The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (72 page)

Prime Minister Begin with President Reagan and their respective advisers during a working session in the White House Cabinet Room, 21 June 1982

Photograph credit: Ya’acov Sa’ar & Israel Government Press Office

Prime Minister Begin and President Reagan in animated discussion in White House garden, 21 June 1982

For anyone who has ever questioned the veracity of media reporting on matters to do with the Israel-Arab conflict in wartime, this contentious exchange between Reagan and Begin is, surely, instructive. Here was an American president shaping policy on the basis of perception, and not upon facts on the ground as the prime minister knew them to be. The president’s perception was fed, first and foremost, by the voracious impatience
–
indeed tyranny
–
of a twenty-four-hour media cycle that is ravenous for news but is often out of sync with the incessantly changing military reality on the ground. Here was proof, if any was needed, that in a transparent real-time wartime information environment, rebuttal is persuasive only if done with instant and accurate information
–
an exercise in which Israel has been out-foxed time and time again.

On this occasion, at least, Begin did seemingly succeed in persuading the president that the truth did not tally with the news reports, for as Reagan rose to his feet, he said, “It’s time we join our colleagues in the Cabinet Room, and I would like them to hear what you’ve just told me, so I suggest we start with that.”
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As they walked into the Cabinet Room where their senior advisers were waiting, Menachem Begin had the sense that he had reestablished a measure of rapport with the president which, surely, would help foster their dialogue in the months ahead. It certainly helped when, after the usual pleasantries and photo-op, the president asked Begin, using his first name for the first time on the trip, “Menakem, please repeat for my colleagues what you just told me concerning the bombing of the sports stadium and
PLO
training base in Beirut.”

The prime minister readily responded.

After he made his point, Secretary of State Alexander Haig remarked, “The latest wire service reports from Beirut say that shelling is continuing, and that the Soviet Embassy has reportedly been hit by artillery fire, inflicting casualties.”

“That report is only from one source,” said the head of Israel’s military intelligence, General Sagui, who was a member of the premier’s entourage. “It has not been corroborated, so I suggest we refrain from commenting on it until it is confirmed one way or another.”

Begin added, “There has been firing on both sides, and perhaps a Palestinian shell hit the Soviet Embassy. We certainly have no interest in interfering with Soviet diplomats in Beirut.” (Later reports would support his claim.)

“Would not the bulk of the Palestinians prefer to stay in Lebanon as part of Lebanese society and under Lebanese authority?” asked the president, of no one in particular.

“According to our information,” answered Haig, “the Lebanese President, Elias Sarkis, has said the Palestinians could remain, but only as non-voting residents.”

“And what’s your view, Menakem?” asked Reagan.

“I think that for the sake of the future of Lebanon, a portion of the Palestinians should leave. After all, Libya and Iraq are almost empty countries, and perhaps they could take them in. One thing is for sure, if the
PLO
is disarmed and allowed to stay in Lebanon, they will re-arm in no time. It is impossible to stop Soviet gun-running. No central Lebanese authority is strong enough to do that. They have to go.”

“That might well be true,” conceded Reagan, “but surely you will agree that there can be no full answer to the Middle East problem until this Palestinian refugee situation is resolved.”

“I agree, and it is doable,” said Begin. “It is a humanitarian problem, and if only the Arabs had the will they could resolve it in short order. After all, that is how the refugee problems in Europe were resolved after World War Two. That’s how the refugee issue was handled between Pakistan and India. That’s how the refugee problem between Greece and Turkey was tackled. And that’s how we tackled our own refugee problem. Israel took in and resettled some eight hundred thousand Jewish refugees expelled from Arab countries. But the Arabs keep
their
refugees in permanent camps and reject any suggestion of resettlement because, for them, their refugees are a weapon against us.”

The president, wanting to move on, glanced at a cue card and read, “Cap, will you say a few words about our military strategy for the Middle East generally.”

“Certainly, Mr. President,” said Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and he proceeded to explain to the prime minister and to the rest of us seated around the burnished oak conference table how America was trying to woo strategic Arab countries, some fabulously oil-rich, away from the Soviet influence.

“The U.S. is determined to pursue, as a strategic goal, an ability to protect Middle East oil countries,” he said in his clipped, rapid speech. “This is a matter of acute national interest, because were these oil fields to fall to the East, the West would have a hard time surviving.”

Smelling a rat, Begin looked hard at the defense secretary and the defense secretary looked back hard at him.

“The Soviets will soon need to import energy from the Arabs, and they may not choose to do so by conventional means,” Weinberger went on. “So we have to be ready for any contingency. To secure these areas we have talked to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Oman, primarily. Thus far we have naval rights in Oman and bases in Egypt. We are striving to promote relations with other Arab countries, but they are reluctant to associate with us. For example, we have talked to Jordan and urged them to buy U.S. weapons, but instead King Hussein has turned to the Soviets for weaponry. This means no control by us over the supply, the number, or the use of such weaponry. I can’t overstate how important it is for us to win over the Arabs, but it is terribly hard to carry out our policy of military supply, because the Arabs do not perceive us as a reliable supplier.”

Weinberger sounded like he was making a diagnosis, but to Begin it came across as an existential threat. A low buzz of disaffection started in our ranks. Begin was twisting his lips in a way that as much as said, “How callous and voracious and shortsighted can a man be?” This sentiment entered his voice when he said contemptuously, “Mr. President, I absolutely differ with this presentation. Don’t arm Jordan! Jordan is linked militarily with Iraq, and Iraq with the Soviet Union. Even as I speak, Soviet ships are docked in Akaba port unloading weapons for Iraq.”

Sympathetically, yet firmly, Reagan responded, “But how long can Israel exist as an armed camp in a hostile world, Menakem? As I’ve said before, we have to create more Egypts. So yes, we are seeking to encourage Jordan to follow Sadat’s path. But to influence King Hussein in that direction we must raise his confidence in us by agreeing to sell him arms. We would never sell arms to Jordan and then simply stand back when they use them. In this matter Israel must trust us. I’ve had a very good meeting with King Hussein, and I have the confidence to say to you, Menakem, that the U.S. will proceed in asking Jordan to express its willingness to deal with Israel, just as Egypt did. We believe that Jordan is prepared to be brought into the picture. Jordan bought Soviet weapons because the weapons we sold them in the past were so restricted in how they could use them as to be almost useless to them. On the other hand, we know that the king is very unhappy with the purchases he made from the Soviet Union. He wants ours. We would never try selling arms to Syria, for example, but only to those regimes which show signs of responsibility. And, believe me, we would not deal on trust alone, but would insist on assurances. We are using good judgment, Menakem.”

As he was talking, Begin was shaking his head.

“I see you disagree,” said the president. “So tell me, what are the alternatives? How can you live everlastingly surrounded by hostile neighbors, with your economy forever stretched to the limit, and your standard of living constantly drained? This is no future! So yes, we have made overtures to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.”

Begin was about to answer, but the president preempted him. “Just let me finish this thought. We intend to provide military equipment to those Arab nations who have come to rely on us, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for the means to defend themselves. I believe that in so doing, Arab confidence in us is strengthened, our strategic position in the region is improved, and thereby we encourage these Arab nations to take risks for peace. And now let me hear your response.”

Begin took aim and fired his salvo. “Mr. President, it is my responsibility to tell you that arming Jordan will pose a mortal threat to our survival. Yours is a mighty country, ours is Lilliputian. Does Jordan’s goodwill really depend on airplanes? Of course, we trust the United States, but Jordan has never kept its promises. Supply Jordan with weaponry, and in minutes it could hit Israel’s centers of population. Of course it’s important to try to influence King Hussein to join the peace process. I am ready to receive him in Jerusalem at any time, or let him invite me to Amman. But for the United States to arm him, in addition to Saudi Arabia, and the others
–
they, with their unprecedented wealth
–
could bankrupt us merely by our trying to keep up.”

“So, if that’s the case, what’s your future, Menakem? What’s your solution?” Reagan sounded genuinely empathetic.

“My solution is to say to you that five years ago, no one would have believed there would be a peace treaty with Egypt. It was achieved through great Israeli sacrifice and by maintaining Israel’s deterrent strength. That is what brought Egypt to the peace table. That is what will bring the others to the peace table. If the Lebanon problem is solved, and I pray Operation Peace for Galilee will help solve it, Israel will have peace with Lebanon. If present policies are maintained by guaranteeing Israel’s deterrent strength, Jordan, too, will have good reason to join the peace process. And as for Saudi Arabia, well, the only thing I can say about that so-called country – if it is a country at all – is that it is the most fanatical of all the Arab states in their striving to destroy Israel. I go further: the U.S. money which goes to pay for Saudi oil often ends up enabling the Soviets to buy weapons for the PLO.”

“That’s not so!” barked an angry defense secretary, a muscle jumping in his jaw. “The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia enabled us to get the
PLO
to accept the ceasefire in Lebanon which we’d sponsored, and which lasted for almost a year until you invaded that country. This was solely because Saudi Arabia was able to use its influence with Syria which, in turn, used its influence with the
PLO
.”

“Is that how it came about?” asked Reagan, searchingly.

“No, Mr. President, that is not how it came about,” answered Begin. “Secretary Weinberger is wrong. Saudi Arabia did not persuade Syria
–
”

“Excuse me, they did
–
”

“Mr. Weinberger, please have the goodness not to interrupt me. The president has given me the floor.”

The defense secretary went red and turned away, and Begin, turning his back on him, faced the president squarely and declared, “Anwar Sadat told me, personally and directly, that the so-called ceasefire, which the
PLO
honored only in the breach, came about solely because the Saudis paid twenty million dollars
–
TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS
–
directly into Yasser Arafat’s bank account. It’s as simple as that! And as for Saudi Arabia, I say again, they are the most extreme haters of my country.”

“You could have said as much about Egypt at one time,” said the president, a trifle sardonically. “Saudi Arabia is deeply anxious about its own future. It is fearful of domestic turmoil as well as of Soviet designs on its oil. And as Cap has pointed out, our strategic interest in that country is paramount. So you have to trust us, Menakem, that we won’t pursue that interest at Israel’s expense.”

“Oh, we trust the United States absolutely,” said the prime minister, “but even the best of intentions are sometimes hard to fulfill.”

He might as well have said the road to hell is paved with good intentions, because that is how it came across.

Reagan, catching the nuance, countered, “I accept that over the last few years [meaning the Carter administration] the United States showed little muscle in world affairs. But now, things are different. Now, we are again growing muscular, and nations are beginning to take note. That’s why the Soviets are ready to talk to us about arms reductions. And that is why, if only Israel had more confidence in what we are doing, we could proceed to a wider peace in the Middle East.”