An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (137 page)

p. 537: “but there is no evidence”:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1002-10, especially 1004 and 1007.

p. 537: “We have no”:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
12.

pp. 537-38: “for the sake of” and “Nothing will be”: Fursenko and Naftali, 194-97.

p. 538: “Now, as to Cuba”:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1047-48.

pp. 538-39: Pressures on JFK:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
923-24, 947-58, 968, 1033-34; Fursenko and Naftali, 198-206; and three Sept. 4, 1962, conversations about Cuba in Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 19-80.

p. 539: Preparation of the statement: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 33-51.

p. 539: “The major danger”: Ibid., p. 42.

p. 539: The statement:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1038.

pp. 539-40: “What is our policy?”: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 61-62, 71.

p. 540: Robert Frost:
New York Times,
Sept. 10, 1962.

p. 540: JFK’s reaction: Stewart Udall OH.

p. 540: Democratic senators: Mike Mansfield to JFK, Sept. 12, 1962, Box 31, POF.

pp. 540-41: JFK news conference, Sept. 13, 1962:
PPP: JFK, 1962,
674-75.

p. 541: CIA assessment: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Sept. 19, 1962, in
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1070-80.

p. 541: NSK to JFK, Sept. 28, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
152-61.

p. 541: Senate resolution:
New York Times,
Sept. 21, 1962.

p. 541: Schlesinger urged: Schlesinger Memo, Sept. 24, 1962, in
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1084-86.

p. 541: “The question is”: William Jordan to W. W. Rostow, Oct. 10, 1962, Box 415, NSF.

p. 542: Kennedy further instructed and Khrushchev canceled:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1081;
FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis,
6-7, 10-13; Fursenko and Naftali, 206-17; Richard Reeves, 366-67.

pp. 542-43: “a first-hand sighting”:
FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62,
1083-84.

p. 543: U-2 flights: Ibid., 1054; Fursenko and Naftali, 212.

p. 543: Bundy and McCone:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
14.

p. 543: Bolshakov carried: Fursenko and Naftali, 219.

p. 543: JFK Oct. 9 decision and weather conditions:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
17; Fursenko and Naftali, 220-21.

p. 543: Dobrynin-Bowles conversation:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
26-29.

p. 544: Leak to Reston:
New York Times,
Oct. 12, 1962; Richard Reeves, 367.

p. 544: Results of the U-2 mission and Bundy’s decision to wait until morning:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
29-30.

p. 544: The 8:45
A.M.
meeting and JFK’s response: Richard Reeves, 368.

pp. 545-47: The 11:45 Ex Comm meeting: For participants and seating: May and Zelikow, 39-43; Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 397. The initial discussion: Naftali and Zelikow, 397-403.

p. 547: Oct. 16, morning discussion: Ibid., 404-27.

pp. 547-48: Ad lib remarks: O’Donnell and Powers, 315-16.

p. 548: Evening meeting: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 427-68.

p. 549: RFK and JFK on Pearl Harbor: Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy,
507; Brinkley, 154-74; Chace, 398-99.

p. 550: For an overview of activities on Oct. 17, see May and Zelikow, 118-21.

pp. 550-51: Summaries of the meetings, including McCone’s with JFK, AES to JFK, and RFK’s memo:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
94-106.

pp. 551-53: Thursday, Oct. 18, meeting: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 516-72.

p. 553: JFK-Gromyko conversation:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
110-14.

p. 553: JFK-Lovett conversation: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 573-74.

p. 553: Gromyko’s reaction: Fursenko and Naftali, 231-32.

p. 553: Lovett’s advice and RFK’s agreement: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 573-74.

pp. 553-54: Late-night meeting: Ibid., 576-77. The JFK quote is on 512.

p. 554: Considered canceling the trip: O’Donnell and Powers, 315; and
PPP: JFK, 1962,
797-805.

pp. 554-55: Meeting with Joint Chiefs: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 578-98.

p. 555: “Can you imagine”: O’Donnell and Powers, 318.

p. 555: After JFK left the room: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 597-98.

p. 555: JFK told Bundy:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
117.

p. 555: Told RFK and Sorensen: Sorensen, 780.

p. 556: Afternoon meeting:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
116-22.

p. 556: RFK urged JFK: Brugioni, 303-4.

p. 556: Oct. 20 meeting:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
126-36. Also see JFK conversation with Omsby-Gore, Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 5.

p. 556: “that we would accept nothing: Ibid., 148.

p. 556: JFK asked the
Times:
JFK to Orvil Dryfoos, Oct. 25, 1962, Box 29, POF; Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 4.

p. 557: JFK told Taylor: Naftali and Zelikow,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. II, 614.

p. 557: For calls to the former presidents:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
153.

p. 557: For the National Security Council meeting: Ibid., 152-56, and Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 42-57.

p. 557: Meeting with congressional leaders: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 60-90.

p. 557: Joked with Humphrey: Richard Reeves, 393.

pp. 557-58: JFK comment to Donald: Donald, 13.

p. 558: DDE to JFK: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 12.

p. 558: “the most difficult meeting”: Robert Kennedy, 53, 55.

p. 558: JFK to NSK, Oct. 22, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
165-66.

pp. 558-59: JFK speech:
PPP: JFK, 1962,
806-9.

p. 559: “We have won”: Quoted in Richard Reeves, 397. NSAM No. 196, in
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
157.

p. 559: Ex Comm meeting, 10
A.M.
, Oct. 23: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 102-140.

p. 560: NSK to JFK, Oct. 23, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
166-67.

p. 560: JFK and Clay: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 146-47.

p. 560: Enforce the blockade: Ibid., 148-49.

p. 560: Evening Ex Comm meeting: Ibid., 150-73.

p. 560: JFK to NSK, Oct. 23, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
168. Soviet shipment of warheads by plane also worried JFK. Because Moscow would need landing rights in West Africa for this shipment, JFK won agreement from the presidents of Guinea and Senegal not to allow it. See Philip Kaiser, 197-99.

p. 560: JFK and RFK: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 177.

pp. 560-61: RFK initiative and meeting with Dobrynin: Fursenko and Naftali, 251-53;
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
175-77; Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 178-82.

p. 561: Ex Comm meeting, Oct. 24, 10
A.M.
: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 183-205.

p. 561: The MRBMs and Soviet knowledge of SAC’s nuclear alert: Fursenko and Naftali, 256, 258.

p. 561: “This was the moment”: Quoted in Schlesinger,
Robert Kennedy,
514.

pp. 561-62: State Dept. report, report to McCone, and JFK worried: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 188, 191-92, 196-98.

p. 562: “We’re eyeball”: Rusk, 237.

pp. 562-63: McNamara and Anderson: Roswell L. Gilpatric OH; Shapley, 176-77; Brugioni, 415-17.

p. 563: Afternoon meetings, Oct. 24, 1962: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 206-26.

p. 563: JFK told Macmillan, Ibid., 226-28.

p. 563: NSK to JFK, Oct. 24, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
169-70.

pp. 563-64: Knox-Khrushchev meeting: William E. Knox OH.

p. 564: JFK to NSK, Oct. 25, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
171. “He could not go to war”: Fursenko and Naftali, 259-62.

p. 564: NSK’s proposal: Fursenko and Naftali, 259.

p. 564: JFK’s temporizing: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 232-69.

p. 564: “a sense of euphoria”: Ibid., 253.

p. 564: U Thant, JFK, and Macmillan: Ibid., 261-62, 280. Also,
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
183, 191-97, 199, 203-4, 210-12.

pp. 564-65: AES and Zorin:
New York Times,
Oct. 26, 1962.

p. 565: “I never knew”: O’Donnell and Powers, 334.

p. 565: Lebanese ship boarding: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 284.

p. 565: For quotes from the Oct. 26 meetings: Ibid., 287-88, 293, 295, 302, 309-10, 312, 328, 345.

pp. 565-66: NSK’s letter: Llewellyn Thompson OH.
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
172-77.

p. 566: Scali-Fomin meeting: Fursenko and Naftali, 263-65. Fursenko and Naftali believe that Fomin took this initiative on his own. But it so closely reflected two of NSK’s proposals as to make it doubtful that Fomin acted without instructions. Indeed, would any KGB operative have taken the initiative on so large a matter?

p. 566: Ex Comm meeting, Oct. 27, 10
A.M.
: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 356-57, 380, 382.

pp. 566-67: NSK’s revised Oct. 26 letter:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
178-81.

p. 567: Response to the revised proposal: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 363-64, 366, 377, 385-86.

pp. 567-68: The afternoon-evening Oct. 27 Ex Comm meeting: Ibid., 387-482. The JFK quotes are on 398-400, 417, 419, 421.

p. 568: JFK to NSK, Oct. 27, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
181-82.

pp. 568-69: RFK’s record of conversation with Dobrynin:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
270-71.

p. 569: The meeting on the Turkish pledge: Bundy, 432-33.

p. 569: JFK instruction to Rusk: Blight and Welch, 83-84.

p. 569: “the most depressing”: O’Donnell and Powers, 341.

pp. 569-70: State Dept. cable:
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
276-77.

p. 570: RFK and McNamara: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 509.

p. 570: The presidium meeting: Fursenko and Naftali, 283-87.

p. 570: NSK’s replies to JFK, Oct. 28, 1962:
FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev,
183-87, 189-90.

p. 570: On LeMay: Fursenko and Naftali, 287. JCS to JFK, Oct. 28, 1962, in Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 517.

pp. 570-71: Meeting with the Chiefs: Beschloss,
Crisis Years,
544.

p. 571: JFK’s view of the agreement and future difficulties: Zelikow and May,
Presidential Recordings,
vol. III, 517-23.

p. 571: JFK could not assume:
PPP: JFK, 1962,
814. The CIA saw little danger that the Soviets would delay dismantling the missiles: “Implementation of Khrushchev’s Message of Oct. 28,” CIA, Memo, Oct. 29, 1962, Box 415, NSF.

p. 571: “We’ve given K.”: Komer to McGeorge Bundy, Oct. 29, 1962, Box 322, NSF.

p. 571: “We must operate”: JFK to Robert McNamara, Nov. 5, 1962, Box 274, NSF.

p. 571: “I am sure”: JFK to McCone, Dec. 15, 1962, Box 68, POF.

p. 572: On the negotiations: May and Zelikow, 663-65.

p. 572: The news conference:
PPP: JFK, 1962,
830-31.

p. 572: “Considering the size”: JFK to McNamara, Nov. 5, 1962, Box 274, NSF.

p. 572: “An invasion would have been”: Schlesinger,
A Thousand Days,
831.

p. 572: Continued covert opposition to Castro: May and Zelikow, 665;
FRUS: Missile Crisis,
586-90, 668-87. JFK, Background Briefing for the Press, Dec. 31, 1962, Box 415, NSF. JFK continued to worry about Cuban subversion in the hemisphere; see JFK to John McCone, Feb. 9, 1963, Box 68, POF.

pp. 572-73: JFK’s performance: Bird, 242-46.

p. 573: “unimaginative and sterile”: Arthur Schlesinger to JFK, Nov. 17, 1962, Box 5, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Papers, JFKL.

p. 573: “a different president”: Barton J. Bernstein, “Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiter Missiles in Turkey,” in Nathan, 106-7. Cf. Beschloss,
Crisis Years,
564.