Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (90 page)

57
. Cox (1993), “Introduction to the Transaction edition,” in Paterson [1943] 1993, xix-xx; Cox 2004, and Rand (October 1964), “Books:
The God of the Machine
,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:42–43. Nineteen forty-three saw the publication of
The Fountainhead
and
The God of the Machine
, as well as Nock’s
Memoirs of a Superfluous Man
and Lane’s
Discovery of Freedom.
In fact, Paterson’s book was published in the same month as
The Fountainhead.
Both books are critical of “the humanitarian with the guillotine.” Rand and Paterson differed violently over religion. Without access to Rand’s personal journals, it is difficult to ascertain who influenced whom on certain issues. B. Branden (1986, 172, 177, 182) notes that Rand probably learned much about U.S. history and political institutions from Paterson. But in failing to give Rand any credit for some of the ethical ideas expressed in
The God of the Machine
, Paterson disappointed Rand deeply. Also see N. Branden 1989, 123–24.

58
. N. Branden, “Common fallacies about capitalism,” in
Unknown Ideal.
I will examine some of these Austrian-flavored discussions in
Chapter 12
.

59
. Rand (25 October 1971), “The moratorium on brains, part one,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
1:8; Reisman (August–September 1968), “Platonic competition,” in
Objectivist
7:504; Buechner (August 1982), “Ayn Rand and economics,” in Binswanger 3.4.3.

60
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 12, 15.

61
. Marx and Engels (1848), “Manifesto of the communist party,” in Marx and Engels 1968, 49.

62
. Marx [1843–44] 1967, 247. Marx [1843–44] 1967 is hereafter cited as
Jewish Question
by page number in text and notes.

63
.
Capital
, 3:817; Marx [1863a] 1963, 393. Marx [1863a] 1963, [1863b] 1968, and [1863c] 1971 are hereafter cited as
Surplus-Value
by part and page number in text and notes.

64
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 32.

65
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 19.

66
. Rand [1976] 1992T.

67
. Rand (21 November 1981), “The sanction of the victims,” in
Voice of Reason
, 154.

68
. Rand (3 June–1 July 1974), “Egalitarianism and inflation,” in
Philosophy
, 154.

69
. Among non-Marxist theorists, the Austrians have also promoted a theory of capitalist entrepreneurship and creativity as essential to the production process. See Kirzner 1973. Schumpeter ([1942] 1976, 81–86), who was not a fully Austrian theorist, celebrates the entrepreneur as the author of a “process of creative destruction.”

70
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 24–25. Peikoff (1976T, Lecture 10) maintains that Rand’s identification of the “socially
objective values” is merely a terminological difference with those Austrians who champion the “subjective-value” theory. Peikoff recognizes that the Austrians discuss “subjective” values in their campaign against intrinsicism, or old-style objectivism. Some Austrian school theorists, however, are philosophically subjectivist, since they deny the possibility of any objective valuation.

71
. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 24. Franck (27 July 1993C) observes that there are epistemic problems with this formulation. Despite Rand’s contextual proviso, there is the implication that one can take the synoptic standpoint of “the most rational mind” in evaluating the “best possible to man.”

CHAPTER 11. RELATIONS OF POWER

1
. Marx (24 January 1873), “Afterword to the second German edition,” in
Capital
, 1:20.

2
. B. Branden 1962T, Lecture 8; Rand 1969T.

3
. Peikoff (June 1987), “My thirty years with Ayn Rand: An intellectual memoir,” in
Voice of Reason
, 343–45.

4
. Rand (17 July 1972), “Representation without authorization,” in
Voice of Reason
, 234–35.

5
. To say “structural” is not to imply “structuralism” in Rand’s analysis. Though Rand has a structuralist-like interest in examining the reciprocal relations among various factors within a system, she does not eliminate the human element in sociohistorical theory.

6
. Rand (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 268;
New Intellectual
, 54.

7
.
Fountainhead
, 637–38. While the master-slave dynamic is obvious in the case of Toohey and Keating, it is less obvious in the relationship of Keating and Roark. And yet, there are significant elements of parasitism in their relationship. Roark recognizes that Keating is a pure “second-hander,” who has lived off of Roark’s achievements as a “parasite” of consciousness. But throughout their academic and professional careers, Roark helped Keating with his architectural designs. This was not an “altruistic” offering; it was motivated by Roark’s perfectionism. In the climax of the novel, Roark submits plans for public housing under Keating’s name. He soon realizes that he has been a willing participant in a relationship that benefits no one. He states: “It’s I who’ve destroyed you, Peter. From the beginning. By helping you. There are matters in which one must not ask for help nor give it.” Roark learns that his assistance, however “nonsacrificial,” could never have facilitated the emergence of genuine self-sufficiency in Keating’s life.
Fountainhead
, 612–13. This aspect of the Roark-Keating relationship raises a host of fascinating psychoethical issues about the nature of “nonsacrificial” assistance. Rand has not resolved this issue: Why would Roark hopefully expect even “nonsacrificial” assistance to facilitate the emergence of genuine self-sufficiency in Keating, unless Roark had the “altruistic” expectation that actions which benefit himself will also benefit Keating? For raising this issue, thanks to Cox (18 October 1993C).

8
. Rand foreshadowed her own concept of “the sanction of the victim,” in her earlier novel,
The Fountainhead.
Roark defeats Toohey by not granting him any existential or moral validity. Toohey approaches Roark in their only encounter in the novel, and asks him: “Mr. Roark, we’re alone here. Why don’t you tell me what you think of me? In any words you wish. No one will hear us.” Roark responds: “But I don’t think of you” (389).

9
. La Boetie [1577] 1975. This edition includes an introduction by Rothbard.

10
. Aristotle,
Categories
7.7b1–19, in Aristotle 1941, 20. Lincoln ([1 August 1858?], “Fragment,” in Basler 1953, 532) also recognized the organic unity of master and slave, for in a democracy, “as I would not be a
slave
, so I would not be a
master
.” Thanks to Franck (27 July 1993C) for this reference.

11.
Heilbroner (1981), “The dialectical approach to philosophy,” in Machan 1987, 6–8.

12
. Copleston [1963] 1985, 183; Marcuse [1941] 1960, and (1936), “A study on authority,” in Marcuse 1972, 51.

13
.
Fountainhead
, 682–83. For a discussion of the virtue of independence in “the code of the creator,” see Kelley 1993.

14
. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 144–45. Branden (1992, 36) still employs this concept, which he has recently described as “the illusion of self-efficacy and self-respect without the reality.” Orthodox Objectivists also continue to use this concept. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 9; Packer, in Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 11; Locke (April 1984), “Review of Stanton E. Samenow’s
Inside the Criminal Mind
,” in Binswanger 5.2.12.

15
. Branden’s first discussion of “social metaphysics” appeared in print in the November 1962 issue of the
Objectivist Newsletter.
I cite
The Psychology of Self-Esteem
, which reproduces these early entries almost in their entirety. According to both Barbara Branden and Nathaniel Branden, Rand saw “social metaphysics” as an embellishment of and advance over her own concept of the second-hander. B. Branden 1986, 269; N. Branden 1989, 128. In Rand (July 1964), “The argument from intimidation,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 141, she used the Brandenian concept freely, especially in her pre-schism writings. Barbara Branden argues, however, that the concept of “social metaphysics” was only “a valuable
description
of an aspect of inner behavior … not a fundamental motivational principle; it names how some people behave, but it does not name the underlying sources and base of such behavior.” In her view, the concept of “social metaphysics” became an instrument of psychological control within Rand’s inner circle.

16
. Rand saw many of the protesting students of the New Left as Dionysian, “Independent” social metaphysicians and “counterfeit” individualists.

17
. Rand (December 1962), “The monument builders,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 88.

18
. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in
New Left
, 227.

19
. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 30; N. Branden (1962), “The moral revolution in
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 34–35.

20
. For the recognition of a unique “period style,” thanks to Cox (18 October 1993C).

21
. Fromm [1941] 1969, 163–80. Interestingly, Barnes (1967, 133) notes that Rand’s portrait of the “second-hander” bears some resemblance to Fromm’s “Market Personality.”

22
. Branden’s essay appears in
Unknown Ideal
, but it also appears in abridged and revised form in N. Branden [1971] 1978. See also N. Branden 1983b, 253.

23
. N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 289.

24
. See Adorno 1950.

25
. N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 295.

26
. Addendum to N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in N. Branden [1971] 1978,237.

27
. The phrase “linguistic left” was coined by Hughes (1993).

28
. McCarthy 1978, 86, 133; Habermas [1968] 1971; 1970; [1971] 1973; and [1976] 1979. McCarthy presents a very comprehensible summary of Habermas’s views.

29
. Habermas, “A reply to my critics,” in Thompson and Held 1982, 264.

30
. McCarthy 1978, 200; Habermas [1968] 1971, 217–36.

31
. Habermas [1971] 1973, 18–19; McCarthy 1978, 305, 312.

32
. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 3. To say that honesty is a relationship between the mind and reality is not to say that Rand’s theory is solipsistic. Rand seeks to objectify the virtue of honesty.

33
. Rand (February 1963), “The ethics of emergencies,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 52.

34.
Rand did not develop the issue of communicative interaction in art, but it is clear that there is a kind of raw, subconscious honesty involved in the “sense of life” relationship between the artist’s creation and the responder’s experience.

35
. N. Branden (March 1963), “Mental health versus mysticism and self-sacrifice,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 36.

36
. N. Branden 1983a, 100, 127, 131; 1986, 21; 1983b, 178–79; 1987; 1994.

37
. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
1:1. Rand’s identification of anti-concepts should be distinguished from the “anti-conceptual mentality” discussed in
Chapter 8
. An anti-concept is not simply the linguistic creation of an anti-conceptual mentality. It is at root an illegitimate concept with no clear existential referent. The anti-conceptual mentality, by contrast, is an illegitimate method of cognitive functioning. Thanks to Kelley (20 August 1989C) and Johnson (18 June 1990C) for emphasizing this point. In addition, it should be noted that Objectivists distinguish between an “anti-concept” and a “floating abstraction.” An anti-concept is illegitimate, whereas a floating abstraction may be a legitimate concept in need of concretization. Peikoff 1990
–
91T, Lecture 9.

38
. There are some obvious Hegelian overtones in Rand’s study of systemic negation. But this parallel should be noted with a caveat: while Rand sees the statist system as a negation of everything rational, her future Objectivist society is not the inexorable product of a historical
Aufhebung.

39
. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
1:1.

40
. Rand (September 1964), “‘Extremism,’ or the art of smearing,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 176–77.

41
. Rand (25 September 1972), “How to read (and not to write),” in
Voice of Reason
, 131. Rand argues that “atomism” is one such “anti-euphemism,” a term which makes offensive the concept of a free, independent, individual.

42
. Rand violently opposed the draft on moral grounds, even when a compelling national interest is at stake; she favored instead the all-volunteer army. Rand (April–May 1967), “The wreckage of the consensus,” in
Unknown Ideal.

43
. Rand (September 1962), “The pull peddlers,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 170; (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 20–21; (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in
New Left
, 61. Rand discusses a host of “anti-concepts” throughout her writings, including “fairness doctrine,” “isolationism,” “meritocracy,” “mixed economy,” “xenophobia,” and concepts of mysticism, among others. For brief explanations of each of these anti-concepts, see the corresponding entries in Binswanger 1986.