This Isn't the Sort of Thing That Happens to Someone Like You (26 page)

, 8). Expert in electrical generation & maintenance. Also likely early member of PDTFG; has mentioned being in Cadet Force while at school, so useful expertise. Good understanding of crisis, altho sceptical (& sarcastic) at times.

B
– early 20s, v. enthusiastic & energetic altho w/ limited practical skills. Key member of PDTFG, also of PWG. Prime potential for links with weapon sources; altho discussion of these links raises separate concerns & needs to be handled carefully. Good health but drinks & uses drugs v. heavily. Emotional attachments unknown; has alluded to number of short-term relationships within activist & party circles, unclear how these arise or are terminated but no evidence of undue emotional impacts.

M
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– early 30s (??), no known relationships or sig. emotional ties. Expert in unarmed combat, also enthusiastic contribution to construction tasks. Well connected in activist circles, thus often absent from site, but contributes well to workload anyway. Apparent ready access to cash & willingness to contribute. Highly engaged in discussion of crisis & response; some members of group critical/wary of this. Not yet discussed PDTFG, but likely to be keen early member.

N
– mid 60s, minimal relationship ties (has alluded to ex-partner & children, but no known contact with them to date; whereabouts unknown). Expert in food production, crop management, storage, etc. Prime source of expertise within group in this field. Often in poor health, w/ tendency to unusual diet & supplement regimes to combat this. Strictly vegan. Also has pronounced pacifist tendencies; has referred to surrender as a viable option in the face of armed assault, has also argued in favour of close links with local community and other resilient groups. Dangerously influential, altho presents as soft-spoken/passive etc etc. Will need to be kept
completely
unaware of PDTFG.

Children – ages 5, 8, 13. Also possible 10-month-old baby joining group. 13 y/o and 8 y/o should be able to contribute useful labour at time of crisis & in preparation for it. 5 y/o obv. less use & req. more resources (also reduces available labour from parents). Admittance of baby wd be v. poor choice by group: extra resource demand + v. reduced labour from that parent; also significant burden in event of siege/tunnel/escape procedure; also at high risk of ill-health and resultant emotional strain. (Also, parentage situation in this case will presumably cause sig. probs w/ relationship dynamics, tensions & conflict etc, at cost to effective co-operation and shared labour.)

Re 13 y/o girl, note that presence is useful in terms of long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Group Analysis Summary:

Good mix of skills and experience. Mostly good health. V. young and v. old members of group remain a concern; continue to slant discussions towards options for leaving site and being replaced by members of more appropriate age; when sourcing replacement members suggest addressing current gender imbalance with view to long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Majority of group
are
engaged w/ problem of crisis & preparation for it, altho small maj. opposed to armed defence. However, small minority not always serious in their discussion of issue; provocative/sarcastic/unhelpful. Recent remarks to effect that sexual activity/attachment wd reduce attention to detail as re crisis preparation were particularly unhelpful. Predict this minority won’t always consider subject worthy of humour.

Assessment of External Threats:

Working down from top:

Assume, at crisis, central & local authorities will withdraw to defendable spaces with existing supplies/stocks, & not form any threat to resilient groups across the periphery of their territory.

Police/military will be primarily focused on maintaining order in larger population centres and/or protecting significant infrastructure. (Certainly on protecting any remaining supply chain, eg any food production & distribution centres which are able to continue functioning.) Threat from police/military therefore likely to be limited: however police/military also unlikely to prevent threats from other parties such as eg:

Immediate neighbours. Early stages of crisis likely to see requests for assistance from local residents, followed by unpleasant coercion/emotional blackmail etc, followed by covert attacks (attempted night-theft) or co-ordinated overt attacks (direct armed assault, eg by mob w/ handtools or by pseudo-militia w/ weapons). Covert attacks shd be prevented by perimeter defences & by good surveillance. Overt attacks will need to be repelled by direct display of superior force, deadly force if req. (See
Defence
, below.) Since a large & co-ordinated overt attack will have a numerical advantage it will be important to prevent one arising. Careful surveillance & intelligence (perhaps by false negotiation) could assist in this; a pre-emptive strike or strikes may become necessary.
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