1999 (16 page)

Third, we should redirect the START talks. We should propose a strict limit on the number of strategic warheads capable of destroying hardened military targets in a first strike. Both superpowers would be allowed to retain equal numbers of counterforce warheads. But the level of these most threatening weapons would be scaled back dramatically. This limitation should involve a 75 percent cut from the present level of such Soviet weapons as the SS-18, the SS-24 and the SS-25. It would also require reductions in planned deployments of comparable U.S. weapons, like the MX and Trident II D-5 missiles. In conjunction with such an agreement, the United States should agree to limits on the extent of the deployment of a space-based defense system against ballistic missiles. We should deploy only enough defensive weapons to counter the threat of the Soviet Union's decreased offensive force.

An agreement along these lines would create both quantitative and qualitative equality between our forces. Even more important, these terms would reduce the ratio of first-strike warheads to first-strike targets for both sides, thereby improving mutual security and bolstering strategic stability. The bottom line is that under such an agreement we would have true strategic stability. Neither side would have a first-strike capability. Both would have a retalitatory, second-strike capability against the other side's strategic forces.

In recent months, some analysts have claimed that under Gorbachev the Soviet Union has undergone a revolution in strategic thinking. Soviet strategists, in this view, have finally accepted the Western concepts of “strategic sufficiency” and “strategic stability.” Since there have been no changes in Soviet military programs or arms-control strategy, a dose of skepticism is in order. But we
should put this so-called new thinking to the test. We should put forward a proposal, like the one above, designed to enhance mutual security by cutting to an equal and stable level the weapons systems accurate and powerful enough for use in a first-strike attack.

We must always keep in mind that, with a total of more than twenty thousand strategic warheads in the superpower arsenals, the relative numbers of nuclear weapons on each side do not matter as much as the relative vulnerability of each to a first strike by the other. Vulnerability, not arithmetic, must guide our arms control negotiating strategy. After all, if we haphazardly subtract from the number of weapons, we could add to our vulnerability, thereby jeopardizing our security. If we wish the START talks to mark a turning point in the U.S.–Soviet competition, we must redirect them toward the objective of limiting the counterforce weapons which pose the greatest threat to security and stability.

Fourth, any cut in strategic forces also requires ironclad verification. Those who have argued that the INF agreement has solved the thorniest problems of verification are wrong. The agreement broke new ground by permitting limited on-site inspection. That was a positive development. But no one would dispute that, given the small size and the mobility of the SS-20 missile, a determined Soviet effort to cheat would evade detection. In addition, the provision for on-site inspection lasts for only thirteen years. After that, the United States is on its own. While the verfication provisions in the INF agreement are better than those in any previous arms-control accord, they will not be an adequate model for a START agreement.

Verification for a START treaty will be far more difficult—and far more important—than verification for the INF agreement. Eliminating a whole class of weapons can be verified much more easily than reducing various classes of weapons, with some based at sea or under it, others on long-range bombers, and still others in fixed silos or on mobile launchers on land. No one in the American government has yet come to grips with the complexity of this task. We must not rush into a START agreement until the problems involved have been painstakingly considered. At the same time, we must remember that verification is
a
central issue, but not
the
central issue. The fact that a bad agreement can be verified does not make it a good agreement.

We must recognize that it would be suicidal to enter a START treaty with slipshod verification provisions. Cheating on the INF accord would provide a significant but marginal edge, but cheating on a START treaty—especially after deep reductions in strategic forces—could produce a profound shift in the balance of power. This potential payoff would create a tremendous incentive to cheat. We would be certain to keep our end of the bargain, but would Moscow? Kremlin leaders have never been noted for resisting such temptations in the past—so we must not dangle such tantalizing opportunities before them in the future.

If we are to go forward with a START agreement during the Reagan administration, all of these issues must be addressed. We must link progress on START to progress in conventional-arms-control talks. We must not undermine the possibility of deploying in the near term a limited strategic defense to protect our strategic forces. We must not reduce offensive strategic forces in a way that increases our vulnerability to a first strike. We must never sign an agreement on the central issue of the U.S.–Soviet strategic balance unless we can guarantee verification. If a START agreement fails on any of these points, we are better off without it.

We must recognize that the only way we can get a good deal out of Moscow is to demonstrate to Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would be worse off without a deal. We should make it clear to his negotiators that we intend to deploy whatever defenses are necessary to negate Moscow's current advantage in first-strike weapons. He will then have the choice of accepting a comprehensive compromise that serves both our interests or pouring good money after bad in seeking to restore his offensive superiority.

If Gorbachev then signs an agreement that preserves a stable balance of forces, arms-control talks will have achieved their purpose. If not, America will still have the strategic forces needed to deter Moscow.

I
f we succeed in deterring the Kremlin, we can avoid a nuclear war. But if we fail to compete with Moscow, we will be defeated without war. Competition is at the center of the American–Soviet relationship and will determine who wins the superpower struggle. We cannot afford a policy based on ad-hoc responses to Soviet thrusts. That is a prescription for defeat. Stopgap measures are no match for the calculated, persistent expansionism of the Kremlin. We not only must develop the capability to engage the Kremlin's tactics on their terms, but also must adopt a long-range strategy to compete with Moscow on ours.

Kremlin leaders are already expert at waging this battle by all means short of nuclear war. Americans are not. As a nation, we only reluctantly recognized the danger posed by Soviet expansionism after World War II. We put our trust in Stalin at the Yalta Conference, only to lose Eastern Europe. We pulled our forces out of Western Europe, only to reintroduce them when Moscow threatened to dominate the continent. We withdrew our troops from the Asian mainland, only to send them back when Soviet-supported North Korean armies invaded the south. Diplomatic treachery, military intimidation, and aggression by proxy are standard operating procedures for the Kremlin leaders.

We tried a strategy of containment which sought to ring the
Soviet bloc with a string of alliances. It failed when the Soviet Union broke out of containment and when the chain of alliances broke down. We tried a strategy of détente which sought to mitigate conflict where possible but which recognized the need to engage in active competition where compromise was impossible. It failed when some American leaders assumed that an end to the open hostility of the Cold War meant an end to superpower conflict in general. The Soviet Union took advantage of this naiveté to embark on a global drive for imperial conquest. We cannot afford to return to those failed policies of the past.

We must begin by recognizing two fundamental facts. First, an improvement in the atmosphere of American–Soviet relations does not mean the end of the competition between the superpowers. Cordiality is not concord. Even if compromises are worked out on issues like nuclear-arms control, we will still be in conflict on others, such as the future of Europe and regional conflicts in the Third World. If an improvement in the atmospherics of U.S.–Soviet relations leads us to lower our guard, we will be engaging in the worst kind of unilateral disarmament.

Second, a strategy which consists only of defending static positions in Europe and Asia will lead to defeat. Moscow will continue to press forward in the Third World. It is essential that the United States counter these Soviet moves, because the Third World is where territory and people will actually swing from one side to the other. At the same time, we must not grant the Soviets sanctuary in their own sphere or concede the initiative to the Kremlin in ours. If we are to compete, it must be on their side of the Iron Curtain as well as ours. If we compete only on Moscow's terms, Soviet leaders will take what we give them and come back for more. They will mass their forces for a breakthrough at our weakest point and patiently accumulate small gains at low cost and little risk. And we will eventually find that the balance of power has tipped in Moscow's favor.

No Soviet leader has ever lost sight of these two key points. Gorbachev is no exception. The eloquence of his words about peace and friendship is contradicted by his deeds in Africa, in Southeast and Southwest Asia, and in Central America. He does not want war, but he does want victory, and he believes he can get
it with tactics short of war. That is the danger we must confront and the challenge we must overcome.

If we sit behind a Maginot Line of nuclear deterrence, we will lose the American–Soviet struggle. Nuclear weapons can deter a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and can deter a Soviet attack in a central theater of conflict like Europe. But nuclear deterrence works only if the stakes involved justify the risks of nuclear war. We therefore cannot rely on nuclear weapons to deter direct or indirect Soviet aggression in peripheral regions where American interests are less than vital. That means that our nuclear arsenal will be useless in crises in the Third World. The problem is that this is where superpower confrontations are most likely to occur in the years before 1999.