The King's Cardinal: The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (Pimlico) (148 page)

Since Clement was still a prisoner of an Imperial army Charles was in a reasonable position to insist on his request being acted upon, though not in quite such a good position as might at first appear. The destruction of the Holy City and the humiliating treatment of the Holy Father and his cardinals was a matter of some embarrassment to the Holy Roman Emperor, even if he could truthfully claim this had happened without his knowledge or consent.
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In order to avoid even greater
odium, he was forced to move with circumspection, or, to put it another way, Clement, although physically helpless, was in a strong moral position to resist unwarranted demands from Charles. And there remained for Charles the further embarrassment that, while his troops remained in what threatened to become a chronic state of mutiny, he was not fully in control of events in Rome, and, therefore, not best placed to negotiate with a pope who was his army’s prisoner rather than his own.

For Wolsey, on the other hand, the pope’s captivity offered an outside chance of obtaining the divorce without Clement becoming directly involved. Given that Henry’s case was by no means certain in law, and given Clement’s inevitable fears about offending the emperor, such a possibility had its attractions, and he tried two ways of bringing it about. One was to summon a council of cardinals to Avignon, whose ostensible task would be to administer the Church during this emergency, but
en passant
they might be persuaded to pass sentence in Henry’s favour.
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The other way was to have himself appointed the pope’s vicar-general with full authority to act on his behalf; once in that office he could then himself pass sentence. Having completed the main negotiations with Francis and Louise, Wolsey spent his remaining time in France attempting to accomplish one or other of these ends.
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As he himself realized all too well, his chances were never good.
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What is also clear is that both schemes were only ever a reluctant response to an extraordinary situation, for throughout this time he was working even harder for Clement’s release.
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One might think this a little surprising, and certainly not in line with the usual picture of an egotistical Wolsey always anxious to push himself forward; but, in fact, neither scheme, even if it could be achieved, offered a satisfactory solution to his problem. Any divorce pronounced either by himself alone as vicar-general or by a council of cardinals could only have ever been considered partial and provisional, and certainty was what he was after. Of course, if Clement was going to remain in captivity for long, then alternatives would have to be sought, but it was not to be. On 7 December, with some connivance from his gaolers, Clement escaped to Orvieto, and both schemes became redundant, for it was now possible to negotiate with Clement directly.

Admittedly the flight to Orvieto only marginally increased Clement’s room for manoeuvre, for his position remained extremely fraught.
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Before escaping he had been forced to accept humiliating terms from the Imperial commanders. These included the surrender not only of some papal towns but also of a number of cardinals, who were to serve as security for the large sums of money that he had promised and that the Imperial commanders needed to pay their troops with, but which, because of the havoc wrought by those troops and by the endemic feuding of the Orsini and Colonna families, was not available. Clement was left with no
money, no Rome and no Papal States. And with the havoc came famine and disease. But, despite everything, he remained the Vicar of Christ, and this was a negotiable commodity. During the months ahead he was to exploit it for all it was worth, with everyone, but especially with the emperor. Meanwhile, although he was reasonably secure in Orvieto, it was fear of the Imperial army, whether paid or unpaid, that preoccupied him. This state of mind was by no means entirely to Wolsey’s disadvantage, but, as always, everything would depend on getting the timing and balance right. If Clement was too frightened, he would only do what Charles told him to do; but if he had no fears at all, he might well not do what Wolsey wanted. What Wolsey needed was a Clement who remained both grateful and beholden, at least long enough for him to decide in Henry’s favour over the divorce. The instrument by which Wolsey was to bring this about was the existing League of Cognac, but more especially Lautrec’s army, which at Amiens in August he had agreed to help finance.

What Lautrec’s army could do was provide Clement with the prospect of real protection against the Imperial army, and it was a prospect which became increasingly real with Lautrec’s new success. By early November he had reached Parma on the southern fringe of the Po valley, and Genoa and most of the duchy of Milan, though not the city itself, were already in the league’s hands. These successes were enough to persuade Alfonso d’Este duke of Ferrara to change sides and on 14 November he formally joined the League. Would Clement follow suit? Having recovered his freedom, he could again receive foreign envoys, and those of the league immediately began to pressure him into rejoining. Even without his inherent caution there were good reasons why Clement should hesitate, but as during the spring of 1528 Lautrec proceeded to mop up the cities of the kingdom of Naples, so that by 26 April virtually only Naples itself was left to the Imperialists, the reasons for rejoining grew more compelling. One early bonus was that during 16 and 17 February the Imperial army, after nearly eight months of occupation, left Rome, enabling Clement to contemplate a return. And as the league’s successes continued, and the likelihood of his rejoining increased, so did the likelihood of his granting what Wolsey wanted as regards the ‘divorce’.

There has been some debate about how far Clement’s attitude towards Henry’s ‘great matter’ was governed by political and temporal considerations rather than legal and ethical ones. The great historian of the papacy, Ludwig Pastor, took pains to emphasize that it was the latter;
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but even if it is admitted, as it is here, that Henry’s case was poor and that, therefore, there was no overwhelming legal or moral reason why Clement should have supported him, the facts do not appear to endorse Pastor’s view. It was only during the spring and summer of 1528 that Clement was prepared to make significant concessions to Henry: the dispensations enabling him to marry within the prohibited degrees, and thus to marry Anne, the general commission of 13 April enabling the divorce to be decided in England; the regranting of this commission on 9 June, and in that same month the ‘secret’ decretal commission; and finally in July the ‘pollicitation’, by which he promised not to interfere with any decision reached in England. The granting of the decretal commission, of which the content but not its potential application satisfied Wolsey,
is particularly relevant. As we saw earlier, by this document Clement was in effect giving judgment in Henry’s favour, provided only that three highly selective and easily ascertainable facts could be established. In doing this he made it impossible for Catherine to mount a defence, which, given that certainly as regards natural justice and probably in law she was in the right, was a monstrous act of injustice, and one that can only be explained by his wish to take advantage of the league’s successes. For Clement it was a comparatively cheap way of signalling to an important constituent of the league that he was on its side, but without having as yet to commit himself. The fact that the decretal commission was only granted in a secret and limited form only confirms that political considerations were uppermost in his mind when taking this step.

By mid-1528 it was by no means certain that the league’s successes would continue. Lautrec and his army had been encamped around Naples for some time without the city falling, and, as the summer advanced, so did the heat, and with the heat plague and typhoid. Meanwhile, for the defenders of Naples the only serious problem appears to have been the lack of wine for the thirsty German troops who made up a large part of the Imperial army. It was also becoming clearer that, owing to insensitive handling on their part, the French were in imminent danger of losing the services of the Genoese naval
condottiere
, Andrea Doria, whose support had given them vital naval supremacy off the west coast of Italy. Moreover, as early as April a second Imperial army, led by the duke of Brunswick, had entered Northern Italy and linked up with those Imperial forces that had remained in possession of the city of Milan. Admittedly, this new threat had been countered by a second French army led by the count of St-Pol, but the situation in the north was by no means promising for the league. One way and another, Clement would have been extremely foolish to commit himself wholeheartedly to it at this point. He would also have been foolish not to make some concessions to Henry. The decretal commission was a large concession but, given the manner in which it had been granted, one that could easily be withdrawn. And how right Clement was to move cautiously. On 4 July Doria left the French service, on 16 August Lautrec died of the plague, and by the end of the month what was left of the French army in the kingdom of Naples surrendered. In the north it took a little longer for things to turn decisively against the league, but by the end of October the French had lost control of Genoa and nearby Savona. Only a toe-hold in Northern Italy remained to them. Venice, for her part, was just able to cling on grimly to what was her own, or, in some cases, to what only she considered to be her own. The League of Cognac was, in effect, no more.

When Campeggio had set off for England towards the end of July 1528, the death of Lautrec and the other disasters to befall the league were still in the future, but some at least could have been predicted. At any rate, Clement’s native caution served him in good stead. Ostensibly Campeggio would be doing the king of England’s bidding, or, more correctly, he was to act as Wolsey’s fellow judge in the ‘great matter’. In fact, as we noted earlier, his instructions were first of all to persuade Henry to change his mind, and, failing that, to persuade Catherine to take religious vows. Only if both moves were unsuccessful was he to exercise his commission and, with Wolsey, to proceed to a trial. Underlying these instructions was the need to play for time for, as he was informed in September, ‘every day
stronger reasons are discovered which compel the Pope to remind you that you are to act cautiously’.
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By December, with the virtual disappearance of the league, the situation had become much clearer, and it did not encourage Clement to look favourably upon Henry’s cause. No wonder that he was driven to distraction, perhaps even to illness,
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by Wolsey’s pestering to be allowed to make more use of the decretal commission.
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Now Clement deeply regretted that he had granted it even in limited form.
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He need not have worried. Campeggio had allowed Henry and Wolsey one glimpse of the document, had read it out to them once, but that was all.
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In January 1529 the pope’s chamberlain, Campano, arrived in England with orders for Campeggio to destroy the document, which he duly did. He also brought instructions for Campeggio on no account to proceed to a judgment, or so Clement maintained. In June Campeggio was to deny that he had ever received them, but by then he was under such pressure from Henry and Wolsey to decide in the king’s favour that he was doubtful of being able to avoid doing so, whatever Clement desired.
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What is not in doubt is that by the end of 1528, perhaps even as early as August,
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Clement had decided to make terms with the emperor – and part of the price he would have to pay would almost certainly be a settlement in Catherine’s favour, however much it would offend his erstwhile Defender of the Faith.

It is important to stress that Clement came to this decision not so much out of fear of the emperor, but because he had come to the conclusion that it was the emperor who had the most to offer him. The sack of Rome and the resulting collapse of papal authority had inevitably led to chaos in the Papal States, and there were plenty of people around to take advantage of this. Amongst them were the Venetians who had moved in when in June and July 1527 the cities of Ravenna and Cervia were disrupted by factional fighting stirred up by Imperial intrigue, and had in effect claimed both cities for their own.
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As for many years they had belonged to the Venetians and had only been lost to the papacy in 1509, it could be argued that they were merely reclaiming their own, but this did not prevent their action from being a bitter blow to Clement. Perhaps as bitter to him had been the decision in November 1527 of his great rival, the duke of Ferrara, to join the league, but at a price – and the price that he had demanded was the surrender of all papal rights to Modena, Reggio and Rubiera.
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However, the bitterest blow of all concerned Florence which ever since Giovanni de’ Medici had become Pope Leo x in 1513, had been virtually part of the Papal States. There on 17 May 1527, as an almost direct result of the sack of Rome, the Medici family had been requested to leave, and the last Florentine republic was established.
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For Clement, who for so long had been virtual ruler of a Florence that had been in effect his family’s patrimony for a hundred years, all this had been almost harder to bear than the horrendous happenings in Rome. Thus, the recovery of Florence was at the top of his shopping list. And by the autumn of 1528 it had become apparent to him that the best way of obtaining most of what he wanted was to seek Imperial aid, which strange to say, he was in quite a good position to obtain. Since Charles was so heavily committed in a number of areas, there would be great advantages for him in arranging the affairs of Italy as quickly as possible, even if this meant making concessions to its leading states, including the papacy. Moreover, Charles’s aims of being crowned emperor could only be achieved with any dignity if he and Clement were on good terms. And there were other useful things that Clement as head of the Church could do for him. Most importantly, he could grant him a
cruzada
, which would enable him to raise a considerable amount of much needed money. So, one way and another Clement had quite a few good cards to play, and Charles might well be willing to pay quite a lot for them. He would be sorry if any deal with Charles meant that he would have to deny Henry what he wanted, and thereby, perhaps, precipitate England’s withdrawal from the Catholic Church, but it would hardly be his fault, given that what Henry wanted was both unreasonable and unnecessary.
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That, at least, was how things must have looked to Clement when he made his decision to side with Charles, and by the Treaty of Barcelona of 29 June 1529 he gained most of what he wanted.
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Charles, it is true, was to renege on his promise to force the duke of Ferrara to return Modena and Reggio, but an Imperial army did restore Medici rule in Florence and got Venice to return Ravenna and Cervia. As a result, Clement emerged from one of the most disastrous episodes in papal history with the Papal States virtually intact, if greatly impoverished, and the interests of his own family well served. It was a remarkable performance, but one that helped Wolsey not at all.