1999 (14 page)

An alternative would be to develop mobile land-based missiles, like the proposed Midgetman. I strongly endorsed this concept when it was recommended by the Scowcroft Commission. I still favor it, but it now faces two major problems. First, it is unlikely that the American public and Congress will agree to allow nuclear missiles to roam over the wide areas a mobile system needs to be invulnerable. Federal-government reserves might not be large enough to make the missiles invulnerable, and deploying these weapons on the U.S. railroad or interstate highway system would prompt great opposition. Second, if the Soviet Union continues to develop its strategic defense capabilities, the United States needs to develop multi-warhead, not single-warhead, missiles. If we commit a large proportion of our resources for strategic weapons to a fleet of single-warhead missiles, even a moderately effective
Soviet strategic defense could seriously cut down the effectiveness of an American retaliatory strike. Small, mobile missiles should be a significant part of our deterrent force, but unless these problems are solved they cannot play as big a role as we hoped when the Scowcroft Commission first made its report.

We can and should build strategic weapons capable of hitting hard targets so that we can put at risk a significant portion of the Soviet arsenal. We have done so with the deployment of the first group of MX missiles and with the future deployment of the new Trident II missiles. But that is inadequate. The United States plans to build only forty MX missiles and has deployed them in fixed silos vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The new Trident II is invulnerable at sea, but communication with submerged submarines is difficult at best. The fact is that we still need to build a more substantial land-based force that can survive a Soviet first strike.

A push to deploy a strategic defense to protect the American population, as advocated by many of the proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative, would not solve our strategic problems. The idea of building a defense that would render nuclear weapons obsolete is a myth. It would have to be perfect to work, and not even the most optimistic advocates of the idea believe it would be technologically feasible until well into the next century.

But it is possible to build a limited defense that makes our strategic weapons less vulnerable and that could protect the country against an accidental launch of a few weapons or against a small attack by a nonsuperpower. That kind of defense does not need to be perfect. Even if it were only 50 percent effective, it would so complicate the calculations for executing a Soviet first strike that no Soviet leader could ever be confident of success. Under the best of circumstances, a first strike would be a dicey gamble. With a limited U.S. strategic defense, Moscow's odds would become even longer. The threat of a Soviet first strike would lose its credibility, and the Kremlin therefore could not use it to blackmail the United States in a superpower crisis.

A limited strategic defense is the key to solving the critical problem of the vulnerability of U.S. land-based forces to a Soviet first strike. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative not only has been useful in forcing the Soviets to negotiate seriously but also
has created the possibility of deploying a limited defense. Though the call for a perfect defense is unrealistic, he deserves high praise for pressing forward with SDI. We should direct the bulk of research and development funds in the Strategic Defense Initiative toward designing a limited defense of our strategic forces, rather than toward the unrealistic hope of a nationwide population defense. An attempt to build a total defense would give us only the chimeral protection of an electronic Maginot Line. We should not pursue the unattainable at the expense of the achievable.

A limited defense would remedy the problems with both the MX and the Midgetman missiles. Putting an MX missile in a fixed silo does not improve the survivability of our forces—but with a limited defense it would greatly improve our security. Deploying Midgetman missiles on federal reserves might leave them vulnerable to a saturation attack—but with a limited defense they would improve our security and improve strategic stability. We should therefore move forward with
both
a modernization of our offensive forces and a deployment of defensive forces.

We should not bog ourselves down in a legalistic argument about what kind of research, testing, and deployment the ABM Treaty of 1972 permits. I signed the treaty because it served American security interests in the strategic setting of the early 1970s. It was an important achievement and has lasted longer than any other major arms-control pact. To engage in a debate over whether the treaty should be broadly or narrowly interpreted is neither useful nor necessary. When the United States enters into a treaty, we should abide by its terms and not try to squirm out of them by legalistic maneuvering. The treaty specifically provides that either side can opt out on six months' notice if it finds that events have “jeopardized its supreme interests.” We should determine what we need to do to assure our security. If that requires a limited strategic defense, we should find out what kind of a defense is feasible and then take the steps to develop and deploy it. If that requires the renegotiation of provisions of the ABM Treaty, we should put our demands on the superpower agenda. If Moscow refuses to negotiate, we should then invoke our rights under the treaty to suspend its provisions after a six-month notice.

We should declare that we intend to deploy a limited defense as
early as technological advances permit. We should indicate that we prefer to do so through a negotiated timetable but that we will go forward alone if talks fail to produce a timely agreement. The issue of early deployment should be negotiated, but negotiations should not stop us from deploying a system as soon as possible.

While a limited strategic defense would solve some of our problems, it would not solve all our problems. We need to complement it with additional offensive forces. We should not seek a first-strike capability. That would turn out to be politically impossible because the American people would not support it and technologically impossible because the Soviet Union would adopt countermeasures, like its own strategic defense, to render our effort futile. But we still need to deploy new strategic weapons which would, if war broke out, provide an American President with more options than mutual suicide and surrender.

Arms control alone cannot solve our strategic problems, but it can play a major role in doing so. Those who oversell arms control do their cause great damage. While Americans tend to view arms control as an end in itself, the Soviets consider arms control a means to an end. Moscow is right. Arms control alone cannot produce peace or ensure our security. It is only one part of our overall defense policy. It is not an end in itself but a means to maintain our security. To improve our security and mutual stability, defense and arms-control policies must go forward in a coordinated fashion. Each can reinforce the other. It is ironic that so many arms-control proponents oppose SDI, because if President Reagan had not proposed SDI the Soviets would not be negotiating arms control.

A properly negotiated arms-control agreement can be constructive in three ways. First, it can help to produce the strategic stability which could reduce the chances of a crisis escalating into a war. Strategic instability results when either side or both sides deploy weapons that create the potential for a first strike. This in turn creates an incentive to use these weapons in a crisis in order to gain a decisive advantage. The danger is greatest if these weapons themselves are vulnerable to a first strike because in a crisis a leader would be tempted to use his arsenal before he loses it. An agreement that prevents either side from attaining a first-strike
capability would enhance strategic stability and reduce the likelihood of war.

Second, an arms-control agreement limiting offensive weapons can increase the effectiveness of a limited strategic defense. Without such an agreement, the Soviets could try to increase their offensive forces in order to overwhelm our defense. Since our defense would seek only to achieve the limited aim of protecting our strategic forces, a Soviet buildup would almost certainly fail to restore its present advantage. But the fact remains that an arms-control agreement capping the level of offensive forces enhances the prospects for an effective strategic defense by limiting the threat.

Third, a serious effort to negotiate on arms control is a political imperative. Western leaders will not be able to mobilize public support for defense spending without a credible arms-control policy. We should not argue about whether or not to negotiate. Those who initially refuse to negotiate, like the superhawks in the Reagan administration, will sooner or later be forced to negotiate by Congress or public opinion. Our focus should be on how to negotiate in a way that serves our interests.

As the United States and the Soviet Union look toward a future strategic-arms-control treaty, we must ensure that it meets four conditions:

Equality.
It must be based on equality. Equality in numbers is important, but numbers alone should not be the sole measure of equality. We should negotiate the number and size of missiles and the number of warheads so that each side has the same military capability. In this respect, the capability of each side to destroy hardened targets of the other is the most crucial measure. It is vitally important therefore that the sublimits—which are limits on specific types of weapons included under the overall limit—be designed to provide qualitative equality.

Warhead-to-target ratio.
It must not allow either superpower to have a credible first-strike capability. It must reduce the ratio of Soviet first-strike warheads to American first-strike targets below the present level. If an agreement allowed an offensive power like
the Soviet Union to maintain or increase its present advantage in first-strike weapons, it would actually increase the danger of war and of defeat without war.

Modernization.
It must have ironclad provisions against upgrading old missiles into first-strike missiles. Both SALT I and SALT II tried to deal with modernization but failed. The Soviet Union not only violated the spirit of the agreements by exploiting ambiguities in their language to modernize their weapons but also violated the letter of the treaties in deploying more new systems than allowed. If we are to sign an enduring strategic-arms-control agreement, we must treat modernization as a central issue, not as a sideshow.

Verification.
It must provide means for each side to verify the compliance of the other. We have relied in the past on satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means of verification. But advances in military technology now require that we settle for nothing less than on-site inspection. The Soviets have always rejected such provisions in the past, but have agreed in the INF Treaty to compromise on this point. This is a good start, but it is not enough for START. We must insist that the provisions for on-site inspection are more than cosmetic. We must make the Soviets understand that two thirds of the Senate will vote for ratification only if we have absolute confidence that both sides will carry out the agreement.

In addition to pursuing these goals, our arms-control policy cannot ignore Soviet violations of past arms-control agreements. These must not be swept quietly under the rug in the rush toward new accords but should be met with a measured response. Soviet arms-control violations should not lead us to throw out the old agreements and quit negotiating. Instead, we should put the issue of Soviet compliance high on the superpower agenda. If Moscow fails to address our concerns to our satisfaction, we must take the position, as the Reagan administration has, that Soviet arms-control violations will be met with proportional American responses.

Unilateral compliance is unilateral disarmament. We sign agreements for the sake of our security, and we must not abide by agreements when Soviet violations threaten our security. Unilateral
compliance will win us not goodwill but contempt from the Kremlin leaders.