The Israel-Arab Reader (29 page)

The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, came in May 1971. You will also recall that he announced he had nothing to request from Egypt—nothing. After the announcement of the initiative in February, he announced in May that he had nothing to request from Egypt and that Egypt had fully done its part. At that time, we also answered Jarring's memorandum of 8th February 1971.

We waited. May and June passed. On 6th July 1971, I received notification from the U.S. Secretary of State that the United States would intervene to achieve a peaceful solution in accordance with the initiative I had submitted. They asked some questions, including a question about the Egyptian-Soviet treaty which was concluded at that time, May 1971.

After the U.S. Secretary of State had visited here, President Podgornyy came. We concluded the treaty in late May. They [the Americans] put questions, and I answered them. My answer has always been that all our decisions express our free will. Since 23rd July 1952, our will has been free to take whatever decision we see fit to take.

July passed without anything happening. August and September passed. On 11th October 1971 I went to the USSR. I had a long session with the three Soviet leaders. As I have told you before, and as you heard at the [ASU] Central Committee, we reached agreement. We removed the clouds that existed in our relations with the USSR. We agreed in October 1971 on specific deals, and the arms were to arrive before the end of 1971. They asked about the year of decision, why I held to this and why I insisted that the situation be reactivated militarily—because there was no other way.

I explained the matter to them very clearly and frankly and in a friendly manner. As I have said, we agreed on arms deals, and the arms were to arrive before the end of 1971.

Relations between ourselves and the United States at that time were not progressing well. On the contrary, their promises in May and July and their failure to fulfil all these promises prompted me to reveal the true American attitude to the people. I attacked them most violently.

This is because the attitude of the U.S. Secretary of State at that time was indeed regrettable. He had reason to feel ashamed and I did shame him before our people, the Arab nation and the whole world.

In 1971, when the first shipments began to arrive, we were supposed to be able to make a decision on the battle on 8th December. I was in the Soviet Union in October. October passed and so did November. And then December came, but there was absolutely no information about the arrival of any shipments or anything. On 8th December the battle between India and Pakistan began. As we all know, the Soviet Union had commitments towards India. We entered December and then more than half of December had gone by—nothing had arrived. The understanding was that these shipments would arrive in October, November and December so that before the end of 1971 we could make a decision and begin operations.

At that time I notified the Soviet Union. About the middle of December I told them that there were only fifteen days left before the end of the year and we did not yet even have the dates for the arrival of shipments or vessels. We had no information about them and they had not appeared. I had fixed the year as the year of decision, and therefore I asked if I could visit them in order to avert this situation and that we might solve it together. They fixed a date for my visit—not in January 1972 but in February 1972. This was so that the whole of December and January might have passed, and so would February. As a matter of fact, I almost rejected this date. However, I always place the sublime interest of the cause and the country above personal considerations.

As you have seen, in the past three years, I have experienced and suffered a great deal. I learned [something about the background] afterwards. I went [to the Soviet Union] in February and, as I understood it, their purpose in delaying the date was to let me calm down or cool off a little. This was because I had fixed 1971 as the year of decision and they did not approve of it. Actually they did not approve of any action other than political or diplomatic action.

I went in February, and two months after February in the same year— that is in April. This time they had asked that I visit them and insisted on it because Nixon was going to visit them in May. The first summit conference in Moscow was in May 1972. I visited the Soviet Union again late in April. It was the fourth time. The first was in March 1971. The second was in October 1971. The third in February 1972, and the fourth in April 1972.

The core of the discussion between us was—and I always said it—that the issue would not be activated or solved without military action. The Soviet Union's view was against military action. The discussions used to finish up with the view that even in order to reach a peaceful solution, Israel must be made to feel that we are in a position to talk about a peaceful solution from a position of strength, not weakness. This was the result that we used to end up with, and they used to promise to supply us with arms, etc. etc.

I am not saying this to belittle the arms that we have received. I am continuing the explanation. The April 1972 meeting was held, as I told you, and we agreed at that meeting that after the summit meeting between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in May, [the process of] consolidating Egypt's capability would begin quickly because we agreed that there would be nothing new in the U.S. position in 1972 since it was an election year in the United States. We also agreed that after the elections, that is immediately after November, we had to be prepared. They agreed to this.

I returned from this visit, and in May the summit conference was held in Moscow. I waited for a notification, and after fourteen days, I received a notification, including an analysis by the Soviet Union similar to what we had predicted, that is, that there was nothing new in the U.S. position because the U.S. position viewed Egypt and the Arabs as a motionless corpse and they only respect force. So if Egypt and the Arabs were a motionless corpse, why should they [the Americans] act or change their position? The Soviet analysis was the same as our predictions before the April visit, and it came after fourteen days. I replied and said: All right, now that the analysis is the same as the one we agreed upon, the questions, as agreed upon with you, are the following:

There were seven clauses—this, that and the other thing. Therefore, as we agreed, these clauses were to have reached me by November. We would then be standing on solid ground after the U.S. elections in November. If they spoke about a peaceful solution, we would be standing on solid ground and in a position to speak and say yes or no—we reject or we agree. Why should a solution be proposed to us when we are weak? The solution proposed would exactly reflect the extent of our strength.

My reply was sent to them and I said simply that my reply was on its way. A whole month passed during which I received no answer. We calculated in days the period between the Moscow visit, that is the meeting, and November so as not to lose a single day for the seven clauses that I had requested and that we had agreed upon. A whole month passed. The first fifteen days passed before I received the analysis and one month before I received an answer. I was surprised by the answer I received. There was absolutely no mention of anything about the battle except in the last three lines of the answer.

Before that, there was the statement about the Moscow summit meeting between the two giants. The statement included the phrase military relaxation—military relaxation while Israel had complete superiority and we were short of several things. However, we were asked to embark on military relaxation. What did this mean? It meant that if such military relaxation took place in the area at a time when Israel was superior and we were at the level of our position at that time, the question would not be solved. It would be a case of the stronger side dictating conditions to us. We would either accept or reject. Whether we accepted or not, they would say: We are staying where we are and that is all.

When I received the answer a month later and it included absolutely no mention of what we had agreed upon in April, I made my decisions regarding the Soviet experts, a decision that you learned about in the summer. As I said afterwards, the real aim of these decisions was also strategic; analysts should have been more aware than they were—because anyone who had studied my decisions even a little would have understood that I intended to enter a battle when I ousted the Soviet experts. The Soviet experts were not fighters. They would not enter the battle with me. In fact, they were banned from going near the Canal. All of them were here in the interior as experts on arms and other types of training. Some were manning SAM-3 missiles after the Abu Za'bal raid.

Our sons were already trained and ready to take over everything. In fact, when the Soviet experts left, our sons took over the SAM-3 emplacements in a matter of seconds. There was no vacuum at all that would have left a gap in our air defences. This never happened because our sons took over immediately.

Actually, my purpose, as I have said, was a pause with the friend on the one hand and, on the other, to tell everyone that I was entering the battle— a 100 per cent Egyptian battle. No one at all can claim that anyone has fought it for me. I do not even have experts for weapons training. That was among the reasons for my decision at that time.

The situation continued. Our brothers in the Soviet Union took a long time despite the fact that I sent the Prime Minister, who was Dr. Aziz Sidqi at that time. I sent him because before we proclaimed the decision [on the Soviet experts] we had to agree on a joint declaration in order to cover anything that the West might exploit. They refused and we declared it unilaterally. The issue was settled and the decision was implemented.

Relations remained frozen between us and the Soviet Union all during the summer. The decisions were taken in July. Relations remained frozen all during the summer until October came, when our brother, President Hafiz al-Asad, went to Moscow and intervened in the matter. Dr. Aziz Sidqi left on 16th October and then returned. It was clearly apparent that relations had begun to move again. However, this was on the surface only. In fact and in essence, relations did not move at all.

It was necessary for the Soviet Union to take time to find out that I did not carry out the operation in agreement with the United States behind their backs. I allowed them to take enough time to find out that the matter was not a dagger in their back in agreement with the United States or others. Not at all. It was a national decision. It was a pause to tell them this procedure was unacceptable—a procedure which amounts to a kind of “wait a little, cool off a little, you cannot move until we want you to move.” We do not accept this. We do not accept this procedure. It is not according to our will, which has been free since 23rd July 1952. No one at all can direct us or impose any trusteeship on us.

In December 1972 three months were left before the expiration of an agreement between us and them over facilities in the Mediterranean. We gave them facilities in the Mediterranean, not bases. We do not give bases to anyone. Since 23rd July no one has had bases here with us. We are non-aligned. However, we have extended facilities to them. The agreement was to end in March 1973. Five years would have passed of the agreement, for it was concluded in 1968. The agreement stipulates that three months before its expiry the two sides will agree either to terminate or renew it. At that time, relations were disrupted—exactly as I have told you, and everything was at a standstill.

I asked Field Marshal Isma'il to call the Russian General at the Embassy here and tell him that we had decided for our part, to extend the facilities for another period. This happened three months before the expiration of the agreement.

Nevertheless, I still say that the USSR stood by us in the dark moments of 1967. We are a grateful people. We do not forget past favours.

The Field Marshal called the General and told him about this. The facilities have remained ever since. Early in 1973, Field Marshal Isma'il and Hafiz Isma'il left for the USSR. The two of them concluded a deal. After February 1973 our relations began to be, or to become, normal. Some of [the arms included in] this deal began reaching us after Field Marshal Isma'il's return from the USSR.

As I have told you and as you have already heard from me, the decision on the battle was made last April, April 1973. As I have told you, some of the deal began reaching us after the Field Marshal's return in February. We were happy that our relations would return to normal. But the USSR persisted in the view that a military battle must be ruled out and that the question must await a peaceful solution.

The month of June came and with it the second summit conference between President Nixon and Brezhnev. The first meeting was held in Moscow in May 1972. As I have told you, that meeting resulted in military relaxation. This meant that everything must stop and that Israel would remain superior and that we would remain in our position. It was clear from the statement issued in June 1973 that the two super powers had taken another leap forward. They agreed that nothing should happen anywhere in the world. They agreed to abide by this. The only [trouble] spot left in the world was the Middle East. The Vietnam issue was decided. Nothing would happen there. So the Middle East was the only spot left. Nothing should happen here and everyone should await a peaceful solution. On reading the statement, we found that our issue had been put into cold storage pending a peaceful solution.