Zero Hour: A Post-Apocalyptic EMP Survival Fiction Series (The Blackout Series Book 2) (31 page)

STRATEGY FOR PROTECTION AND RECOVERY

RAILROADS

Railroad operations are designed to continue under stressed conditions. Backup power and provisioning is provided for operations to continue for days or even weeks at reduced capacity. However, some existing emergency procedures, such as transferring operations to backup sites, rely on significant warning time, such as may be received in a weather forecast before a hurricane. An EMP attack may occur without warning, thereby compromising the viability of available emergency procedures. Therefore, under the overall leadership of the DHS, the government and private sectors should work together to implement the general approach described in Strategy and Recommendations.

Specific actions should include:

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Heighten railroad officials’ awareness of the possibility of EMP attack without warning that would produce wide-area, long-term disruption and damage to electronic systems.

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Perform test-based EMP assessments of railroad traffic control centers and retrofit modest EMP protection into these facilities, thereby minimizing the potential for adverse long term EMP effects. The emphasis of this effort should be on electronic control and telecommunication systems.

TRUCKING AND AUTOMOBILES

Emphasizing prevention and emergency clearing of traffic congestion in this area, DHS should coordinate a government and private sector program to:

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Initiate an outreach program to educate State and local authorities and traffic engineers on EMP effects and the expectation of traffic signal malfunctions, vehicle disruption and damage, and consequent traffic congestion.

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Work with municipalities to formulate recovery plans, including emergency clearing of traffic congestion and provisioning spare controller cards that could be used to repair controller boxes.

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Sponsor development of economical protection modules—preliminary results for which are already available from Commission-sponsored research—that could be retrofitted into existing traffic signal controller boxes and installed in new controller boxes during manufacture.

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Sponsor development of automobile robustness specifications and testing for EMP. These specifications should be implemented by augmenting existing specifications for gaining immunity to transient electromagnetic interference (EMI), rather than by developing separate specifications for EMP.

MARITIME SHIPPING

The essential port operations to be safeguarded are ship traffic control, cargo loading and unloading, and cargo storage and movement (incoming and outgoing). Ship traffic control is provided by the Coast Guard, which has robust backup procedures in place. Cargo storage and movement are covered by other transportation infrastructure recommendations. Therefore, focusing on cargo operations in this area, DHS should coordinate a government and private sector program to:

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Heighten port officials’ awareness of the wide geographic coverage of EMP fields, the risk due to loss of commercial power for protracted time-intervals, and the need to evaluate the practicality of providing emergency generators for at least some portion of port and cargo operations.

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Assess the vulnerability of electric-powered loading/unloading equipment. Review the electromagnetic protection already in place for lightning, and require augmentation of this protection to provide significant EMP robustness.

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Coordinate findings with the “real-time” repair crews to ensure they are aware of the potential for EMP damage. Based on the assessment results, recommend spares provisions so that repairs can be made in a timely manner.

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Assess port data centers for the potential loss of data in electronic media. Provide useful measures of protection against EMP causing loss of function and/or data.

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Provide protected off-line spare parts and computers sufficient for minimum essential operations.

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Provide survivable radio and satellite communication capabilities for the Coast Guard and the Nation’s ports.

COMMERCIAL AVIATION

In priority order, it must be ensured that airplanes caught in the air during an EMP attack can land safely, that critical recovery assets are protected, and that contingency plans for an extended no-fly period are developed. Thus, DHS should coordinate a government program in cooperation with the FAA to perform an operational assessment of the air traffic control system to identify a “thin-line” that provides the minimal essential capabilities necessary to return the air traffic control capability to at least a basic level of service after an EMP attack. Based on the results of this operational assessment, develop tactics for protection, operational workarounds, spares provisioning, and repairs to return to a minimum-essential service level.

FOOD INFRASTRUCTURE

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

EMP can damage or disrupt the infrastructure that supplies food to the population of the United States. Recent federal efforts to better protect the food infrastructure from terrorist attack tend to focus on preventing small-scale disruption of the food infrastructure, such as would result from terrorists poisoning some food. Yet an EMP attack could potentially disrupt the food infrastructure over a large region encompassing many cities for a protracted period of weeks to months.

Technology has made possible a dramatic revolution in US agricultural productivity. The transformation of the United States from a nation of farmers to a nation where less than 2 percent of the population is able to feed the other 98 percent and supply export markets is made possible only by technological advancements that, since 1900, have increased the productivity of the modern farmer by more than 50-fold. Technology, in the form of knowledge, machines, modern fertilizers and pesticides, high-yield crops and feeds, is the key to this revolution in food production. Much of the technology for food production directly or indirectly depends upon electricity, transportation, and other infrastructures.

The distribution system is a chokepoint in the US food infrastructure. Supermarkets typically carry only enough food to provision the local population for 1 to 3 days. Supermarkets replenish their stocks on virtually a daily basis from regional warehouses that usually carry enough food to supply a multi-county area for about one month. The large quantities of food kept in regional warehouses will do little to alleviate a crisis if it cannot be distributed to the population in a timely manner. Distribution depends largely on a functioning transportation system.

MITIGATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Federal, state, and regional governments should establish plans for assuring that food is available to the general population in case of major disruption of the food infrastructure. Planning to locate, preserve, deliver, distribute, and ration existing stockpiles of processed and unprocessed food, including food stockpiled by the Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, and other government agencies, will be an important component of maintaining the food supply. Planning to protect, deliver, and ration food from regional warehouses, under conditions where an EMP attack has disrupted the power, transportation, and other infrastructures for a protracted period, should be a priority. Plans to process and deliver private and government grain stockpiles would significantly supplement the processed food stored in regional warehouses. According to the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistical Service, total private grain stockpiles in the United States amount to over 255 million metric tons. Federal grain stockpiles held by the Commodity Credit Corporation exceed 1.7 million metric tons, with 1.6 million metric tons of that amount dedicated to the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust for Overseas Emergency. Planning should include an assessment of how much food the population of the United States would need in an emergency when the food infrastructure is disrupted for a protracted period. Food stockpiles should be increased if existing stockpiles of food appear to be inadequate.

Presidential initiatives have designated the Department of Homeland Security as the lead agency responsible for the security of the food infrastructure, overseeing and working with the Department of Agriculture. Currently, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act), the President “is authorized and directed to assure that adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available for emergency mass feeding or distribution” in the United States. The Stafford Act should be amended to provide for plans to locate, protect, and distribute existing private and government stockpiles of food, and to provide plans for distribution of existing food stockpiles to the general population in the event of a national emergency.

WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURE

National-level responsibilities have already been assigned to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to protect the water infrastructure from terrorist threats. A recent Presidential Directive establishes new national policy for protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructures against terrorist threats that could cause catastrophic health effects.
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EPA is the designated lead agency for protection of drinking water and water treatment systems. DHS and EPA should ensure that protection includes EMP attack among the recognized threats to the water infrastructure.

EMERGENCY SERVICES

VULNERABILITIES

An EMP attack will result in diminished capabilities of emergency services during a time of greatly increased demand upon them. The EMP vulnerability of emergency services systems is primarily due to the susceptibility of computer and communications equipment, and secondarily due to likely commercial electric power outages. Recent test results indicate that some failures of computers and network equipment can be expected at low EMP field levels; at higher levels, much more pervasive equipment failures are expected. Mobile radio communications equipment can be expected to experience disruption and failure at EMP threat levels that are likely to be experienced. Moreover, emergency services are critically dependent on the commercial telephone network, on electric power, and thus on fuel for backup generators. Degradation in these capabilities following an EMP attack is likely, as discussed previously, thereby providing another source of cascading infrastructure failure.

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY FOR PROTECTION AND RECOVERY

The Department of Homeland Security must develop a strategy for protection and recovery of emergency services that emphasizes the inclusion of the EMP threat in planning and training and the establishment of technical standards for EMP protection of critical equipment. The Department of Homeland Security, including its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and state and local governments should augment existing plans and procedures to address both immediate and long-term emergency services response to EMP attack. Plans should include provision for early warning notification, and a protection/recovery protocol based on graceful degradation and rapid recovery that emphasizes a balance between limited hardening and provisioning of spare components, as well as training for their use in emergency reconstitution. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security should provide technical support, guidance, and assistance to state and local governments, as well as to other federal departments and agencies, to ensure the EMP survivability or rapid recovery of critical emergency services networks and equipment.

SPACE SYSTEMS

Over the past few years, there has been increased focus on US space systems in low Earth orbits and their unique vulnerabilities, among which is their susceptibility to nuclear detonations at high altitudes—the same events that produce EMP. It is also important to include, for the protection of a satellite-based system in any orbit, its control system and ground infrastructure, including up-link and down-link facilities.

Commercial satellites support many significant services for the Federal government, including communications, remote sensing, weather forecasting, and imaging. The national security and homeland security communities use commercial satellites for critical activities, including direct and backup communications, emergency response services, and continuity of operations during emergencies. Satellite services are important for national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications because of their ubiquity and separation from other communications infrastructures.

The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization conducted an assessment of space activities that support US national security interests, and concluded that space systems are vulnerable to a range of attacks due to their political, economic, and military value.
Satellites in low Earth orbit generally are at very considerable risk of severe lifetime degradation or outright failure from collateral radiation effects arising from an EMP attack on ground targets.