1999 (31 page)

We must also recognize that the Soviets will stretch every agreement to the limit. They will do everything that is allowed—and whatever else they can get away with. We must respond accordingly. Those who claim that the SALT I agreement permitted the Soviet Union to push ahead of the United States in strategic systems misplace the blame. We fell behind in strategic nuclear weapons not because of the agreement but because of our failure to do everything permitted under the agreement. A whole range of strategic programs—the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, and the Trident submarine—were under way when SALT I was signed. But Congress cut back on their appropriations in the mid-1970s, and the Carter administration canceled some and stretched out the timetable for deployment of others. If we had done all we were allowed to do under SALT I, the window of vulnerability would never have opened up.

In addition, we must not put the issue of Soviet arms-control violations on the back burner while other negotiations proceed. President Reagan has rightly insisted that the United States take proportional steps to counter Soviet violations. Since the Soviets have broken through the SALT II numerical ceilings, the United States should do likewise. Since they have deployed more new missiles than permitted under SALT II, we should press forward with both the MX and Midgetman missiles. Since the Soviets encrypt the telemetry of their missiles in test firings, we should do the same.

We must insist in our negotiations on resolving the issue of compliance before entering new agreements. This is not just a diplomatic nicety. We must tirelessly point out to those who would brush this issue aside that it ultimately affects our national survival. At the same time, we must tirelessly point out to the Kremlin that if they refuse to deal with the issue of violations of past agreements, there is no way that the Senate will—or should—ratify future ones. If we hold to that position, the Soviets will eventually come around.

Those who oppose the idea of negotiating with Moscow also oppose summitry between the superpowers. Summits, in their view, not only have the drawbacks of negotiations in general, but they also benefit the Soviets disproportionately. With their unavoidable champagne toasts and diplomatic cordiality, U.S.–Soviet summit meetings legitimize the Kremlin leaders in the eyes of the world, regardless of the brutal policies they pursue in distant places like Afghanistan.

That view is understandable, particularly given our poor track record at summits. All too often, we have seen an American President captivated by the notion that if only he and his Soviet counterpart got to know each other and succeeded in developing a new tone or spirit in their relationship, then U.S.–Soviet problems would be solved and tensions would wane. This led to the vaunted “spirit” of Geneva in 1955, of Camp David in 1959, of Vienna in 1961, of Glassboro in 1967, and again of Geneva in 1985. But while these spirits improved the atmosphere of U.S.–Soviet relations, they did nothing to resolve the major underlying issues. When a summit is all spirit and no substance, the spirit evaporates fast.

We need to face the hard reality that spirit and tone matter only when leaders of nations with similar and compatible interests have a misunderstanding that can be resolved by their getting to know each other. Such ephemeral factors are irrelevant when nations have irreconcilable differences, as do the United States and the Soviet Union.

But that does not mean that American–Soviet summits serve no beneficial purpose. Summits can play a decisive role in serving peace. But they contribute to a genuine improvement in East–West relations only if both leaders recognize that tensions between their countries are caused not by misunderstanding but by diametrically opposed ideological and geopolitical interests. Most of our differences will never be resolved. But the United States and the Soviet Union have one major goal in common: survival. Each has the key to the other's survival. The purpose of summit meetings is to develop rules of engagement that can prevent our profound
differences from leading to an armed conflict that would destroy us both.

We must recognize that despite forty-four years of peace a world war remains possible. From the least to the most dangerous, there are seven potential causes of such a conflict: (1) a calculated decision by the Soviet leadership to launch a first-strike attack on the United States; (2) an attack on NATO forces by Warsaw Pact forces or on Japan by the Soviet Union; (3) war by accident, in which one side launches a nuclear attack because of some kind of mechanical malfunction; (4) nuclear proliferation, which could put nuclear weapons into the hands of a leader of a minor revolutionary or terrorist power who would be less restrained from using them than the major powers have been; (5) a Soviet preemptive strike to liquidate the Chinese nuclear arsenal, a war which would inevitably drag in the United States; (6) escalations of small wars in areas where the interests of both superpowers collide, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; and (7) a miscalculation in which a leader of one superpower underestimates the will of his counterpart to take the ultimate risk to defend his interests.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in reducing the danger and risks represented by all seven scenarios. Superpower summits can play a constructive role in mitigating each one of them. If properly conducted, such meetings can facilitate the cooperation necessary to reduce the risk of accidental war and to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They also provide a means to make clear our determination to resist Soviet aggression against Western interests, thereby lessening the risk that Moscow will put our will to the test.

Summits present an American President with a unique set of opportunities and challenges. At the summit, he has the chance to break the glacial pace of negotiations between American and Soviet bureaucracies. Such meetings are also the hearth in which he can forge the linkage between various U.S.–Soviet issues. They are the forum in which his Soviet opposite number—for better or worse—takes his measure of the United States. But the summit also has its perils. A President might blunder into a Soviet diplomatic trap. Or he might inadvertently set a tone for U.S.–Soviet
relations that produces a counterproductive public euphoria about the possibility of finally ending the superpower struggle.

During forty-two years in public life, I have watched nine U.S.-Soviet summits and participated as President in three. In looking back at our successes and failures, I believe that in practicing summitry the next President should keep five key rules uppermost in mind:

Do not expect good personal relations with a Soviet leader to produce better state relations.
There can be no more dangerous illusion than the belief that a charismatic American President can charm his counterpart into desisting from aggressive policies around the world. Soviet leaders are expert at playing to this American blind spot. Manlio Brosio, who served for six years as the Italian ambassador to Moscow, saw through the charade. “I know the Russians,” he told me in 1967. “They are great liars, clever cheaters, and magnificent actors. They cannot be trusted. They consider it their duty to cheat and lie.”

Almost every President starting with Franklin D. Roosevelt has at some point fallen prey to the belief that a special personal relationship with the top Soviet leader would facilitate a diplomatic breakthrough that would, in turn, pacify the U.S.–Soviet relationship. All were utterly disillusioned when the Soviets toasted us with one hand while stabbing us in the back with the other. We must recognize that the road to diplomatic disaster is paved with naive intentions.

That does not mean that personal diplomacy makes no difference. It is indispensable in the chemistry of summitry, but if handled improperly it can also explode in our faces. We must learn that the essential element is not sentimental friendship but hard-headed mutual respect. A President need not try to prove his manhood with chest-pounding belligerence toward the Soviets. Instead, he should strive for a serious and businesslike attitude in negotiations, granting the Soviet leader the respect due the leader of a global superpower. But at the same time a President should keep an acute awareness that separating the two sides are irreconcilable differences that cannot be bridged through personal diplomacy between their leaders.

In dealing with Gorbachev, it is particularly important for a President
to keep a realistic attitude about the role of personal diplomacy. Gorbachev is a master at charm. In interviews, he has transformed some of America's toughest reporters into lapdogs. But we must recognize that, as a master of charm, Gorbachev cannot be affected by charm. He knows all the tricks because he has employed them a hundred times. If a President tries to prevail through charm, he will win not friendship but contempt.

Do not pretend that even a successful summit will bring about a permanent peace.
Successful summits tend to breed euphoric expectations, but no single meeting between American and Soviet leaders can transform the world and put an end to the U.S.–Soviet rivalry. Euphoria is an illusion that breeds disillusion and invites irresolution. In fact, Utopian hopes hurt the United States and our allies. It is a goal of the Soviet Union to foster a euphoria about better U.S.–Soviet relations because that in turn facilitates an increase in East–West trade and a reduction in Western defense spending. If we allow—or encourage—such euphoria, Kremlin leaders will not only get what they want but also get it at a discount. We must not make the mistake of believing that Gorbachev's willingness to relax tensions means he has abandoned hardheaded self-interest as his guiding light.

As President, I was well aware that our highly successful summit meeting in 1972 might spawn euphoric expectations among the American people. Even though I knew I stood to benefit politically from such euphoria, I tried to tamp it down and to keep our successes in perspective. I did so particularly because Brezhnev had repeatedly underscored to me that a relaxation of tensions would not end Soviet support for what he called wars of national liberation in the Third World. In a speech before a joint session of Congress immediately upon my return from Moscow, I frankly stated that we did not “bring back from Moscow the promise of instant peace, but we do bring the beginning of a process that can lead to a lasting peace.” I added, “Soviet ideology still proclaims hostility to some of America's basic values. The Soviet leaders remain committed to that ideology.” My words proved to be inadequate. Despite my warnings, euphoria did develop in the Congress and in the media. I was not surprised when the communists acted like communists in the Mideast in 1973. But it was a shock
to many Americans who thought we had entered a new era of peace and goodwill. Unfortunately, the euphoria did not fully dissipate until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

After the Washington summit in December 1987, euphoria swept the capital. President Reagan's postsummit address to the American people was a well-balanced and very responsible assessment of U.S.–Soviet relations. But some administration officials fed the fires of euphoria, predicting rapid progress on complex issues and depicting the dawn of a new era in world affairs. That kind of exaggerated rhetoric weakens our negotiating position by raising domestic expectations. All future Presidents who participate in summits should keep their staffers on a shorter leash.

We must bear in mind that no agreement signed at a summit will eliminate the threat of Soviet aggression. At best, it can only reduce the possibility of that threat's escalating into armed conflict. While we should seek agreements that serve our interests, we must never assume that any agreement changes the nature of the American–Soviet conflict or the aggressive character of the Kremlin's global intentions.

Do not go to an unprepared, “quickie” summit meeting.
Accepting an invitation to an unprepared summit meeting is tantamount to accepting an invitation to a diplomatic disaster. Moscow thrives on these kinds of meetings because it can exploit the publicity for propaganda without making any substantive concessions. When announced, a quickie summit creates anticipation that breeds unrealistic hopes. When it inevitably fails, it creates unrealistic fears and disillusionment. While they might be a short-term political plus, shoot-from-the-hip summits result in our shooting ourselves in the foot and in damaging the prospects for better U.S.–Soviet relations in the long term.

We should have learned this lesson from our experiences with summits in the 1960s. After the Vienna summit in 1961, some of the President's most ardent media supporters reported that Khrushchev manhandled a woefully unprepared Kennedy, who was still reeling from his failures at the Bay of Pigs and in Berlin. The summit contributed to Khrushchev's inaccurate view that Kennedy was a weak President and thereby encouraged the Soviet leader to decide to press his near-fatal gamble to put missiles into
Cuba the following year. At the quickie summit in Glassboro in 1968, Johnson achieved nothing, except to help the world forget the recent brutal Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.