Ancient Chinese Warfare (33 page)

The Ch’a-fang, Hsiang-fang, and Sui-fang are similarly noted as having acted in concert, and the Ch’a also joined with the Man in making
incursions.
³¹
(The Man had previously appeared in Wu Ting’s period down in the south, especially around the area that would become Ch’u, but they also populated more northern areas. Just like “Ch’iang,” the term came to encompass numerous peoples.)
³²
Suppressive efforts mounted by augmented border defense units (
shu
) succeeded in neutralizing the threat from the Ch’a, who temporarily disappeared only to be counted among the
ssu pang
(along with the Sui) in the fifth period.

Little is known about Hsiang-fang (or Hsing-fang) activity in this period, but they are recorded as being jointly targeted with the Li
³³
and were apparently vanquished since the Shang eventually opened fields in their territory.
³⁴
However, without doubt Wu Yi’s most important military effort was directed against the Li, a formidable enemy reputedly located in the Hu-kuan (Hu Pass) area of Shanxi that occasioned much Shang consternation, compelling the king to take the field.
³⁵
He not only exercised sole command
³⁶
but also directed Shang measures in conjunction with well-known commanders such as Chih Kuo
³⁷
and Ch’in.
³⁸

A number of inscriptions inquire about pummeling the Li,
³⁹
having the king’s clan forces and the three clans pursue them,
⁴⁰
seize them,
⁴¹
clear them out,
⁴²
and even “kill” or “slay” them, a very uncommon term,
⁴³
all of which indicate they must have been convincingly defeated. Based on an entry in the
Bamboo Annals
that indicates severe clashes between the Li and the Chou while the latter served as the so-called Hsi Po or Western Duke, at least one analyst not unreasonably believes that the conflict’s intensity reflects a battle to control the intervening area.
⁴⁴

Few enemies or concerted martial efforts have yet been assigned to Wen Ting’s brief era apart from routine repressive activities mounted against the Ch’iang.
⁴⁵
The last two reigns of Emperor Yi (1101-1076 BCE) and the notorious Hsin (1075-1046) in the fifth period were each marked by lengthy campaigns intended to eliminate Eastern Yi threats.
⁴⁶
Some one hundred inscriptions dating to Yi’s era allow reconstruction of a punitive expedition personally commanded by the emperor against various members of the Yi, including the Jen-fang, in the east and southeast just across the Huai River.
⁴⁷
The forty-one queries that can be attributed to the outward journey and thirty-seven to the return encompass twenty-five 10-day periods, commencing with the ninth month of his tenth year and extending into the fifth month of the eleventh year, or slightly more than eight months, variously calculated as 250 or 260 days, the former
expended in actual campaigning plus an additional 10 days for final sacrifices and presumably ceremonial demobilization.

After an initial detour northwest to conduct preliminary sacrifices and announce the campaign to the ancestors, the army was marshaled and ordered in the traditional hunting area of Ch’in-yang slightly southeast of Anyang. Rather than cutting overland and thereby being compelled to contend with numerous mountains and bodies of water, they marched along relatively flat riverside terrain after emanating from Ta-yi Shang.
⁴⁸
Proceeding past Wei,the army reached You, a clan state whose forces under the Earl of Hsi joined them and (in one possible sequence) then subjugated important Yi forces (discussed below). Continuing their progress, the conjoined forces turned down and crossed the Huai River to engage their final enemy, the Lin-fang. From inception to final victory consumed 106 days, but the army moved in spurts interrupted by encampments of a day or more for rest, training, hunting, and ritual sacrifice. Furthermore, the inscriptions specify that they were marching, implying only a very small chariot component was present for command and control purposes, not unexpected because chariots were ill suited for operations in the comparatively moist Huai river valley.

In contrast to the lengthy period required to reach their objective, time on target was apparently minimal, because they are known to have been at Ling-fang on
keng-yin
and returned on
kuei-mao
, the twenty-seventh and fortieth days of the sixty-day cycle, respectively. The slightly less than two weeks available at the southernmost point implies that the conflict consisted of a single clash or at most a short sequence of brief but decisive battles. After being joined by the Earl of Hsi, Shang forces scored a preliminary victory over the Lin-fang, another member of the Eastern Yi, and then vanquished the Jen, who must have been startled at being attacked by a Shang army so far afield.

Unfortunately, the inscriptions are silent on the nature of the actual encounters, only a couple of fragments suggesting that Shang forces managed to capture a local chief and burn an enemy encampment, certainly the first recorded use of incendiary measures. However, additional inscriptions indicate that the Huai River clashes had been preceded by what might be termed a “clearing-out” operation around the Wei and Hua rivers in Shandong that focused on the area around Lin-tzu
and targeted the enemy’s city of Ch’iu (or Chü) for attack. The assault had to employ a variety of forces, including left, right, and center border protective units (
shu
), masses (
chung
) from the left and right
lü
, and the king’s own clan troops, to severely pummel and suppress the enemy.
⁴⁹

The return march paralleled the outward journey but initially progressed several kilometers south of the original route, often on the opposite side of local rivers, presumably to facilitate foraging and resolve other logistical problems, before revisiting most of the major fortified towns initially traversed. Despite making frequent, often lengthy stops to feast, hunt, sacrifice, and no doubt manifest the monarch’s enhanced awesomeness, only ninety-nine days were required. Based on a limited number of inscriptions (including one on a skull) and a bronze commemorative vessel, it appears that a second campaign targeting the Eastern Yi was undertaken in Yi’s fifteenth year. However, little is known beyond the fact that two tribal leaders were captured and sacrificed.
⁵⁰

Whether the Jen-fang campaign is attributed to Emperor Yi’s reign or Emperor Hsin’s, it is certain that Emperor Hsin commanded a Shang punitive expedition eastward into Shandong to repress the Yü-fang, another troublesome member of the Eastern Yi that had been growing in strength and attacked Shang interests at Mao-shih and Kao not far from Shang-ch’iu.
⁵¹
After starting out once again from Ta-yi Shang, imperial forces were augmented by clan troops from several nearby nobles. Despite the target being considerably closer, the effort consumed an entire year, during which the emperor exploited the intermediate terrain for logistical support, implying that displaying his awesomeness among the faithful might have been an equally important objective.

Scholars who ascribe three campaigns to Emperor Hsin’s reign have frequently claimed that these lengthy campaigns exhausted the state,
⁵²
yet in contradictory fashion contemporary PRC historians have blamed their success for fostering greater arrogance in an already dissolute ruler. Impetus for the former derives from two statements in the
Tso Chuan
, “the Tung Yi rebelled when Chou of the Shang held a martial convocation at Li,” and “King Chou conquered the Tung Yi and lost his life.”
⁵³
The first instance is cited in the context of enumerating arrogant or presumptuous behavior in kings who coerced other states into gathering
for a military assembly. (In this case the state of Ch’u not only held one, but then foolishly proceeded to invade the state of Wu.)

However, having unfolded in the eighth and ninth years of his lengthy reign,
⁵⁴
Emperor Hsin’s expeditionary effort would have occurred far too early to constitute a debilitating factor in the Shang’s demise. In addition, once in the field the army certainly lived off the land and provisions furnished by submissive allies, reducing the direct burden on the state. Victories should have resulted in the acquisition of valuable spoils and perhaps large numbers of prisoners who could be forcibly employed in productive labor (if not sacrificed), increasing the Shang’s wealth rather than depleting it. Without doubt these lengthy efforts attest to the power and willingness of the last two “debauched” emperors to mount extensive campaigns, whether simply motivated by the insult of obstreperous behavior or intended to be preemptive.

The Tung Yi clearly played a pivotal role in the Shang’s ascension to power even though the Shang had acted on behalf of the Hsia in an attack on the Yu Yi as they were developing their own military power.
⁵⁵
Perhaps from their inception, predynastic Shang and Yi (Yüeh-shih) cultures had been closely intertwined, many Yüeh-shih elements including core divination practices being incorporated by, or at least common to, the Shang.
⁵⁶
Yüeh-shih participation in an uncertain but probably active conquest role is indicated by the presence of their artifacts among Shang deposits in the postconquest fourth period at Erh-li-t’ou
⁵⁷
as well as around Yen-shih.
⁵⁸
Prior to the final campaign the Yi had been known as allies of the Hsia,
⁵⁹
their submissiveness being attested by Chieh’s expectation that they would attend military conclaves when summoned. According to Mo-tzu’s account, when King T’ang had first acted in a rebellious manner, the Nine Yi’s response to Chieh’s summons was all that deterred him from initiating an attack. Only after further developments, including a Hsia attack on a Yi proto-state, saw a similar summons fail did Yi Yin, reputedly a member of the Yi, conclude the moment to strike had finally arrived.

King T’ang thus not only neutralized the potential Yi threat but continued the Shang’s close relationship with them and somehow persuaded or cajoled them into participating in the final campaign. Nevertheless, before the end of Hsin’s reign the Shang would subjugate the area to
the east, eliminate Yüeh-shih culture, and penetrate the southeast. However, the rapidity of the process and the exact nature of the displacement or conquest of Yüeh-shih groups, resulting in the amalgamation of Shang and Tung Yi cultures, remain open to question. Without doubt the process was clearly affected by topographical factors, being easier on the plains of Shangdong than in the mountainous region of the upper Huai, with its many tributaries and streams.
⁶⁰

Serious conflict apparently began during Chung Ting’s reign when, despite reputed internal dissension and a general withdrawal from the P’an-lung-ch’eng region, artifacts recovered from Ao show a major victory must have been achieved and the immediately contiguous area in nearby Shandong subjugated. Sporadic military efforts over the Shang’s two centuries of reign from Yin-hsü culminated in lengthy expeditionary campaigns under Emperors Yi and Hsin that concluded the archaeologically attested process of bringing the greater Hai-tai region and much of the upper Huai river basin under Shang control. The latter were never integrated into the Shang hierarchy of proto-states and military bastions;
⁶¹
nevertheless, these Shang thrusts initiated the separation and displacement of the Yi subsequently known as the Huai Yi, a process that would be completed in the early Chou.
⁶²
Although it may be fashionable to attribute the Tung Yi’s extirpation to simple cultural superiority, Shang violence, force, and outright military aggression thus played the crucial role in expanding its dominance to Shandong, northern Jiangsu, and upper Anhui.

Enmity with the
ssu pang
or four allied states is also frequently mentioned with reference to the final period. The four are normally identified as the Ch’iang, Ch’a, Hsiu, and Sui. The Ch’iang are of course well-known but apparently suffered significant defeats just prior to or during the early part of Hsin’s reign, because the emperor is noted as hunting in their former domain
⁶³
and performing divination there. The Sui had previously been active in K’ang Ting, Yi, and Hsin’s eras, and even Wu Ting had deputed Ch’üeh and his own infantry to strike them.
⁶⁴
The Ch’a, who were located near the Ch’iang and thus a western force,
⁶⁵
had previously cooperated with the Sui during Wu Yi’s reign and been temporarily dispersed. Threats from the Hsiu had also been deflected in the third period.

The era ultimately ended with the Chou’s precipitous victory at the Battle of Mu-yeh following a rapid but direct march from their homeland in the Wei river valley. For whatever reason, Emperor Hsin’s defenses were easily shattered and his fate quickly sealed. Extensive moppingup activities and forays onto contiguous terrain concluded the effort, leaving many inexplicable questions, including the reason for the execrable performance of the Shang forces; Hsin’s failure to anticipate the campaign in view of highly transparent Chou intentions and an aborted, earlier thrust; and the unfolding of the battle itself. However, these and other aspects, such as the nature of the forces and tactics employed, are best discussed in the context of the Chou’s rapid rise and astounding conquest in our succeeding volume,
Western Chou Warfare
.

12.

M
ILITARY POWER DERIVES FROM NUMEROUS FACTORS, including administrative organization, the ruler’s talent and charisma, the polity’s material prosperity, the culture’s martial spirit, and any propensity to control others and resolve disquieting situations with violence. Whether the monarch can act despotically in initiating aggressive activities, must gain the support of key clan members, persuade an extended circle of influential citizens, or even cajole the general populace into participating strongly influences a state’s military character and its bellicose tendencies.