Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (86 page)

17
. Rand (18 April 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 4.6.2.

18
. Rand (29 June 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 4.6.8–9.

19
. However, Rand’s characters
do
grow intellectually. For instance, in
The Fountainhead,
Roark experiences growth in his knowledge and application of certain principles.

20
. N. Branden 1971b, 18. Merrill (1991, 79–84) responds to Branden’s critique.

21
. N. Branden (1962), “Objectivism and psychology,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 78.

22
. Despite these similarities, Branden and Ellis have vastly different approaches to psychology and politics.

23
. Mack (1984), “The fundamental moral elements of Rand’s theory of rights,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 146–48.

24
. N. Branden ([I971] 1978, 86) argues precisely this point: the characterization of thoughts or feelings as moral or immoral is akin to thinking of them as virtuous or sinful, a religious view inappropriate to Objectivism.

25
. Rand (8 March 1947), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Binswanger 5.2.7.

26
. Rand (August-December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in
New Left
, 193–94.

27
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 25.

28
. Packer (February 1985), “Understanding the subconscious,” in Binswanger 6.1.1. Packer links her concept of “core evaluations” to Rand’s concept of “sense of life.” Core evaluations are “basic conclusions, bottom-line evaluations, that we all hold subconsciously.”

29
. Rand (22 Novemher–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in
Philosophy
, 250–51.

30
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 31.

31
. N. Branden 1980, 103. Branden’s discussion is a direct outgrowth of Rand’s discussion in “Philosophy and sense of life” (see note 30).

32
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 30; Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11, and 1991b, 427.

33
. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 2) argues that Rand’s psychologizing is appropriate in this context, but it is independent of the truth or falsity of the philosopher’s viewpoint, which can only be assessed by rational argument.

34
. N. Branden (1971b, 12) does not disagree with Rand’s insights into the fallacy of “psychologizing.” But he believed that she was being “hypocritical,” since she often moralized about other peoples’ psychologies. B. Branden (1990, 76) observes too that Rand frequently engaged in such psychologizing, and that anything in her writings “that impinges on psychology is really a disaster.” In a private correspondence (28 June 1993C), however, Barbara Branden qualifies this sweeping statement: “Much of what Ayn considered to be psychological syndromes were in fact philosophical syndromes, conscious or subconscious errors of thinking about wide general issues. They therefore gave no guidance to the altering of deep-seated errors held only in emotional form.”

35
. Rand (March 1971), “The psychology of psychologizing,” in
Voice of Reason
, 23–24.

36
. In the authorized course on Objectivism, one in which Rand participated, Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 4) argues that emotions as such are not moral or immoral. Morality applies only to volitional issues. We have no choice over what we feel, even if we
can
alter, over time, the basic premises of our feelings.

37
. Rand (March 1971), “The psychology of psychologizing,” in
Voice of Reason
, 29; Peikoff 1989T, Lecture 1, and 1991b, 280.

38
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 29.

39
. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.3–4. It is noted that the journal entry was written “
probably in the
1950s.”

40
. Rand (February 1966), “Philosophy and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 29–30.

41
. Packer 1990T; N. Branden 1983b, 180–81.

42
. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 34.

43
. B. Branden 1962T, Lecture 3; N. Branden [1969] 1979, 81–82.

44
. N. Branden 1990, 15. See also Wieder (1988–89), who views the left-brain/right-brain dichotomy as rooted in “the age-old dichotomies of mind versus body.” Allan Blumenthal provides an interesting parallel in his discussion of musical conducting. He stresses the notion of the right hand as the “doer” and the left hand as the “dreamer.” Blumenthal and Blumenthal 1974T, Lecture 12. If the left side of the brain controls the right side of the body, and vice versa, one can see in the union of right and left hand direction a synthesis of linear and emotive components.

45
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 18.

46
. N. Branden [1969] 1979,99–100. Branden’s original articles on psycho-epistemology appear in
The Objectivist Newsletter
, October–November 1964.

47
. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in
New Left,
195.

48
. Rand (6 March 1974), “Philosophy: Who needs it,” in
Philosophy
, 20–21.

49
. Rand (January 1994), “‘Memory-storing’ epistemology,” in Schwartz 8.1.4.

50
. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 87–88; [1971] 1978, 105.

51
. N. Branden 1983b, 141–46. N. Branden (1980, 92n) argues too, that there are “biological forces deep within our organism that speak to us in a wordless language we have yet barely begun to decipher.” Though Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 7) has dismissed Eastern philosophy, and though Rand and Branden never formally examined such holistic medical concepts and techniques as chi, biofeedback, or psychosomatic medicine, these perspectives offer interesting nondualistic parallels on the mind-body unity. See Moyers 1993.

52
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 17–18; Saint-Andre 1993, 161–63.

53
. Rand (April-June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 60.

54
. For Branden, psychology provides the crucial link “on ‘how to get there from here,’ meaning: how to learn to live the Objectivist morality.” His post-Randian work “provides something missing [from] and badly needed” by the philosophy of Objectivism. He has “been concerned with devising the means that would enable a person to live consciously, responsibly, productively—and happily.” N. Branden, 14 January 1994C; 21 June 1993C; 1994.

55
. Redressing the balance of reason and emotion is by no means the chief aim of Branden’s post-Randian work. In a personal correspondence (15 June 1993C), Branden explains: “In the years since I left New York, I have had three principal goals which my writing reflects: (1) to develop further my theory of self-esteem; (2) to explore the psychology of romantic love; (3) to design a psychotherapeutic technology for facilitating change and growth.”

56
. Peikoff 1983T, Lectures 2, 6, and 10, and 1991b, 159–62.

57
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 2; N. Branden and E. D. Branden 1983, 99.

58
. Rand (July-August 1971), “The age of envy,” in
New Left
, 173–74.

59
. Rand did not repudiate all of modern feminism, only its “collectivist” elements. She responded positively to Friedan’s
Feminine Mystique.
Edith Efron (July 1963), “Books,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
2:27. Despite her hostility toward “Women’s Lib,” several commentators have written of Rand’s positive contribution to feminism. Riggenbach argues that Dagny Taggart, the heroine in
Atlas Shrugged
, is an extraordinary female role model, great at everything from engineering to sex. Riggenbach maintains that Rand’s message of individual autonomy influenced those whom she would have “disowned,” including militant feminists, gay activists, and student rebels. Riggenbach 1979, 1982. Gladstein (1978) explores the “unlikely,” but positive alliance between Rand and feminism. Landrum (1994) characterizes Rand as among the most important “creative women who changed the world.” And Taylor (1992), who knew Rand in the 1960s, incorporates a number of significant Objectivist themes in her feminist work. See also Gladstein and Sciabarra 1999.

60
. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 206–8. In Rand’s fiction, especially
The Fountainhead
, there is a pronounced emphasis on the male as sexual aggressor. This aggressiveness, however, is
not
a sanction of rape. Rand uses explosive imagery in her description of sexual acts that are
always
consensual and mutually desired.

61
. N. Branden 1983b, 174. Like other psychologists, N. Branden (1983b, 1986, 1987, 1994) argues not only for the integration of the “male” self and “female” self, but of other “sub-selves” or “sub-personalities,” including the “child-self,” “teenage self,” “intuitive self,” and “sage self.” Livingston (1994, 10) observes that this doctrine was originated in the “therapeutic movement known as Transactional Analysis.”

62
. Glennon (1983), “Synthesism: A case of feminist methodology,” in Morgan 1983, 260.

63
. On a woman president, see Rand (December 1968), “About a woman president,” in
Voice of Reason
. Peikoff (1985T) claims that Rand’s opposition to a woman presidential
candidate was not a philosophical issue. Rand wrote the article based upon her personal view of masculinity and femininity, not as a philosophical distinction. On homosexuality, Rand never wrote an article, but in several instances, exhibited definite homophobia: Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in
New Left
, 175; and Rand 1971T. See also Sciabarra 2003a.

64
. On the “nature-nurture” debate, see Rand (1972), “The stimulus and the response,” in
Philosophy
, 175, and Peikoff 1991b, 204. On the “determinist” premises shared by behaviorism and psychoanalysis, see Locke (February 1980), “Behaviorism and psychoanalysis: Two sides of the same coin, “in Binswanger 1.1.11.

65
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 11, and 1988aT; and Packer 1985T.

66
. N. Branden 1982T and 1983T.

67
. N. Branden 1983T; Blumenthal 1992T. Blumenthal argues too that there are certain biochemical factors and physiological complexities that must be taken into account in our understanding of emotions. Since clinical depression and chemical imbalances are not alterable by a therapeutic articulation process, aspects of Rand’s theory may need further modification.

CHAPTER 8. ART, PHILOSOPHY, AND EFF ICACY

1
. See
Romantic Manifesto
for these more specific applications. For Rand’s discussion of music, which employs Helmholz’s theories, see Rand (April–June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 50–71, and Blumenthal and Blumenthal 1974T. Though not considered as a component of Rand’s aesthetics, a discussion of the nature of beauty is provided by Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 11 and 1991b, 448. The best critical presentation of Rand’s aesthetics is provided by Torres and Kamhi 2000.

2
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 16–17.

3
. Compare Hayek (1948), who similarly argues that our efficacy is largely a result of how well we perform certain activities without thinking about them.

4
. Rand (May–July 1969), “What is romanticism?” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 101.

5
. Rand (April-June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in
Romantic Manifesto,
46–47, 73.

6
. Rand 1958T, Lectures 1 and 7. On the nature of “creative thinking,” see N. Branden [1969] 1979, 81; Smith 1993; and Rand (1940), “The simplest thing in the world: A short story,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 173–85. In this stream-of-consciousness narrative, Rand depicts the inner workings of the mind of Henry Dorn, an author, in his attempt to write a story. Dorn’s subconscious integrations direct his conscious thoughts with lightning-like speed.

7
. Peikoff 1991b, 446. Though Lossky was not an aesthetician, it was he who taught Aristotle to Rand. Lossky himself argued that each art work is an organic unity in which all elements are “in harmony with, and exist for, one another.” Lossky [1917] 1928, 48, 160. Tolstoy was another Russian writer who championed the “completeness, oneness, the inseparable unity of form and contents” in a work of art. Tolstoi [1899] 1913, 96.

8
. Rand, in N. Branden (1962), “The literary method of Ayn Rand,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 135–40. Cox (1993) examines the extensive integration that Rand achieved in
The Fountainhead.

9
. I use the word “responder” to include viewers (for the visual arts), readers (for the literary arts), and listeners (for music). Thanks to Torres and Kamhi for this suggestion.

10
. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 35.

11
. In her concept of “style,” Rand merged two tacit dimensions: “sense of life” and “psycho-epistemology.” As she put it: “Style conveys what may be called a ‘psycho-epistemological sense of life,’ i.e., an expression of that level of mental functioning on which the artist feels most at home.”
Romantic Manifesto
, 42.

12
. Rand (March 1966), “Art and sense of life,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 35.

13
. Rand (April 1965), “The psycho-epistemology of art,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 24.

14
. Rand (April–June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in
Romantic Manifesto
, 63.