Top Nazi (30 page)
When the Waffen SS wanted to establish a new division, Himmler and Wolff had to obtain permission from headquarters. Hitler had assured the OKH “that units of the Waffen SS in general would not go beyond 5 to 10 percent of the army’s peacetime strength.” He needed this armed power—as Hitler justified the existence of the SS—as “State Police Troops … empowered to represent and carry out the authority of the Reich internally in any situation.” Not to mention, “the Great German Reich”
would “in its final form…. have borders that did not exclusively include people considered favorable to the Reich.”
As usual, Hitler failed to honor this agreement as well. By the end of the war the Waffen SS had reached thirty-eight divisions, many of them having less of a headcount, weapons, and equipment than what was described on paper, but the original limit had been greatly exceeded. Berger, who, like most of the Main Office Heads was given the rank of general without having the proper background, guessed that approximately 800,000 men wore the uniform of the Waffen SS. He and not Wolff was the organizer of this increase by constantly discovering new ways to enlist recruits. Wolff most definitely cleared the path for him at Führer headquarters, and certainly successfully negotiated with the Wehrmacht generals for the allotment of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles, but in doing so he was very careful not to overdraw on his often-cited “personal credit.”
Himmler also was not about to have Wolff represent the Waffen SS at headquarters by himself. As the Reichsführer SS spoke with the Führer in the Ukraine on September 22, 1942, at the “Werewolf” headquarters, he made a report—as he wrote in his note for the files—“regarding the condition of the Waffen SS.” Wolff would find out after the fact that on that occasion, by the Führer’s order, the four oldest SS divisions were each increased by an additional armored division and an assault artillery battalion. References of this kind show that Chief of the Personal Staff Wolff was intensely committed to the troops, but there is no trace in the normally voluminous correspondence at the Main Office. It seems, on the other hand, that the SS division commanders were never required to serve as representatives at headquarters.
Gruppenführer Theodor Eicke, commander of the infamous Totenkopf Division, was one exception. The division was at first mainly made up of concentration camp guards; their replacements were also drawn from there. Eicke always wrote to Wolff when he was having problems—which was normal procedure in his case since he never missed an opportunity to argue and thought nothing of placing himself above all regulations. Because of his flaws, the Weimar Republic police refused to hire him, despite the fact that he passed the mandatory tests. The gauleiter of Palatinate, Josef Brückel, had temporarily placed Party comrade Eicke in a lunatic asylum as an unrepentant brawler. During the Röhm affair, his lack of a conscience and robust physique made him capable of murder and when Röhm refused to shoot himself with a pistol in the jail cell, Eicke used his pistol instead.
Eicke usually called Wolff his friend. He poured out his problems to him in a chain of letters during 1940, rebelling against OKW rules. He demanded Wolff’s help in securing a number of 15 cm caliber Howitzers that belonged to no one and were just laying around in the Skoda factory in Pilsen. He also implied that he could have them picked up by a raiding party if his division didn’t manage to find a unit of heavy artillery any another way. Wolff was also asked to be helpful in getting rifles for the marksmen from the Polish booty. Later, he again asked for Wolff’s support against Berger, who was undermining Eicke’s reputation with HimmlerOn the other hand, Berger also complained to Wolff about Eicke because he allowed superiors to mistreat the recruits during training. Wolff was also supposed to offer support against Jüttner. Eicke had sent one of his officers, the most talented “organizer” (as it was called by people in the army for those who used tricks and cunning to steal for the unit), to the Dachau camp because he could use some of the supplies there, but the man was arrested as he tried to slip out the gate with a convoy of cars full of stolen goods. Now Wolff had to prevent court-martial proceedings against the officer, since it would reveal that Commander Eicke issued the orders.
During the French campaign, Eicke and his men behaved like pirates. As complaints about him flowed in to Himmler, Eicke wrote to Wolff on October 8, 1940: “Since I left home, some people have been trying in any way they can to undermine the trust the Reichsführer SS has had in me for years.”
Again Wolff helped. It seems he was able to prevent some of the accusations against SS units from reaching Himmler. Wolff was not always successful, but when it came to an argument, no one could quiet matters better than he, and no one was more clever at delaying the contentious issues into the future.
Wolff mended the disagreements among comrades during extensive trips in the second half of 1940. Himmler and his constant escort could now leave Berlin without worry; they knew that no earth-shattering news was expected. For operation “Sea Lion” Hitler had indeed pulled together a huge number of barges and landing boats of all kinds along the ports on the coast, but then he dropped preparations for the landing in England. Namely, his plan assumed that, beforehand, the Luftwaffe must practically destroy the RAF—which did not happen. So now the talk was that the last and toughest enemy would be defeated in another way—with submarines, bombs, and kicks in the “soft belly” in Africa and Asia. France and
Spain were to become new allies. With German troops occupying half of their country, the French were dependent on Hitler’s good will, and the Spanish owed him thanks because German soldiers of the “Condor Legion” helped Generalissimo Francisco Franco defeat the Republicans. Under the guise of a fall trip to visit the heads of state, Marshal Pétain and Franco, Hitler hoped to win them over to his plans.
This had nothing to do with the responsibilities of the SS, but Himmler really believed that it served his reputation to act like the supreme leader. So he, Wolff, and the usual retinue flew to Paris on October 17 where no one recorded their arrival. The French government was now located at Vichy in the unoccupied part of France, and the military commander in the capital obviously saw no reason to drive to Le Bourget airport to meet the travelers. After a quick lunch the SS team again boarded the plane and shortly before nightfall landed in Bordeaux. There, Wolff had the pleasure of being greeted by his friend Theodor Eicke. His Totenkopf Division was billeted in southern France. They naturally celebrated with a parade for Himmler.
On the following Saturday, the travelers crossed the border into Spain in Irun. Here and for the rest of their trip to San Sebastian, Burgos, Madrid, Toledo, and Barcelona, Spanish hospitality did not miss an opportunity to honor their guests and show them the sights their country had to offer. They saw a bullfight, viewed the magnificent residence at Escorial, the Alcazar that was so viciously fought over during the Civil War, and the paintings in the Prado. Everything took place very quickly over five days. They dined with the minister of the interior, were received by Franco, were awarded medals, but longer conversations could only take place at meals, refraining from politics and commitments.
On the day they flew back to Berlin, their Führer met with Franco in Hendaye on the French border; the SS raiding party was also restrained by the ceremonial perfection of their hosts. Himmler was in a better position than Hitler because he could at least take something with him. The Germanic Western Goths had settled in Segovia, fifteen hundred years before, and now archeologists were in the process of digging up their legacy. By coincidence and as requested by the Spanish minister of the interior a few artifacts were dug up in the presence of their important guest from Germany. The Reichsführer received them as a gift.
Himmler and his clan basked in the glory reserved to victorious warriors, and could even claim that they were slaving away in the service of the Fatherland. They visited and were visited in turn; they went sightseeing
and as a return gesture they showed them the sights of the Third Reich. Dutch fascists got to see Dachau concentration camp, a measure of trust among blood comrades, like the Norwegians who were already presenting their newly formed SS units when Himmler and Wolff traveled to Narvik in the far north. Everywhere and at every opportunity, they gave speeches, and at times there were special events. In the meantime the Germans at home had to struggle with the rations they were allotted on their grocery cards, and people in the defeated countries had even less.
The SS officials also had to handle less amusing subjects, for example the quarry near Gross Rosen, forty-five minutes by car from Breslau. It was not marked as a true concentration camp in the travel program because they were reluctant to call embarrassing things by their real names. On March 1, 1941, they toured the concentration camp at Auschwitz where the murder machinery had not yet started. It would be five months later that the Reichsführer SS ordered the camp commander Rudolf Höss to create a vast complex to exterminate people at the neighboring camp of Birkenau. What they saw, therefore, was not serious enough to prevent the happy party atmosphere that followed. It was the birthday of SS Gruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, who was known to take on assignments requiring a man devoid of any scruples.
The Messiah for the Next Two Thousand Years
T
he top SS leaders were certainly aware of Hitler’s “Directive 16,” if not verbatim, then at least the intention to launch “Barbarossa,” dated December 16, 1940. It was the order to prepare for the invasion of the Soviet Union. For that reason, it was definitely not a coincidence that Himmler and Wolff inspected a concentration camp that was to become of great importance because of the anticipated events.
Had Himmler and his satellites not known until then what the main emphasis would be for them, then by March 13, 1941, at the latest, they had to know. Hitler decreed in his own wording, which was confusing to outsiders: “In the operational area of the army [during the eastern campaign] the Reichsführer SS will receive special assignments in the preparation of the political administration that will result from the struggle to be held once and for all between two opposing political systems. Within the framework of these tasks, the Reichsführer SS will act independently on his own responsibility.”
In those days, the Führer headquarters filled up once again with its familiar players, who had only worked sporadically until then. Hitler had
been traveling a lot—to the Berghof, Vienna, and Linz. But when a military putsch in Belgrade toppled the Yugoslav government, which had just signed a pact with Nazi Germany, panic swept through the Reich chancellery. Hitler threatened to crush the Balkan countries in a lightning campaign if they did not agree to join the Axis policies. This became even more urgent since the Duce’s armed forces were badly trounced during his attack on Greece. The prestige of the Axis powers was at stake and the defeat threatened to become even more serious because British troops had already landed in Greece to help those under siege and (planned by Winston Churchill) to attack the Germans from the rear.
These issues did not exactly put Hitler in a relaxed mood when the SS once again complained to him, as the trio of Himmler, Heydrich, and Wolff asked for more authority for the SS at the army’s expense. They accused Wehrmacht generals in Poland, Holland, and Norway of sabotaging SS “pacification operations” in those countries. They demanded that the commanders of the military administration be filled by SS officers. According to them the submissive population would revolt as soon as they noticed that an army unit disagreed with the police measures. Wehrmacht doctors, for example, were not to treat sick Poles. In Radom a doctor wearing an army uniform even took over the supervision of a Polish hospital—one that was run by Catholic nuns, no less.
Himmler presented his plans whereby all Poles were to be concentrated in several areas within their own country, where they would also be isolated. Krakow would become a purely German city. In Holland and Norway the SS was planning to set up German schools. In the long term, the residents there would once again become closer to their Germanic heritage and united to the German country they originally came from. In Flanders, the SS was working in the same direction, but the resistance of the military administration allied with the Catholic clergy was impairing these efforts. Field Marshal Keitel and Hitler’s army adjutant Gerhard Engel were both present when these allegations were made. The latter commented in his notes that the SS were again intriguing against the army. The three presented their accusations “in a straightforward manner” but also maliciously so that, with one “successful shot,” they secured Hitler’s approval against the army once more.
As Hitler listened to these complaints, parts of the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, were already in ruins for hours. Without declaring war, German bomber squadrons attacked Belgrade in the early morning hours of April 6, 1941. Four days later Hitler again boarded his special train accompanied
by his entourage. After a short stop in Munich on the evening of April 11 they continued into the Austrian province of Styria. A few kilometers from the Yugoslav border, near the railroad station of Mönchkirchen, the train was once more the headquarters, as it had been in Poland. That stretch of tracks was blocked off over a long distance, and during air raids the train would disappear into a tunnel as planned. This was unnecessary; the Yugoslav air force had been destroyed on the ground during the first two days of the campaign. By Hitler’s birthday (ten days after the fighting began) the war was actually over, as the rest of the Greek armed forces still fit to fight surrendered to the SS Leibstandarte. Yugoslavia’s soldiers had already capitulated several days before. The short campaign left SS Lieutenant General Wolff with almost nothing to do; however, on two state visits, he was allowed to play the role of the decorative extra; King Boris III of Bulgaria and the Hungarian head of state, Admiral Nikolaus von Horthy, paid a visit to the Führer’s headquarters. Their armed forces had contributed in a limited way to the war, and now they wanted to pick up their reward.