When the War Was Over (61 page)

He underlined how the party had chosen the anniversary of its founding “to openly and officially proclaim its existence to the nation and to the international
public.” He expressed his “profound respect” to all revolutionary soldiers and peasants for “the defense of our sacred territory, for the rapid construction of our new Cambodia and for the rapid improvement of our people's living conditions in conformity with the slogan: ‘Great leaps and bounds.'”

Pol Pot's aim in the address, however, was to convince the party as a whole that under his leadership the communists of Cambodia had created a genuine Marxist-Leninist party and a genuine revolutionary proletarian party. It was a rallying cry for all to unite behind his leadership against the Vietnamese, and the alleged Vietnamese agents within the party. For all five hours he hammered away at this point, reviewing the country's history as seen through the eyes of the communist party.

He attacked Buddhism. “Such views as the belief in a former life and the influence of the stars and past deeds were also instrumental in misleading the peasants about the conflict [of class warfare].”

He minimized Sihanouk's role and attacked the institution of the monarchy. He gave no credit to the North Vietnamese army for fighting the first years of war against Lon Nol's troops and gave little credit to the Chinese, either, not mentioning either country by name. “As for aid from foreign friends,” he said, “it was only supplementary.”

And he claimed that the communist party had freed Cambodia for the first time in its history. “For more than 2,000 years our people lived in utter deprivation, in complete despair and hopelessness. What was the brightest day for them?” he asked, answering, “It was 17 April 1975,” the day of victory over Lon Nol's army.

The party had liberated the people and, he said, prevented “the constant loss of Cambodia's territory which used to happen in previous eras when the country was under various exploiting classes.” Pol Pot lay claim to be the country's first protector. And he vowed he would allow no country “to carry out aggression, violations, interference, subversion or provocation against our country or allow anyone to redraw our borders.”

Pol Pot asserted that Cambodia had no intention of harming any other country, that “a small, weak country cannot swallow a big country.”

The day after the speech Pol Pot flew to Beijing and later to Pyongyang.

The Chinese were pleased. They gave a tumultuous welcome to Pol Pot and his entourage, which included Ieng Sary. In Pyongyang Pol Pot even gave an abbreviated sketch of his own life. The Chinese helped publish an oversized, glossy color magazine about Cambodia's revolution called
Democratic Kampuchea Is Moving Forward.
The Chinese-made movie featuring So
Phim was released at the same time. The film and the magazine showed a happy, hardworking country of peasants and workers digging irrigation canals, planting and harvesting rice, and reinvigorating small industry. The propaganda war to change Cambodia's image was under way.

Ieng Sary took his role in this mission seriously. He traveled on to New York, where he addressed the United Nations and hinted that Western journalists as well as foreign friends would soon be allowed to visit Cambodia. He passed out the magazine, screened the film, and laughed at the stories of hardship told by refugees from Cambodia who had reached Thailand.

But those stories were not so easily dismissed. Writers and journalists in Bangkok had been hammering away at the injustices and bloodshed that refugees said were the lot of the common people in Democratic Kampuchea. Western nations were preparing documented proof of the horrors of what was now known publicly as the Pol Pot regime. The United Kingdom led the push to force the United Nations Human Rights Commission to issue a condemnation of Cambodia for human rights violations. One year later the commission issued a challenge to Cambodia to answer these charges. The number of refugees fleeing Cambodia into Thailand had increased dramatically in 1977 following the Center's purge of the Northwestern Zone. The purge created sufficient chaos to allow hundreds of Cambodians to escape, and their vivid testimony propelled more Western nations to demand an investigation inside Cambodia at the very least.

The Vietnamese were cautiously watching this duel over human rights in Cambodia. They did not condemn Cambodia's human rights policies. And neither Pol Pot in his speeches nor Ieng Sary in his address to the UN mentioned Vietnam by name as Cambodia's primary fear. The Vietnamese even attended Ieng Sary's reception at the UN, although Nguyen Co Thach, then a deputy foreign minister for Vietnam, cautioned a reporter at the reception not to use the term Indochina in Ieng Sary's presence. “The Cambodians don't like to hear the word ‘Indochina,'” said Thach.

Pol Pot's first and last trip overseas as Cambodian head of state was limited to his journey to China and North Korea. He returned home prepared to wage war.

In 1977 there appeared at first to be two fronts: the border with Thailand as well as the border with Vietnam. In that year Thailand reported 100 border “incidents” with Cambodia. Nearly all of these clashes were in areas claimed by both Cambodia and Thailand. But by October 1977, after the party leaders decided Vietnam was the true enemy, they needed to end the fighting on the Thai border. And they had to find a “Vietnamese secret
agent” who could take the blame for the border problems with Thailand. In fact, Khmer Rouge border troops on the Thai border had acted on orders similar to those sent to the troops guarding the border with Vietnam: to aggressively attack, that is, “defend,” territory in dispute.

Although the Center leaders initially charged Nhim Ros, the Northwestern Zone leader, with failing to achieve the agricultural and irrigation miracles it demanded, they added a new charge to his indictment in late 1977: He was accused of fomenting the border trouble with Thailand. He was condemned for traitorous activity not only in the name of the CIA but as an agent of the Vietnamese as well.

Ieng Sary was deputized to improve relations with Thailand at the time and convince the Thais that Vietnam was the chief menace in the region. He described this neat “discovery” of Nhim Ros's double-agent status. “According to Nhim Ros [the border incidents] were provoked by CIA agents,” Sary said. (Nhim Ros at that point was merely repeating the charges prepared by the Center to prosecute his own deputies.) “But,” Sary continued, “we later discovered Nhim Ros had relations with the Vietnamese also.”

Thereafter the number of border incidents with Thailand tapered off, although they did not disappear, and Thai-Cambodian relations improved markedly. Cambodia was preparing for the next round with Vietnam.

In October and November, Vietnam was not sitting back and merely waiting for another Cambodian border attack. Hanoi saw an opportunity opening up. The Vietnamese started recruiting Cambodian refugees in southern Vietnam and overseas to join a “united front” to rid Cambodia of Pol Pot. A Cambodian living in suburban Washington, D.C., received a letter at the time, postmarked Moscow, which asked him to be prepared to help his compatriots in southern Vietnam to “liberate” Cambodia. Cambodian refugees in southern Vietnamese camps were being enlisted to the same cause. International relief organizations hoping to aid those refugees were refused entry to the camps. Vietnam decided it did not need international aid for its Cambodian refugee population, despite earlier requests for aid similar to that offered Cambodian refugees in Thailand. Instead, the authorities sealed off southern Vietnam from most foreign visitors. Hun Sen was released from detention to help with the organizing.

Hanoi and Phnom Penh had exchanged notes about their border dispute in June. Vietnam had suggested high-level meetings, while Cambodia had suggested that the two sides pull back their troops one kilometer from the disputed border primarily between Tay Ninh and Svay Rieng provinces.
Vietnam did not pull back its troops, and Cambodia refused to discuss a meeting. The first diplomatic initiatives failed.

In December fighting erupted in full-scale warfare.

The Vietnamese committed twice as many troops as the Khmer in the war: 60,000 Vietnamese soldiers against 28,000 Cambodians. The Vietnamese used helicopter gunships and tanks. Without such sophisticated weaponry, the Cambodians relied on guerrilla tactics. The Vietnamese fought deep in Cambodian territory, crossing into Svay Rieng province and heading toward Neak Luong, the main Mekong River crossing point. East Zone defenses crumbled, especially on Route Seven where Heng Samrin's division was routed. Pol Pot decided to send reinforcements. Defense Minister Son Sen was dispatched with Central Committee troops to launch counter-attacks, but in the confusion on the battlefield, they clashed with Eastern Zone soldiers. The Vietnamese, meanwhile, decided they had made their point and withdrew. Publicly, Pol Pot proclaimed a great victory. Privately, he was persuaded more than ever that So Phim was a traitor. So Phim's defeats showed he had “opened the way” to the Vietnamese. His troops had even attacked those of the Central Committee from behind, in Pol Pot's analysis. So Phim's treason could not be more obvious. Pol Pot had to act quickly to clean out the nest of spies he believed had taken over the Eastern Zone.

On December 31, the Cambodians made the conflict public. Vietnam responded in kind. Both sides broadcast accounts of the war that inflamed racial antagonisms. The Vietnamese accused the Cambodians of “raping, tearing fetuses from mothers' wombs, disemboweling, cutting off the heads and tearing out the livers of adults, massacring children and throwing their bodies into flames.”

The Phnom Penh radio claimed the Vietnamese had come to Cambodia “to loot and take away thousands of tons of rice . . . strafing the people—children and old people alike—burning houses, seizing cattle, poultry and property of the people, raping and killing our women in the same manner as the Thieu-Ky and South Korean mercenary troops of the past, or in an even worse manner.”

The Cambodians explained this Vietnamese behavior by saying: “The Vietnamese have always despised and looked down upon the Cambodian people. The Cambodian people and nation, like all small nations and peoples, have their honor and dignity. . . . They cherish their race and will never allow it to become extinct.”

While the Phnom Penh radio declared the Cambodian troops had achieved a “great historic victory,” the hospitals in the capital told another
story. They were crowded with the wounded, many of whom died because the Khmer Rouge cadre trained as “people's doctors” were incompetent. The “doctors” had neither the medicine nor the training. There were appeals for blood donations but the doctors were not even capable of performing simple transfusions.

The actions of the party also belied the public announcement of victory. The purge of the Eastern Zone leadership was begun, and along with them thousands of Eastern Zone people.

In January and February, after the war tapered off on the border, the Center began arresting Eastern Zone cadre. So Phim realized, too late, that he was the target of the purge. He was blamed for the failure of the Cambodian troops to annihilate the Vietnamese in the border war, and he was considered part of the “underground Vietnamese party” implanted in the Cambodian Communist Party.

In March, So Phim apparently called a secret meeting of his closest aides and told them to be on guard. Those Eastern Zone cadre who had recently been arrested by the Center had not been traitors but were friends of the people, the party, and the revolution. Something had gone wrong. He told all those assembled to be careful, for the situation was changing considerably. So Phim did not know how quickly. Nor did he understand who was behind the changes. He figured Son Sen was responsible, never Pol Pot. Son Sen was going beyond his authority, So Phim reasoned, presumably with the help of Tuol Sleng chief Duch.

Within one month some 400 Eastern Zone cadre were imprisoned at Tuol Sleng. The commanders of the two Center divisions posted in the Eastern Zone had been arrested and replaced by men owing no allegiance to So Phim. The Center was purging Phim's regional party structure and taking over control of the soldiers stationed in his zone. Duch in Phnom Penh and Son Sen in the Eastern Zone itself indeed were coordinating a purge that amounted to a full-scale assault on Phim and what remained of his loyal forces.

Yet Phim and his troops still believed there was a mistake; they knew they were not traitors and they believed the Center would rectify its mistaken suspicions once the truth was known. They were as incredulous as the new people had been at the start of the revolution. When the leaders of the Eastern Zone military were called to a meeting in May, they obeyed orders. It
was an ambush by the Center. By the end of May hundreds of military figures from the Eastern Zone had been called to similar “meetings” and all had gone, like lambs to slaughter.

Finally So Phim himself was called to a meeting by a subordinate of Son Sen. He balked. He sent a messenger to investigate the purpose of this meeting. When the first messenger failed to return (he was executed), Phim sent a second, then a third, and finally a trusted fourth aide. None returned. On May 25 Son Sen attacked the Eastern Zone with two brigades; one included amphibious tanks, crossed the Mekong River, and went down the eastern Highway Seven to close in on Phim.

Incredulous to the end, So Phim actually tried to reach Phnom Penh over a field radio to protest the attack. When he received no answer he climbed into a jeep to drive to Phnom Penh and talk to Pol Pot himself. It had to be a mistake; Phim still could not imagine that he and his region were being purged by the Center for traitorous behavior in the pay of Vietnam. They had been the first line of defense. Phim was a member of the most select circle of revolutionary leaders; he had supported every twist and turn in the revolution, had obeyed orders. He had rationalized the blood on his own hands with his nearly religious belief in the wisdom of the party.