A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (67 page)

Perhaps the most significant of all demilitarisation measures was the insertion into the new constitution, drafted early in 1946 by SCAP staff, of Japan’s famous ‘no war’ clause. This was inserted by MacArthur personally, but was not necessarily initiated by him, for its exact source is still unclear.
¹⁷
In full, the article (Article IX) reads:
¹⁸

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.

The punishment of war criminals was also part of the general process of demilitarisation. At the T
ky
War Crimes Trial, held between May 1946 and November 1948 under the newly created Military Tribunal for the Far East (which involved all 11 victor nations), 25 men were tried for major (Class A) crimes such as having plotted and brought about the war. In what has sometimes been described as ‘victor’s justice’, all were found
guilty in varying degrees. Seven, including General T
j
and former prime minister Hirota (the only civilian), were sentenced to death and subsequently hanged.
¹⁹
A number of other trials were held elsewhere, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. In these local trials more than 5,000 Japanese were found guilty of more specific crimes (Classes B and C) such as gross cruelty towards prisoners of war, and some 900 were executed.

From the outset there was a widely held opinion, both in Japan and overseas, that the individuals on trial were to an extent scapegoats.
²⁰
Many who might be considered more culpable were never brought to trial. Among those who escaped trial were the staff of Unit 731, who had conducted numerous biological and chemical warfare experiments on civilians and prisoners of war. The whole business of 731 was hushed up by the Americans, who offered immunity in return for scientific data from the experiments that their own ethics and laws prevented.
²¹
So too, it has been argued, was the business of Operation Golden Lily, the code name for the squirrelling away of the vast loot acquired by the Japanese forces in Asia, seemingly with the complicity of members of the imperial family and allegedly also the American authorities.
²²

The most controversial omission to prosecute was in the case of Hirohito. This even puzzled most Japanese, however much they might have been relieved.
²³
There were certainly many in America, Australia, and the other Allied nations who strongly believed that Hirohito should stand trial, with the expectation he would be found guilty and hanged.
²⁴
The American government’s position on the emperor was basically one of proceeding with caution. There was no real wish to dismantle the imperial institution itself, for this had a useful role in keeping the nation together, in maintaining national morale, and also in legitimising Occupation policy.
²⁵
The Japan specialists in the State Department were not unaware of the deep-rooted importance to Japanese people of the exercise of power being legitimised by high authority and thus made acceptable. Without such legitimisation, anarchy might prevail, and expose the nation to communism. Moreover, with the emperor in place the organs of national administration would be more easily kept running. This was an important matter, for unlike the case with the occupation of the familiar old foe Germany – which was far less constructive and more destructive – there were few among the Occupation forces in Japan who had the knowledge or confidence to erect a replacement administrative machinery appropriate for these alien people. Japan specialists like Borton were very thin on the ground in Japan itself.

But as regards Hirohito personally, there was less sympathy in government circles. Many would have been happy to see Hirohito out of the way, either by trial and execution or by abdication, and replaced with a new emperor. That might even make things easier for a new beginning. After all, a new era traditionally went hand-in-hand with a new emperor. Even many Japanese were thinking Hirohito should at least abdicate.
²⁶
But Hirohito clung on. As justification – quite apart from the well-known argument that he had been unaware of atrocities and/or that he had not really participated in the war and was misled by his generals – he variously claimed that emperors (especially divine ones) cannot simply abandon that position, and/or that he had a duty to stay on in order to help rebuild Japan.
²⁷

Hirohito’s great saviour was MacArthur. They had met in private late in September and MacArthur had been greatly impressed by him. There seems to have been a strong personal affinity between them. In particular, they shared a hatred for communism. MacArthur felt that retaining Hirohito personally, not just the imperial institution, would be the most effective safeguard against anarchy and communism. In his memoirs he was to say that he felt Hirohito was not personally responsible for any wrongdoing.
²⁸
This was a generous interpretation of events, perhaps deliberately so.
²⁹
Nevertheless, in a powerful memorandum to the joint chiefs of staff in January 1946 MacArthur made a very strong plea for the retention of an innocent Hirohito, warning of dire consequences for the Occupation plans if this was not accepted.
³⁰
It was. Hirohito survived. Not only did he avoid trial and probable execution, thanks to MacArthur he even managed to avoid having to abdicate.
³¹

This may have been what MacArthur wanted, but it was to leave lingering distrust among many about an undesirable type of continuity with prewar Japan. This distrust was to remain to the present day, especially among Asian nations who suffered under Japanese rule, but also among progressive-minded Japanese.

Hirohito may have survived, but he could not escape a change of role and image. He had to become a symbol of the people, and win acceptance and respect from those people in the form of affection rather than mindless awe towards a deity incarnate. In line with Washington policy and MacArthur’s own views on the dangers of a god-emperor, Hirohito was to be made a mere mortal.
³²
This would greatly reduce the danger of a resurgence of the emperor-system indoctrination seen in the
Imperial Rescript on Education
and the
Kokutai no Hongi
. In that sense his change of status was a further measure against the possibility of any revival of
militarism. As a related measure, state Shint
would be dismantled. Shint
would be declared a religion, and religion would be legally separated from the state. It would no longer be a national duty for Japanese to revere their god-emperor.

The
Shint
Directive
that disestablished state Shint
was issued by SCAP staff in December 1945. The same month, SCAP staff also drafted the rescript popularly known as the
Declaration of Humanity
(
Ningen Sengen
), which Hirohito broadcast on 1 January 1946. The official line was that it came from Hirohito himself, but this is demonstrably questionable. In fact, when he saw the draft Hirohito was quite upset at having to renounce his divine descent, and subtly but significantly managed to change this to a renunciation rather of his status as a living god.
³³
Realising democracy was now being forced on the nation, he also ensured that the rescript started with a restatement of the
Charter Oath
of 1868, thereby stressing the continuity between monarchy and democracy since the Restoration. In any event, the final version of the
Declaration
broadcast in January included key phrases such as ‘the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world’.
³⁴
MacArthur and Washington were greatly pleased.