The Real Chief - Liam Lynch (17 page)

Day and night he worked, endeavouring to foster an atmo­sphere of confidence and optimism in the other officers. He was convinced that the Republican forces could maintain almost in­definitely the kind of opposition to the Provisional Government forces which would eventually cause them to accede. He be­lieved he could create a situation which would force the treaty­ites to abandon their cause, surrender to the old movement, and in a united effort demand a less humiliating settlement with Britain.

By this stage he had lost faith in the sincerity of Free State proposals, believing that their general policy was to split the soli­darity of the army Executive. Not even De Valera's request ear­lier in August could wean his mind from the course in which it had now been set. De Valera also wrote to Lynch suggesting that it was their duty to meet the Free State in some form of political basis. ‘It has always been my view that with anything like good­will on both sides a constitutional way out of this im­passe could be found.'
27
But even though military victory was out of reach, Lynch's outlook remained unchanged.

Though Liam Lynch saw what was happening in Ireland, he was, nevertheless, aware of the intervention of Britain in affairs since the outbreak of the Civil War. On 30 January 1923 he made a de­tailed report to the president and ministers stating that:

When the Civil War broke out orders were issued from the Four Courts to wage war on England but owing to disorganisation no­thing could be done. At the last meeting of the Executive the matter was again discussed, but though action was very much favoured I was not in a position to recommend it, as we had not a staff in charge and no satisfactory organisation.

He now believed that his forces in England were sufficiently well organised and equipped to undertake operations in specific areas, and suggested that hostilities against the common enemy should be undertaken. Whether or not this suggestion was a ploy for unity, the rapid changes in the situation in Ireland certainly can­celled out any plans which he may have had for an offensive in Britain.

By the end of January 1923 guerrilla warfare was almost over. Fighting was reduced to sniping attacks between opposing forces. Fifty-five executions had been carried out and many more were pending. The Free State authorities had introduced a policy of sentencing prisoners to death in places where Republican acti­vi­ties were taking place, consequently the conflict now lacked any human dignity. It seemed that the Free State forces were out to win the struggle no matter how ruthless the methods. It was evi­dent that military victory was no longer a possibility, yet dog­gedly and stubbornly both sides continued the battle.

The Republicans seemed prepared to continue fighting even though their strength had been steadily whittled down, with lives being lost daily; their actions were outlawed by the church; the majority of the people and the morale of their forces was weaken­ing. Tom Barry, Liam Deasy and men at ground level began to see that victory was impossible and that negotiations should be under­­taken. Liam Deasy was captured on 18 January as he lay sick in a house in Tincurry. Previous to this he had been formu­lating proposals to end the conflict as he realised that further re­sistance was useless. He was aware of the responsibility which he held, but unfortunately his arrest did not help the situation. No longer free and trapped into making a decision, he felt obliged to avail of the only means his captors left open to him; faced with death, he decided that there was no point in con­tinuing, as many more of his comrades would be executed by the Free State govern­ment,
1
therefore he signed a document dictated to him which agreed to an unconditional surrender of all arms and men as re­quired by General Mulcahy:

... in pursuance of this undertaking I am asked to appeal for a similar undertaking and acceptance from the following: E. de Valera, P. Ruttledge, A. Stack, M. Colivet, Domhnal O'Callaghan, Liam Lynch, Con Moloney, T. Derrig, F. Aiken, S. Barrett, T. Barry, S. McSwiney, Séamus Robinson, Humphrey Murphy, Séamus O'Donovan, Frank Carthy and for the immediate and unconditional surrender of themselves after the issue by them of an order for surrender on the part of all those associated with them, together with their arms and equipment.
2

Though not looked on at the time as a courageous stand Liam Deasy's appeal was subsequently regarded as such. Copies of it, together with a long covering letter in which Deasy set out the reasons which impelled him to make it, were delivered to the mem­bers of the government and army Executive by Fr Tom Dug­gan who had been nominated as courier by Liam Deasy. The Free State government did not publish the document imme­diately but waited until 9 February 1923 and gave it the widest publicity in conjunction with a similar appeal made by prisoners in Lime­rick.

The policy of executions initially begun in November 1922 continued to mount with ruthless vigour.
3
On 20 January 1923 eleven prisoners were shot, two in Limerick, four in Tralee, five in Athlone. On 22 January three men were executed in Dun­dalk, on 23 January two in Waterford, on 26 January two more were shot in Birr and on the next day two were executed in Mary­boro. Not even the terrible cost in blood, in sorrow and in sadness, not even the bleak prospect that failure may be nigh, not even the appeals of former, now neutral, comrades nor of church leaders or of friends could alter Lynch's determination to conti­nue the struggle in arms. He stood firmly in the role in which he had set out, and replied:

I am to inform you officially, on behalf of the Government and Army Command, that the proposal contained in your circular letter of 30 January, and the enclosure, cannot be considered.

Comrades say that because he lived in Dublin during this period, his appreciation of the true situation was far more optimistic than the facts warranted. Maurice Twomey, general headquarters staff, gives a picture of Liam at that time:

He could not or would not face the thought of defeat and collapse of Republican resistance to the imposition of the Treaty. The farthest he would allow himself to think in such a direction was that the Free State authorities would be compelled to negotiate with Republicans. Abandonment of the struggle in the field he would not countenance, and I believe this would have continued to be his attitude if he had not been killed. I feel that in no circumstances would he himself surrender, and that he would never order those under his command to do so.
4

Ernie O'Malley, who was in jail at this time, got a letter out to Liam Lynch with his criticism of Deasy's activity. ‘Prisoners are casualties and must not be considered ...' He further expressed his opinion that the public would swing to which ever side they felt would win. ‘The chaplain came to me with a paper yesterday and hinted that I should follow Deasy's example and also that of the Limerick prisoners; I'm glad I managed to contain myself when he was in my cell, but when he left I went up in smoke.'
5

The following day O'Malley got another letter out to Lynch which indicated that the deputy governor had been attempting to persuade the Mountjoy men to sign the unconditional sur­render; but he advised Lynch to have courage as the ‘... enemy govern­ment will realise that even if the leaders go, the rank and file will carry on ...'
6
This type of encouragement gave Lynch re­newed vigour.

De Valera, in a letter to McGarrity, regarded Deasy's sur­ren­der statement as ‘the biggest blow we have got since we started'.
7
Liam Lynch told McGarrity that Deasy was ‘in a des­pondent mood' and his attitude was that ‘there can be no going back on our de­mands. It is clear the enemy will carry out many execu­tions, but even though this terrible sacrifice has to take place we must put up with the consequences.'
8

It was Lynch's intention towards the last day of January to visit the south ‘in a few weeks';
9
however the many activities which crowded his days meant he had to postpone the visit. He made an appeal to his forces to make an all-out effort to compel the Free State authorities into the position of negotiation.

From the outset of the Civil War he endeavoured to conduct the conflict on recognised warfare lines, and in an ‘Order' dated 27 September 1922 he had prohibited retaliation despite the fact that ‘some cruel and cold blooded murders' had been committed against ‘our troops' but ‘similar reprisals for these murders cannot under any circumstances be tolerated.'
10

In the same order he prohibited the shooting of unarmed Free State soldiers and the use of explosive ammunition; wound­ed enemy personnel should receive proper medical attention; the hoisting of the white flag denoting surrender should be accepted. In the Mulcahy papers there are copies of alleged ‘captured docu­ments' one issued to ‘O/Cs all battalions' dated 23 Novem­ber 1922 and a further document which is entitled ‘Enemy Murder Bill' and dated 30 November 1922 in which it is stated that, ‘All members of the Provisional “Parliament” who, were present and voted for the Murder Bill will be shot at sight ... Houses of mem­bers of Murder Bill, active supporters of P.G. who are known to support Murder Bill will be destroyed ... Free State army officers who approve of Murder Bill will be shot at sight; also all ex-Bri­tish army officers and men who joined the Free State army since 6 December 1921.'
11
The order was ‘to be duplicated and trans­mit­ted to O/C all units.' This alleged document came to light when an inquest was being held on the death of Hugh Hough­ton, Dublin. According to the
Irish Independent
15 March 1923 re­port, ‘a Colonel in the nation­al army identified the sig­nature on a captured document pro­duced as that of Liam Lynch, chief-of-staff in the Irregular army.'
12
But without investigation could it be identified categorically and stated with certainty that a signature was that of a particular person?

In a ‘Proclamation' of 1 February, Lynch as chief-of-staff ex­pressed his revulsion at the unethical practices of the Free State government ‘who have resorted to the infamous practice of shoot­­­ing Republican soldiers taken by them as prisoners of war, and have already put to death fifty-three officers and men in this manner, “and having violated with impunity” the “international usages of war” this “Junta” have announced “that Punitive Action” will be taken against other prisoners in their power if hostages which we have been compelled to take are not set at liberty.
Now We Hereby Give Notice
that we shall not give up our hostages, and if threatened action be taken, we shall hold every member of the said Junta and its so-called Parliament, Senate and other House, and all their Executives responsible, and shall certainly visit them with the punishment they shall deserve'.
13

A further ‘Captured Document' order issued to ‘O/C batta­lion III' states:

The following will be shot at sight ... (a) all members who voted for Enemy Murder Bill; (b) officials of all rank; (c) members of senate in list A; (d) members of Murder Gang; (e) officials – civilians who order prisoners to be fired on; (f) those who torture prisoners ...

The order goes on to list a number of targets such as ‘high court, county and district judges and state solicitors ... editors and leader-writers of hostile press in Ireland in cases where these are known to be hostile ...' It also lists the residences belonging to certain owners which ‘shall be destroyed.
14

The documents published in the
Freeman's Journal
16 March 1923 are similar but not identical to those found in the Mulcahy papers – those published in the newspaper appear on the surface at least to go beyond Lynch's dictum of having ‘honourably stood by the rules of War', because the alleged ‘Captured Documents' in the newspaper states that ‘aggressive civilian supporters of the Free State government policy of executions of prisoners of war [and] ... officials (civilian or military) employed at the headquarters of the different enemy Ministries', as ‘enemies of the Re­public will be shot at sight ...'
15

On 4 December 1922, which was four days after the alleged captured documents were issued, a document under the heading ‘General Activities' was signed by Liam Lynch, which is among the alleged ‘Captured Documents' in the Mulcahy Papers. In this, document he again talks about the rules of war:

... We have met the enemy in noble warfare, putting our weak arm against his strong one ... We have not adopted against him the same tactics adopted against the British ... While our prisoners have been murdered and tortured ... all efforts will be concentrated on making the enemy realise that no matter what the cost may be, no government but that of the Republic will ever function in Ireland. The maintenance of discipline is the first duty of officers and they will take special care to see that no matter what tactics the enemy descends to, the honour of the IRA will be preserved inviolate.
16

According to Florence O'Donoghue, ‘even in the face of persis­tent Free State policy of executing prisoners of war, he [Lynch] continued steadily to resist any departure from the letter or spirit of the order, beyond the taking and holding of hostages.'
17
On 1 February 1923, Lynch issued a strongly-worded proclamation denouncing the ‘Government of the Irish Free State'.
18

Lynch was keenly aware of adverse propaganda. The
War News
issued by the Free State government carried stories, which were often exaggerated, and these were often reprinted in the daily newspapers.
19

On 10 February, he sent a formal letter of protest to Richard Mulcahy setting out in detail the breaches of ‘civilised warfare' ethics such as the ‘shooting of prisoners' without trial; prisoners taken from lorries and murdered by the roadside; the wounded deprived of proper medical attention. In this document he out­lined full details of the breaches with names and dates. He was convinced that military resistance to the treaty should con­tinue as long as the treaty included partition and enforced in­clusion in the British empire.

In a letter to Con Moloney he stated that ‘were it not for re­cent events we would have forced them to accept our terms with­in a few weeks'.
20
It seems likely that he was referring to Liam Deasy's order of unconditional surrender. Lynch remained ada­mant and would not entertain any suggestion of seeking terms, be­­­cause according to Liam Deasy:

Being an idealist, his highest principles were his guide. It was not in his nature to surrender or to compromise. It is my opinion that the promise he made to support the Four Courts garrison, if they were attacked remained a sacred trust, and the two broken treaties which he had signed in Limerick with Donnacha O'Hannigan and Michael Brennan confirmed his determination that this would be a fight to the finish.