The Murder of Cleopatra (19 page)

This description of such a bold display of royalty in Alexandria would not appeal to the Roman people. Neither would the will that Plutarch claimed Antony had written while in Alexandria, stating that he wanted to be buried in Egypt (a will that supposedly was hand-delivered to Octavian by one of Antony's men who supposedly had defected at Actium). That either of these stories has much truth in them is of little import. If Octavian convinced the Roman populace that Antony was indulging in grandiose thoughts concerning his life with Cleopatra and that he was indeed forsaking Rome in favor of Egypt and its dangerous queen, Octavian would have little choice in declaring war on Egypt.

But is there any merit to this story of Antony being overtaken by ego to embrace Cleopatra and Egypt? I think the answer is yes, but not because of the story Plutarch tells us. If we look back at the assassination of Julius Caesar, and if we believe that Mark Antony was not an innocent bystander, we can see that he did have some ambitions of being as big as or bigger than Caesar. Then, he divorced his wife, Octavia, which certainly makes it seem as though he was working toward having Cleopatra as his wife and partner, especially after having three children with her, spending time in Alexandria with her, and using her wealth to fund his military campaigns (most significantly the final one against Octavian). He sought the prize that was Parthia just as Caesar had, and if Antony had been successful, he would have eliminated the last major enemy of Rome and would have made himself the new Alexander, something that Julius Caesar had hoped to become but failed to accomplish.

However, it is one thing to see your future with the Egyptian queen and to be content to leave her in her place as you become the dictator of Rome (much in the same manner as Julius Caesar), and it is quite another to be so foolish as to announce your plans to take over the Mediterranean world with a non-Roman ruler when you need the Roman people behind you to strike against Octavian. The Donations of Alexandria were no doubt an extreme exaggeration of a holiday celebration in Alexandria spun by an astute propagandist (and there was none better than Octavian) for the purpose of justifying his attack on Antony. Octavian was a master at fabricating outrageous behaviors on the part of Antony and Cleopatra that would work to his political favor. He no doubt saw their partnership as a catalyst for Antony to increase his power, which would in time crush all opposition. Octavian knew he had to strike quickly, toss the dice while he might still come up with a winning roll rather than to allow time to stack the deck against him.

It is hard to say, if Octavian had not been such an aggressive player, whether Antony would have tolerated having him around as a lesser partner in a regime of shared power. Then again, Antony might
well have shared Octavian's view that two Caesars is one Caesar too many. Both men may have recognized that when you leave a very adept enemy alive, you have to watch your back twenty-four hours a day, and it might not be long before one of you takes the other down. On the other hand, Cleopatra knew she had to have a Roman in her corner if she wanted to keep her country. She needed Antony to keep Egypt.

Back in Rome, Octavian was making his case that Antony was showing too much interest in another country and scheming with that Egyptian vixen to sell out Rome, while he, Octavian, was keeping his feet firmly grounded in Rome and spending all of his time in its service. And for many Romans his argument would have been quite convincing. On top of the vicious propaganda campaign against Antony and Cleopatra, Octavian also had won against Sextus while Antony lost badly in Parthia (no thanks to Octavian, who failed to send him proper troop support). The commentary from Octavian that Antony was a washed up, over-the-hill, traitorous has-been who was losing the love of his men and was planning to become dictator with an Egyptian queen as part of the package may have had just enough truth in it to be disturbing to both Cleopatra and Antony. Antony needed the support of his men and of as many of the Roman people as possible if he was going to beat Octavian, reassert his power, and redeem his reputation.

Octavian wasn't spreading such propaganda for his personal amusement. To start his campaign against Antony, he needed to turn enough Romans against his foe so that they became enraged and would supply him with what he needed—ships, men, and provisions—as soon as possible. He needed to take out Mark Antony quickly. He declared war on Egypt and Cleopatra, but not against his fellow Roman, Antony. Octavian promoted himself as saving Italy from foreign control, not turning on his fellow Roman coruler and trying to take over Italy and the Roman Empire for himself. It was a smart political move—risky, but smart. The final showdown between Antony and Octavian was about to begin.

I took a train from Rome to the docks where the ships came in, and I boarded a ship that would take me to Ephesus, Turkey, where Antony and Cleopatra wintered on the way toward Greece, gathering their fleet and relaxing before moving their ships into their final positions in Greece that autumn (31 BCE). Ephesus is quite a beautiful spot where the ruins of the city include a fabulous main street that rises up to the top of a gentle hill overlooking the Mediterranean Sea for miles in both a southerly and westerly direction. One can envision the charm of the city in ancient times, the fine architecture and the still quite intact coliseum that attests to the beauty of the city during Antony and Cleopatra's sojourn there. As they viewed from the hill the panorama of their might and wealth, their ships coming from all directions and pulling into the port, they no doubt could sense victory in the wind. How everything went wrong from that point on has been extensively argued by historians.

Most of our information comes from Plutarch, who we know was biased in favor of Octavian and against Cleopatra. Yet, it is worth reading his complete description of the battle and how he claims it played out. Then we can dissect it for a more probable rendering of what actually occurred. Although anyone who tries to make sense of the events cannot help but do so in hindsight, such a final and drastic turn of events for the Egyptian queen is an extraordinarily important event that we must take a look at it carefully if we are to understand the
choices she made during that time and the following nine months until she met her death at the hands of her nemesis, Octavian. Plutarch writes a very detailed account of the Battle of Actium, I have selected the most important parts from Plutarch's
Life of Antony
to highlight and analyze so we can get the clearest idea of what happened in 32/31 BCE:

Antony heard of this [how Octavian was turning the Romans against him and keeping all the spoils of war for himself and his soldiers] while he was tarrying in Armenia; and at once he ordered Canidius to take sixteen legions and go down to the sea. But he himself took Cleopatra with him and came to Ephesus. It was there that his naval force was coming together from all quarters, eight hundred ships of war with merchant vessels, of which Cleopatra furnished two hundred, besides twenty thousand talents, and supplies for the whole army during the war.
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Once Cleopatra had provided these ships, manpower, money, and supplies, Octavian claims Antony tried to send Cleopatra back to Egypt on the advice of others, but she wanted to stay because, after all, she was his partner and a queen, and she had the right to do so. He relented.

Meanwhile, Octavian wanted to declare war on Antony, but first he had to stem discontent from the citizens over tax issue and get the people behind him.

Wherefore, among the greatest mistakes of Antony men reckon his postponement of the war. For it gave [Octavian] time to make preparations and put an end to the disturbances among the people.
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Plutarch says that this delay of attack by Antony and Cleopatra gave Octavian time to convince the Roman people that they should back him in declaration of war against the duo. Also, Plutarch claims that during this period of time Octavian got his hands on Antony's will, which further showed Antony to be a traitor and a pawn of Cleopatra.

[Octavian] laid most stress on the clause in the will relating to Antony's burial. For it directed that Antony's body, even if he should die in Rome, should be borne in state through the forum and then sent away to Cleopatra in Egypt. . . .
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When [Octavian] had made sufficient preparations, a vote was passed to wage war against Cleopatra, and to take away from Antony the authority which he had surrendered to a woman. And Caesar said in addition that Antony had been drugged and was not even master of himself, and that the Romans were carrying on war with Mardion the eunuch, and Potheinus, and Iras, and the tire-woman of Cleopatra, and Charmion, by whom the principal affairs of the government were managed.
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Now the die was cast.

When the forces came together for the war, Antony had no fewer than five hundred fighting ships, among which were many vessels of eight and ten banks of oars, arrayed in pompous and festal fashion; he also had one hundred thousand infantry soldiers and twelve thousand horsemen. [Octavian] had two hundred and fifty ships of war, eighty thousand infantry, and about as many horsemen as his enemies.
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While it seems that Antony clearly had more ships and men, Plutarch points out that Antony had a great many mercenaries in his army who were getting disgruntled and men who were not the best at sea either. Octavian, while he had less to work with, had far higher quality in his men and equipment.

This fleet [Octavian's] kept assembled at Tarentum and Brundisium, and he sent to Antony a demand to waste no time, but to come with his forces.
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But Antony refused to bring the fight to Italian waters, wanting Octavian to fight him over in Greece, in neutral territory.

[Octavian] got the start of him by crossing the Ionian Sea and occupying a place in Epirus called Toruné (that is, ladle); and when Antony and his friends were disturbed by this, since their infantry forces were belated, Cleopatra, jesting, said: “What is there dreadful in Caesar's [Octavian's] sitting at a ladle?”
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What was dreadful was that Caesar nailed Cleopatra and Antony with a surprise attack.

The enemy sailed against him at daybreak
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It didn't go well for Antony and Cleopatra.

Since his navy was unlucky in everything and always too late to be of assistance, Antony was again compelled to turn his attention to his land forces.
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But Plutarch says:

Cleopatra prevailed with her opinion that the war should be decided by the ships, although she was already contemplating flight, and was disposing her own forces, not where they would be helpful in winning the victory, but where they could most easily get away if the cause was lost. . . .
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When it had been decided to deliver a sea battle, Antony burned all the Egyptian ships except sixty; but the largest and best, from those having three to those having ten banks of oars, he manned, putting on board twenty thousand heavy-armed soldiers and two thousand archers.
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While Antony was heading into battle, Plutarch also admits Antony put sails on some of his ships, which indicates he and Cleopatra had a plan to flee.

He had no good hopes himself, since, when the masters of his ships wished to leave their sails behind, he compelled them to put them
on board and carry them, saying that not one fugitive of the enemy should be allowed to make his escape. . . .
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During that day, then, and the three following days the sea was tossed up by a strong wind and prevented the battle; but on the fifth, the weather becoming fine and the sea calm, they came to an engagement. Antony had the right wing, with Publicola, Coelius the left, and in the centre were Marcus Octavius and Marcus Insteius. [Octavian] posted Agrippa on the left, and reserved the right wing for himself.
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The battle is slow to begin, but Antony finally had no choice but to move forward:

After surveying the rest of his line of battle, he was carried in a small boat to his right wing, and there was astonished to see the enemy lying motionless in the narrows; indeed, their ships had the appearance of riding at anchor. For a long time he was convinced that this was really the case, and kept his own ships at a distance of about eight furlongs from the enemy. But it was now the sixth hour, and since a wind was rising from the sea, the soldiers of Antony became impatient at the delay, and, relying on the height and size of their own ships as making them unassailable, they put their left wing in motion. When [Octavian] saw this he was delighted, and ordered his right wing to row backwards, wishing to draw the enemy still farther out from the gulf and the narrows, and then to surround them with his own agile vessels and come to close quarters with ships which, owing to their great size and the smallness of their crews, were slow and ineffective. . . .
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