The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (26 page)

2. Proposals for a small quick-reaction force have perennially involved an
underestimation of the size of forces required for certain urgent tasks.
Trygve Lie’s 1947 suggestion that ‘from one thousand to five thousand men would be sufficient – because it [the proposed force] would have behind it all the
authority of the United Nations’ is a clear example of such underestimation. In Somalia and Bosnia doubt was cast on the capabilities of even quite large professional forces to carry out the difficult tasks envisaged for them. In such situations of ongoing conflict, any standing force acting in a vanguard role would require a strong backup capacity. Sooner or later such a force would appeal for help, and something would have to be available. This reinforces the worries that the existence of a standing force would encourage the Security Council to intervene more frequently, thus potentially increasing the already serious problem of the UN’s overcommitment.
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3. The common factors in most of the crises in Africa and elsewhere which have stimulated proposals are the inherently difficult problems of
civil war and the failed state.
These are especially complex problems, and the early injection of a military force into such crises may not necessarily avert tragedy. The history of UN involvements in certain crises in 1991–4, including in Somalia and Bosnia, suggests caution in this regard. Civil wars and failed states present three main difficulties so far as quick international military action is concerned. (a) Such problems are not generally susceptible to a quick in-and-out military action, and indeed may require a longer commitment than UN member states have seemed willing to envisage. (b) There may be a need for outside bodies to take on heavy administrative responsibilities on a long-term basis, possibly in a trustee-like role. (c) In many situations of these kinds the impulse to intervene may be primarily humanitarian, or reflect a legal obligation under the Charter, rather than engaging the material or security interests of outside states: it can therefore be difficult to secure and maintain a high level of outside military involvement over a long period.

4. If, as is sometimes proposed, a UN standing force were to have the role of
pioneer/pathfinder for subsequent peacekeeping forces contributed by states in the normal way
, and were scheduled to withdraw after, say, 4–6 months, it is far from certain that the standing force would still be on the spot when its services were most urgently needed.

5. The
problems of UN uses or threats of force in connection with ongoing peacekeeping or humanitarian operations
remain serious. They include risks to the UN’s reputation for impartiality, and dangers of UN or related personnel on the ground being taken hostage. There is some risk of the UN and the office of Secretary-General being seen as primarily military in function, when some of the organization’s greatest achievements, whether in the field of good offices or of peacekeeping, have been based on negotiations and consent of the parties; or, as with some enforcement and other actions, on force being authorized by the UN but handled by states. Many events of recent years suggest that too direct an association with military force, which inevitably involves tragedies and failures
of many kinds, could seriously undermine the UN’s, and more especially Secretary-General’s, reputation and capabilities.
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6. While there is often a strong case for the use of force in connection with UN peacekeeping operations, and there remains a need for coherent doctrine on this matter,
force may be better managed by states or regional alliances
than by the UN. When force has to be used, experience suggests that it may need to be under the command and control of a single country or alliance rather than the UN as such. For example, when in summer 1995, after the extreme provocation of the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica, the UN was finally able to mobilize an effective use of force against the Bosnian Serbs, it did so not only through its own rapid-reaction force (established as part of UNPROFOR), but also through an outside body, NATO, with its own long-established and extensive military expertise and infrastructure. It was NATO that conducted the Operation Deliberate Force air campaign against Bosnian Serb military targets in August and September 1995. Similarly in Sierra Leone in 2000, when force had to be used for a variety of purposes (including the freeing of hostages and support for the aims of the large UN peacekeeping operation in the country), it was small UK forces operating separately from the UN that performed the necessary military tasks. While there are hazards in any contracting out of responsibility to use force in connection with peacekeeping operations, the pattern has arisen sufficiently often to suggest that it serves a need.

7. There are two main
doubts about the suitability of the Security Council
as a military decision-making body. Firstly, its structure – including both its composition and the existence of the veto power – is not suited to running fast-moving military operations. It lacks resources in certain spheres, including intelligence. In certain crises its members have different interests and views, making rapid agreement on action hard to secure. Secondly, its judgement and possible bias have been very heavily criticized not only in the USA, but also by some Group of 77 members in the UN General Assembly.
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There is a fear that a quick reaction capacity would mean in practice the North intervening in the South – and doing so on a selective basis reflecting particular interests. As a result of these concerns, any placing of military power more directly in the hands of the Security Council (or the Secretary-General) is likely to be resisted. The tension between the General Assembly and the Security Council is a real problem in the UN, and the fears that the Security Council may acquire powers which the General Assembly views as belonging in its sphere have been evident over several issues. Both these reasons may reinforce the arguments for maintaining standing forces on a regional rather than global basis, with a capacity to be used on regional as well as UN authorization.

8. Although it is possible that a UN volunteer force could, as its proponents have argued, be
more prepared to sustain casualties
than national contingents, many of which have been extremely nervous about any losses in UN peacekeeping service, it is not self-evident that this would be so: soldiers might still be reluctant to take considerable risks in conflicts far from home, and in causes that are debatable; and those in charge of such a force might be similarly cautious.

9. The
financing
of a standing UN force, whether volunteer or composed of national contingents, would be difficult. Some states have ruled out the standing force option on basically financial grounds. As France put it in 1993: ‘Since it is clear that the Organization cannot today afford to maintain a standing force, it is indispensable for the Member States to establish forces which can be mobilized rapidly.’
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It is indeed not obvious that governments, which have denied the UN any general right to draw on parts of their armed forces, and have in many cases kept the UN (and especially its peacekeeping operations) on a ludicrously short financial leash, would be willing to pay the large sums involved.

10. There are multiple pressures for a wide range of problems to be tackled on a
regional rather than global
basis – an approach that accords with the provisions on regional arrangements in
Chapter VIII
of the Charter. A UN rapid-reaction capability might tilt the balance too far away from regional responsibility, thereby overloading the UN and undermining efforts to build up standing force capabilities on a regional basis.

For all the excellent reasons that have always informed its advocacy, the idea of a UN standing force continues to have considerable appeal. A new version of the idea in 2006 was for an individually recruited UN Emergency Peace Service.
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Yet the ten criticisms outlined above suggest that building up standing military forces directly under the Security Council may not be the best way to approach the difficult problem of maintaining respect for the UN, or even of enhancing rapid-reaction capabilities. The inherent difficulties of multilateral raising and management of military force, and the dangers of creating false expectations in that regard, need to be recognized.
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The history of international organization is full of episodes in which high ambition has led to disappointment and adverse political reaction. This is true of the debate about the specific issue of standing UN forces – witness the way in which
An Agenda for Peace
(1992) was followed by the cautious US document PDD-25 (1994) and the almost equally cautious
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace
(1995).

The fundamental question has to be addressed: Why have the provisions in the UN Charter, and the various attempts to establish standing, or even standby, forces yielded such slim results? In the early years of the UN, the most obvious reason for the failure to implement the Charter provisions for forces directly under Security Council control was the inability of the Permanent Members of the Council to reach agreement across the Cold War divide. However, this may be a superficial explanation. There appears also to be an underlying reluctance on the part of all states to see a major transfer to the UN of their power to use military force, especially if this commits their forces in advance to participate in what might prove to be distant, controversial, and risky military operations without their state’s express consent and ongoing command. States continue to be jealous of their powers, and to act in accord with what they perceive as national interest. In short, the record suggests that there is a general resistance among almost all governments to the idea of endowing the UN with an independent military capacity.

At the same time, actual practice has produced a rich variety of partial solutions to the problem of having forces available to implement certain aims of the UN Security Council. In light of this fact, the failure to implement the many proposals for standing UN forces should not be seen as a complete abandonment of efforts to develop collective uses of armed force. On the contrary, as noted in the Introduction to this volume, the UN era has seen many variations on the collective security theme, including UN authorizations of the use of force under the leadership of a single state or alliance; the establishment of international peacekeeping forces, under both UN and regional auspices; and standby arrangements, whether regional or global, regarding the availability of national forces for a variety of operations, including UN ones. As in the 1950s, so in the years after 1992, it has been the development of peacekeeping that has led to the strongest pressure for strengthened standby arrangements, and also for the establishment of standing UN forces.

Several crises since 1995 have confirmed that the problem of how to organize prompt and effective action, whether in peacekeeping or coercive mode, remains important. However, any progress that has been made has not been on a standing UN military force as such. The measures on which some progress has been achieved and more might be possible include:

• Recognizing the advantages of the type of arrangement whereby certain military operations, authorized by the Security Council, are under national or alliance
control as distinct from under direct UN control. Such advantages may apply not only to enforcement operations, such as those reversing the results of aggression against a state, but also to certain peacekeeping operations requiring a willingness to use force. Military operations devolved in this way benefit from the fact that states and alliances are by nature better than the UN at reacting rapidly to fast-moving situations. Such actions have often provided valuable support for the UN’s purposes and, in certain cases, for its peacekeeping operations.

• Enhancing the existing UN standby arrangements. The system of standby arrangements has survived for six decades because, while it has some glaring defects, it also has solid merits. It has enabled states to retain control over their armed forces and the uses to which they are put; and it has reflected the UN’s need to have substantial reserves potentially available, even if not all are required at a given time. It could be further developed by maintaining a dialogue with governments about willingness to supply forces, and about the timescale of political decisions; by encouraging joint training and exercises by the standby forces of different countries; and by building on the system whereby states which deploy troops rapidly can be assured of their release in a given time – generally under six months.

• Assisting regional standby arrangements, whose functions are not limited to UN operations, with a view to developing a system for more rapid reaction not just within the regions from which the forces come, but also elsewhere.

• Improving the quality of military advice available to the Security Council and the Secretary-General; and strengthening the staffing of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters in New York by maintaining a permanent planning unit, from whose numbers the senior military and civilian staff of any individual operation can be taken promptly once it is decided to set up an operation.

• Developing the UN’s capacity for post-conflict peacebuilding, for example by improving its capacity to provide police and administrative services. To this end, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in December 2005.
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• Developing a logistic capability for peacekeeping and other forces acting under a UN mandate.