The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (73 page)

At some unseen signal, presumably from the president, Secretary of State Haig, who had remained largely reticent throughout the proceedings, took the floor, and said, “Time is running out and we need to sum up. While all of us are paying a price over Lebanon, something good might yet come out of it. We must get out of the Lebanese tragedy as soon as we can and get back to the work of peacemaking. After Egypt, Jordan is the next obvious choice and so, yes, we want to bring Jordan in, and we want Saudi Arabia in too, to endorse the outcome. Yet, as the president has pointed out, the United States cannot be oblivious to these countries’ security concerns and expect at the same time to win them over to the peace process. So, Mr. Prime Minister, we ask you to join us in understanding why we have to conduct the policy the president has outlined with respect to those two countries. If we don’t, the United States and Israel will be left isolated in the Middle East, and that is untenable for us. So this has to be our first order of business
–
the renewal of the peace process, beginning with Jordan and backed by Saudi Arabia, and I know that to make this happen all parties concerned will have to shed some attitude.”

“I agree,” said Begin surprisingly. “There are no eternal enemies. Today we even have a German ambassador in Tel Aviv.”

Whether he said this for tactical or for other reasons was hard to tell. What mattered was that the president threw him a nod of satisfaction, and together they walked out to the South Lawn to meet the waiting press. As they stepped through the door, Reagan laughed out loud when Begin quipped: “I need hardly say, Ron, how grateful we are for your assistance. American aircraft with Israeli pilots are an unbeatable combination.”

Speaking to the news people, Ronald Reagan exuded confidence and natural charm, making the session sound as if it had been a warm and casual chat: “It has been worthwhile to have Prime Minister Begin at the White House again. All of us share a common understanding of the need to bring peace and security to the Middle East. Today, we’ve had an opportunity to exchange views on how this cause can be advanced. On Lebanon, it is clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence there, and a sovereign, independent Lebanon under the authority of a strong, central government. We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north, and that the United States will continue to work to achieve these goals and to secure withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. And now, I invite our guest, Prime Minister Begin, to say a few words.”

A far less sanguine Begin was more forthright. “Everybody knows that we now face a situation in the Middle East which calls for activity, great attention and understanding. I have read in some newspapers in this great country that Israel invaded Lebanon. This is a misnomer. Israel did not invade any country. You invade a land you want to conquer or annex. We don’t covet even one inch of Lebanese territory, and we shall willingly withdraw our troops and bring them back home as soon as possible
–
as soon as arrangements are made that never again will our citizens
–
men, women and children
–
be attacked, maimed and killed by armed bands operating from Lebanon, and armed and supported by the Soviet Union and its satellites. There is hope that such arrangements will be made, and that all foreign forces, without exception, will be withdrawn from Lebanon, based on its territorial integrity. And we pray the day is near that such a Lebanon will sign a peace treaty with Israel, and live in peace forever. Thank you.”

In his memoirs,
An American Life
, Ronald Reagan writes about the depth of his feelings for Israel, coupled with his exasperation in his dealings with its leadership
–
presumably a reference to Menachem Begin, though he does not mention him by name. He writes:

I’ve believed many things in my life, but no conviction I ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel. The Holocaust, I believe, left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that what happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again. We must not let it happen again. The civilized world owes a debt to the people who were the greatest victims of Hitler’s madness. My dedication to the preservation of Israel was as strong when I left the White House as when I arrived there, even though this tiny ally, with whom we share democracy and many other values, was a source of great concern to me when I was President.
95

One reason for this “great concern” was what happened after he had sent a top secret cable to Ambassador Samuel Lewis on 31 August 1982,
containing
a letter which he was to deliver without delay to Prime Minister Begin, who was vacationing in Nahariya, a small seaside town a few miles south of the Lebanese border.

By the time this letter was written, the
IDF
had not only cleared the
PLO
out of the south of Lebanon, but had also put such a squeeze on the last surviving
PLO
enclave in West Beirut that Yasser Arafat and his minions were driven out of that savagely fragmented land altogether, and dispersed to other Arab destinations, mainly Tunis. It took vicious fighting and tortuous negotiations brokered by the president’s special emissary, Philip Habib, to make this happen, and once accomplished, the curtain rose again on another blow-up between Washington and Jerusalem. As before, the will of the prime minister was pitted against that of the president, who, believing the Peace for Galilee campaign had achieved its goal, concluded it was time for him to achieve his by launching a far-reaching Middle East peace initiative, just as he had indicated to Begin at their last meeting. It came to be called the Reagan Plan.

Ambassador Lewis knew that by delivering the president’s letter he would be intruding on Begin’s well-earned rest after the strains and the stresses of the war. He picked up the phone with enormous reluctance to ask for an appointment, feeling all the more uncomfortable because he was not entirely happy with the instructions he had received, but who was he to question a presidential order?

“Hello, this is the American ambassador speaking,” said Lewis into the phone. “Please forgive me but
–
”

“Ah, Mr. Lewis, how are you?” answered Mrs. Aliza Begin, in her tobacco-roughened voice.

Mrs. Begin, though still an ailing woman, had recovered sufficiently to resume her normal routines.

“I’m well, thank you. I do apologize for intruding
–
” Lewis began.

“I presume it’s not me you want to talk to, but my husband. Hold on, I’ll call him.”

He felt a little hot under the collar as he listened to the background talk of Mrs. Begin telling Mr. Begin that the American ambassador wanted to talk to him on the phone.

“Sam, good afternoon. How can I help you?”

The prime minister sounded like he was in fine fettle. He had good reason to be buoyant, for though the cost of the war had turned out to be bloodier than he had hoped and prayed for, its outcome was, by his lights, a resounding victory: not only had the
IDF
expelled the
PLO
from Lebanon, it had also taught Syria a lesson it would not readily forget, and the new Lebanese president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, a pro-western Christian, seemed amenable to negotiating a peace treaty with Israel.

“Forgive me, Mr. Prime Minister,” said Lewis, “I wouldn’t be bothering you, but I’ve just received instructions
–
”

“Speak up, Sam, the line is not very good.”

“I said I’ve just received instructions to deliver to you personally a most urgent message from the president.”

The prime minister sighed. “I hear what you say, Sam, but please understand, these have been rather stressful weeks, and I’m taking a few days’ rest. So I hope whatever the message is can wait a few days.”

“I’m afraid not, sir.”

Begin sounded put out. “Sam, the last holiday I took was four years ago. I simply need a vacation, and I’m sure the president will appreciate that.”

“I understand, but
–
”

“And I chose to come here to Nahariya, so that everybody should know that things are quiet again on our northern border. So, I suggest you speak to Yechiel to set up an appointment for when I return to my desk in a few days’ time.”

Lewis’s hands went clammy. “In normal circumstances I’d do that, Mr. Prime Minister, but this really can’t wait. My instructions are from the president himself.”

Begin capitulated with a grunt: “In that case I suppose you’ll have to do what you’ve been told to do.”

“Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. I’ll leave Tel Aviv right away and be with you in a couple of hours.”

“I shall be expecting you,” said an irked Begin.

Sam Lewis was about to perform one of the more distasteful duties of his career. He was to go through the motions of consulting with the prime minister about a blueprint for a Middle East peace which carried the imprimatur of the president himself. He was to tell Begin that President Reagan intended to make his peace plan public in a nationwide address within the next seventy-two hours, hence the hurry. And while he was to assure the prime minister that he would report back everything he said concerning the presidential plan, he was to leave no impression that the plan itself was open to modification.

The letter in effect said that while the U.S. had hitherto functioned as mediator, it was now publicly expressing its own view. And that view was that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process
–
most immediately by Jordan and the Palestinians
–
would Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity would be respected by its neighbors. Hence, it was essential, wrote the president, to find a way, “to reconcile Israel’s legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” The preferred American solution was not a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, since that would not be viable, but rather a transitional five-year period of Palestinian self-government in the occupied territories as envisioned in the Camp David Accords, evolving into a political association with the Kingdom of Jordan. Moreover, “The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purposes of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks.”

Identical démarches were made at exactly the same time by the American ambassadors in Riyadh, Cairo, and Amman which, unlike Jerusalem, were essentially in the picture, since Washington had already consulted with them.

As he was being driven along the coastal highway to Nahariya, Lewis read and reread the presidential letter and its attendant talking points, and the more he studied them, the more irritated he became. For one, he was uncomfortable with the style and contents of the talking points which he was instructed to deliver orally to Begin, together with the letter. They appeared to him to be ineptly and inappropriately phrased, couched (as he would later learn) in the identical language as that being employed by his ambassadorial colleagues in Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia when delivering their letters
–
as if Menachem Begin could possibly be persuaded to enter into negotiations swayed by the same arguments as those tailored to appeal to the Arab mind and interest.

Lewis could only assume that George Shultz, the new secretary of state in place of Alexander Haig, was a man of such high purpose and hidebound integrity that he mistakenly believed it was imperative that all his ambassadors follow the exact same script in all the Middle Eastern capitals, so that no one could later accuse him of double-dealing.

The ambassador was also chagrined at not having been consulted more than perfunctorily about this peace plan, which elaborated in far greater detail than any previous American initiative a solution to the most complicated political and territorial issues, and this without even attempting to solicit the thinking of the one party whose stakes were arguably the highest: Israel.

As his car sped northward to what he knew would be a thorny rendezvous, Samuel Lewis could not rid himself of these frustrations: why had he been left largely in the dark during the preparation of such a far-reaching plan? He did not disagree with its essence, but he bridled at having been excluded from the tightly knit coterie which the new secretary of state had gathered around him – and whom he’d sworn to absolute secrecy. He was the most qualified to offer significant input on the Israeli aspect of things, and the most competent to advise the president and the secretary how and when to present the plan to a man like Menachem Begin. The whole thing seemed to him to be so tactically flawed that it was bound to fail. As in life, so in diplomacy, timing can be as important as substance, and in this instance, the timing was abysmal. Had he been asked, Lewis would have urged prudence and patience: this was the worst of times to expect Israel to entertain an initiative in which it, alone, was being asked to make enormous sacrifices and take tremendous risks in surrendering up the West Bank and the Gaza Strip when the dust of the war in Lebanon had hardly settled; when the IDF was still deployed there and things were still messy; when the nation was still mourning its dead; and when the Israeli Right and Left were locked in a furious tug-of-war over the human cost of the war, the excessive length of the war, and the political gains of the war. Acceptance of the plan now, in whatever modified form, would be regarded by Begin as both a capitulation and an outright betrayal of everything his government stood for.

Such were his troubled thoughts as his car drew up to a small boarding house on a partially paved Nahariya street with a view of the sea. Its façade was the color of diluted mustard. His usual cheery smile, which he bestowed on the posse of security guards in attendance on the premier, was artificial. As he walked toward the door, Mrs. Begin, comfortably dressed in a housecoat and slippers, came padding out to usher him in with a gush of hospitality. Cheerfully, she explained that the advantage of not staying in a large seaside hotel was that her husband could avoid boisterous holidaymakers with rowdy children.

“Ah, here you are, Sam,” said the prime minister, rising from an armchair to shake his hand, as the ambassador walked into a marvelously comfortable-looking room filled with overstuffed chairs strewn with needlepoint pillows.

“I really am sorry, Mr. Prime Minister, to disturb you
–
”

“Say no more about it, Sam. You have your duty to perform, and if your duty can’t wait, you must perform it.”

Lewis had never seen the prime minister looking so relaxed. Instead of his usual suit and tie he was wearing a sports shirt and slacks, and the spontaneity of his reception – warmed all the more by Mrs. Begin’s freshly brewed tea and biscuits – made him feel all the more discomfited because of the unpleasant duty he was about to perform.

“Well, Sam,” said the prime minister, after a pleasant preliminary chitchat, “what’s on President Reagan’s mind that can’t wait?”

“I am instructed by the president to deliver this to you, Mr. Prime Minister,” said Lewis gravely, handing over the letter.

“With your permission I shall read it in your presence. May I?” asked Mr. Begin, with his old-world courtesy
–
a set ritual the ambassador knew well.

“Please do.”

Begin adjusted his spectacles, drew the page closer to his face, and began studying it with intense concentration, taking in the meaning of the words. The further he read, the more his brow puckered and his face dropped, so that by the time he reached the president’s signature his features were a scowl and his mouth thin with displeasure.

“Sam,” he said, “this is the saddest day of my life since becoming prime minister. Could you not have allowed us to enjoy our victory for just a day or two longer? Did you have to bring this to me now?” And then, eyes as steely as his face, he flared, “Mr. Ambassador, is this it, or do you have anything orally to add?”

“Yes, Mr. Prime Minister, I do,” answered Lewis, hiding a thick swallow, and he proceeded to read out his talking points, which caused the expression on the prime minister’s face to mutate from anger to angst and back again. When the ambassador related that Washington was consulting simultaneously with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the presidential plan, Begin became so angry that he bit his lip, and said from between clenched teeth, “Did I hear you say you were consulting with Saudi Arabia? What on earth does Saudi Arabia have to do with peace with Israel? Are you telling me that your superiors in Washington are involving those anti-Israel, Islamic fanatics in determining our future, our very fate?”

“My instructions state
–
”

“I hear exactly what your instructions state, Mr. Ambassador. You have told me. They state that Washington has been consulting with everybody but with the government of Israel. And they state that the king of Jordan already seems favorably disposed to the presidential initiative which concerns Israel most of all, but about which my government knows least of all.”

The premier stared at the letter in silence, his face grim. The ambassador held his tongue. The room went as quiet as a catacomb. Finally, Begin threw the ambassador a livid look, and with bitterness said, “Please inform the president that I have read his letter and am most unhappy both with its contents and its implications. I have also listened very carefully to your oral message and am extremely upset by its contents. You may tell the president and the secretary of state that I am astonished that your government did not see fit to indicate that such an initiative was in the making, or to consult with the government of Israel at any stage of its elaboration. This is entirely unacceptable. The whole initiative is utterly contrary to all our understandings with your country. It is not in accordance with the Camp David agreements; in fact it is a violation of those agreements. Of course, I will consult with my cabinet, and then give you a response. We being a democracy – unlike those others with whom your government has seen fit to consult – necessitates my being given time before giving a formal response.”