A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (66 page)

Table 5.2
   Key values and practices from end Meiji to end War

P
ART
S
IX

A P
HOENIX FROM THE
A
SHES:
P
OSTWAR
S
UCCESSES AND
B
EYOND

6.1 American Dreams for a New Japan

Allied troops began to arrive in Japan in late August 1945, and the Occupation officially started upon the formal surrender on 2 September. The Japanese had feared brutal Allied reprisals, but were greatly reassured by the surrender-acceptance speech from the man who was to head the Occupation, US General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur stressed the importance of putting aside hatred and of looking to a future of peace. He also expressed his confidence in the Japanese people to rebuild their nation and regain their dignity.
¹

His men did not let him down. There were inevitably a number of cases of brutal treatment,
²
but in general the Occupation troops showed kindness towards their former foe. The Japanese, for their part, were extremely cooperative. As a result, the scale of the Occupation forces could soon be reduced from 500,000 to just 150,000.

Obviously, in addition to the immediate and serious practical concerns of food and shelter,
³
the people of Japan were in a state of confusion and anxiety. Their indoctrinated faith in Japan’s divine superiority and invincibility was now seriously undermined. So too was their faith in their political and especially their military leaders. Many Japanese felt anger, disillusionment, and a sense of betrayal towards those leaders. Some even had negative thoughts about Hirohito, though not so much towards the imperial institution itself.

MacArthur reassured the Japanese not only by his speech, but also by his manner. Now in his mid-sixties, he had been a general since the age of 38 – at the time the youngest ever in the history of the United States.
He was a man born to lead, a man dignified and self-assured, firm but benevolent, and possessed of an almost messianic conviction of his own God-given destiny to shape history.
⁴
He was in some ways reminiscent of the Meiji oligarchs in his mix of democracy and authoritarianism, and certainly in his conviction that he knew best what was good for the people he ruled. To a nation accustomed to being led, he was a welcome new leader. He was hailed by the Japanese as a new sh
gun, Japan’s American emperor, even a god.
⁵
His own men used to say tongue-in-cheek that if you got up early enough in the morning you could see him walking on the waters of the Imperial Castle moat, just a short distance from his headquarters.
⁶

In theory the Occupation was an Allied exercise and not merely an American affair, let alone a one-man show. MacArthur’s formal title was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Of those Powers, China and the Soviet Union sent no troops to Japan, but British Commonwealth troops did play a definite if limited part in the Occupation, mostly confined to a zone in western Honsh
.
⁷
The four major Allied powers – the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China – established an Allied Council late in December 1945 in T
ky
, where they held fortnightly meetings. There was also a Far Eastern Commission of all 11 victor nations, which met in Washington from February 1946 to determine general Occupation policy that was then to be relayed through the Allied Council.

In practice, however, the Occupation was indeed almost entirely an American affair, and MacArthur was very much master of ceremonies. He dismissed the Allied Council as a ‘nuisance’ and the Far Eastern Commission as ‘little more than a debating society’.
⁸
He wanted to get on with his job, and the plans he and Washington had in mind had anyway mostly been set in motion already.

Both Washington and MacArthur had plans not only for the functional dismantling of a militaristic and totalitarian Japan, but grander visions of the construction of a Utopian new nation. Washington had started its planning as early as mid-1942, with considerable input from New Dealers.
⁹
MacArthur’s plans seem to have come later, but fortunately were quite similar to those of his government.

Washington’s policies were often drawn up by ‘faceless’ figures in the State Department such as Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee. Borton in particular, a self-effacing man recognised for his knowledge of Japan but under-recognised for his role in rebuilding the nation, seems to have had a hand in most things relating to Occupation policies.
¹⁰
These policies
were for the most part relayed in a directive issued to MacArthur in October 1945. This was the
Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan
, more conveniently known as JCS1380/15 ( JCS standing for Joint Chiefs of Staff).
¹¹

The directive outlined an idealised American-style democracy for Japan. The emperor, if retained, was to have a purely symbolic role as figure-head of the nation. There were to be guarantees of civil rights and personal freedoms, if necessary enforced by a new constitution. All adults, including women, were to have the right to vote. The military and the old-style police were to be abolished, and the
zaibatsu
were to be dismantled. All in the military, government, and business who had contributed to the war effort were to be purged from any responsible office. Labour unions were to be encouraged, and the rights of unionists protected.

MacArthur’s largely similar ideas were expressed in more grandiloquent style. In his memoirs, he likened his position to that of Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Napoleon, and wrote:
¹²

I had to be an economist, a political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts. I had to rebuild a nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war. … Japan had become the world’s great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule and for the liberalization of government from within. It was clear that the experiment must go far beyond the primary purpose of the Allies – the destruction of Japan’s ability to wage another war and the punishment of war criminals. …

I felt the reforms I contemplated were those which would bring Japan abreast of modern progressive thought and action. First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernise the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release the political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. Decentralize the political power. Separate church from state. …

To restore Japanese dignity and morale, he would encourage them not to abandon everything Japanese, but ‘to seek a healthy blend between the best of theirs and the best of ours’.
¹³

The fact that in most cases MacArthur was basically following orders does not deny his extraordinarily powerful role. JCS1830/15 itself, while giving him broad orders, somewhat paradoxically also confirmed his personal power. It stated clearly to him that ‘in addition to the conventional powers of a military occupant of enemy territory, you have the power to take any steps deemed advisable and proper by you to effectuate … the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration’.
¹⁴
On occasion he was to use that personal power.

Demilitarisation was the first step in the ambitious ‘joint’ MacArthur-Washington programme for building a new Japan. To this end, the army and navy were demobilised within a few months. Japan was stripped of the territory it had gained by military means, effectively returning it to the situation before the start of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95. Steps were taken to start repatriation of the three million Japanese troops and the similar number of Japanese civilians scattered around Asia. Orders were issued for Japan to pay reparations to victim nations. A number of Japan’s ships were given to the Allies, while other war equipment and weapons were destroyed – including, as a priority task and against MacArthur’s own wishes, its nuclear particle accelerators.
¹⁵
Between 1946 and 1948 some 700,000 individuals were screened and some 200,000 who were felt to have been, in the words of JCS1380/15, ‘active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression’, were ‘purged’ from office. This too, at least in terms of scale, was seemingly against MacArthur’s own personal judgement.
¹⁶