Zero Hour: A Post-Apocalyptic EMP Survival Fiction Series (The Blackout Series Book 2) (29 page)

IMPORTANCE OF ASSURED TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Telecommunications plays a key role in US society in terms of its direct effect on individuals and business and due to its impact on other key infrastructures. The relationship of telecommunications to the other critical infrastructures, such as the financial industry, is often recognized during and following widespread outages, such as those experienced as a result of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Centers and the immediate vicinity of “Ground Zero.” The local disruption of all critical infrastructures, including power, transportation, and telecommunications, interrupted operations in key financial markets and posed increased liquidity risks to the US financial system. In the days following the attacks, institutions in the affected areas were implementing their business continuity plans, which proved vital to the rapid restoration and recovery of services in the New York City area. In addition, the President emphasized that the prompt restoration of Wall Street’s capabilities was critical to the economic welfare of the Nation; in doing so, he aptly linked economic stability to national security.

For some of the most critical infrastructure services, such as electric power, natural gas, and financial services, assured communications are essential to their recovery following a major adverse event. The importance of telecommunications in an emergency situation is underscored by the existence of the National Communications System (NCS), established by Executive Order 12472,
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions.

The NCS shall seek to ensure that a national telecommunications infrastructure is developed which: (1) Is responsive to the national security and emergency preparedness needs of the President and the Federal departments, agencies and other entities, including telecommunications in support of national security leadership and continuity of government; (2) Is capable of satisfying priority telecommunications requirements under all circumstances through use of commercial, government and privately owned telecommunications resources; (3) Incorporates the necessary combination of hardness, redundancy, mobility, connectivity, interoperability, restorability and security to obtain, to the maximum extent Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications to facilitate the initiation, coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications services or facilities under all crises and emergencies; developing and ensuring the implementation of plans and programs that support the viability of telecommunications infrastructure hardness, redundancy, mobility, connectivity, and security; and serving as the focal point for joint industry-government and interagency NS/EP telecommunications planning and partnerships. In addition, the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) CEO-level advisory group to the President, is tasked with providing industry-sourced advice and expertise related to implementing policies affecting NS/EP communications. These NS/EP services are those “critical to the maintenance of a state of readiness or the response to and management of any event or crisis that causes harm or could cause harm to the population, damage to or the loss of property, or degrades or threatens the NS/EP posture of the United States.”

The NSTAC in its 1985 Report on EMP found that “consistent with its cost constraints, industry should incorporate low-cost EMP mitigation practices into new facilities and, as appropriate, into upgrade programs. For those areas where a carrier/supplier recognizes that a significant improvement in EMP resistance and surveillance could be achieved, but at a cost beyond the carrier/supplier's own cost constraints, the carrier/supplier should identify such options to the government for evaluation and possible funding.” On October 9, 1985, the NSTAC approved the EMP Final Task Force Report and forwarded a recommendation to the President, calling for a joint industry and Government program to reduce the costs of existing techniques for mitigating high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)-induced transients and to develop new techniques for limiting transient effects. As a result, the NCS and industry, working with the ATIS—the Alliance for Industry Solutions—developed a set of ANSI standards and Generic Requirements
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to address EMP.

NS/EP Definitions

NS/EP Telecommunications Services
: Telecommunications services that are used to maintain a state of readiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis (local, national, or international) that causes or could cause injury or harm to the population, damage to or loss of property, or degrades or loss of property, or degrades or threatens the NS/EP posture of the United States. (
“Telecommunications Service Priority [TSP] System for National Security Emergency Preparedness: Service User Manual,
”
NCS Manual 3-1-1, July 9, 1990. Appendix A.)

NS/EP Requirements:
Features that maintain a state of readiness or respond to and manage an event or crisis (local, national, or international), which causes or could cause injury or harm to the population, damage to or loss of property, or degrade or threaten the NS/EP posture of the United States. (
Federal Standard 1037C)

With respect to NS/EP telecommunications, capabilities exist for prioritizing phone calls through the wireline, wireless, and satellite networks during the time interval when call volumes are excessive and facilities are damaged, giving priority to restoring services that may be damaged or degraded, and getting new circuits into operation.

According to recent testimony by a DHS official, “The NCS is continuing a diverse set of mature and evolving programs designed to ensure priority use of telecommunications services by NS/EP users during times of national crisis. The more mature services—including the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)—were instrumental in the response to the September 11 attacks. FY 2005 funding enhances these programs and supports the development of the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program and upgrade to the Special Routing Arrangement Service (SRAS). Specifically, priority service programs include: (1) GETS, which offers nationwide priority voice and low-speed data service during an emergency or crisis situation; (2) WPS, which provides a nationwide priority cellular service to key NS/EP users, including individuals from federal, state and local governments and the private sector; (3) TSP, which provides the administrative and operational framework for priority provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP telecommunications services; (4) SRAS, which is a variant of GETS to support the Continuity of Government (COG) program including the reengineering of SRAS in the AT&T network and development of SRAS capabilities in the MCI and Sprint networks, and; (5) the Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN), which is an NCS program that provides dedicated communications between selected critical government and telecommunications industry operations centers.”
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For example, due to concerns with respect to getting calls through during intervals of high network call volumes that follow disaster events, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) utilizes the Government Emergency Telecommunications System (GETS) and other NS/EP telecom services such as wireless priority services to communicate with commercial nuclear power plants and to relay critical status information. This use of GETS grew out of lessons learned from the Three Mile Island incident in 1979. During the initial days of this incident, NRC personnel experienced communication problems that were attributed primarily to call volume overload at the local telephone company switch.

Another NS/EP service is the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program, which exists to assign priority provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP telecommunications services in the hours immediately following a major disaster. In place since the mid-1980s, more than 50,000 circuits are protected today under TSP, including circuits associated with critical infrastructures such as electric power, telecommunications, and financial services.

The telecommunication system consists of four basic and primary physical systems: wireline, wireless, satellite, and radio. In general, the national telecommunications infrastructure may be farther advanced then others in its ability to address the particular consequences of EMP. This is due in large measure to the recognized alternative threats to this system, as well as broad recognition of its importance to society. The three primary and separate systems (excluding radio) that make up the broad telecommunications infrastructure each provide specialized services; they also overlap heavily. Thus the loss or degradation of any one of these somewhat redundant subsystems subjects the remaining functional subsystems to heavier service loads.

Each of these four primary systems is unique in their capability to suffer insult from EMP. The wireline system is robust but will be degraded within the area exposed to the EMP electromagnetic fields. The wireless system is technologically fragile in relation to EMP, certainly in comparison to the wireline one. In general, it may be so seriously degraded in the EMP region as to be unavailable. Low Earth Orbit (LEO) communications satellites may also suffer radiation damage as a result of one or more high-altitude nuclear bursts that produce EMP (see Space Systems, page 44).

The radio communication sub-system of the national telecommunications infrastructure is not widespread, but where it is connected to antennas, power lines, telephone lines, or other extended conductors, it is also subject to substantial EMP damage. However, radio communication devices not so connected or not connected to such conductors at the time of the EMP attack are likely to be operable in the post-attack interval.

EMP EFFECTS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Based upon results of Commission-sponsored testing, an EMP attack would disrupt or damage a functionally significant fraction of the electronic circuits in the Nation’s civilian telecommunications systems in the region exposed to EMP. The remaining operational networks would be subjected to high levels of call attempts for some period of time after the attack, leading to degraded telecommunications services.

Key government and civilian personnel will need priority access to use public network resources to coordinate and support local, regional, and national recovery efforts, especially during the interval of severe network congestion.

To offset the temporary loss of electric power, telecommunications sites now utilize a mix of batteries, mobile generators, and fixed-location generators. These typically have between 4 and 72 hours of backup power available, and thus will depend on either the resumption of electrical utility power or fuel deliveries to function for longer periods of time.

For some of the most critical infrastructure services such as electric power, natural gas, and financial services, assured communications are necessary—but aren’t necessarily sufficient—to the survival of that service during the initial time-intervals after an EMP attack. Therefore, a systematic approach to protecting or restoring key communications systems will be required.

RECOMMENDED MITIGATION ACTIVITIES

The following actions are recommended as particularly effective ones for mitigating the impacts of EMP attack:

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Expand the respective roles of the National Communications System (NCS) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) as the Federal Focal Point for EMP within the Code of Federal Regulations Part 215
to address infrastructure interdependencies related to NS/EP telecommunications services.

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Ensure services targeted at NS/EP operate effectively as new technology is introduced into the telecommunications network. Specifically, services such as Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority Service (WPS) that are intended for use in emergency situations to improve the call completion probabilities for key personnel must operate effectively. Within the next 15 years, new technologies will be introduced into the public networks that will play major roles in operation of these services. EMP is just one of the potential threats that could stress the telecommunications networks; therefore, ensuring that NS/EP services perform effectively as new technology is introduced has benefits beyond providing robustness to EMP, and moreover is consistent with avoiding failures from other hostile actions.

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Determine the effects of EMP on different types of telecommunication equipment and facilities, using tests and theoretical analyses of the type done in the course of Commission-sponsored work and previous EMP-related studies conducted by the National Communications System (NCS).
^.
A comprehensive, continuing telecommunications testing program,
along with the use of existing national and international standards, may be a model activity that would be a key part of this overall National effort.

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Improve the ability of key network assets to survive HEMP. There are key elements in the network such as the Signal Transfer Points (STPs) in the signaling system (Signaling System 7 (SS7)), Home Location Register (HLR), and Visiting Location Register (VLR) in the wireless networks whose degradation can result in the loss of service to a larger number of users. Effective mitigation strategies include a combination of site hardening and installation of protective measures for the fast rise-time (E1) component of EMP.

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Improve the ability of telecommunications to withstand the sustained loss of utility-supplied electric power. This mitigation strategy would entail the use of best practices, review and improvement of existing programs such as the Telecommunications Electric Service Priority (TESP) program, and the increased use of alternative backup power sources.