Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (36 page)

14.
“Nigeria: An Open Letter From Mutiu Sunmonu,” Shell Sustainability Report, 2012, http://bit.ly/1j4mso6.

15.
The pattern is unique neither to Nigeria nor to oil. “Since they specialize in the export of a small range of primary products, African countries are particularly susceptible to a management of their main economic resources [that] is highly politicized and centrally controlled. This is particularly the case with regard to mining and oil production. The extraction of minerals in enclave centres of production, sometimes offshore, enables the political authorities to negotiate royalties and other agreements directly with major companies.” Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou,
The Criminalization of the State in Africa
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 84. The authors report that African countries, on average, retain a measurably lower proportion of the revenues than do OPEC countries.

16.
John Campbell,
Nigeria, Dancing on the Brink,
updated ed., Council on Foreign Relations (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), p. 15; Adam Robert Green, “Agriculture is the Future of Nigeria,”
Forbes Magazine,
August 8, 2013; and “We Will Grow Nigerian Agriculture,” the agriculture ministry’s own brief to top Nigerian economic officials, September 2011, reproduced by the Nigerian investment firm Dorneo Partners, http://bit.ly/ 1dqAclg.

17.
Human Rights Watch,
Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers,” and Corruption in Nigeria
(October 2007), pp. 17–30, http://bit.ly/1lPCQpR.

18.
Ibid., pp. 33–40.

19.
Ibid.; Ike Okonta,
The Fire Next Time: Youth, Violence, and Democratization in Northern Nigeria
(Wuse Il Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2012), http://bit.ly/ 1j7ljrn; and European Union Election Observation Mission,
Nigeria: Final Report: General Elections, April 2011
, http://bit.ly/OxzsVv.

20.
When I began researching prices after this incident, I discovered that similar practices prevail in the United States. See Nina Bernstein, “How to Charge $546 for Six Liters of Saltwater,”
New York Times,
August 25, 2013.

21.
Smith,
Culture of Corruption,
pp. 80ff.

22.
That comment made me think back to Qayum Karzai, the brother of the Afghan president, and the NGO I ran for him. I remembered how irritated his half-brother Ahmed Wali was that we were not “getting enough contracts.”

23.
See the thoughtful discussion of the ambiguous dynamic between social obligation and corruption, and its evolution toward a one-way, extractive dynamic in Smith,
Culture of Corruption
.

Chapter Eleven: Up a Level

1.
The best public account of the Kabul Bank case is Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,”
The New Yorker,
February 14, 2011.

2.
“This Week Transcript: Karzai, Khan and Levitt,” ABC News, August 15, 2010, http://abcn.ws/1j4qn4i.

3.
William of Pagula,
The Mirror of Edward III
, in
Political Thought in Early Fourteenth-Century England: Treatises by Walter of Milemete, William of Pagula, and William of Ockham,
ed. and trans. Cary J. Nederman (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), p. 76. The other mirror writers concur. “If a person knows something and does not act upon it,” wrote John of Salisbury, “he is accused not by reason of ignorance but by reason of malice.”
Policraticus,
trans. Cary J. Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), bk. 5, chap. 11, p. 92. “If [the king] is informed [of the exactions that take place] and makes no effort to end them,” wrote Nizam al-Mulk, “then he’s the same as the oppressors and approves the tyranny.”
Traité de gouvernement,
ed. and trans. Charles Schefer (Paris: Sindbad, 1984), p. 118.

4.
Petraeus did follow our suggestion to enlarge the original Anti-Corruption Task Force and place it under independent, high-level command. He called on a long-time protégé, General H. R. McMaster, to head what was renamed Task Force Shafafiyat (Transparency). McMaster launched a lengthy, formal planning process, but his style shattered the fragile collusion that had existed between the mutually suspicious civilian and military officials. Within a few months, it was evident that Shafafiyat’s main purpose was not actually to challenge the grip of kleptocratic networks over Afghanistan’s government but to help Petraeus persuade members of Congress that he was “working” the corruption problem. Over the years, young, dedicated officers did make some inroads on the military mindset—the need to collect intelligence on host government officials, for example, and to pay attention to the way money was spent. For “if money is a weapon system,” as Lieutenant Colonel Jodi Vittori put it, “then it can shoot you in the foot just as easily as any other, if it’s used inappropriately or aimed in the wrong direction.”

5.
Bob Woodward,
Obama’s Wars
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

6.
Robert W. Komer,
Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,
Rand, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (August 1972), p. vi, http://bit.ly/1gQNfgB.

7.
During the notorious 2009 debate over U.S. Afghanistan policy, the key question was eventually asked. To inform one of the Principals Committee meetings, the National Security Staff (NSS) sent out a query as to whether it was possible to defeat an insurgency on behalf of a government seen by its people as illegitimate. Working in McChrystal’s headquarters at the time, I was stunned at the very idea. It took me awhile to come up with more than a one-word answer: “No.” Eventually I drafted an argument that I sent directly to Admiral Mullen. After a few days, the same question came down from the NSS, phrased differently. And then another version. It was as though “no” were a simply unacceptable answer, and the decision makers thought that if they could reword the question just the right way, perhaps they could change reality.

8.
Carl Forsberg,
Power and Politics in Kandahar,
Afghanistan Report 5, Institute for the
Study of War (April 2010), http://bit.ly/OxAMYp, and abundant international press coverage of Ahmed Wali Karzai.

9.
Adam Entous, Julian Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, “US Shifts Afghan Graft Plan,”
Wall Street Journal,
September 20, 2010.

10.
Matthew Rosenberg, “With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan,”
New York Times,
April 28, 2013.

Chapter Twelve: Forging an Appeal on Earth

1.
See, for example, Frans de Waal,
The Age of Empathy
(New York: Three Rivers, 2009), pp. 158–200.

2.
William of Orange, “A missive in the form of a supplication to His Royal Majesty of Spain, on behalf of the prince of Orange, the States of Holland and Zeeland, etc., 1573,” in E. H. Kossman and A. F. Mellink, eds.,
Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 107.

3.
Ironically, as kings were claiming God’s support for extending and consolidating their power, they were showing less concern about God’s judgment for their misdeeds.

4.
Martin van Gelderen,
Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 30. “Many rancors had built up under the government of [Charles] the Bold, over, in particular, the violation of local and regional privileges, a consequence of centralizing reforms.” Maurice-A. Arnould, “Les lendemains de Nancy dans les ‘Pays de par deca’ (Janvier-Avril 1477),” in W. P. Blockmans, ed.,
Anciens pays et assemblées d’états,
vol. 80,
Le privilège général et les privilèges régionaux de Marie de Bourgogne pour les Pays-Bas
(Kortrijk-Heule: UGA, 1985), p. 13.

5.
J. A. Fernandez-Santamaria,
The State, War, and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance, 1519–1559
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 264.

6.
Charles V, “Instructions de Charles-Quint a l’Infant Don Philippe, son fils,” in Charles Weiss, ed.,
Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle, d’après les manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Besançon
(Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1842), pp. 3:268, 270.

7.
John Lynch,
Spain Under the Habsburgs,
vol. 1,
Empire and Absolutism, 1516–1598
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 171, 180. For rule via a tight circle of informal advisers, see A. W. Lovett,
Early Habsburg Spain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 122.

8.
Lynch,
Spain Under the Hapsburgs,
p. 174. See also Kossman and Mellink,
Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
, p. 3.

9.
Lynch,
Spain Under the Hapsburgs
, p. 180. See also Van Gelderen,
Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt,
p. 32.

10.
Peter Arnade,
Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 49, and the description of an engraved double portrait Philip had published, of him and Christ side by side. The inscription quoted I Peter 2:13–15: “For the sake of the Lord, accept the authority of every social institution: the king as the supreme authority, and the governors as commissioned by him . . .Such is God’s will.” Thus, argues Arnade, did Philip establish a “direct linkage
of Church, Crown, and political authority,” pp. 171–72. See also Lynch,
Spain Under the Hapsburgs
, pp. 172–73.

11.
“Avis de ceux des châtellenies d’Ypres, de Cassel, Bailleul, Warneton, etc., sur l’Acte de Modération,” in I.L.A. Diegerick, ed.,
Archives d’Ypres, Documents du XVI e siècle,
vol. 3,
Documents concernant les troubles religieux
(Bruges: Aime de Zuttere, 1876), p. 76.

12.
“Avis émis par les états de Flandre sur l’Acte de Modération,” ibid., p. 85.

13.
“Address and Opening to Make a Good, Blessed and General Peace in the Netherlands, and to Bring Them Under the Obedience of the King, in Her Old Prosperity, Bloom, and Welfare,” in Martin van Gelderen, ed.,
The Dutch Revolt
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 93. Said William of Nassau: “I have only the following objectives in this war: . . .*that state affairs shall be discussed in the States of the provinces in accordance with the custom of our ancestors. *That political matters will be dealt with by the king himself and by the States which are chosen in every province and not be dispatched secretly by hired foreigners.” “Remonstrance of William of Nassau, prince of Orange etc., redeemer of the freedom of the Netherlands, to the States and the people, 1572,” in Kossman and Mellink,
Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
, p. 96.

14.
“Political Education Containing Various . . . Arguments and Proofs,” ibid., pp. 183–86.

15.
“Address and Opening,” ibid., p. 85; “A Defense and True Declaration of Things Lately Done in the Low Country,” ibid., p. 20.

16.
Ibid., pp. 85–86. “The princes as well as the subjects of the country have always had to commit themselves by a formal contract and to swear a solemn oath that they would maintain these rights and realise them. The inhabitants therefore owe obedience to the rulers only on condition that the freedoms are maintained.” “The Prince of Orange’s Warning to the Inhabitants and Subjects of the Netherlands, 1 September, 1568,” ibid., p. 84. See also Van Gelderen,
Political Thought,
p. 129.

17.
“Edict of the States General . . . by which they Declare that the king of Spain has forfeited the sovereignty and government of the afore-said Netherlands,” in Kossman and Mellink,
Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
, pp. 216–17.

18.
Simon Schama,
The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age
(New York: Vintage, 1997).

19.
“The prince of Orange’s warning to the inhabitants and subjects of the Netherlands,” in Kossman and Mellink,
Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
, p. 84.

20.
Wim Blockmans, “L’histoire parlementaire dans les Pays-Bas et la Belgique XIIe–XVIIe siècles,” in
Las Cortes de Castilla y León, 1188–1988. Actas de la tercera etapa del Congreso Científico sobre la Historia de las Cortes de Castilla y León
(Valladolid: Cortes de Castilla y
León
, 1990) pp. 173–92; Arnade,
Beggars, Iconoclasts,
p. 33; Van Gelderen,
Dutch Revolt,
p. xiv.

21.
“Privilège de Marie de Bourgogne pour les états de Namur,” in Blockmans, “L’histoire parlementaire,” pp. 244–52. The most important text in this regard is the Great Privilege of February 11, 1477.

22.
Raymond Fagel, “Immigrant Roots: The Geographical Origins of Newcomers from the Low Countries in Tudor England,” in Nigel Goose and Lien Luu, eds.,
Immigrants in Tudor and Early Stuart England
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 48.

23.
King James VI and I, “Basilicon Doron,” in
King James VI and I: Political Writings,
ed. Johann Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 1. I have modernized
the spelling. For James’s theory of divine right absolutism, including the idea that the king is bound to the law only by his good will, and is the master of the lives and possessions of his subjects, see also “The Trew Law of Free Monarchies,” ibid., pp. 62–85.

24.
King James VI and I, “Speech in the Star Chamber,” ibid., pp. 206, 211.

25.
King James VI and I, “Basilicon Doron,” ibid., p. 21.

26.
King James VI and I, “Speech in the Star Chamber,” ibid., p. 213.

27.
Note that a similar process of centralizing and solidifying royal authority, based on a divine right argument, also preceded the French Revolution in the following century.