys were being used in such raids, as there was never any sign of forced entry. Vibart was an important source, as most Flying Squad detectives (especially Tommy Butler, who would eventually be promoted to lead the squad the following year) had a reputation of remaining tight-lipped.
Vibart had apparently been grateful to the
Express
for not using a story that came their way concerning a highly embarrassing situation he had found himself in not long before. He believed that there were several gangs at work specialising in mail crime, all benefiting to a greater or lesser extent from inside information. Furthermore, he indicated that one James Bryan, who was renowned in the criminal underworld as one of the best ‘locksmiths’ in the business, was believed to be making and supplying keys for post office jobs to at least one of these gangs, if not more.
8
Sources on the court circuit also proved useful. Convictions for mail crime were rare, although on 7 July 1962, three men - William Robertson, Michael O’Leary and Arthur Atkins - were remanded at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court in connection with receiving £3,740 19
s
2
d
of stolen National Insurance stamps and £1,540 16
s
of postage stamps. Whether these men were part of a mail crime gang or merely receivers was not apparent at the time. Suspicions remained, however, that at least one of them had a deeper involvement.
9
At the end of August 1962 the mail crime spree took a more dramatic turn. Even
The Times
began to take more notice, although its coverage was invariably buried deep within the paper:
A mailbag robbery which appeared to have been carried out under cover of a fire in a Victoria to Brighton train on Wednesday evening was being investigated last night by Sussex Police and British Transport Commission officers. Two mailbags, one of them containing more than 20 registered packets, were missing from the train.
The fire, in an empty compartment, was noticed when the train reached Preston Park Station, two miles from Brighton. A porter attempted to control it with a fire extinguisher, but was unsuccessful and the fire brigade was called. The robbery is believed to have taken place when the guard left his van to fight the fire. The value of the contents of the bags was not known last night.
In April this year five men in railway type peaked caps made a £15,000 mailbag haul in Brighton as a train was being unloaded just before midnight.
10
Once more the
Daily Express
crime team were at the forefront of the story. Unlike
The Times
and other press reports that day, theirs was a front page story that was again derived from on-the-spot interviews at the scene:
The mailbag bandits operating on the Victoria to Brighton Line have pulled off a brand new kind of snatch, it was discovered yesterday.
To get at the van carrying the registered mail they set the train on fire. Coshing a lone, unprotected guard is out. It is old hat to dress up as a railwayman to rob the mails. Tampering with the signals to hold up the train – a technique used twice before – is more complicated than luring the guard away from his van by setting a compartment alight with petrol soaked rags. That was what they did on the 10.28 pm train arriving just on midnight at Preston Park on the outskirts of Brighton from Victoria. Old style bandits over the last two years have got away with a total of £32,000.
The post office could not estimate last night the value of the registered mail in two bags now missing. Railway porter George Kay was standing in the booking office at Preston Park when the 10.28 pulled in 18 minutes late. He said last night: ‘I saw smoke coming from an empty carriage and ran the length of the platform to warn the motorman. He jumped from the engine and came to help and at the same time the guard came running from his van as the platform roof was getting scorched. I thought the fire was getting worse so I called the fire brigade. I had no idea that while all this was going on somebody was getting at the mail.’
The guard, Mr Thomas Guile, said: ‘It seems obvious that one of the gang set a compartment ablaze at Haywards Heath, jumped out and got into another. At Preston Park a porter told me that there was a compartment on fire. I grabbed an extinguisher and ran. There was a small fire in the corner but as soon as I pulled the door open it blazed up and out of the compartment. The top of the station canopy started to catch fire and I shouted to my driver, Percy Shepherd, to pull the train out of the station. I would think that the gang then got into my carriage while I was fighting the fire and grabbed the mailbags. I was out of my van for about eight to 10 minutes.’
11
So far, no clues had been found that might provide any lead whatsoever on any of the mail hold-ups. None of the raiders had ever been seen without masks and no informants had come forward with names or even the merest of possibilities. However, in January 1963 an informant began passing on a series of snippets to Chief Inspector Walker of Scotland Yard’s Criminal Intelligence Branch (C11). Early the following month, Walker received information that a big robbery was imminent and a train leaving Weymouth was the target:
The train was said to travel to London via Woking, that it made four to six stops en-route and at each stop collected surplus monies received at banks. According to the informant each bank carried a certain float and when the bank takings exceeded this float the balance was conveyed on the same train each day. At Woking this surplus money was conveyed from the railway platform onto the train itself by two men who wore yellow around a uniform cap. The precise point of the alleged attack was not known, but it was expected that it would occur en-route and that Woking was the probable point.
12
Further investigations by C11 concluded that the train in question was the South West TPO Night Up and, as a result, Walker liaised with W.J. Edwards, the assistant controller of the Post Office IB, with a view to strengthening security on the train. Walker also sent out a warning message to all chief constables, who as a result increased the number of police officers present at each of the stations en route.
In Edwards’s report he noted that, ‘Walker informed me that he learned that about the time of the proposed attack on the train, Robert A. Welch, CRO 61730/58, who was believed to be a member of the gang concerned was attempting to obtain suits of postmen’s clothing and hats.’
13
As February wore on, the attack on the South West TPO failed to materialise. While C11 and the IB were focused on the Weymouth to Waterloo line, a headline-grabbing mail raid on the opposite side of London took everyone by complete surprise:
Eight masked bandits battled with dining car attendants along the corridors of the Irish Mail express last night after overpowering a guard and ransacking the mail van. The fight spilled over into first class compartments.
One of the gang pulled the communication cord as the Euston to Holyhead express neared Boxmoor, Hemel Hempstead. After the train jerked to a halt at the station, the raiders jumped to the track, taking with them a bag of stolen packages. The bandits scrambled up a snow-covered banking. An attendant who chased them told police he saw a car waiting in the road. He heard doors banging and a second car move off.
A railway spokesman said early today: ‘We do not know yet just what is missing, but I think it must be a fair haul. The raid came at 9.25, 45 minutes after the train left Euston. It picked up speed outside Watford on its 260-mile journey. White-coated attendants prepared to serve the first sitting of dinner. The bandits, who are thought to have split up among other passengers when they boarded the train at Euston, converged on the guard’s van.