A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (105 page)

59
Nishi 82, p95.

60
Cohen 87, p261.

61
Yoshida 61, p75.

62
See Frost 83, p53.

63
See also Frost 83, p54.

64
See the video ‘Reinventing Japan’.

65
Cohen 87, pp299–300.

66
The remarkable General Charles Willoughby, the German-born aristocrat who now headed SCAP’s Intelligence Section, was one such highly placed critic. See Cohen 87, pp90–6.

67
See Gibney 92, p201.

68
See Cohen 87, Chs 21–5, for details on Draper, Kennan, and others, and their financial policies.

69
This is popularly termed the ‘reverse course’, but this is a misleading over-simplification. There were many continuities between pre-1947 and post-1947 Occupation policies. A ‘shift of course’ is more appropriate terminology.

70
See Frost 83, p53.

71
Following protest from a number of Asian nations Japan was in fact to pay very modest reparations to those nations in later years, principally in the form of capital goods produced in Japan from raw materials supplied by the nations themselves. In effect, however, Japan can be considered to have emerged with an extremely light burden of reparations – another source of lingering discontent towards Japan among Asian nations.

72
For details see Borton 55, pp365–6.

73
Cohen 87, p458.

74
See Dower 79, p316.

75
Nakamura 81, p42.

76
For details of MacArthur’s account of the Korean War and his view of Washington policy, see MacArthur 64, Ch. 9.

77
MacArthur 64, pp378–9.

78
They first met in May 1952, after the Occupation had formally ended. See Large 92, p157.

79
The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and India did not sign. A number of other nations only signed on condition that the United States also signed special security pacts with them, such as the ANZUS Pact (linking Australia, New Zealand, and the United States). Neither of the two Chinas was invited to the conference, for diplomatic reasons.

80
MacArthur simply states in his memoirs (MacArthur 64, p383) that ‘I was not invited to attend. Perhaps someone just forgot to remember.’

81
In particular, the late 1990s saw great tension between central and local government over the continued presence of American bases in Okinawa, the matter being partly fuelled by the 1995 rape of a young Okinawan girl by three US servicemen. In the end, the central government prevailed, and the bases remained.

82
See Weinstein 95, and Beason and Weinstein 96, for detailed illustration of the limits of MITI’s success. One well-known and less technical example is the failure of MITI to support Sony in its early days in the 1950s.

83
Figures for industrial structure here and immediately below are taken from
Japan 1995: An International Comparison
, p20.

84
Some refer to it as a ‘second miracle’, the first one being its economic growth during Meiji.

85
See Schoppa 91, Ch. 5, for detailed discussion of the process of recentralisation.

86
See Dower 79, p312.

87
See, for example, Ishihara 76, esp. p84, regarding the continuation of the war.

88
Considerable footage of this dispute is included in the video ‘Inside Japan Inc.’ in the
Pacific Century
series. For fuller treatment of unrest in the mining industry in general see Allen 94.

89
These included the erratic literary genius Mishima Yukio, who had prewar-style militaristic and ultranationalistic leanings and even had his own private army dedicated to the service of the emperor. Some years later, in 1970, amidst much publicity, he committed ‘warrior’s suicide’ by ritual disembowelment. This was seemingly out of disgust with what he saw as Japan’s present effeteness and lack of integrity towards its cultural heritage. The incident caused considerable embarrassment in Japan and concern overseas.

90
In December 1953. See Borton 55, p449.

91
Footage of the assassination is included in the video ‘Inside Japan Inc.’ in the
Pacific Century
series.

92
For further details of the
Zengakuren
and student unrest, see Steinhoff 84.

93
For detailed critical discussion of these and other
Nihonjinron
works, including some written by westerners, see Dale 86. See also Taylor 85, esp. Ch. 1.

Just as the
Nihonjinron
works of this time tried to analyse the reasons for Japan’s success, there had in fact been works written just after the war that tried to analyse the reasons for Japan’s defeat. These earlier, negative works are also termed
Nihonjinron
by some scholars, meaning that one has to be careful of the term. For a discussion of these other types of
Nihonjinron
, see Aoki 94.

94
Western academics were far more reserved about his book – though they obviously bought it too – for it contains a number of very questionable assertions. These include claims of student satisfaction, union happiness, and a wonderful welfare system. His work is often treated nowadays as a western example of
Nihonjinron
, with all the negative connotations that entails.

95
Among recognised works, those supportive of Japanese management practices include Pascale and Athos 82, and Morita 87. By contrast, Sethi et al. 84 is critical. Whitehill 91 tends towards the supportive but is generally balanced and a useful introduction to the subject.

96
Whitehill 91, pp236–7.

97
Though these were largely postwar practices, and were genuinely valued by the Japanese through their stress on security and familialism, there were nevertheless indications of early western influence. In the late Meiji period Japanese study missions overseas had identified as worthy of emulation the ‘cradle to grave’ family-style personnel policies of companies such as Krupp in Germany and National Cash Register in the United States. See Dore 84, esp. pp23–4.

98
He was forced to resign in December 1974 after a number of corrupt deals were disclosed in a popular journal. His name is invariably linked with the Lockheed Scandal, in which he received massive paybacks from Lockheed in return for using his position to place aircraft orders with the company. In
fact, though his dealings with Lockheed took place in 1972–73, they were not revealed till 1976, and were not the cause of his resignation. For details of these and other scandals involving Japanese politicians and bureaucrats, see Herzog 93, Ch. 7.

99
Nakamura 81, p230.

100
For details on pollution diseases, see Ueda 83 and Ui 92. For details of the litigation see Upham 87 and McKean 81. See also Barret and Therivel 91 for broader discussion of environmental attitudes.

101
Reischauer 88, p118.

102
See, for example, Wolf 83.

103
See Woronoff 90, p223, regarding the comparison with California, and Tada 96 regarding the planetary comparison.

104
When Sony bought up Columbia Studios its president, Morita Akio, was astonished at the intensity of anti-Japanese reaction. He made the very important point that it takes two to make a deal. It was not simply a case of Sony buying, but of Coca-Cola selling. He wondered why there was no criticism of the seller, only the buyer. The answer is obviously that people preferred to see it that way. This is emotion not reason. It also raises once again the unfortunate possibility of racist thinking. When it was discovered that Japan controlled 4 per cent of the American economy there was a similarly extreme reaction, yet Britain had controlled a similar percentage for some time, evoking no reaction.

105
The leading Japanese opponent of official falsification of Japanese history, and of textbook interference in general, was the historian Ienaga Sabur
(1913–2002). Ienaga fought a well-known campaign since the 1960s, and did achieve some success. His greatest success was perhaps the publicity he generated. For a useful account of his battles, see for example NLSTSS 95.

106
On the effects of this speech see, for example, Russell 91, p416. Russell gives a useful account of general Japanese attitudes towards blacks.

107
See the report in the
Far Eastern Economic Review
, 18 September 1986, pp14–15.

108
The book ‘
No’ to Ieru Nihon
was written jointly with Sony’s president Morita Akio, who – fearing his interests in America might be jeopardised – insisted his name be dropped from the authorised English translation that appeared in 1991. Morita’s belief that westerners would not pay real attention to anything written in Japanese was similar to Nakasone’s assumption in 1986 that westerners would not pick up his Japanese comments about blacks and Hispanics. They both illustrate a widespread Japanese belief that Japan is somehow set apart from the rest of the world, and is a sort of hallowed ground for Japanese only.

109
Ishihara 89/91, p28.

110
Ishihara 89/91, p61.

111
See Wilkinson 81, p221.

112
Figures available in
Asahi Shimbun Japan Almanac
, annually.

113
Woronoff 85, p250.

114
Hidaka 80/84, esp. p9.

Part Seven: A Superpower Adrift

1
The official translation is ‘Peace and Harmony’. This is not exactly incorrect, but seems to prioritise euphony over precise accuracy.

2
Wood 93, p11.

3
See
http://japantimes.co.jp/weekly/news/nn2003/nn20030802a3.htm
, and also the
Asahi Shimbun Japan Almanac
2004, p35.

4
See
http://japantimes.co.jp/weekly/news/nn2003/nn20031206a3.htm
, and also the
Asahi Shimbun Japan Almanac
2004, pp208–13.

5
Figures from
Statistical Handbook of Japan
2009.

6
See the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 13–19 June 1994.

7
For example, in a period of less than two years the formerly little-known T
ky
Managers’ Union experienced a 20-fold increase in its membership. See the video
Goodbye Japan Corporation
. In general, ‘unions’ in Japan – certainly among the bigger organisations – have been organised ‘in house’ rather than being trade unions.