The Longest August (42 page)

The detonations were mainly to occur in a 0.62-mile-long, 9-foot-diameter, steel-covered tunnel bored into the granite Koh Kambaran
Mountain in the Ras Koh range in Chagai district of Baluchistan, thirty miles from the Iranian border. Constructed in the form of a fishhook by the PAEC in 1980, it was a PAEC asset. Its fishhook form ensured that following an explosion, the mountain would move outward and the tunnel would collapse and seal the entrance. It was capable of withstanding an explosion of twenty kilotons, the same magnitude as the one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945.

Taking this into account and the fact that the PAEC had conducted more cold tests on nuclear weapons than the Kahuta-based Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), the government had opted for the PAEC.
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At an earlier, expanded meeting called by the government, the nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had argued that given the KRL's record as the first to enrich uranium and design its own atom bomb and conduct cold tests on its own, it should be given the opportunity to carry out Pakistan's first nuclear tests. But his plea fell on deaf ears. He complained to Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Jehangir Karamat. The COAS called Sharif. As a result, Sharif decided that KRL personnel should be involved in preparing the test sites as well as be present at the time of testing.

On May 19 two teams of 140 PAEC scientists, engineers, and technicians were flown from Islamabad and other locations to Turbat airport in Baluchistan on their way to the test site in the Koh Kambaran Mountains.

It took five days to assemble the five nuclear devices containing weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium. The PAEC's Samar Mubarakmand supervised the assembly personally, checking and rechecking each device, while trudging through the stuffy tunnel five times. Then diagnostic cables were laid through the tunnel to the telemetry station, which communicated with the command post six miles away. Next, a complete simulated test was carried out by radio link.

It was now May 25.

Unlike the latter-day Pokhran military firing range in India, the test site in Pakistan was an open book for the US spy satellites, which were focused on their target day and night. On May 25 an American intelligence official said, “At this point, they could conduct a nuclear test at any time.” The CIA kept Clinton informed on an hourly basis.

By the time the tunnel was sealed with six thousand bags of cement, it was the afternoon of May 26. Once the cement had dried within twenty-four hours, the engineers declared that the site was ready. This was conveyed to Sharif via the military's general headquarters (GHQ). All told,
various official agencies of Pakistan had performed a gargantuan task with admirable speed, coordination, and calm confidence.

In Washington officials predicted the testing occurring “within hours.” On the night of May 27 (Islamabad time), Clinton made the last of his four calls to Sharif. According to his spokesman Mike McCurry, it was a “very intense” twenty-five-minute conversation in which Clinton implored Sharif not to conduct a test.
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It proved futile.

Recalling the intense pressure he was subjected to during that crisis twelve years later, Sharif revealed that Clinton offered as much as $5 billion of aid to Pakistan in return for abstinence from testing nuclear weapons. But, added Sharif, it was more important for him to implement the national will, which demanded those tests.
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Another version of that crucial telephone conversation is that Sharif sought explicit US security guarantees, which Clinton was unable or unwilling to offer.
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Most likely, both points were discussed.

As if this were not enough, India and Israel cropped up in Pakistan's unfolding drama. On May 27, the Indian Army's Signals Intelligence Directorate intercepted a coded telegram alerting the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi that Pakistan had “credible information” that India was all set to mount a predawn attack on its nuclear installations.
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And as Pakistan prepared to test its nuclear devices, its military spotted US-made F16s in the surrounding airspace. It was aware that Israel used two-seater F16s, equipped with advanced reconnaissance equipment, which at forty-five thousand feet could take pictures of objects many miles away. It feared that this was part of an Indian-Israeli plan to launch a preemptive strike at its test site in Baluchistan. It alerted both the United States and the United Nations. They in turn contacted the Israeli government immediately, which assured then that it had no such plan.
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Pakistan was not reassured. Its president, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, would suspend the constitution and declare a state of emergency as a result of threats of unspecified “external aggression” soon after Sharif's TV speech.

“Today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests,” announced Sharif at 15:00 GMT on May 28 on Pakistani TV. His declaration received the jubilant applause usually reserved for a batsman who has smashed the ball over the boundary by cheering crowds at cricket matches.

Elaborating his dramatic statement later at a press conference, Sharif said, “Pakistan today successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The results
were as expected. There was no release of radioactivity. I congratulate all Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians for their dedicated team work and expertise in mastering complex and advanced technologies. The entire nation takes justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories and all affiliated organizations.” Blaming “the present Indian leadership's reckless actions,” he added that “our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the interest of national self-defense . . . to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.”
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There was instant jubilation in the streets. Karachi, for instance, was paralyzed by traffic jams as tens of thousands headed for the city center to join the festivities. In Lahore crowds burned effigies of Vajpayee while chanting slogans in praise of Sharif, Karamat, and Qadeer Khan.
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Those attending Friday prayers heard sermons thanking Allah for making Pakistan the first Muslim nation to acquire nuclear weapons. The Islamist parties were euphoric about the successful testing of the Islamic atom bomb—a term coined by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, their bête noire—for two reasons. It gave Pakistan parity with India in defense that it lacked when facing its bigger and more powerful neighbor in conventional terms. Second, mastering the production and testing of such a weapon was a triumph of the marriage between Islam and modern technology. What they overlooked was the fact that Pakistan had assembled a uranium-based atom bomb by pilfering parts and materials from Western sources and obtaining the design from the atheist government of the communist People's Republic of China.

Gohar Ayub Khan, a hawkish foreign minister close to the generals, was decidedly bullish, brimming with newborn confidence. “We have nuclear weapons, we are a nuclear power,” he declared. “We have an advanced missile program,” he added, warning that Pakistan had acquired the capacity to retaliate “with vengeance and devastating effect” against Indian attacks.
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After half a century of uncertainty about the continued existence of Pakistan because of the hostility of the militarily mightier India, its leaders now possessed an effective deterrent against any attempt by Delhi to break up their republic or absorb it.

Moreover, intent on beating India in the numbers game, Sharif ordered a further test, code-named Chagai II, on May 30 at Kharan, a flat desert valley ninety-five miles southwest of the Ras Koh Range. The site was an L-shaped shaft three hundred feet deep and then seven hundred
feet long horizontally, and the device was plutonium-based. The officially announced yield of eighteen to twenty kT was disputed by independent assessors, with the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
coming up with the figure of two kT. Equally exaggerated were the statistics about the cumulative total of the five devices detonated earlier under the code-name of Chagai I. Pakistan's claimed figure of forty to forty-five kT stood in sharp contrast to the estimate of eight to fifteen kT by the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
.
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Scientists make a distinction between a nuclear weapon test and an explosion. According to them, India had conducted three nuclear tests, including the one in 1974. In May 1998 at Pokhran there were two tests: one involving two simultaneous blasts and the other three synchronized explosions.
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By the same token, Pakistan's five simultaneous explosions at Chagai Hills counted as the first test, with the next single blast at Kharan as the second. So the final test score was: India, 3; Pakistan, 2.

While ordinary Pakistanis were in a celebratory mood on May 29, the affluent among them fell into deep depression. The Sharif administration issued an emergency order, freezing $11.5 billion in private foreign currency deposits in Pakistani banks and suspending the licenses of foreign exchange dealers. Fearing a rush to withdraw foreign currencies in view of the impending economic sanctions, the government acted instantly, nervously aware that its central bank had only $1.6 billion in foreign exchange reserves. At $32 billion, Pakistan's foreign debts were a whopping 64 percent of its GDP. It announced a 50 percent cut in all expenditures except development projects.
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The only foreign leader Sharif shared his top-secret decision to conduct atomic tests with was Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia. In appreciation of this gesture, Abdullah offered to supply Pakistan fifty thousand barrels of oil per day, about one-seventh of its total consumption, for an indefinite period and on deferred payment terms. This helped to relieve to a certain extent the ill effects of the sanctions by the United States and the European Union.
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Saudi Arabia was one of the two countries that congratulated Pakistan for taking the “bold decision,” the other being the United Arab Emirates.

Domestically, the political upside for Sharif was a dramatic turnaround in his popularity, from a slow, irreversible decline to a meteoric surge. Vajpayee too gained in the esteem of the public, which saw him as a staunch upholder of India's security. This uptick in their popular standing made the two leaders amenable to cease saber rattling and mend fences.

Postblast Thaw

They did so by sticking to the long-established practice of meeting on the margins of the annual South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit. In July 1998, it was hosted by Sri Lanka. News of this event encouraged Clinton to consider easing sanctions against the two South Asian neighbors.

More substantial progress was made during the cordial parley between Sharif and Vajpayee in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session on September 23. Sharif stated that in a nuclear weapons environment neither side could even contemplate the use of force.
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They decided to revive dialogue between their respective foreign secretaries on the eight outstanding issues and to break new ground: resume bus service between Delhi and Lahore to encourage people-to-people contact. This in turn led Clinton to withdraw his opposition to the IMF loan to Pakistan.

Welcome though the news from Washington was to Sharif, it was not enough to reverse the economic downturn in Pakistan, which had deepened in the aftermath of sanctions by Washington and other Western capitals. Among those suffering were the military's corporate interests. COAS Karamat lamented the deteriorating internal situation and proposed the formation of the National Security Council, including military leaders, to institutionalize decision-making.

Sharif interpreted this as an attempt to curtail the constitutional rights of the prime minister. He challenged Karamat either to take over the administration or resign. Unlike Sharif, Karamat was not confrontational. So he stepped down in July 1998, three months before his scheduled retirement date.

Sharif promoted General Pervez Musharraf. A square-faced, bespectacled man of medium height with a neatly trimmed mustache, he was third in seniority among the three-star generals. Sharif figured that Urdu-speaking Musharraf, a native of Delhi, leading the predominantly Punjabi-Pushtuns corps commanders, would lack the clout to pressure a civilian government led by a Punjabi. This would turn out to be a fatal assumption.

As for Islamabad-Delhi relations, during their meetings in October and November, foreign secretaries Krishnan Raghunath and Shamshad Ahmad made progress on procedural matters as a step toward institutional contacts. Starting mid-December they focused on drafting a mutually agreed-on document to be presented to their respective premiers.

In an interview published on February 3, 1999, Sharif said, “Why can't we talk directly? Why do we have to go on approaching each other via
Bhatinda
[a Punjabi metaphor for circuitous approach]?” He added that if Vajpayee responded positively, he would be more than willing to “take the initiative” to invite him to Pakistan.
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Vajpayee responded positively. And Sharif invited him to Lahore on the inaugural fourteen-hour Delhi-Lahore bus journey on February 20, 1999. Vajpayee boarded the bus.

Bus Diplomacy

That afternoon, Sharif rolled out the red carpet for Vajpayee at the Wagah border crossing, fifteen miles from Lahore, in the full glare of international media. He was accompanied by senior cabinet ministers as well as Information Minister Mushahid Hussain, who was designated liaison minister-in-waiting with Vajpayee—but not the defense chiefs. They had declined Sharif's invitation to join him at Wagah, arguing that they did not wish to be seen in public welcoming the leader of “an enemy nation.” After inspecting a guard of honor, Vajpayee and Sharif boarded a helicopter. It flew them to where the Indian premier was to stay overnight—the palatial, opulent Governor's House in Lahore, decorated with crystalline chandeliers in many rooms, in the midst of eighty acres of immaculately tended lawns.