The Road to Berlin (56 page)

In London Mikolajczyk and the Prime Minister studied the implications of the ‘Volhynian agreement’ enacted between the Red Army and the
AK
. The first stage had involved the Soviet military taking over and then lighting on more of the
Armija Krajowa;
with the establishment of the 1st Polish Army, an attempt
was made to incorporate Polish units into the Soviet-sponsored army, an attempt that was resisted, leading to the shooting of the
AK
commander and the hanging of twenty men of the
AK
. Late in March the Soviet attitude changed, no doubt owing in part to the recognition of the military utility of the
AK
, and a more favourable ‘agreement’ was drawn up. Mikolajczyk suggested that now was the time to take ‘a new initiative’ and also to think about sending British and American military missions to Warsaw and the ‘Volhynian division’. Churchill thought not: sending British officers would only enrage the Russians; it ‘would not help but rather bring much harm’. As for ‘activating’ British policy, he had broken off his correspondence with Stalin—which also made the situation ‘more acute’; at this juncture, while agreeing to an American proposal that there might be a joint Anglo-American ‘plain-spoken approach’ to Stalin, Churchill elected for ‘a moody silence so far as Stalin is concerned’.

On the eve of Mikolajczyk’s departure for the United States, a journey on which he embarked with high hopes of turning the tide of Allied policy in Poland’s favour and with the Prime Minister’s encouragement to seek out the President, Stalin made his own moves to blunt the impact of this development. With an election in the offing, President Roosevelt was not anxious to alienate ‘the Polish vote’, but (as Ambassador Ciechanowski subsequently pointed out to Mikolajczyk) there was ‘no significance in the long run’ now that the Polish problem had become part of American internal politics; it was a unique coincidence of events, unlikely to endure or to return. This had also not escaped Stalin’s attention, and his reception in Moscow of Professor Oskar Lange, influential among left-wing Polish-Americans, and Father Orlemanski, a Catholic priest from Massachusetts who exercised similar influence, was calculated to have some effect on public opinion in the United States. It was thus a gesture in the direction of President Roosevelt, and a shaft aimed at Mikolajczyk.

Stalin talked at length to Professor Lange on 17 May, opening the discussion with an exchange about the Polish army and the political attitudes of the groups within the Polish ‘patriotic’ front. The Soviet leader listened to a deal of academic pomposity from Professor Lange, and on being told about ‘the radicalism of the Polish people’, which he underestimated, and the unrepresentative ‘social composition of the Polish army’ in the USSR, replied tongue in cheek, though he took note of Professor Lange’s observations about the treatment of Poles in the USSR—when the refugees and deportees returned to Poland, tales of their harsh treatment would have an adverse effect on Polish public opinion. On ‘the Polish problem’, Stalin insisted that he wanted Poland as an ally, that he was ready to arm and equip a Polish army of a million men. He brushed aside arguments that Germany might be too deeply hurt by Polish territorial compensations and demands; he was indifferent to German feelings—the peace would either ‘create no desire for German revenge, or it will be such as to make German revenge impossible’; in any event, ‘Germany must be destroyed once and for all as a political power.’ The co-operation between the Soviet Union, Britain and America,
which he readily conceded to be the foundation of any lasting peace, was itself no mere ‘temporary conjuncture’ but rose from ‘a fundamental community of historical interests’. And with the destruction of Germany—conceived at Teheran —‘Poland will emerge as a major European power’.

In Poland itself ‘the Poles must form their own administration’: the Polish government must emerge out of Poland itself’ and Stalin believed that ‘such forces’ existed within the Polish underground. While Soviet-sponsored bodies might play a part, an understanding with the London government could be desirable and the door to it ‘is never closed’. Stalin was ‘favourably disposed’ towards Mikolajczyk and Romer, but as far as ‘collaboration’ between the Polish underground and the Red Army was concerned thought that Mikolajczyk should beware the ‘fairy tales of his own intelligence service’. Over the Curzon line, Stalin conceded that there might be adjustments—‘four kilometres to east or west’—but Professor Lange reminded him about Lvov and what this meant to ‘Americans of Polish descent’ and to those Polish refugees sympathetic to the Union of Polish Patriots, who had asked him specifically to raise the question. Any concession on Lvov, Stalin went on, meant he must ‘make war on the Ukrainians and there are several millions of them in the Red Army’: either the Poles or the Ukrainians ‘must be hurt’, therefore it must be that party that will mean the least hurt ‘to the future of Polish–Soviet friendship’. Though reminded by Professor Lange that Lvov meant more to the Poles, and that surrendering it would be a ‘constant source of anti-Soviet ill-feeling and agitation’, Stalin would only commit himself to ‘further study’ of the question. On this occasion Stalin showed himself much more sympathetic to the London government; having told the Prime Minister that he saw no reason why the London government could not agree at once on a territorial settlement, in the presence of Professor Lange he mellowed and announced that ‘to a certain degree’ he understood their predicament—required as they were to cede territory in the east before the compensation in the west materialized. The western frontiers of Poland must therefore be settled first.

Finally Stalin urged Professor Lange to seek out Mikolajczyk and General Sosnkowski—‘and find out what that man really wants’—but not to do this through official channels, not to arrange a trip to London through the British Ambasador, but to go to London from America. On being questioned by Stalin about the genuineness of Soviet assurances of not encroaching on Polish independence and sovereignty, Professor Lange replied that they could be ‘political manoeuvres’, but the fact that Stalin was arming a Polish force ‘to win and protect Poland’s independence’ disposed of this argument, and was the basic ‘proof’ of Soviet intentions. From Stalin’s point of view it had proved to be a very satisfactory exchange, underlining his reasonableness and the underlying honesty of his intentions. He did choke off a suggestion for direct talks between the Union of Polish Patriots with its seat in Moscow and the London government, with the excuse that this meant ‘official negotiations’ and thus required ‘definite proposals’, suggesting
instead that Professor Lange as a ‘private citizen’ (and as an American) could do much on his own; within a very few days, however, Lebedev, the Soviet Ambassador to the Allied governments in London, made a confidential approach to Professor Grabski, president of the Polish National Council in London. This was followed a week later (on 31 May) by another meeting, all with Mikolajczyk’s knowledge, to try to establish a new Soviet–Polish agreement designed also to secure military collaborations. To judge by his comments to the Prime Minister and Eden at the end of May, Mikolajczyk was not impressed, for he discerned in these moves the ‘third phase’ of Soviet policy designed to ‘split the unity of Polish politicians, parties, soldiers and people’.

Once in Washington Mikolajczyk hoped to enlist the aid of the President to turn the tide of policy finally in Poland’s favour. With the approach of the great fire-storm which the Soviet command planned to unleash on the Eastern Front, however, time was running short. From the outset the Polish Prime Minister found himself under pressure to accept the idea of a visit to Moscow, and though his first call upon the President went well, he was shaken to learn from President Roosevelt—in a talk laden with tales of Teheran—that it was Churchill who was the author of the Curzon line proposal. While advising Mikolajczyk to make some concessions to facilitate a Soviet–Polish agreement, the President intimated that it would be judicious to avoid ‘final or definite’ territorial settlements at this stage—and he so couched his opinion that Mikolajczyk quite justifiably drew the conclusion that the Curzon line was not to be the last territorial word. The changes in the government that President Roosevelt urged on the Polish Prime Minister were in reality a small concession—after all, only four people—but they might prove decisive. Over the possibility of Mikolajczyk visiting the Soviet Union (in which matter the Polish minister had already rejected the good offices of President Benes) and the question of American support, President Roosevelt indicated his willingness to act as ‘moderator’ in this matter, a good Presbyterian device which enabled him to forgo the role of prince or bishop in this election year and to confine himself to promoting the moral betterment of both parties, itself a form of support. Immediately after this talk, Mr Stettinius went so far as to offer Mikolajczyk some unofficial advice: with the war as it now ran, and in the midst of preparations for an election, the United States, like Great Britain, could not take a bolder line against the Soviet Union; but in palmier days—if the Poles could hold on and postpone a settlement—then ‘the United States will come back to her fundamental moral principles’ and support Poland ‘strongly and successfully’.

With his hopes thus buoyed, Mikolajczyk launched on his encounter with Professor Lange, whose request to meet the Polish Prime Minister had been withheld by the Polish Embassy in Washington but reached him through a second channel, one furnished by Stettinius and Bohlen. Promptly at four in the afternoon of 13 June Professor Lange arrived at Blair House: in the course of the two-hour interview Mikolajczyk did not venture his own opinions nor did he ‘disclose
his own plans of action’. Professor Lange summed it up admirably himself: ‘I was talking all the time and Mr Mikolajczyk was sitting with a poker face.…’ Professor Lange produced an accurate summary of his talks with Stalin on the territorial settlement, on the nature of the Soviet military administration in Poland and on Stalin’s wish for a ‘Polish–Soviet understanding’. Professor Lange was at pains to express the conviction of the men within ‘Berling’s army’ that they were fighting for Polish independence—‘all of them were against Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs’, and since the bulk of the Poles in the Soviet Union was made up of Poles from Galicia, then ‘all the soldiers took the view that Lvov should remain with Poland’. Feelings ran so high that Berling was forced ‘to intervene with Stalin on several occasions’, though there was less passion spent over Vilno.

The next day Mikolajczyk paid his farewell call upon the President, the talk based on a memorandum drawn up on the evening of 13 June. President Roosevelt told his guest that ‘he would approve the Polish Premier’s journey to Moscow and his direct talks with Stalin’: he adjured Mikolajczyk to come to terms with the Russians—‘there are five or six times more Russians than Poles’—but pointed out that the concessions would involve ‘prestige’ rather than territory. In this ‘political year’ the President could not ‘take an initiative and actively assist the Polish government’, though he wished Mikolajczyk to leave America ‘with a full conviction that he, Roosevelt, was willing to be helpful’, indeed anxious ‘to be a moderator’, to which end he would prepare a telegram for Stalin. Whatever Mikolajczyk’s feelings at this, a report from Ambassador Ciechanowski made sombre reading: President Roosevelt’s ‘pre-election promises’ would never be put into effect; interest in ‘the Polish case’ would not last ‘any longer than five or six weeks’, by which time the Red Army would have struck deep into Poland. The next six weeks were crucial and were all that remained to Poland—without any settlement (either a Soviet–Polish agreement or some incorporation of Poland into a system of European security) then the Polish cause would suffer grave damage, even to the loss of independence: ‘whatever we can secure in the next six weeks will be all that we should expect’.

While Mikolajczyk tried to work a miracle cure in Washington, General Tabor struggled to win more support for the
Armija Krajowa;
at a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 12 June the general presented a full report on the strength of the
AK—
approximately 250,000 men (6,500 platoons) of which only twelve per cent, or 32,000 men, were armed—and while putting the obvious arguments for greater arms deliveries, also stressed the advantages to be derived from synchronizing Polish underground operations with those of the ‘general war effort of the Allies’. If the Allied air forces carried out 1,300 flights to Poland, delivering arms and equipment, then the requirements of the
Armija Krajowa
would be fully met and the Polish striking force made fully effective. On being asked by General Macready (head of the British Military Mission) whether a general rising in Poland would take place ‘in co-operation with Russia’, General
Tabor’s reply caused a stir: ‘It is our aim’, he replied at once, ‘to defeat the Germans in co-operation with the first Ally who comes near enough Polish territory’. How consonant this was with the Polish C-in-C’s instructions issued in London did not seem clear. The next day (13 June) General Tabor went over some of the same ground at a meeting of the Planning Staff (Office of Strategic Services): for three years the equipping of the
AK
had lagged; at present plans were organized on a monthly basis but they could only be fulfilled if there was general co-ordination with Allied action and if the
AK
received a minimum quantity of arms and equipment. In April 1944 Operation
JULA
, a test of diversionist activity in southern Poland, had been successfully carried out at the British request. At the moment arms were flown in from the Italian bases, but General Tabor submitted that use of the ‘northern bases’—British bases—was now imperative. Two days after the meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff (ccs) a Polish journalist (Mr Besterman) supplied the Polish Ambassador with information, apparently from a Pentagon source, that the
CCS
supported the proposal for more arms for the
AK
but that the reply received from the Soviet authorities—consulted in order to implement a common policy—was ‘negative’, to the effect that Poland was an ‘operations area under Soviet responsibility’: only the Soviet command could supply arms to the Polish underground. On 19 June Colonel Mitkiewicz and Brigadier Donovan (head of the American Office of Strategic Services-
OSS
) discussed arms deliveries, and Donovan suggested using American air bases, which would give the Poles a useful political lever, but Colonel Mitkiewicz returned to the point that the question was basically ‘political’ in view of that state of Soviet–Polish relations.