The Vatican Pimpernel (5 page)

Others whom he helped at that time were three soldiers from New Zealand who arrived at St Peter's seeking sanctuary. They had become acquainted with O'Flaherty on his visits to the prisoner-of-war camps and asked to meet him when they arrived in Rome. He immediately arranged sanctuary for all three within the Vatican.

More and more escapees were now heading towards Rome seeking assistance. While it is probably true to say that, by and large, they were safer in the countryside, Rome was a fairly obvious objective for anyone in those circumstances. The idea was to make contact with one's own embassy, or that of a neutral country, or indeed take advantage of the long-standing and worldwide tradition of sanctuary in monasteries, convents and other religious houses. Many of these people had escaped from the prisoner-of-war camps and others had managed to get away from their captors on train journeys which were bringing them to camps in Germany. In the early months, many of those who came to Rome managed to hide safely in the Vatican, which cannot have been too difficult given that it extends to approximately 10,000 rooms. We can be fairly certain that O'Flaherty was involved with many of these cases. However, the fact that such an escape route existed became well known. This embarrassed the Vatican authorities and compromised their diplomatic situation. Orders were issued to the Swiss Guard that anyone seeking refuge in the Vatican or on papal property was to be refused. This created a new difficulty for the Monsignor in his efforts to assist people. One of the first large groups he dealt with was fourteen British prisoners of war to whom the Swiss Guard had refused entry to the Vatican for sanctuary.

O'Flaherty arranged with the help of a friend, Antonio Call, a policeman with strong anti-Fascist sympathies, to smuggle them into the Vatican two and three at a time. In light of the new arrangement, however, they were expelled the next day and so O'Flaherty with the help of Fr Giuseppe Clozner arranged to have them housed, rather incredibly, in an Italian police barracks where they were cared for by the staff until such time as the Germans occupied Rome the following September. Unfortunately, all but two were recaptured at that stage. However, this was an early indication of O'Flaherty's extensive range of contacts and the willingness of many people, irrespective of their circumstances, to help him.

Three South Africans, a Corporal De Villiers and two Privates, Crout and Dally, having escaped in the north of Italy, walked to Rome and sought O'Flaherty's help. He arranged to place them in private accommodation. En route there, he was stopped by three German SS officers who fortunately only asked for directions. At the same time, he arranged for two American pilots, who had been forced to parachute near Rome, to be placed in safety. Then he heard that a Sergeant Wyndham was in hospital in Rome and, having arranged for his discharge, the Monsignor placed him with a family who were willing to help.

The Germans cast continuous doubts on the situation of the diplomats in the Vatican. In October 1942 after a visit by the Head of the Gestapo, Himmler, a story reached the Vatican that he had demanded the expulsion of all the diplomats, and it was only because the Italian authorities protested that a decision was made not to go ahead. Rumours ebbed and flowed for the remaining years of the War as to possible intrusions and takeovers of the Vatican by the German authorities. There were even suggestions from time to time of a plot to kidnap the Pope. It was also suggested that there were actually agents of the Gestapo in the Vatican. Information garnered by American code breakers, which was made public after the War, confirmed that this was in fact the case.

The legal situation in relation to the diplomats was not very clear. The wording of the Lateran Treaty was, as we have seen, fairly vague. Everyone knew that in these circumstances it was of huge importance that the Vatican and its diplomats behave in accordance with the conditions laid down for them. The reality for all of those living in the Vatican was indeed rather tenuous. The Vatican is an extremely small area and has no water supply of its own. At any stage, the Italians could have forced the situation by switching off the supply of this necessity.

In December 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour and, in response, the Americans declared war. Taylor returned to Washington leaving Tittmann in charge of relations with the Holy See. In diplomatic terms, Tittmann's status was unclear. Essentially his role was to provide logistical support to a personal friend of the President of the United States, who had the status of Ambassador but not the rank or title. So while the Vatican authorities were happy to offer him the same sanctuary as D'Arcy Osborne and the others, the Italian Government was opposed. Roosevelt decided to face down any likely domestic opposition and, within a couple of days, Tittmann was appointed to the rank of Chargé d'Affaires. He took up residence in the Hospice Santa Marta on 16 November 1941 and quickly developed a close personal friendship with his British counterpart. This filled a gap for D'Arcy Osborne. Previously he had been very friendly with the French Ambassador, d'Ormesson. However, the latter had been withdrawn by the Vichy Government, which came to power after the collapse of France, and had been replaced by Bérard, who did not communicate with Allied diplomats at all.

The police and the Italian authorities had a good idea of the views of senior Vatican personnel on the political situation. Montini was regularly the focus of attack in the Fascist newspapers. The police relied for their information on Italian servants working in the Vatican, as well as undercover agents. They even went to the extent of stationing agents in churches to monitor those who might approach the clergy for help. D'Arcy Osborne was also a focus of attention as he was the leading Allied diplomat living within the Vatican. However, insofar as we know, the authorities had still not become aware of O'Flaherty and his activities to any significant degree. While the absence of records means that information is rather sketchy we can say with certainty now that by November 1943 O'Flaherty and his colleagues had placed in excess of a thousand people in safety.

The latter months of 1942 and early 1943 saw the beginnings of a re-evaluation of Italian involvement in the War by some in positions of authority. By March 1943, there were signs in army circles that many were willing to consider the possibility of a
coup d'état
. The British and American authorities began to consider the terms they would apply to any armistice should one be sought by the Italians. The possibility that the Pope might fulfil the role of peacemaker received active consideration inside and outside the Vatican. A message was transmitted to Mussolini by the Vatican authorities emphasising their concern at the damage that was being caused to Italy by the War and underlining that the Pope was available, as always, to do what he could to help alleviate the suffering of the people. Mussolini, however, still thought victory was possible and was not of a frame of mind to consider the possibility of surrender and so did not explore this offer of assistance. At the same time, suggestions came to him from the King and those around him that a change of policy would be appropriate. He informed the King that it would take three months to prepare for a possible peace move.

At the same time, he expected that there would be an attack in Sicily as the Allied Forces, following their victory in Tunisia, were now in a position to commit men to such a tactic. Hitler also anticipated such an attack and offered Mussolini five additional German divisions but this was declined. There is no doubt that Hitler was anxious to stiffen the resolve of Mussolini as he realised the strategic importance of the Italian Dictator to the German cause.

In the meantime, the British authorities were anxious to get D'Arcy Osborne home to be fully briefed on these moves, as communication on such delicate matters, other than in a face-to-face session, was highly dangerous. In accordance with the terms of the Lateran Treaty, Ambassadors to the Vatican had a free right of communication with their home country. However, Italy had made it a condition that this could only refer to matters within the Vatican. The papal authorities felt that they, as a result, had a moral obligation to come to the assistance of the diplomats who were facing difficulties in this regard and so offered the use of the Vatican diplomatic bag. These bags went by papal courier to Berne or Lisbon where they were handed over to the British Embassies and then in turn sent on to London. However, there was always the risk that information could be leaked and so the authorities in London were very anxious for a meeting. D'Arcy Osborne could only leave the Vatican with the permission of the Italian authorities. This he finally secured through the good offices of Monsignor Montini who used sympathetic contacts available to him in the Foreign Affairs section of the Italian Government. At that stage, some in authority were anxious for peace and so were willing to co-operate with the Vatican authorities whom they looked to as suitable mediators in these matters. D'Arcy Osborne left Rome on 18 April 1943 and returned on 8 June. On the day after his return he visited Monsignor Tardini and reported the official British Government line which was that Italy would have to surrender unconditionally. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that, in the event of Germany and or Japan seeking an armistice, the Allied position would be to require them to surrender unconditionally. There was no formal agreement with regard to Italy. The British Government was now taking the view that the same requirement for an unconditional surrender should apply, a position which D'Arcy Osborne felt was unduly harsh. No progress was made for the next few weeks. However, on 10 July the Allied Forces invaded Sicily. Although their progress was delayed, within four or five weeks they had taken the island. This experience made it clear to Italy's ruling class that they must change sides.

Hitler had foreseen this and had flown to Italy to meet Mussolini, such was his level of concern. Mussolini, meanwhile, had promised the Italian King that at his meeting with Hitler he would raise the possibility of an Italian withdrawal from the War. When he did not fulfil this undertaking, the King decided that he must withdraw his support from the Dictator. At the same time, members of the Fascist Grand Council had requested Mussolini to call a meeting, which he did. This body had not met for a number of years and indeed had always been merely a rubber stamp, so the Dictator did not anticipate problems. However, at this meeting, which started on 24 July and ran into 25 July, a motion of no confidence in Mussolini was passed by nineteen votes to seven. Included among those speaking and voting in favour of this motion was his son-in-law, Count Ciano. Mussolini felt, however, that he still had the support of the King and would remain in power. He was due to have an audience with the King later that day but when he arrived, he was very quickly arrested. Marshal Badoglio was appointed Prime Minister by the King.