Tokyo Underworld (47 page)

When Kanemaru was arrested on March 6, 1993, on charges of tax evasion, a flood of newspaper and magazine articles on the Sagawa Kyubin scandal and his connection to the mob followed. See ‘Goldfinger’,
Asiaweek
, July 14, 1993. Kanemaru’s confession of March 6 was printed in full in the
Mainichi Shimbun
, July 26, 1993, which described how he received illegal secret donations from the construction industry and also the transportation industry and corporations in the cement industry. Also see Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Tremor: Japan’s Post Cold War Destiny’,
The New Republic
, July 1993; Shin Kanemaru obituary,
Economist
, April 6, 1996, p. 108; and Schlesinger,
Shadow Shoguns
, pp. 245–46.

‘Foreigners Beware’ was translated by
Tokyo Insideline
, May 31, 1992.

A NOTE ABOUT THE PLAZA SUMMIT OF 1985

Blaming the Plaza accord was a familiar mantra heard throughout the 1990s among Japanese political and economic commentators. However, it begs the question of why so much borrowing on such shaky collateral (skyrocketing land and stock prices that were destined eventually to come down) was allowed by the banks and other lending institutions during the bubble era. When the bubble burst, as stock fell, banks were left with yakuza borrowers who refused to repay their loans and relinquish their assets.

In regard to
jusen
loans, there was a wealth of material in the daily newspapers and weekly magazines in the mid-1990s. In Japanese, especially useful was an article by Raisuke Miyawaki, ‘
Furyo Shakin Jitsu Wa Boryokudan Kinyu’
[‘Bad Loans Are Really Mob Money’],
Shukan Bunshun
, December 7, 1995, pp. 38–41. Of particular interest in English was the
BusinessWeek
International Edition cover story, ‘The Yakuza and the Banks’, January 29, 1996.

A NOTE ABOUT THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKET

The percentage of individual investment sank from 60 percent in 1950 to 22.4 percent in 1997. Of Japan’s publicly held shares, 50–70 percent remain effectively
untraded because of
keiretsu
, cross-holding shares. Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsubishi Real Estate, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Banks and Mitsubishi Shoji all own each other’s stock.

The shooting of the Sumitomo bank executive was discussed in ‘
Shiten-cho Naze Korosareta No ka?’
[‘Why Was the Branch Manager Killed?’],
Sunday Mainichi
, October 2, 1994, pps. 26–30.

The
Shukan Gendai
article naming Ryutaro Hashimoto and others was published in
Shukan Gendai
, May 21, 1997, and referenced by Velisarious Kattoulas, in the
International Herald Tribune
, May 21, 1997, p.13.

The name of the LDP politician who made the bold statement about gangster connections in 1997 was Eitaro Itoyama. His article appeared in the
Gekan Hoseki
in October 1997, pp. 66–78, entitled ‘
Seijika to Boryokudan’
[‘Politicians and Gangsters’]. It was the subject of an article by Professor Gregory Clark, ‘Japan and Its Economy Have a Crime Problem’,
International Herald Tribune
, October 8, 1997.

US–Japan cooperation in regard to Ken Mizuno is described in ‘Movie Mansion Sold for $1.8 Million’, U.P.I., October 5, 1995.

David E. Kaplan, ‘Yakuza Inc.’,
U.S. News & World Report
, April 13, 1998, pp. 40–45, offers an introduction to the dangers facing American investors in Japan in the late 1990s. Also see ‘
Hashimoto Ryutaro “Baikoku Seiken” Nihon wo Beikoku no Shokuminchi ni shita’
[‘Hashimoto’s “National Sale Regime” Has Made Japan an American Colony’],
Shukan Posuto
, May 8–15, 1998. The
Rokka-Kan Bunko Joho Senta
provided information about the CIA and the FBI in Japan, investigating crime – as did the weekly magazine
Shukan Jitsuwa
, June 25, 1998.

A NOTE ABOUT CONTINUED CORRUPTION

The year 1998 saw the suicide of a Dietman on the verge of being arrested for corruption and bribery in affairs with a top brokerage house, as well as the arrest of several securities company executives and a slew of
sokaiya
busts. It was business as usual, in a sense. What was surprising was the number of cases involving the vaunted bureaucracy: the arrest of several Finance Ministry officials on bribery charges; the suicide of an MOF bureaucrat; and the resignation of two others in key positions, including the minister of finance. This was followed by the resignation of the head of the Bank of Japan over allegations that bankers had received market tips and other insider information in exchange for lavish wining and dining and the unprecedented arrest of a senior official at the Bank of Japan on suspicion of corruption.

Whether this was just the result of a sudden burst of righteous activity by a procurator’s office embarrassed by its continuing inability to control corruption – highlighted by the fall of Yamaichi, Japan’s oldest securities company, because of devious accounting and outright bribery – or whether it signified yet an increase in the level of dishonesty and/or incompetence of those in the civil service was hard to say. Some observers believe there was more than the usual level of concern among career bureaucrats, nearing the retirement age of fifty-five, about their chances of successfully following the traditional path of graduating to comfortable, high-paying board jobs in the businesses they had been regulating over the years, given the seemingly unending recession and the advent of Tokyo’s own ‘Big Bang’, when deregulation would finally mean honest competition in the financial sector.

Despite the prosecutorial blitz, some basic facts remained unchanged. Japanese voters still expected their politicians to be ‘favor givers’ – more perhaps than those in the West. Officially, politicians continued to distribute amounts equal to four to five times their income and unofficially twice that much, the money going to extra staff, providing trips for rural constituents, offering wedding gifts to organizing local functions, and so on. LDP politicians with hefty ambitions continued to enrich themselves in order to be able to disburse funds to build power bases within their party factions. Moreover, with media advertising in election campaigns severely limited, and door-to-door canvassing prohibited by law, the ways in which candidates could reach out to the voters were not as abundant as in the United States and other countries. Thus was money politics an incontrovertible, accepted part of the system, resisting all attempts at reform, the seemingly endless scandals met, generally speaking, with a resounding thud of public indifference, and the unholy triangle of business, politics, and the underworld continued on its merry way.

Richard Mitchell, in his excellent book
Political Bribery in Japan
, while acknowledging that there is just as much corruption in the United States as in Japan, noted one basic difference in his summation:

Throughout American history, even in times of low enforcement of bribery laws, the idea that bribery was morally wrong remained widespread and deep rooted. The strong anti-bribery ethic provided a kind of punishment in lieu of criminal sanctions; public humiliation faced those who offered or took bribes. In the Japanese case, in contrast, the cultural context in which political bribery takes place results in a different outcome: a politician caught taking a bribe may feel shame at public exposure but may not feel a sense of moral guilt. Moreover, political careers flourish despite convictions for bribery.

Mitchell noted that penal codes and enforcement patterns are similar, but added,

Prosecution in Japan, however, is more difficult, because in the United States payment to an official is considered bribery: the prosecutor need not prove that the one offering the bribe received a favor from the official accepting it. This is not the case in Japan, where the procurator must prove that the official received the money, did a favor in return, and understood that the money was meant as a bribe (p. 155).

He added, ‘Political bribery will continue to flourish (in Japan) because electing new political leaders and enacting election reform laws will not alter the basic culture’ (p. 157).

He seemed to be saying, in other words, that the system of governance in Japan is intrinsically corrupt and that money politics is too deeply entrenched.

The Seidenstecker quote appeared in
Tokyo Rising
, pp. 242–43.

The LAPD OCID representative’s name is Ken Beno (retired). His quote in regard to Machii–Ross mob money laundering appeared in the
Mainichi Daily News
, March 3, 1992, with the headline, ‘With New Law, More Yakuza Going Overseas’. (The Ross half of the partnership belongs to one Kenneth Ross, an ex-California state congressman, who has strongly denied any wrongdoing or having more than a passing knowledge of his partner’s former life.)

Tashiro’s attack on the newspaper building was reported in the daily papers: ‘Gangster Arrested in Shooting at Mainichi’,
Yomiuri Shimbun
, September 25, 1994; ‘Gang Boss Arrested in Mainichi Shooting’,
Mainichi Daily News
, October 13, 1994; ‘Mainichi Attacker Given 6 Yrs. in Prison’,
Mainichi Daily News
, February 25, 1995.

Also see ‘Sunday Headline’,
Sunday Mainichi
, October 2, 1994, p. 21.

Inoki’s visit to Pyonyang in 1995 was described by eyewitness Greg Davis, a
Time
photographer.

A NOTE ABOUT KOREANS IN JAPAN

Statistics in 1993 showed that about 80 percent of Korean youth living in Japan used Japanese names. As the
Asahi Shimbun
commented in an editorial about this phenomenon, this demonstrated a ‘suffocating atmosphere in which they [Koreans] would be viewed as being different and placed at a disadvantage if they did otherwise’.
Asahi Shimbun
, May 5, 1995.

A NOTE ABOUT THE JAPANESE ECONOMY

Perhaps the most interesting fact about Japan’s long recession was that as of mid-1998, according to a variety of sources, the Japanese controlled approximately one-third of all the savings in the world, some ten trillion dollars, or an average of $85,000 per person and $250,000 per family. The Japanese also owned $800 billion in overseas assets even when the yen had dropped in value to ¥140 to one US dollar. That, combined with one of the world’s great manufacturing bases and a disciplined workforce, kept Japan the world’s second-largest economy – despite the pervasive economic gloom over stagnant growth and $1 trillion bad debt. Japan also owned $200 billion worth of US T-Bonds as this book went to press, the liquidation of which had the potential to radically affect interest rates in America and cause great ‘confusion’ in markets worldwide.

Interestingly, renowned Japanese crime expert Raisuke Miyawaki, a former NPA officer and cabinet advisor on the Japanese mob, believed that the aforementioned one trillion dollars in bad debt, which he attributed directly to keizai yakuza borrowing, had been quietly invested in the US stock market – meaning that the higher the S&P 500 rose, the richer organized crime in Japan became.

INTERVIEWEES

Kagari Ando; Kozo Abe, editor
Yukan Fuji;
Joji Abe, author and Ando gang member (ret.); James L. Adachi of Adachi, Henderson, Miyatake and Fujita; Kyoko Ai; Eugene Aksenoff, MD and director of the International Clinic in Tokyo; Millard ‘Corky’ Alexander, editor in chief
Tokyo Weekender;
Robert Acquilina, US Marine History Office, Washington, D.C.; Shin Asahina, Bushell and Asahina Law Office; Ome ‘Crazy Wong’ Asakura, jeweler; Kosuke Asakura, James Bailey, journalist; Ed Barner, attorney-at-law, Burbank; Joseph Bernard, attorney-at-law, Washington, D.C.; Leith Bernard, Richard Berry,
Time;
Mona Beyer; Richard ‘The (Masked Man) Destroyer’ Beyer, professional wrestler; Thomas L. Blakemore, Blakemore & Mitsuki; Frances Blakemore; Jim Blessin, manager Sanno Hotel Tokyo (ret.); Alan Booth, author; Mark Brazeal, attorney-at-law, San Francisco; Rosser Brockman, attorney-at-law, San Francisco; Yin Wa Mah Brockman, leading social light of San Francisco.

B.J. ‘Jug’ Burkett, war author; Raymond Bushell, Bushell and Asahina; Frances Bushell; John Carroll, journalist; Ryu Chang, Akasaka hostess; Ann Christensen; Glen Christensen; Toshi Cooper; Glen Davis, author; Greg Davis,
Time
photographer; Jack Dinken, longtime Tokyo businessman; Bill Dorman, CNN; Hal Drake,
Stars and Stripes
(ret.); Kazuko Drake; Clark Frogley, FBI Bureau, US Embassy, Tokyo; John Fuji, AP; ‘Shig’ Fujita,
Asahi Shimbun;
Frank Gibney, director, Pacific Rim Institute; Frank Gibney, Jr,
Time;
Carl Goch, professional
wrestler; Harry Godfrey, Kroll Associates, Tokyo; Ward Grant, publicist, Bob Hope Enterprises; Clyde Haberman,
New York Times
columnist; David Halberstam, author; Yuji Hanabusa; Etsuko Hayano; Fusakazu Hayano, Asahi Chemical; Hiroshi Hirano, TSK; William Horsley, BBC; Andrew Horvat, author; David Howell, instructor; Meiji Gakuen; Mariko Imagawa, Asahi TV; At-sushi Imamura, Bungei Shunju; Naoki Inose, author, TBS news commentator; Shintaro Ishihara, novelist; Hiroshi Ishikawa, Vince Iizumi, H. Ikeda; Reid Irvine, ‘Accuracy in Media’; Koji Itakura, Asahi TV; Takeaki Kaneda, golf consultant; David Kaplan, author, senior writer,
U.S. News & World Report;
Koichi Kawamura, artist; Machiko Kawamura, designer; Reimi Kawamura, NHK; Jiro Kawamura, editor,
Asahi Shimbun, Shukan Asahi
.

Eugene Kim, Ginza hostess; Noriko Kobayashi, translator; Machiko Kondo, UNHCR Tokyo; Mike Knapp, Everett Knapp, Jesse Kualahula, sumo stable master; John Lagant; Leron Lee; Vicquie Lee; J. Anthony Lukas, author; Elmer Luke, editor; Katsuji ‘Ma-Chan’ Maezono, manager ‘3-2-8’, Azabu; Kiyondo Matsui, editor in chief
Shukan Bunshun;
Midori Matsui, translator; M. Matsui, Machii-Ross in Santa Monica; Hideyusuke Matsuo,
Bungei Shunju;
William Miller, literary agent, Tokyo; Dr Masao Miyamoto, psychiatrist; Yutaka Mogami, MPD (ret.); Desmond Muirhead, golf architect; Leslie Nakashima, UPI; Mayumi Nakazawa, author; Hiro Nakao, President Grolier Japan (ret.); Chris Nelson, Barry Nemcoff, USIS (ret.); John Neuffer; Akio ‘Frank’ Nomura, waiter, bartender, club manager; Katsuya Nomura, manager; Yakult Swallows; Don Nomura, agent; Jiro Numata,
Sumiyoshi Rengo-kai;
Professor Kan Ori, Sophia University; Miko Orr; Robert Orr, vice president, Motorola Japan; Ned Oshiro, Tokyo Disneyland; Doug Palmer, attorney-at-law, Seattle; Noriko Palmer; Jim Phillips, aircraft consultant.