A Just Cause (22 page)

Ellis then returned to the FBI recordings that were submitted in the supplementing affidavit. Referring to the section of the affidavit titled “Evidence Concerning Efforts to Obtain Campaign Contributions in Exchange for Official Acts,” Ellis reminded the senate that the about-to-be-revealed accusations were incidents that took place after October 2008 and had been captured on the recordings. Someone identified in the affidavit only as Individual A had informed the FBI that the governor was seeking $2.5 million in campaign contributions before the new campaign contribution restrictions became law at the end of the year. Individual A also told of a list of contributors kept by the Friends of Blagojevich and how the governor had conspired to raise the $2.5 million from those on the list. The FBI had obtained the list, and Ellis pointed out that “numerous of the individuals and entities on that list have state contracts or have received public benefits conferred by Rod Blagojevich”—adding, to remind the senate of what everyone already knew—“such as appointments to positions in state government” (254).

According to the informant, on October 6 Rod Blagojevich had told Individual A that he was going to make an announcement of a $1.8 billion allocation for tollway improvements and that he was going to have Lobbyist 1 contact an individual identified in the affidavit as Highway Contractor 1 to ask for $500,000 in contributions. The use of code names to identify individuals in the affidavit was a legal necessity but also added intrigue to the senate presentation. Blagojevich was blunt and straightforward, noting, “I could have made a larger announcement but wanted to see how they performed by the end of the year. If they don't perform, blank them” (254–55). On October 15, 2008, Blagojevich announced a plan to have new express lanes built on the Illinois Tollway for a cost of $1.8 billion (256).

Ellis told of an intercepted meeting held at the offices of Friends of Blagojevich, where Rod Blagojevich met with an individual identified in the affidavit as Fundraiser A. Later, in the governor's subsequent criminal
trial, Fundraiser A was identified as the governor's brother, Robert. Also attending the meeting were two lobbyists actively involved in fund-raising, whom Ellis did not identify. Injecting a bit of theater, Ellis told the senate, “The voices on the recording are very low and at times are difficult to hear” (257). He specifically spoke of a call made by the governor to an individual identified in the affidavit as Highway Contractor 1. The contractor, later identified during the criminal trial as Gerald Krozel, was an officer in a company that supplied large amounts of concrete to the state of Illinois and was active in the American Concrete Paving Association.
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During the call, Blagojevich told Krozel he was excited about the “tollway” and then asked the contractor to become involved in fund-raising. He went on to explain that the rules of fund-raising would change with the start of the New Year and, attempting to keep Krozel engaged, ended the conversation by saying, “Call me if you need anything” (258).
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Ellis had begun the litany of charges with the selling of Barack Obama's senate seat. Now, coming to the end of the criminal allegations, he presented another emotionally charged accusation: that the governor had threatened to withhold $8 million from Children's Memorial Hospital unless he received a $50,000 contribution. This had incensed the members of the house investigative committee. Ellis reiterated what he had told the house committee, but for the senate he embellished the story. The governor had first approached Children's Memorial through his brother, Robert. But things did not go well. The hospital's chief executive officer, Robert told the governor, was balking and supposedly not returning calls. “I've left three messages there so I'm going to quit calling. I feel stupid now,” Robert told the governor. Blagojevich asked his brother when he had last spoken with the hospital executive, and Robert replied that it had been “two days ago.” The governor responded, “If they don't get back to you, then, then last resort is I'll call” (260–61). Through the taped conversations, it was clear that Blagojevich was contemplating withholding the allocated $8 million unless he received $50,000.

In a later phone conversation, the governor asked Deputy Governor Robert Greenlee, identified in the affidavit as Deputy Governor A, “The pediatric doctors, the reimbursement, has that gone out yet, or is that still on hold?” Greenlee replied, “The rate increase?” and added, “It's January 1.” “And we have total discretion over it?” Blagojevich asked. Greenlee confirmed that the governor had complete discretion. Blagojevich posed a hypothetical question: “We could pull it back if we need to, budgetary
concerns, right?” Greenlee replied, “We sure could, yeah,” to which the governor responded, “Okay. That's good to know” (261–62).

By mid-November, as the January deadline to raise unlimited campaign funds loomed on the horizon, the Blagojevich fund-raising team shifted into high gear. Robert Blagojevich was instructed to contact Lon Monk, the governor's former chief of staff and now a well-connected lobbyist, to discuss what they could do about the hospital executive who was not returning phone calls. A frustrated Blagojevich asked, “What do we do with this guy?” (262–63).

Blagojevich was aware that trouble was stirring. In a conversation related to the highway contractor from whom they were attempting to get $500,000, Blagojevich told Robert, who was going to talk to an individual identified as Lobbyist 2, about the contractor's reluctance to raise the money. “Now, be real careful there,” the governor said. “I mean, the FBI went to see Lobbyist 2. You understand?” (263). The FBI investigations prompted some caution, but they seemed not to faze Rod Blagojevich or alter his efforts to raise money. In 2006 he had been questioned by the FBI in connection with Operation Board Games. The federal authorities asked to meet with him again in late October 2008, but his lawyer, Sheldon Sorosky, informed the FBI that the governor would invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
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Blagojevich knew that the government was circling and carrying on an active investigation, but it seemed to embolden him, and he took the investigations as a personal challenge. In 2006, just before his election, with Rezko indicted and Stuart Levine pleading guilty, he thought he was above it all. He appeared at a Thirty-Sixth Ward rally in Chicago and “howled, they got nothing, nothing.”
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The prosecutor again asked Special Agent Cain if everything just stated from the criminal complaint was true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. He answered yes. Ellis then asked if the governor's voice had been identified, using the identification procedures outlined in previous questioning. Again Cain answered yes. The prosecutor was attempting to establish certainty, to leave no doubt that the governor had said the things just related. But these questions to Cain were merely procedural. For the sitting senators, there was no doubt that the governor had said those things.

Quoting from the affidavit accompanying the criminal complaint, Ellis displayed a train of criminal allegations that stretched back to Rod Blagojevich's first year in office and continued until his arrest. The governor had turned the state government over to criminal advisors, and from the
affidavit, the prosecutor recounted incident after incident of extortion, including the emotionally charged efforts to barter the senate seat and withhold allocated funds from Children's Memorial Hospital.

The prosecution announced that one more topic would be addressed: the horse-racing bill. Ellis set the stage, telling the senate what they were about to hear, using a tape of the governor discussing his plot to extort money from an executive at Balmoral Park, a horse-racing track in south suburban Chicago. On November 13, 2008, when the first conversation was intercepted, HB 4758, the bill that would direct a percentage of casino revenue to the horse-racing industry, was still being debated and still being advocated by its supporters in Springfield. The governor wanted the horse-racing industry to make a contribution if the bill passed and he signed it before the end of the year. Ellis summarized a series of phone conversations between the governor, his brother, and Lon Monk regarding the squeeze play with John Johnston, an executive at Balmoral Park identified in the affidavit as Contributor 1 (266).

Ellis now informed Chief Justice Fitzgerald that it was his intent to play the tape recordings, and Fitzgerald told him to proceed as he wished. The first recording was a phone conversation between parties whom Ellis identified as the governor and his brother, Robert, obtained by using a wiretap on the governor's home phone. The senate chamber was silent, mesmerized by hearing portions of the evidence spoken by actual voices for the first time. Everyone seemed to assume the temporary persona of an eavesdropper, listening to a private conversation between the governor and his brother. The fascination with the circumstance seemed to overcome any moral reluctance.

The conversation opened with the two brothers exchanging the greeting “Hey.” Then the governor got right to the point and asked, “How we doing?” Robert said they were good and that Lon had talked to John Johnston and that Johnston was “good for it.” But then he added a caveat. The contribution was forthcoming but, “ya know, he didn't get it. But he said, ya know, I'm good for it.” Robert explained that Johnston had told Lon Monk he just had to decide what accounts to use. “Lon's going to talk to you about some sensitivities legislatively tonight when he sees you,” he told the governor, “with regard to the timing of all this.” The governor was concerned: “Right—before the end of the year though, right?” Robert reassured the governor and told him that Lon Monk would give him the details that evening, “when he sees you.” The governor asked if Monk would meet him
that night, and Robert informed the governor that Monk would join him at a basketball game at the United Center. Attempting to rationalize the delay in receiving the contribution, the governor mentioned that Monk and Johnston were in Springfield, “pushing the bill.” The governor stated, “Yeah, they're pushing a bill. So that's probably what he wants to wait on” (270–71). The exchange made clear that the governor was obsessed with getting the contribution before the end of the year, before the campaign restrictions became law.

Ellis moved on to the second tape, a conversation between Lon Monk and John Johnston recorded from Monk's cell phone. Monk called Johnston, and after the two exchanged greetings, Johnston informed Monk that he had previously called and was just “checking in.” Monk asked Johnston, “Where are you right now?” Johnston said he was at the track, and Monk asked if he could come and see him. Johnston said yes, and Monk told Johnston that he would be there in about forty-five minutes. Attempting to describe evolving events, the prosecutor told the senate that the call took place at 2:21
P
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. on December 3, 2008 (271–72).

He then went on to the third tape recording, a call from Monk's cell phone to Rod Blagojevich at his campaign office, recorded at 4:11
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. the same day. Monk told the governor that he had asked Johnston, “What about your commitment?” Johnston answered that he would be leaving town in two weeks and would be gone for two weeks. “I know that I have to have this in your hand by the end of those two weeks,” Johnston told him. Monk, expressing some concern about Johnston's delay, told the governor that he said to Johnston, “Look, there's [concern] that there's gonna be some skittishness if your bill gets signed because of the timeliness of the commitment.” Johnston responded, “Absolutely not,” and then hedging a bit, asked, “Do you want me to put some into the next quarter?” Monk reported to the governor that he told Johnston, “This has all gotta be in now.” Paraphrasing Johnston, Monk told the governor that he said, “I hope I'm gonna have it next week, but you have my commitment. I've always been there. I'm gonna be there. I've gotta have it in the next two weeks cause I'm going out of town.” At the end of the recorded conversation, the governor said to Monk, “Good job” (272–74).

The senate audience remained fiercely attentive. They were familiar with the governor and with his voice. The impact of hearing the governor seemingly totally obsessed with contributions, scheming to obtain money before the end of the year, resounded and challenged the moral sensibilities
of even the most jaded among them. The tape recordings accomplished what Ellis had hoped: they provided evidence that went beyond an abstract allegation to the actual enactment of wrongdoing.

The final intercepted conversation to which Ellis had been given access was another conversation between Monk and Blagojevich recorded from Monk's cell phone. The next day, December 4, they spoke again of obtaining a contribution from John Johnston. Monk, the lobbyist for Balmoral Park, thought a call from the governor might serve to motivate Johnston to make the contribution. Blagojevich opened the dialogue with his familiar, “Hey, Lon.” Monk hesitated but finally got to the point: “So one thing I was thinking about last night is that, um, you ought to give, not today, but maybe tomorrow, just give John Johnston a call and say, you know, calling just to say hello, um, you know, I'm working on the timing of this thing, but it's gonna get done.” Blagojevich responded, “Okay,” then asked, “Call him tomorrow?” Monk replied, “It's a two-minute conversation.” Blagojevich said, “Yeah, happy to do it. Call him tomorrow, right?” The governor then questioned the strategy; “Okay. Call Johnny Johnston, or should I call—have Harris call him?” Monk hesitated and Blagojevich continued, “I mean, you want me to call him directly, I will, whatever's the best thing. I'm just a little bit—.” Monk quickly said, “I think it's better if you do it. . . . It's better if you do it just from a pressure point of view.” Blagojevich relented and told Monk he would call and use as a ruse that he wanted to do a bill signing downstate and they could get together and start picking some dates. Monk asked the governor what the chances were of signing the bill the next week, and Blagojevich responded, “You know, they're good.” Monk reinforced that the contribution was coming: “He's—I'm telling you he's gonna be good for it. I got in his face.” Balmoral Park was Monk's client, but his allegiance was to Blagojevich (274–76).
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